

**The Polish Western Border
Poland, Germany and the Genesis
of World War II
Neue Wache (1818-1993)
The German Democratic Republic's
Attitude Towards the Nazi Past
The Border Controversy
in the Pomeranian Bay
The Most Common Polish Surnames
in Germany
Realization of the Rights of Poles
in Germany
Poles on the German Job Market
Cultural Cooperation (1990-2010)
Polish-German Relations (2007-2009)
America – Poland's Perfect Ally
Polish-German Relations in the
European Union
Polish Attitudes Towards the
European Union
About the Strategy of Promoting Poland
The Priorities of Poland's Presidency
in the Council of the European Union
Polish Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)**

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“Przegląd Zachodni” (“Western Review”) is a scientific journal of the Instytut Zachodni (Institut for Western Affairs) in Poznań. It has been published without a break since 1945, at present it is a quarterly with an interdisciplinary character. It includes mostly academic articles, sources, reports from conducted research, but also polemics and reviews written by Polish and foreign authors.

In the almost seventy-year-long history of the “Przegląd Zachodni” the primary profile of the journal has not changed. However, the layout of focus on particular issues has undergone a clear evolution which was demonstrated by different thematic priorities in different periods, and in consequence since 2001 all the issues have been profiled.

Currently the subject matter of the journal mainly fits into the slogan, **Poland – Germany – Europe**. However, it is frequently expanded by topics of significant importance for understanding the contemporary world and the new challenges which are facing societies and states.

Making reference to the image of the journal developed over many years as devoted to German studies, the problems of Germany (internal or analyzed in the general European or international context) and Polish-German relations remain one of the main topics.

For several years now there has been a noticeable increase of interest in European issues in articles presented in the journal, among others, in the various stages and aspects of the transformation of the European Union, in overcoming divisions in Europe, and in the development of integration of the entire continent.

Still a lot of attention is devoted to Poland including both its past and present. It is expressed, among others, in the renaissance of interest in Western and Northern Regions, although the current research questions concern mainly other issues, e.g., the regional diversity of Poland, the shaping of local identity, the degree of identifying with the “private homeland”, or issues which were so far left unsaid, e.g., German cultural heritage in those regions, expulsions of Germans, wasteful exploitation by Russians, or the resistance movement after 1945.

The special issue of “Przegląd Zachodni” which we have prepared includes selections of articles from the years 2008-2011 which present Polish research and opinions concerning various aspects of relations between Poland – Germany – Europe. It contains articles about: research by Prof. Gerard Labuda concerning the Polish western border, the genesis of World War II, attitudes towards the past in Germany, the border controversy between the Polish People’s Republic and East Germany, and the migration of Poles to Germany. Successive articles make an attempt to evaluate the realization of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation (the rights of Poles in Germany, access to the German job market and cultural cooperation), as well as pointing out the change of character in Polish-German political relations after 2007.

The subject matter of the last group of articles is related to the European Union. They concern the positioning of Polish-German relations in the EU, the attitudes of Poles towards integration, Polish foreign direct investment, strategies for promoting Poland and the Polish presidency in the Council of the European Union.

Such a selection of subject matter aims at disseminating the results of Polish research into the correlations between the relations of Poland – Germany – Europe among the readers from outside the Polish language community.

We hope that the articles published in this issue will evoke interest and encourage readers to follow further issues of “Przegląd Zachodni” prepared also in English. They will be devoted to the evaluation of the Polish presidency in the EU Council and the future of Europe.

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Hanka Dmochowska
Editor-in-chief of “Przegląd Zachodni”

MARCELI KOSMAN
Poznań

THE POLISH WESTERN BORDER

SEVEN DECADES OF GERARD LABUDA'S RESEARCH

In 1975 Henryk Łowmiański characterised the research profile of a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences¹ and his younger colleague from the Institute of History of Adam Mickiewicz University – Gerard Labuda. At that point, the two men had been working with each other for thirty years, since ‘the exile’ from territories on the river Neris found his haven in Poznań in the spring of 1945. However, before enumerating professor Labuda’s chief areas of interest in the service of Clio – the muse of history – professor Łowmiański shared the following statement with readers:

“Continuing the excellent traditions of our medieval studies, Labuda has mastered to perfection (...) the complete control of scientific literature, which he has been collecting with exceptional heuristic skill. His aim has been to uncover the results of studies – often ones forgotten today – and with their use, highlight a range of problems. Simultaneously, the defining characteristic of his research methods has been combating historiographical legends and fallacies and submitting such views to devastating criticism. Thus, he removes such elements from the sphere of authoritative knowledge. Only having prepared such a sound basis for research does the author strive to build a more adequate image of the past. Moreover, he introduces his own constructions, characterised by outstanding ingenuity, an abundance of observations and the ability to present diverse issues in a vivid and graphic way. Nevertheless, medieval and generally historical studies (as the author does

¹ In 1964 Gerard Labuda became a correspondent-member, and in 1969 a full member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The most recent biographic texts published in the form of obituaries after his death which took place on 1st October 2010: J. Strzelczyk, “Gerard Labuda (1916-2010),” *Przeгляд Zachodni* 1, (2011): 3-18; idem, “Gerard Labuda 1916-2010,” *Roczniki Historyczne* vol. LXXVI (2010): 9-26; idem, “Gerard Labuda 1916-2010,” in J. Strzelczyk, ed., *Wybitni historycy wielkopolscy* (2nd extended edition), (Poznań, 2010): 855-874; the same publication includes research output for the past 35 years, preceded by Henryk Łowmiański’s paper cited below in footnote 2. See also the memories of the author of this paper: M. Kosman, “Pożegnanie Profesora Gerarda Labudy (1916-2010),” *Zapiski Historyczne* vol. LXXV: 4 (2010): 157-163, as well as “Gerard Labuda (28.12.1916-1.10.2010),” *Český časopis historický* vol. 108: 4 (2010): 750-752; as well as M. Řezník “Prof. Gerard Labuda (28.12.1916-1.10.2010),” *Slovanský přehled* (in print – I would like to thank the editorial office of the journal for making the paper written in mid October 2010 available to me).

not avoid modern topics as well) constitute but one aspect of his activity. Activity, which can be described as a harmonious and equally successful involvement in the three basic areas of a scientist's work: research, didactics and organisation"².

These three areas of work can sometimes be closely intertwined; undoubtedly, this is the case, as far as the historical development of the Polish-German frontier and the border between these two nations is concerned. Seven decades... here is the justification for the period of time mentioned in the heading: the cooperation of barely a student with Józef Kisielewski can be treated as the beginning of this stretch of time; the first fundamental volume³ of a synthetic history describing the author's little homeland – written by a senior of Polish historical studies and issued on his ninetieth birthday – can be seen as the finale of this period. The middle of this era is marked by the publication of an excellent history of the Polish western border in the second millennium.

The researcher-to-be grew up in the cultural borderland of his little homeland, Kashubia, a region open to both great nations – Germans and Poles. Although his biography escapes all norms, he tried to slightly trivialise a number of facts when giving interviews many years later. One of those was that he mastered the art of reading before going to school (he was curious of life right “from the start”, and rightly called himself a typical self-taught man⁴ who always chose his own ways and never needed to be led by the hand). Another such example was his debut in scientific polemics against a researcher and PhD holder, even before taking his final secondary school examinations. Finally, the fact that a paper written by him and later considered to be his Master's thesis, as well as his future PhD dissertation, both came into being during his first years at university. With but a shrug of his shoulders he remarked that he was not an exception. That may well be true, but only if you take into consideration scientific geniuses. Having passed his final secondary school examinations, the twenty-year-old arrived at Poznań University, where eminent scholars quickly accepted him as a partner in research endeavours. At this time, he already spoke a number of languages, and soon learned several others. Additionally, as a young boy he had learned the art of calligraphy in beautiful Gothic style, under his mother's watchful eye.

As an eight-year old he went to the Primary School in Luzino where he studied for four years (1924-28), and was taught to read, write and speak Polish correctly. “What good was it that I knew Polish, if I was familiar with the language only

² H. Łowmiański, “Gerard Labuda,” *Nauka Polska* 1 (1965): 58.

³ I am consciously referring to a fundamental volume (up till the 16th century) and not a fundamental synthesis, as it will be possible to assess the entire publication only when the two subsequent tomes prepared by Zygmunt Szultka and Józef Borzyszkowski will have been issued. These tomes, written by seasoned experts on modern Kashubia are anxiously anticipated.

⁴ As he was approaching eighty, he opened up and discussed his childhood memories in the introduction to the book *Dzieje wsi Luzino do schyłku XIX w.* (Gdańsk-Luzino, 1995) 5; see reprint in: *Zapiski kaszubskie, pomorskie i morskie. Wybór pism.* (Gdańsk, 2000), 469.

from church sermons and the prayer book. I read and pronounced every word in Kashubian, and my orthography was very distant from the rules of correct Polish spelling”⁵. He did not forget Kashubian until the end of his life, and used it both willingly and proficiently in telephone conversations with his countrymen. We often witnessed this in Poznań, when the Professor used flawless Polish which he had attained in his family home through reading calendars, classical literature (primarily Henryk Sienkiewicz) and scientific publications. At the age of twelve, his geographic horizons extended when he spent eight years at his first temple of knowledge – the classical gymnasium in Wejherowo – among whose staff he met graduates of the Jagiellonian University. There, but also later during his studies, he came across the opportunity not only to get to know central Poland, but also the distant Kresy [Eastern Borderlands]⁶. This was when the character of the young Pole was formed – a citizen of the reborn Republic of Poland, and at the same time, a researcher of the national past. Soon, however, he was to face the brutal reality.

It was the spring of 1938, Józef Kisielewski (1905-1966), a popular Poznań journalist and the editor-in-chief of the illustrated monthly *Tęcza* [The Rainbow] was preparing a book on the history of West Slavs and their struggle against the Germanic influx. When he asked Kazimierz Tymieniecki for consultations on sources and the literature, the professor delegated this project to a sophomore history student. While Labuda had his doubts whether he would be up to the task, the essayist did not immediately put his full trust in the young man. Soon, however, they developed an understanding, and the book that was to focus on contemporary Germany turned into a work on the issues of Slavic territories and their interests in the face of the impending Second World War. *Ziemia gromadzi prochy* [Earth gathers ashes] appeared in 1938; when half a century later a re-edition was being prepared, Gerard Labuda was asked to write a preface to it. Across a dozen pages or so he evoked a history ranging from “nearly idyllic” times (an expression used by Kisielewski) to the grim present. Having reminded readers of the *Anschluss* of Austria to the Reich, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, he went on to write:

“Despite the Non-Aggression Pact between Poland and Germany signed on 26th January 1934, which entailed silencing the anti-Polish propaganda in the German government’s official statements, the press and the radio, nothing changed in the everyday practice of economic relations, in the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany, and particularly in the anti-Polish attitude of the society itself. On the contrary, under the influence of the ideology overtly advocated by the Hitler movement, slogans of revising the Polish borders continued to prevail. The superiority of German

⁵ G. Labuda, *Zapiski*, 468.

⁶ During meetings at the Professor’s house, I had the opportunity to hear about his visits to Vilnius, the Gate of Dawn, as well to the region of Volhynia, among others, the stronghold Zbaraż famed by Sienkiewicz.

culture over Slavic culture was openly stated, with a particular stress on the dependence of Polish culture from the German one. Also, the German tradition of the ‘drive to the East’ (Drang nach Osten) was reminded of more and more frequently; this time, however, under the watchword of ‘Wiedergewinnung des deutschen Ostens’ [regaining the German East]⁷.

The idea of the book changed under the influence of political incidents. “Events began to race with history”, while the author and his colleagues did not anticipate the disaster looming quickly. “From the contact between the reality of the present day and the historic reality of former Slavic territories, stretching between Hamburg and Gdańsk, between the estuary of the river Elbe and the Vistula, a new idea for a book appeared and began to materialise. This was a book where the idea of ‘reclaiming the Polish West’ emerged with such clarity for the first time in Polish literature. Nonetheless, when this idea was being formed, no one, not even the Author or his closest colleagues, attributed this kind of significance to it. Its aim was – and this I know – to awake people from their slumber; its task – to sound an alarm. It was also to serve as a great reminder”⁸.

Although in the end the collaboration with Kisielewski turned out to be an episodic one, it did affect the young historian’s views on contemporary and past German issues. Kisielewski, born in the vicinity of Przemyśl, was the son of an officer-lawyer and a teacher. Having attended two secondary schools in Kraków and Grudziądz, he graduated from the department of Polish Studies in Poznań, and was politically connected with Stronnictwo Narodowe [the National Party] (hence, his cautiousness as far as the threat of expansions of the Third Reich). After 1945 the two did not resume their work together, as the journalist remained in emigration, and Labuda – at that time the director of the Institute for Western Affairs – tried to contact him, but to no avail.

The sophomore student described his contribution to the book as a modest one. Their meetings were discussions between a professional historian and an amateur one (sometimes the euphemistic expression: “a historian by accident” is used), due to the different approach to sources. The two men would meet in the editorial office, the journalist’s flat in a villa in the district of Sołacz, as well as for walks on summer afternoons. In July 1938 Labuda accompanied Kisielewski on a journey through his homelands to Gdynia, after which, towards the end of the year, he departed on a scholarship to Lund and their work together was halted. When he returned in July 1939, the book had already been printed. In its introduction, the author enumerated Labuda as one of his associates, which was not without influence on the future life of the young historian. Since the book *Earth gathers ashes* had become a personal enemy of the Third Reich, the Germans began searching for the people mentioned by the author as co-workers immediately after their invasion of Poland. Anyone who was searched and found in possession of a copy of the book risked being sent to

⁷ Quoted after: G. Labuda, *Zapiski*, 427.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 428 (emphasis mine – M.K.).

a concentration camp, at the very least. During the September Campaign, Labuda – unaware of these arrests – was hunted by the Gestapo in the area of his family home, at Poznań University, and later also in Kraków, where he sought refuge in the General Government. However, fortune favoured him. In the end, he found himself in the position of margrave Wielopolski's librarian in the town of Chroberz. He even managed to survive the eviction of the owners and remained there as an accountant, when the estate was taken over by German administration. He returned to Poznań already as a PhD holder (earlier he had obtained his Master's degree while still in conspiracy). Having gained experience in underground operations, and after a didactic debut at the secret University of the Western Lands, he immediately joined the efforts of reconstructing Poznań University, and particularly zealously helped rebuild the library of the Institute of History. Soon, he grew to be a leading figure in the scholarly community. He became an associate professor at the age of 34 (1950) and a full professor six years later. At first (1946) he headed the Institute of the History of Western Slavdom, and next the Institute of Polish History, into which the former institution was incorporated (1952). The actual development and career record of professor Labuda, including all his administrative functions, are quite well known both in his scholarly community and in Poland in general.

In 1975, Henryk Łowmiański used the term “immeasurable, but not (...) unclear”, when describing the scientific output of Gerard Labuda (at that point, it included over a thousand publications)⁹. He also outlined five of the Professor's major areas of interest, including – last but not least – the aforementioned **history of the Polish western border** (5). In first place came the **beginnings of the Polish state in the second half of the 10th century and the earlier Middle Ages 11th – 13th centuries**, next **Western Slavdom in the early Middle Ages** (2), **the history of Pomerania including Warmia, Masuria and the State of the Teutonic Order** (3), as well as **source studies** (4)¹⁰.

⁹ See the list of publications included in the volume in honour of Gerard Labuda's 90th birthday: J. Dobosz, ed., *Naukowe dzieło Profesora Gerarda Labudy* (Poznań, 2006), 162-227. The volume includes the following texts: *Gerard Labuda – zarys biografii* (Tomasz Schramm), *Gerarda Labudy badania nad historią kultury* (Henryk Samsonowicz), *Źródło w historycznych dociekaniach Gerarda Labudy* (Brygida Kürbis), *Historia społeczna w badaniach naukowych Gerarda Labudy* (Jerzy Wyrozumski), *Gerard Labuda – historyk wczesnego chrześcijaństwa polskiego* (Jerzy Kłoczowski), *Początki państwa polskiego w badaniach naukowych Gerarda Labudy* (Roman Michałowski), *Český kontext díla Gerarda Labudy* (Ivan Hlavaček), *Gerard Labuda jako historyk wczesnej Słowiańszczyzny i kontaktów słowiańsko-niemieckich* (Jerzy Strzelczyk), *Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w dorobku naukowym Profesora Gerarda Labudy* (Tomasz Jasiński), *Pomorze – Brandenburgia – Prusy w badaniach naukowych Gerarda Labudy* (Bogdan Wachowiak) oraz *Polskie Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne w historycznej twórczości naukowej Gerarda Labudy* (Wojciech Wrzesiński). The history of the Polish western border has not been singled out in this list, but the chapters written by J. Strzelczyk, T. Jasiński and B. Wachowiak focus on this issue in particular. The question of Kashubia is not treated separately as well, but the above-mentioned authors discuss it in their chapters.

¹⁰ H. Łowmiański, *ibidem*, 60f.

Gerard Labuda was to go on to become the rector of Adam Mickiewicz University (1962-65), and then – due to the requirement of being employed in only one place, introduced in 1970 – a professor of the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IH PAN)¹¹, where he stayed until his retirement (1986). Before that, however, he was entrusted with the task of setting up the Department of the History of Pomerania¹² at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences. This gave rise to a longstanding research plan which included excellent teams of scholars (many of whom began with their M.A theses and in time became professors with rich scholarly output, including monographs of fundamental importance). As a result of their work, multi-volume synthetic analyses were created – in particular focusing on the history of Toruń, Gdańsk and Szczecin – and most importantly, the groundbreaking *Historia Pomorza* [The History of Pomerania] edited by Gerard Labuda. The publication took several decades to complete – the first part of volume one was published in 1972, part three of volume three appeared in 2001. The initial research plans were extended geographically¹³, encompassing Great Pomerania, and reaching beyond the Polish borders established in 1945, both to the west and to the east¹⁴. In the *Preface* to the first part, the editor-in-chief pointed out the multifaceted character of nationality, geography and politics in the Pomerania region, and consequently, the different available models of synthesis. (1: a traditional one – with diverse narrative aspects for particular historical periods; 2: an integrative one – which treated political histories separately, yet unifying economic issues; 3: an individualising one – with a complete division between the subsequent historical stages). Of the three, the last one seemed to be most appropriate, at least in the case of the events occurring before 1815. The subject matter of the dissertation was the history of the local inhabitants, irrespective of their nationality and political background¹⁵. What was stressed in relation to the earliest communities was “the discussion of the morphological and socio-economic aspects of particular cultures within the Pomeranian population,

¹¹ As a matter of fact, his connection to the University never stopped, and he was legally reinstated at the beginning of the 21st century by the University authorities.

¹² Poznań became the venue of the Institute and one of its four offices; the remaining three are formed in Toruń (chaired by prof. Marian Biskup), Gdańsk (prof. Edmund Cieślak), and later also in Szczecin (Bogdan Dopierała). This state of affairs was maintained until Gerard Labuda retired, when the office was reorganised and became self-dependent.

¹³ See in particular: K. Górski, “Zadania historiografii polskiej na Pomorzu,” *Przegląd Zachodni* 2 (1946):139-146.

¹⁴ See the discussion between: J. Hackmann, “Gerard Labudas Konzeption der Geschichte Pommerns,” *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* vol. 41 (1993): 109-134; and G. Labuda, “O założeniach programowych syntezy Historii Pomorza,” *Zapiski Historyczne* vol. 57 (2002): 621-640. The history of how this multi-volume synthetic work came about and the role of Gerard Labuda played in its creation was described by B. Wachowiak, “Pomorze w polskich badaniach historycznych lat 1953-2002 (pięćdziesięciolecie Zakładu Historii Pomorza IH PAN),” *Acta Cassubiana* vol. IV (Gdańsk-Wejcherowo, 2002), 277-294.

¹⁵ G. Labuda, *Preface to: Historia Pomorza* vol. 1:1 (Poznań, 1969), 7f.

leaving the ethnic issues aside”¹⁶. The situation changed in the 12th century, when the Slavic part of Pomerania entered the “age of feudal relations, while the economic and social development of Prussian Pomerania slowed down significantly”. A breakthrough took place around 1230, when the Teutonic knights arrived at first to the region of Chełmno, and later to Prussia. The indigenous Slavic inhabitants found themselves under the cultural influence and dominance of the foreign German element (knights, townspeople, the Monastic State). The seizing of Pomerania by the Teutonic knights triggered a period of wars with the united *Corona Regni Poloniae* which ended in 1466, and was finally resolved in 1525¹⁷.

The History of Pomerania was a teamwork proving ground¹⁸ for Gerard Labuda where he himself deepened the analysis of the Polish western border in the second millennium A.D. Speaking of institutions – apart from the Department of the History of Pomerania at IH PAN – also the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań played an important role in his life. He was affiliated with the Institute since its beginning until the end of his life¹⁹. Between 1956 and 1958 he was the vice-director of the Institute, afterwards (until 1960) he served as its director, and from 1962 to 1966 as the chairman of the Science Council. Additionally, for many years he was a member of the *Przegląd Zachodni* Editorial Council – the institution’s chief publishing body. As an exquisite strategist and excellent tactician he would often successfully defend the publishing house when its existence was in peril, and frequently enriched the journal with his own publications. Strangely, he was not to become the first author to publish a dissertation on Polish-German relations (hence, on the history of the Polish western border) in this very institution. The paper entitled *Formy antagonizmu polsko-niemieckiego w dziejach* [The Forms of Polish-German antagonism throughout history] was prepared by two different editorial offices (January-February, and June 1946); however, its manuscript was placed in a drawer for exactly half a century, and

¹⁶ Ibidem, 10.

¹⁷ Ibidem, 11f.

¹⁸ Chronologically, part 3 of volume II was issued last (*Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1648-1815*), Poznań 2003. There, the editor-in-chief included the concluding remarks before the main text itself, where he provided the total length of the publication (5,500 pages) and discussed his “rather modest” input as an author (p. 134f). He also reminded that volumes IV (2000-2002) focusing on the period 1850-1918, and volume V (in preparation) – until 1939 would appear edited by Stanisław Salmonowicz. In his initial words, Labuda referred to the past: “Work on creating *Historia Pomorza* started with the creation of the Department of Pomeranian History at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1953. The first draft of the methodology of research was presented at the Pomeranian Conference in Gdańsk in 1954 (*Konferencja Pomorska 1954*, Warszawa 1956). Its realisation became possible when a team of authors emerged from among the employees of the Department and the University community, who would have the necessary research preparation for this task. Several years were needed for the first monographs and dissertations to appear, which would set the stage for a future scientific synthesis” (G. Labuda, *Słowo zamykające*, see footnote above), p. 1.

¹⁹ His signature can be found among the 16 founders of the Institute for Western Affairs, who on 19th April 1945 submitted the application for registering the Institute at the Voivodship Office – see: *Instytut Zachodni w dokumentach*, wybór i opracowanie A. Choniawko and Z. Mazur, (Poznań, 2006), 49.

was published as late as 1996. It appeared in a collection of papers on Polish-German relations prepared for the Author's 80th birthday²⁰, who explained the manuscript's origin and history in the afterword:

“This paper was commissioned by the editorial office of *Przegląd Zachodni*, as a voice in the discussion on Zygmunt Wojciechowski's book cited above, *Polska-Niemcy* (1945)²¹. Professor Wojciechowski commented on the first version of the paper, and suggested a number of issues that should be changed, shortened or supplemented; his critical remarks particularly pertained to the conclusion. I extended the description of the parliamentary debate in the Prussian Bundestag from November 1916 – March 1917. What survived was the initial version with my stylistic and content-related corrections, yet I included my own conclusion with only minor alterations. The second version was not published as well. The typescript consists of 17 tightly packed (and already very faded) pages and serves as a document of that time. We were all under the strong influence of wartime experiences which could not have been without effect on some of our judgements and interpretations. What has not changed, however, are the facts which still encourage reflection”²².

What happened, therefore, was post-war censorship – not the official one – but the one operating from the editorial, or director's office. Regardless, both functions were at the time in the hands of Zygmunt Wojciechowski, who served as the director of the Institute and the editor-in-chief of *Przegląd Zachodni*. The above-mentioned publication had the characteristics of an essay, written with passion and reflecting the general mood in Poland at the time. It was filled with grief over the years of persecution experienced during World War II, which was transferred onto an entire millennium of history. Half a century was necessary for these emotions to be revalued (at times even to too great an extent), for the **struggle** to transform into neutral **coexistence**, and sometimes into deep **friendship**²³. This issue was brilliantly discussed by a Poznań researcher in her essay on the **memories of war** and the **war between memories**. According to her, the policy of genocide programmed and consistently realised by the Third Reich broke all the norms existing thus far; the “traditional image of death on the battlefield was pushed out by the memory of a victim who was tortured, shot, or gassed, which had to impact the perception of the general meaning

²⁰ G. Labuda, *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy o przeszłości. Zbiór rozpraw i artykułów* (Poznań, 1996), 11-33 (the chapter *Formy antagonizmu polsko-niemieckiego w dziejach* begins with the first part of this collection of papers entitled: *Polska-Niemcy. Zagadnienia ogólne*).

²¹ Z. Wojciechowski, *Polska-Niemcy. Dziesięć wieków zmagania* (Poznań, 1945), 267.

²² G. Labuda, *Formy antagonizmu*, 33f.

²³ A particularly good example of the opposite extreme is the book by Z. Kowalska, *Krzyżacy w innym świetle. Od średniowiecza do czasów współczesnych* (Wien – Tarnów, 1997). A good counterbalance for this publication could be an objectively and clearly written book, issued both in German and Polish: H. Boockmann, *Die Deutsche Orden. Zwölf Kapitel aus seiner Geschichte* (München, 1981) / *Zakon Krzyżacki. Dwanaście rozdziałów jego historii* (Warszawa, 1998).

of war. The **total** war into which 61 countries were dragged, which was fought on the territories of 40 nations and three continents, left a mark on all walks of life. Nothing was the same after 1945”²⁴.

The recent murders, roundups and deportations to concentration camps were replaced with mass expulsions. These took place chiefly to the east of the Oder, but were not uncommon on its other bank as well, in particular due to the extensive border changes. New inhabitants arrived to what was later called recovered territories; they had to forfeit their own homes beyond the River Bug. To quote Anna Wolff-Powęska, who cites the conclusions of an Italian author from 1923: “The past is continually new. It keeps on changing, as life moves on. Some of its parts, seemingly forgotten, emerge once again; other – less important – ones fade away. The present conducts the past just like a bandmaster conducts musicians in an orchestra. It determines the particular tones. What reaches the present are parts of memory meant for those who will light up or bedim them”²⁵.

Such an attitude should not be characteristic of a researcher, and a historian in particular. However, shaping the public’s opinion of the past – especially in the first years after the war – was not up to Gerard Labuda unless he was changing into a publicist, which was the case with Zygmunt Wojciechowski. The latter – who due to the functions he performed – decided on the direction of political propaganda, and would often resort to the tools he had at hand, i.e. publishing certain texts in the journal he ran, and withholding others. Apparently, he came to the conclusion that this should be the fate of the paper written by a 30-year old researcher, which was ahead of its times and differed from the black and white analyses dominant at the time. Especially that Labuda had introduced certain minor changes, he did not give in when it came to fundamental issues. Hence, his text on the forms of Polish-German antagonisms was placed in the Institute’s archives, and the author himself concentrated on the early Middle Ages. This, however, does not mean that he gave up writing in a chronologically broader sense; still, apart from a few reviews from 1946, his texts were absent from *Przegląd Zachodni* for a long time. In turn, he focused on issues such as *Źródła niemocy polskiej na kresach zachodnich*²⁶ [The sources of Poland’s powerlessness on the western borderlands], or *Uzasadnienie Grunwaldu 15 VII 1410*²⁷ [A justification of Grunwald 15th July 1410]. Already anticipating the grand synthetic publication mentioned above, he sketched the place of

²⁴ A. Wolff-Powęska, *Polacy – Niemcy. Kultura Polityczna, kultura pamięci* (Poznań, 2008), 42. In order for the images of war to change, at least partially – especially the ones of the closest vicinity – much time had to pass and a generation change had to take place. See: M. Muszyński, P. Sypniewski, K. Rak, eds., *Niemcy o Polsce i Polakach – Germans on Poland and Poles – Die Deutschen über Polen und die Polen* (Warszawa, 2007).

²⁵ A. Wolff-Powęska, *ibidem*, 42.

²⁶ G. Labuda, “Źródła niemocy polskiej na kresach zachodnich,” *Przegląd Wielkopolski* II:2 (1946): 33-45. Offprint issued by Księgarnia Akademicka, Poznań 1946.

²⁷ G. Labuda, “Uzasadnienie Grunwaldu 15 VII 1410,” *Głos Wielkopolski* II: 191 (1946).

*Wielkie Pomorze w dziejach Polski*²⁸ [The Great Pomerania in the history of Poland] in a separate smaller book, but also initiated a scientific discussion with a treatise entitled *Potrzeby historiografii polskiej w dziedzinie historii Pomorza Zachodniego w średniowieczu*²⁹ [The needs of Polish historical studies with respect to the history of Western Pomerania in the Middle Ages].

Gerard Labuda's second work on the early Middle Ages (after *Studia nad początkami państwa polskiego*, (1946) [Studies on the beginnings of the Polish state]), i.e. the *Pierwsze Państwo Słowiańskie. Państwo Samona* [The first Slav state. Samo's kingdom] (1949) brought him international fame. However, already before the book was published, the author's output suggested an increasingly stronger interest on the topic of the Polish-German relations, signalled by the above-mentioned unpublished study requested by the editorial office of *Przegląd Zachodni*. Incidentally, it was not until 1950 that his first major text appeared in this very journal³⁰.

Coming back to the treatise from 1946 which has retained its worth even after several decades - its only supplementation were the concluding remarks, written half a century later and containing information about papers published by Kazimierz Tymieniecki, Zygmunt Wojciechowski³¹ and others, including Ewa Maleczyńska and Bronisław Pasięrb's study on the *Polish political thought with respect to Germany during World War II* [Polska myśl polityczna okresu II wojny światowej wobec Niemiec] (Poznań 1990).

The brilliantly written text begins with:

“Germans are not liked by their neighbours, and vice versa. Germans do not like their neighbours. The last war, however, has demonstrated that there is no nation the Germans hate more than the Poles. In fact, it should not be denied that Poles felt the same about Germans.”³²

²⁸ G. Labuda, *Wielkie Pomorze w dziejach Polski*, (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1947), 79, including a map.

²⁹ G. Labuda, “Potrzeby historiografii polskiej w dziedzinie historii Pomorza Zachodniego w średniowieczu,” *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* vol. 13:1-4 (1947): 9-30. The following papers were issued in the journal *Polska Zachodnia*: “Dzieje Niemiec w osądzie historyków polskich” (1948, no 4), as well as “Historycy a Ziemie Odzyskane” (1948, no 42), whereas “Pomorze Zachodnie w poglądach historycznych Jana Długosza” appeared in *Tygodnik Wybrzeże* vol. 3: 27, 28 and 29 (1948). The competence of Gerard Labuda was borne out by his presentation at the conference of Polish historians in Wrocław: “Osiągnięcia i postulaty historiografii polskiej w zakresie dziejów Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej,” in *Pamiętnik VII Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich we Wrocławiu*. T.I, (Warszawa, 1948), 187-198; see also: “Historycy dziejów Pomorza wobec nowych zadań (z powodu Sesji naukowej PAN na 500-lecie powrotu Pomorza do Polski i 10-lecie Polski Ludowej w Gdańsku 25-28 października 1954 r.),” *Nauka Polska* 2: 3(7) (1954): 136-157. He continued to use the press to inform the general public of his research achievements, such as: “Naukowcy poznańscy badają dzieje Pomorza Zachodniego,” *Nowy Świat. Tygodniowy dodatek do Głosu Wielkopolskiego* vol. 4: 47 (1953).

³⁰ G. Labuda, “Kazimierz Wachowski jako historyk Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej,” *Przegląd Zachodni* 9/10 (1950): 337-348.

³¹ He would write about his scientific antagonist with great objectivity: “A resonance of my reasoning at the time can be found in a paper by Z. Wojciechowski, *Polityka wschodnia Niemiec a katastrofa współczesnej cywilizacji*,” *Przegląd Zachodni* 5 (1947): 381-395, which obviously does not make his conclusions any less original” (G. Labuda, *Formy antagonizmu*, 34; emphasis mine – M.K.).

³² Ibidem, 10.

It should be borne in mind that these words were written in the city of Poznań destroyed by war and less than a year after its liberation from the Nazi occupation. Next, the author combines the skills of a historian and political scientist, and goes on to write:

“The problem of Polish-German antagonism is of interest to more than these two nations; due to certain idiosyncratic geo-political conditions, this antagonism constituted a threat to world peace and continues to do so. Hence, disarming this antagonism is synonymous with eliminating the danger of war from this part of Europe. The creators of a future peace treatise and the UN High Assembly face the difficult task of coming up with such forms of coexistence between these two nations which would not only cure their long-lasting hatred, but also create a basis for more noble feelings towards each other”³³.

The declaration above constitutes a specific preamble to the main text, which involves a historical perspective (the author also sees a place for researchers of present times dealing with sociology and the psychology of nations), including issues unattainable for other social sciences. He remarks that the historical perspective is a theoretical foundation for constructing an analysis of sociological facts, which can be supported by reaching into the past. The Polish-German antagonism is treated as a complex phenomenon pertaining to large social groups and present both in the past and at present. Throughout the ages, it has existed with various degrees of strength and it has been caused by various sources – political, religious, national, cultural and pseudo-racial elements. The basis for the lack of trust – according to the author – is the common antagonism towards outsiders which was supported by the fact that the term **Germans** was used when referring to foreigners.

The earlier adoption of Christianity gave the Germanic peoples the feeling of civilisational superiority; yet, their contact with Poland took place when the Poles abandoned polytheism and were taking the first steps at creating their own state. According to Labuda, the German national ambition was irritated by the results of wars fought between 1000 (or rather 1002 – note M.K.) – 1018, soon after that by the coronation of Boleslaus the Brave, and later by the coronation of his grandson and namesake in 1076.

The treatise from 1946 should be treated as a forecast of thorough studies on Polish-German relations, particularly throughout the Middle Ages, as well as on the border between the two nations and countries. The author’s reasoning undoubtedly remained under the influence of his times; however, they were far from a characteristic (and to an extent justifiable) one-sided analysis. He bravely (for those times) wrote that both nations are to blame for fanning the flames of antagonisms. Nevertheless, he claims the blame was not distributed evenly, which he supported with opinions of sociologists and a vast quotation from Florian Znaniecki’s work published during the inter-war period (1931). According to Znaniecki:

³³ Ibidem.

“German aggressiveness and expansiveness is not met with any equivalent opposition on behalf of the Polish nation. They do not strive to destroy the Germans, subdue them, divide them or polonise them. All Poles do is try to polonise the German migrants on their own territory and control as much of the German occupied territory as is necessary to remove the obstacles created by the Germans and preventing the Polish nation from actively participating in the civilised world”³⁴.

At this point it is worth reminding Gerard Labuda’s attitude towards hot, controversial topics which abounded in particular with reference to Poland’s western neighbour (as the eastern one was shrouded with a veil of silence by censorship). An important statement appeared in his interview with Piotr Grochmalicki for the Poznań weekly magazine *Wprost*, which incidentally became the title of the publication: *Nie gniewam się na historię* [I’m not angry at history]. When discussing the difficult early years after the liberation of Poland he remarked:

“I assumed that (in difficult times it is best to concentrate on your work; post-script 1999)³⁵. You know, history is a bit like the weather. Can you resent the weather just because it changes? That is why I have never held a grudge towards anyone for those things. As a historian I understand you should not be angry at history”³⁶.

“Those things” – refer to the plan of dismissing Gerard Labuda from the University by the authorities, for his marriage with the daughter of margrave Wielopolski during the occupation. The plan did not materialise though, due to a fortunate turn of events, especially that at the time Labuda received a state award for his *Studies on the beginnings of the Polish state*. Without a shadow of a doubt, however, his attitude to history was of a more complex character than just concentrating on private matters. Containing his anger was primarily related to the past in a broad sense, and especially his attitude to the German problem. His study on the *Forms of antagonism* is a prime example of just that.

During the time when the historic agreement between the governments of Poland and the German Federal Republic was maturing there were no diplomatic relations between the two states. Therefore, it would be impossible to overestimate the role of the researchers working for the handbook committee (history and geography), as well as the role of politicians who relied on their personal contacts³⁷. G. Labuda as

³⁴ G. Labuda, *ibidem*, 31. Next the author goes on to summarise (and concur with) the findings of F. Znaniecki’s “Siły społeczne w walce o Pomorze,” in J. Borowik, ed., *Wielkie Pomorze* vol. III (Toruń, 1931), 80-108.

³⁵ What comes to mind at this point is the memorial speech at Gerard Labuda’s funeral delivered by the vice-director of PAN, Karol Modzelewski. He discussed the late Professor’s approach to the new reality in Poland after 1945. Next to Gerard Labuda he mentioned persona of such magnitude as Tadeusz Manteuffel, Aleksander Gieysztor, or Stanisław Herbst; hence, those responsible for organising scientific life in Poland, who irrespective of the political system worked for the institutional reconstruction of Polish historical studies.

³⁶ I quote after a reprint of the interview in the volume: *Zapiski kaszubskie*, 479 (emphasis mine – M.K.).

³⁷ In his diaries, the then editor-in-chief of the weekly *Polityka*, Mieczysław F. Rakowski thoroughly discusses the atmosphere of preparing those agreements in December 1970, M. Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne* vol. 4: 1969-1971 (Warszawa, 2001).

a historian, former rector of Adam Mickiewicz University and, until recently, the director of the Institute for Western Affairs was actively involved in this process. In 1969 he published a 42-page long booklet entitled *Państwo i naród w obronie zachodniej granicy polskiej na przestrzeni dziejów* [The state and the nation in defence of the Polish western border throughout history]. Just beyond the horizon was the grand synthetic analysis which the author was soon to begin writing at the request of Wydawnictwo Poznańskie. Its size – compared to the initial assumptions – increased exponentially. At its base was an eleven-year project (1957-58) to create a two volume work which would also include an analysis of modern and the newest history of the Polish western border by Kazimierz Piwowarski (1903-1968)³⁸. Nonetheless, due to the death of the historian in question, this project failed. Still, after over 10 years, Gerard Labuda who was to have been the author of the volume on medieval and early modern history, decided to take up the task of writing the entire publication. Taking into consideration the length of the publication with 42 author's sheets and the pace at which the book was written was incredible (the preface which crowns the author's unbelievable efforts is dated 21st June 1970). It is a scientific synthesis, yet written in a very clear tone and aimed also at readers outside the narrow circle of specialists (1-323). It includes a comprehensive review of literature (as well as a vast geographical and persons index, 324-453)³⁹.

From all of the Polish historians from the middle of the 20th century, Labuda was the one best prepared to tackle this topic; yet, he began with a humble declaration, one which could have been uttered only by an outstanding scholar. He claimed that once he set about the task of writing the book, he realised he was “not satisfactorily prepared” to do so. Nevertheless, this claim seems to be contradicted, or rather formulated more precisely, in setting out the (and later meticulously realised) plan:

“When elaborating on the topic and moving from ancient times, through the Middle Ages towards the modern era I realised that not only am I badly prepared for this task, but also the entire sphere of Polish historical studies. Much has been written about the history of the Polish western border, and since the turn of the 18th century also about the history of the Polish struggle for independence which was to reclaim not only the Polish state, but also its Western border. Therefore, there is much to talk about it in terms of political history. However, should we move onto other plains of historical processes we will come across blank areas, uncharted branches of history and

³⁸ After 1950, due to political reasons, he was forced to leave his parent University in Kraków and move to Poznań University. During the political thaw of 1956 he returned to Kraków (or rather stopped commuting between the cities). Between 1958 and 1965, he was the director of the Board of Trustees at the Institute for Western Affairs, and after the death of Zygmunt Wojciechowski he became the director of the Institute. There he cooperated closely with Gerard Labuda, who was his deputy (and later his successor to this post 1958-1961). The plans of working together on the topic of the Polish western border turned out unfeasible after Piwowarski's return to Kraków, and due to the serious health problems which revealed themselves towards the end of his life. See the biographical note in: J. Gierowski, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* vol. XXVI (1981), 594-597.

³⁹ The author claimed – in our conversations which he held with me towards the end of his life – that synthetic publications lose their value if they are not based on thorough bibliographical documentation.

a shortage of knowledge. Particularly, since the 19th century, what is imposed upon us is the necessity to recreate the national border and determine its changes until the first decades of the 20th century. Hence, a historian who has been using a popular-synthetic method of exposition is forced to adopt a popular-analytical method⁴⁰.

The author resorted to an extensive list of sources and an impressive list of references; however, as a historian, in this respect he found significant shortcomings, particularly with respect to modern times. Although as a medievalist he was very comfortable with the Middle Ages and the early modern times, he did expect support from historians specialising in the modern era⁴¹. In the bibliographic chapters he did quote, among others, the research of 19th and 20th century specialists such as Roman Wapiński⁴². However, what he found especially useful were the studies by scholars specialising in law: Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Bolesław Wiewióra, or Alfons Klafkowski⁴³, whom he cited very often. Similarly, he relied on the research geographers, literature specialists, sociologists, art historians, and scholars working in other fields, primarily in the humanities.

His work was dedicated to the memory of three of his outstanding predecessors who researched Polish-German relations, Józef Kostrzewski, Kazimierz Tymieniecki and Zygmunt Wojciechowski⁴⁴. He did not treat the Polish borders (in his analyses he did not forget about the eastern ones as well) in isolation, but rather discussed them in the context of the historical process and historical conditionings in particular eras. It suffices to take a glance at the table of contents and the titles of the subsequent 30 chapters (the last, the 31st chapter contains some concluding remarks, p. 315-323). One will find political history next to the discussion of ethnic and administrative borders, the potential of the political system, geography, or culture; however, it is the ‘na-

⁴⁰ G. Labuda, *Polska granica zachodnia. Tysiąc lat dziejów politycznych* (Poznań, 1971), 23.

⁴¹ At various occasions he would discuss topics requiring a wider perspective, such as: *Jak świat światem, nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem* (Poznań, 1968), 17-32. See also: *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy*, 98-111; this issue also became the title of an interview with J. Górski, *Rozmowy o historii* (Kraków, 1967), 92-102, “Echa rzekomo kościuszkowskiego ‘Finis Poloniae’ w niemieckiej myśli politycznej XIX wieku,” in: *Wiek XVIII – Polska i świat. Księga poświęcona Bogusławowi Leśnodorskiemu* (Warszawa, 1974), 125-140; reprint: *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy*, 385-399; in this case the medievalist revised the findings of researchers of modern history, already having written the fundamental synthetic publication on the Polish western border.

⁴² R. Wapiński, “Endecja wobec problemów polskich ziem zachodnich w latach 1919-1939,” *Zapiski Historyczne* 31 (1966): 601-620; “Endecka koncepcja granic Polski w latach 1918-1921,” *ibidem* 33 (1968): 535-557.

⁴³ K. Skubiszewski, *Zachodnie granice Polski* (Gdańsk, 1969); B. Wiewióra, *Uznanie nabytków terytorialnych w prawie międzynarodowym* (Poznań, 1961), *Granica polsko-niemiecka a konkordaty z lat 1929 i 1933* (Warszawa 1958), as well as *Granica polsko-niemiecka po II wojnie światowej* (Poznań, 1970).

⁴⁴ Below is a telling citation from that dedication (a.24): “One writes books alone, but not in solitude. This publication too owes much to Poznań historiographers. In the past fifty years (i.e. since the beginning of the inter-war period – M.K.) this community has been the main centre of Polish scientific west-oriented thought. It is to the chief representatives of this line of thought that I devote this very book, *Polska granica zachodnia*”.

tion' that is always visible. What is worth noticing is the imagery of exposition, also found in the headings, such as: *Najbardziej „stala” granica w Europie w XVI-XVIII wieku* [The most 'stable' border in Europe in the 16th-18th centuries] (note the use of the inverted comas), *Najbardziej ruchoma granica Europy w XVIII wieku* [The most mobile European border in the 18th century], or *Naród polski i jego instytucje w walce o „narodowość” w XIX wieku* [The Polish nation and institutions in the fight for “nationality” in the 19th century]. The last heading refers to the period 1945-1970 and in this case – this we know from the author's later statements – Labuda had to resort to extensive self-censorship, in order not to find himself in conflict with the official censorship. Nevertheless, in the discussion of certain issues he would not be led (politically) astray, in particular in the case of the famous letter of Polish bishops to German bishops, which preceded an international agreement. Therefore, in the end one will not find the name of cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in the index; similarly, the roles of the Protestant and Catholic churches are discussed in a condensed note coupled with a comment that both of these institutions had to say “had a smaller or larger impact – and in any case a stimulating one – on the shaping of German public opinion”⁴⁵.

With the realities of the Gomułka period in mind, one could say that the statement above contains a conclusion which departs from the official version of the period. It may be true that the book appeared in a slightly different political situation – at the beginning of the “Gierek decade” - still, censorship was equally vigilant as before the changes at the top in December 1970.

Gerard Labuda presented his research credo in brief, in chapter one, discussing the border as a subject of historical research. It is an original interpretation, differing from the analyses presented before – usually fragmentary or one-sided ones. This of course is not an allegation directed at the authors of many thorough works, as without them it would be impossible to discuss the subject matter holistically. The point of departure of this study is the increasing density of settlements in the tribal period. A political border came into being with the creation of a state, and with time, issues of national, ethnographic, cultural, social, ideological, etc. borders appeared. These rarely overlapped which led to conflicts between the people living on either side. Such conflicts were most visible in the sphere of politics; let us remind ourselves, therefore, of a fragment of the interpretation mentioned above:

“Every border is a product of evolution; hence, it is created in the fight between the old and the new, in a fight between economic, social, class, political and ideological opposites. The changes occurring in these spheres are symptoms of the transformations that have already happened, but also a forecast of new changes that are to occur in the lives of human communities subject to them. It is most difficult to capture these changes in the spheres of awareness and ideology, as creating new values and their reception happen in a continual, and nearly unperceivable manner. Only religious views take on a more visible shape; this, however, stems from the organisational character of all manner of churches as institutions representing those views outside. Borderlines with respect to the development of productive forces and – what is connected with it – the evolution of social rela-

⁴⁵ G. Labuda, *Polska granica zachodnia*, 309 (emphasis mine – M.K.).

tions are also blurred. It is only through great technological, industrial and social revolutions that military blocks, political systems or civilisations are outlined.”⁴⁶

In the chapter summing up the analysis (XXXI) we find a synthesis of the 1000-year-long history of the Polish western border presented against the background of the history of the state and nation from an evolutionary perspective, including its good and bad sides. Despite looking from a Polish point of view, the author manages to avoid Polono-centric evaluations. In this respect, he does not omit the German partner, but admittedly he does not devote an equal volume of text to it. And no wonder, after all he is writing about the Polish – not German – border. His attention is focused mainly on the times closer to us – modern and contemporary history. Today, he might supplement the text with a chapter (or maybe points 5 and 6 – point 4 is entitled *Ostatni etap 1966-1970* [The last stage 1966-1970]) on the conflict around the borderline running across the Szczecin Lagoon. The conflict was resolved at the last minute, just before the downfall of the ‘old’ system, thanks to the determination of General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s team⁴⁷. Also, he might discuss the new situation on the continent after the unification of Germany and both countries entering common military structures and the EU.

Gerard Labuda’s work, republished after three years⁴⁸, caused quite a response, and not only in Poland. Dozens of reviews and discussions were published⁴⁹, among which many were polemic in nature. In particular, there were a number of one-sided, anti-German voices, such as the publication by Kazimierz Koźniewski, famous for his publicistic disposition, which was however immediately refuted by a Szczecin historian Bogdan Dopierała⁵⁰. The experienced journalist – quite rightly – treated the book as a life’s work⁵¹, although its author had over four decades of creative working life ahead of him; needless to say, he used them to the fullest to create a number of further fundamental synthetic works⁵².

The novel approach to the history of the western border was noticed by well known historians in several extensive analyses, including: Jerzy Topolski⁵³,

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 28.

⁴⁷ More on the topic: M. Kosman, *Los generała. Wokół medialnego wizerunku Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego*. (Toruń, 2008): 354ff (chapter entitled: *Granica...niepokoju*).

⁴⁸ G. Labuda, *Polska granica zachodnia. Tysiąc lat dziejów politycznych*, 2nd edition. (Poznań 1974): 472.

⁴⁹ See: a list of these in the References of the volume: *Naukowe dzieło Profesora Gerarda Labudy*. 216f

⁵⁰ B. Dopierała, “Dwugłos o książce Gerarda Labudy,” *Polityka*, June 17, 1972, 25 (798).

⁵¹ P. de Laval, “Opus vitae Gerarda Labudy,” *Więź* 15:9 (1972): 132-137.

⁵² The last of them, *Historia Kaszubów w dziejach Pomorza* (vol. I opening a synthetic analysis which was to take up three volumes), Gdańsk 2006, p. 530, the author passed on to his successor as rector and called it his life’s greatest work. Undoubtedly, this was the last of his magnificent works and one strictly connected to the history of the Polish western border.

⁵³ J. Topolski, “W imię integralnego spojrzenia na historię,” *Nowe Drogi* 278: 7 (1972): 161-168.

Władysław Czapliński and Wojciech Wrzesiński⁵⁴, Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk⁵⁵, Roman Heck and Adam Galos⁵⁶, or Kazimierz Myśliński⁵⁷. Additionally, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz⁵⁸ discussed the publication from the point of view of a literary specialist with a broad humanistic outlook, while Jan Szczepański⁵⁹ provided the perspective of an experienced sociologist. A fresh evaluation was also included by a legal analysis of the subject matter⁶⁰; moreover, the text aroused the interest of diplomats and specialists in contemporary history⁶¹.

The author of the millennial history of the Polish western border had become the most outstanding specialist in the field already before 1971, and not just in Poland; the publication of the book only confirmed his status. Information about the synthetic analysis reached foreign readers through reviews published by the English and French counterparts of the Institute for Western Affairs, and written by Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk (*Polish Western Affairs – La Pologne et les Affaires Occidentales*), as well as due to researchers from Germany⁶² and Czechoslovakia⁶³.

Among the analytic studies published in the years to come, the third volume of *Fragmety dziejów Słowiańszczyzny* [Fragments of the history of Slavdom] from 1975 was of particular importance to issues related to the shape of the borders. A quarter of a century later (2002), this publication – together with the two earlier volumes – was included in a nearly 1,000-page long book issued by the Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk. Additionally, more and more texts appeared devoted to the history of the author's "little homeland" – Kashubia – the grandest of which was to be the synthetic analysis from 2006⁶⁴ mentioned above. This book can be treated as the final word of seventy years of research on the Polish western border. Other major publications on the topic included the subsequent volumes of *Historia Pomorza* [The history of Pomerania], as well as (issued since 1982) *Historia dyplomacji polskiej* [The history of Polish diplomacy], also edited by Gerard Labuda. What is more, he participated in

⁵⁴ W. Czapliński, W. Wrzesiński, „Polska a Niemcy. Uwagi o książce Gerarda Labudy,” *Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka* 27: 3 (1972): 481-487.

⁵⁵ Z. Kaczmarczyk, „Pierwsza synteza dziejów polskiej granicy zachodniej,” *Przegląd Zachodni* 28: 4 (1972): 367-376 (issued also in English and French).

⁵⁶ R. Heck, A. Galos, „Polska granica zachodnia,” *Kwartalnik Historyczny* vol. 80: 1 (1973): 85-92.

⁵⁷ K. Myśliński, *Studia Historica Slavo-Germanica* vol. 4 (1975): 137-141.

⁵⁸ J. Iwaszkiewicz, „Rozmowy o książkach,” *Zycie Warszawy* 73 (1972): 5 (for years the eminent writer used to be a columnist for the newspaper).

⁵⁹ J. Szczepański, *Literatura* 13 (1972): 1-11. Researchers and publicists wrote about Labuda's book both in the daily press, as well as in social-cultural weeklies and periodicals such as: *Odra*, *Perspektywy*, *Poglądy*, *Spojrzenia*, *Trybuna Ludu*, *Miesięcznik Literacki*, *Więź*, *Przegląd Lubuski*.

⁶⁰ A. Klafkowski, „Kształty zachodniej granicy,” *Nowe Książki* 6: 530 (1972): 5f.

⁶¹ A review by J. Sulek, *Sprawy międzynarodowe* 9: 25 (1972): 125-127.

⁶² E. Meyer, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 6 (1973): 375-377.

⁶³ V. Žáček, *Slezský sborník* 71: 2 (1973): 158-160.

⁶⁴ See: footnote 52.

many multi-author publications where he wrote on various issues connected with the topic⁶⁵, as well as in study volumes and monographic works⁶⁶.

Gerard Labuda's observations of the nation and state in the history of the western border opens the collection of essays on Polish-German relations in the past issued by the Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy in 1986. The volume included texts written by historians and publicists (Jerzy Krasuski, Wojciech Wrzesiński, Stanisław Stomma, Kazimierz Koźniewski, Edmund Męclewski, Marian Podkowiński, Mieczysław Tomala, and Ryszard Wojna)⁶⁷. The clear presentation of methodological issues provided by Labuda at the beginning of the book constitutes an excellent commentary for the works of the remaining authors which often involve subjective and passionate attitudes. In the same year, the proceedings of the 8th National Congress of Polish Historians organised two years earlier in Poznań were published. One of the plenary lectures given by the most eminent researcher at the conference was titled *Polska granica zachodnia w tysiącletnich dziejach państwa i narodu*⁶⁸ [The Polish western border in the millennial history of the state and nation].

The history of the Polish-German border also served as the object of Labuda's critical remarks – both as a researcher and essayist – which he included in a thought provoking conference presentation. The lecture entitled *Geschichte der deutsch-pol-*

⁶⁵ Among others: „Udział Wielkopolski w zagospodarowaniu ziem zachodnich Polski,” in S. Wykrętowicz, ed., *Spoleczeństwo Wielkopolski w procesie przemian socjalistycznych* (Poznań, 1977), 117-132, as well as a reprint in the volume edited by A. Kwilecki: *Polska myśl zachodnia w Poznaniu i Wielkopolsce, jej rozwój i realizacja w wiekach XIX i XX* (Poznań, 1980), 280-295; “Das deutsch-polnische Verhältnis in Mittelalter – aus polnischer Sicht,” in H.J. Markmann and J. Vietig, eds., *Das deutsch-polnische Verhältnis – Referate zu Problem der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchempfehlungen* (Berlin, 1981), 31-49; “Polsko-niemieckie problemy graniczne we wczesnym średniowieczu. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad zaleceniami do podręczników szkolnych,” in M. Biskup, ed., *Śląsk i Pomorze w historii stosunków polsko-niemieckich w średniowieczu* (Wrocław, 1983), 20-34; “Polska granica zachodnia w tysiącletnich dziejach państwa i narodu,” *Wiadomości historyczne* 28:1 (1985): 116-132; the same paper appeared in English and German versions: *Polish Western-Affairs/La Pologne et les Affaires Occidentales* 26:1 (1985): 3-28, as well as *Polnische Weststudien* IV:1 (1985): 3-32; “Pomorsko-krzyżacki zatarg graniczny z roku 1267/1268. Przyczynek do migracji Prusów na Pomorze Gdańskie,” *Zapiski Historyczne* 50:2 (1985): 7-25 (after a few years this text evoked a response written by B. Śliwiński, “Jeszcze w sprawie układów pomorsko-krzyżackich z roku 1267/1268,” *ibidem* 57:2/3 (1992): 106-117.

⁶⁶ The most important publication here would be the book written together with M. Biskup, *Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach. Gospodarka, społeczeństwo, państwo, ideologia* (Gdańsk, 1986), 624 pages, which received excellent reviews, caused a large response from readers and was soon re-issued (Gdańsk 1988), translated into German and published as volume 6 of the series *Klio in Polen (Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen. Wirtschaft – Gesellschaft – Staat – Ideologie. Aus dem polnischen J. Heyde, U. Kodur. (Osnabrück, 2000))*. In 2006 – a jubilee year – Wydawnictwo Poznańskie published a comprehensive book entitled: *Studia krytyczne o początkach Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach i na Pomorzu*.

⁶⁷ *W cieniu przeszłości. O stosunkach polsko-niemieckich* (Warszawa, 1986).

⁶⁸ G. Labuda, “Polska granica zachodnia w tysiącletnich dziejach państwa i narodu,” *Pamiętnik XIII Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Poznaniu 6-9 września 1984 r.*, vol. 1 (Wrocław, 1986), 45-66.

nischen Grenze als Forschungsproblem [The history of the German-Polish border as a research problem] took place on 15th April 1991 at the *Historische Kommission zu Berlin* during the international conference “Oder-Neisse-Grenze und die Geschichte der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen”. Its revised version was published in Polish a year later. In it, the author, among others, referred to the newly published work of Klaus Zernack on the history of the eastern German border⁶⁹; in response to the re-edition published in 1996 Labuda wrote:

“Time and again I have been encouraged to prepare a third edition of my synthesis: *Polska granica zachodnia...* [The Polish western border...] (1971, 1974). I am fully aware of the shortcomings of the book which was written in a hurry and under the pressure of the pact on the normalisation of mutual relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic which was being ratified at the time. I understand the necessity of updating the publication in the light of the unification of Germany in 1989. Finally, I am also aware of the range and depth of the necessary historiographical studies which would have to be undertaken to meet the requirements of the current state of research. In particular, one would have to address the critical voices and calls for supplementation which have appeared during the past quarter of a century”⁷⁰.

However, in time the author of the words cited above became more flexible in his attitude towards the necessity of preparing a new version of the book. Today – when he is no longer with us – one can definitely assert that the *Polska granica zachodnia* [Polish western border] has permanently entered the canon of historiographical classics. Bearing in mind that although synthetic works do retain their timeless importance, they also ‘age’ quickly, publishing a new edition of the book appears to be an urgent postulate. In this case, the work of Professor Gerard Labuda can be a model of objectivity as far as presenting the relations with our German neighbours and the history of the “western frontier”. Moreover, it could constitute a source of methodological inspiration for studies on the Polish eastern border.

⁶⁹ G. Labuda, “Dzieje granicy polsko-niemieckiej jako zagadnienia badawcze,” in A. Czubiński, ed., *Problem granic i obszaru odrodzonego państwa polskiego (1918-1990)* (Poznań, 1992), 11-47 (reprinted in the volume: *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy o przeszłości*, p. 494-524). See also: K. Zernack, “Deutschlands Ostgrenze,” in A. Demandt, ed., *Deutschlands Grenzen in der Geschichte* (München, 1990).

⁷⁰ G. Labuda, *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy*, 524.

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POLAND, GERMANY AND THE GENESIS OF WORLD WAR II

HITLER'S PROGRAMME AND HIS ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT IT

The war, which was meant to give Germany control over Europe and later on also world domination, constituted in Hitler's programme the only realistic means to build the imperialist position of Germany. In fact the programme was drafted in a general outline by the leader of NSDAP as early as at the beginning of his astonishing political career. Using the concept of "Lebensraum" he maintained that the German nation should take under military control other territories on the European continent, and more specifically those on the debris of the Soviet Union¹. He saw his supporter in Italy but it was Great Britain which he intended to be his most important ally. Announcing his will to break away from the so far practiced style of expansion he declared, "Let us stop the everlasting Germanic march to the south and west of Europe and let us direct our eyes towards eastern territories. (...) If we today talk about new lands in Europe we can think first of all about Russia and its subordinate states along the eastern borderlands"². Alliances with Great Britain and Italy would make it possible for Germany to first beat France and then they would create conditions to go east against the Soviet Union. The aim of the new war was supposed to be the creation of the "racially pure"³ German empire in the east of the continent. According to Hitler "Germany will either become a world power or it will cease to exist"⁴. He left no doubt that the future of the Reich will be decided with arms⁵. He claimed that "every nation has the right to take land which it needs and which it has the capacity to utilize"⁶.

¹ A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, München 1937, p. 57.

² Ibidem, p. 742.

³ The racist nature of the future power was for Hitler beyond doubt; see ibidem, p. 311 and 444. Hitler, for example wrote, "The state, which at the era of racial contamination, will devote itself to nurturing its best racial features, must one day become the master of the world"; ibidem, p. 782.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 742.

⁵ *Hitler: Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen. Februar 1924 bis Januar 1933*, München 1992 Bd. III, Teil 2, doc. 6 (speech from 15 Mar 1929).

⁶ Ibidem, Bd. III, Teil 3, doc. 61 (speech from 19 Juni 1930).

After Hitler came to power he radically changed the tone of his public speeches and he was creating an image of a peacemaker and at the most an adherent of equal rights for Germany. He limited his postulates to enumerating the wrongdoing which Germany suffered following the Treaty of Versailles. However, during secret meetings he spoke of something different. He declared not only freeing Germany from the resolutions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles but as his aim he saw “conquering new living space in the east and subjecting it to ruthless Germanization”⁷. During one of the first cabinet meetings he announced that armaments in Germany will be given absolute priority⁸.

Three and a half years later by the end of summer in 1936 in his memorandum concerning the four-year plan Hitler reminded that it had become indispensable “to enlarge the living space, that is the raw material base and the staple food reserves for our nation. It is the task of the political rule to solve this issue in future”. He emphasized that communism has become the main threat for Europe, and above all he gave orders: “I. The German army must in four years be ready for action. II. The German economy must in four years be ready to take the burden of war”. The Reich must have the best army in the world since, as Hitler claimed, the world is at the brink of a decisive battle with the Jewish-Bolshevik threat⁹. Early in September 1936 during a cabinet meeting Göring¹⁰ said that “settling matters with Russia” was inevitable. In a face to face private conversation the *Führer*, according to a note in Goebbels’ diary said, “Armaments are still in full swing. We have invested huge sums of money. We shall be completely ready in 1938. The decisive battle with Bolshevism will come. We shall be prepared. (...) We will gain control over Europe. However, we must not miss any chances. Armaments are a must”¹¹. He was telling his ministers that when it comes to the armament programme financial matters cannot be an issue¹².

In the years to follow winning an ally in Great Britain was one of the main objectives of the Nazi dictator. Joachim von Ribbentrop became a kind of *Führer’s* personal plenipotentiary who was meant to negotiate an alliance with Great Britain. Indeed, he managed to negotiate the German-British naval agreement signed on 18 June 1935, which marked the 120th anniversary of the battle of Waterloo where the

⁷ A speech delivered to the high officers of *Reichswehr* and *Reichsmarine* on 3 Feb 1933; a quote from a short note summarizing Hitler’s theses, made by general Kurt Liebmann; Th. Vogelsang, *Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933*, VfZg 1954, p. 434.

⁸ *Akten der Reichskanzlei. Regierung Hitler 1933-1938*, Teil 1, Bd. 1, Boppard a. Rh. 1983, doc. 17 (cabinet meeting 8 Feb 1933).

⁹ Memorandum in: W. Treue, *Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936*, “Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte” 1955, p. 204.

¹⁰ *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg, 14. November 1945 – 1. Oktober 1946*, Nürnberg, Bd. XXXVI, p. 489. (the Reich cabinet meeting 4 Sept 1936).

¹¹ E. Fröhlich (Hrsg.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Bd. III/2, p. 251-252 (note from 15 Nov 1936).

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 272-273 (note from 2 Dec 1936).

Prussian army helped the victory of the British side. The agreement was signed only three months after shedding the military sanctions by the Reich and it constituted another blow against the Treaty of Versailles. The day when the agreement was signed Hitler called the happiest day of his life¹³, since he wanted to see in this document an introduction to a much further reaching alliance between both countries. In his conversation with David Lloyd George, the former prime minister of Great Britain who visited Germany in September 1936, the *Führer* said that in Ribbentrop he is sending to London his “best man” so that he, already as an ambassador, can make the “last attempt” to convince the British about the necessity of a closer relationship with the Reich¹⁴. When in October he was bidding farewell to his confidant setting off for London he told him, “Ribbentrop, what I want from you is to make England join the Anti-Comintern Pact, it is my biggest wish”¹⁵.

However, Ribbentrop’s mission ended up in failure. The Nazi ambassador “astounded the world with his ignorance of the mentality of the English”¹⁶ but the truth was that even the most clever diplomat would not be able to fulfill the task Hitler had imposed on the Reich’s ambassador to London. The German offer presented to the British contained, among others, a promise of respecting by the Reich the *status quo* in Western Europe, a division of the areas of interest between London and Berlin (a free hand for Germany on the continent with guarantees for its western part and the recognition of the preponderance of Great Britain outside of Europe), a commitment by the Reich to provide military support at any time in the case of a threat to the British Empire. Above all however, Hitler demanded from London to be given a free hand in Central Europe, Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

However, Great Britain did not wish to enter into such a liaison with Nazi Germany. The British side was willing to make considerable concessions when it came to lifting some of the sanctions imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty, but there could be no mention of a complete *désintéressement* of London in the face of German expansion on the continent. According to the British any corrections to the 1919 resolutions should happen by peaceful means and Germany would have to be willing to cooperate with the remaining powers.

This was entirely against Hitler’s expectations who was growing impatient because of the British attitude. He complained that the British authorities are complete-

¹³ J. von Ribbentrop, *Zwischen London und Moskau*, hrsg. von A. von Ribbentrop, Leoni a. Starnberger See 1961, p. 64. The same title of the book (by the way very superficial) R. Ingram, *Hitlers glücklichster Tag. London, am 18. Juni 1935*, Stuttgart 1962.

¹⁴ Th. Jones, *Diary with Letters 1931-1950*, London 1954, p. 251.

¹⁵ Quoted after: Th. Sommer, *Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935-1940*, Tübingen 1962, p. 32 (The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed a month later but the negotiations had lasted for quite some time). According to Ribbentrop’s wife Hitler said, “Ribbentrop I want you to bring me an alliance with England!”, J. von Ribbentrop, *Zwischen London und Moskau*, p. 93.

¹⁶ L. Geyr von Schweppenburg, *Erinnerungen eines Militärattachés. London 1933-1937*, Stuttgart 1949, p. 113.

ly “devoid of instinct”¹⁷. In his speech delivered in the *Reichstag* on his fourth anniversary of coming to power he expressed his regret that the danger of “the Bolshevik plague”¹⁸ has not been recognized on the British Isles. The Nazi dictator started to realize, a conclusion by all means correct, that the British as a matter of fact want to limit and control the Reich’s expansion and that they will want to prevent the creation of a German Empire. In a conversation with Carl J. Burckhardt in September 1937 he complained saying that, “All my life I had loved England and English people. I had never ceased to offer them the friendship of Germany, the friendship of the great nation (...). They pushed me away; they have always pushed me away, that was the truth. It is pure madness (...) which can result in a terrible catastrophe but nevertheless I have to come to terms with it”¹⁹. What is more, the mention of a relationship of the Reich with Italy and Japan started to sound like a threat. At the same time Göring was warning the British ambassador, Neville Henderson that if “the British Empire persistently refused to cooperate with Germany, Germany could endeavour to destroy the Empire instead of sustaining its position in the world”²⁰. Ernst von Weizsäcker, who was soon to become the secretary of state in *Auswärtiges Amt*, said to Burckhardt that the anti-British turn (“the effect of being unhappy in love”) occurred in Hitler completely unexpectedly, and then it was not at all possible to talk with him about England”²¹.

At a secret conference on 5 November 1937, Hitler already referred to Great Britain and France as “two hateful enemies (*Hassgegner*)” for whom “the German giant in the heart of Europe is a thorn in their flesh. These powers “are against the further empowerment of Germany both in Europe and on the overseas territories and in this disapproval all the parties in those countries are unanimous”. The chance for Germany lies however, in the weakening of both western powers, and in particular of Great Britain. The solution to the *Lebensraum* problem was possible only by war and therefore according to the dictator it had to take place not later than between 1943-1945 but should favourable circumstances arise, Germany could strike earlier²². When two weeks later in Berchtesgaden lord Halifax offered to Hitler to reactivate the Four-Power Pact, partially abandoned in 1933, as well as “to repair mistakes of the Versailles Treaty” and “to settle” the question of Gdańsk, Austria, Czechoslovakia and the issues of the colonies, the *Führer* gave him a cold shoulder. The condition that “the changes take place in the process of peaceful evolution” meant that the government of Her Royal Highness does not in any way intend to

¹⁷ E. Fröhlich (Hrsg.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Bd. III/2, p. 249 (note from 13 Nov 1936).

¹⁸ *Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945*, M. Domarus (Hrsg.), Würzburg 1962 Bd. I, p. 664.

¹⁹ An excerpt from a report of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Gdańsk from 20 Sept 1937, quoted after: C. J. Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939*, München 1960, p. 65-66.

²⁰ N. Henderson, *Failure of a Mission*, p. 63.

²¹ C. J. Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission*, p. 68.

²² ADAP, Serie D, Bd. I, doc. 19.

give Germans a free hand on the continent²³. As related by Albert Speer, Hitler in his address delivered to the party's *Kreisleiters* by the end of November 1937 announced that "England is our number one enemy!"²⁴. Goebbels summarized the then *Führer's* reasoning in his diary in the following way: "England wants to give the colonies, that is not by itself but only within the general regulations. This means a return to the League of Nations. That is not on. It (England) wants to grant us concessions in Central Europe. However, the *Führer* refused. Central Europe should not bother England at all. Also the problem of Gdańsk has to be solved. What is London's business in that?"²⁵ At the time Ribbentrop was also convinced that an agreement with Great Britain was no longer possible. He was trying to persuade the Italian foreign minister that "a conflict with the western powers is unavoidable" and therefore a German-Italian-Japanese military alliance becomes a necessity²⁶. In his report for the *Führer* dated 2 January 1938 Ribbentrop made an assumption that "a change to the *status quo* in the east" can be made only through war and he was arguing that the hope for reaching an agreement with London "is gradually fading away". What is more, he expressed his belief that a German-British conflict is inevitable. "In future each day (...) in which our political considerations are not based on our conviction that England is our most dangerous opponent would be for the benefit of our enemies". The counter-measures included building "a network of allies against England, what in practice meant deepening friendly relations with Italy and Japan, and then attracting all countries whose interests are directly or indirectly convergent with ours"²⁷. Poland was supposed to be one of these countries since relations with Germany, following an unexpected breakthrough which occurred in 1933/34, started to take an amazing turn.

POLAND BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE USSR

For many years between the two world wars one of the most serious trouble spots was the state of Polish-German relations and the conflict resulting from Berlin's drive to review the joint borderline. Warsaw made every effort to assure beyond doubt that any attempt to enforce the revisionist postulates of the Germans concerning the eastern border of the Reich will be met with a firm objection from the Polish side, including the use of military measures. When in the spring of 1933 the prospects of establishing a directorate in Europe emerged which included four powers united

²³ Ibidem, doc. 31, appendix.

²⁴ A. Speer, *Wspomnienia* [Memories], Warsaw 1990, p. 210.

²⁵ E. Fröhlich (Hrsg.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Teil I: *Aufzeichnungen 1923-1941*, Bd. IV, München 2000, p. 425 (note from 27 Nov 1937).

²⁶ G. Ciano, *Tagebücher 1937/38*, translated from Italian, Hamburg (1949), p. 32 (note from 24 Oct 1937).

²⁷ ADAP, Serie D, Bd. I, doc. 93 (underlined in the original).

by their ambition to enforce revisionist solutions at the expense of smaller countries, the Polish minister Józef Beck made it very clear by stating that, "If any country, on its own or in the company of others, should be tempted to take even a square meter of our territory the cannons will speak. They know about it in Berlin and they have acknowledged it. But I am afraid they still do not know it clearly enough in London, Rome and not even in Paris..."²⁸.

As long as Germany remained weakened as a result of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles a threat to Poland's security from its western side was relatively low. However, there was a real possibility that the Reich might receive permission from the power countries to be exempt from those clauses of the Treaty which demanded from Berlin to have an army consisting of only 100,000 men without a military air force, armour, heavy artillery, submarines and chemical weapons. Already at the Paris peace conference the British delegation criticized their French partners for having imposed on Germany too severe terms. Anyway, not long after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed, the French politicians themselves started to arrive at a conclusion that the attempts to execute the resolutions of the Treaty enforced upon Germany in an uncompromising way was equivalent to going down a blind alley. The French occupation of the Ruhr Valley in January 1923, as a matter of fact ended with embarrassment which exposed the political helplessness of strong, in the military sense, France. The conclusions which were drawn from that failure in Paris led the conference table in Locarno²⁹.

The national security of the Republic of Poland relied on its own military force and on allied relations with France. However, the military dominance over the German army reduced to the number of 100,000 men could disappear if Berlin managed to cancel the resolution of the Versailles Treaty in this matter. The actual strength of the alliance with France was becoming more and more doubtful because Paris, since the Locarno Conference (1925) in an increasingly clear way wanted a more relaxed approach to its commitments made towards Warsaw³⁰. In any way, France from the very beginning treated the Polish ally like a vassal, and it was using the alliance with Poland as a handy means of exerting pressure on Germany. Thus, there was a fear that the western powers in their attempt to reach agreement with Germany could decide that a correction of the Polish-German border is at least partially necessary in the name of peace in Europe.

The chronic crisis which had been present in the Polish-German relations was under the threat of escalation after Hitler came to power in 1933. It seemed obvi-

²⁸ J. Laroche, *Poland of 1926-1935. Memoirs of the French Ambassador*, Warsaw 1966, p. 123.

²⁹ A. Adamthwaite, *Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe 1914-1940*, London 1995, p. 101.

³⁰ Anyway even before the Locarno Conference and after the left-wing coalition had won the parliamentary elections in France, it was taken into account by Warsaw that Paris could denounce the Polish-French alliance from 1921; P. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, Westport, Connecticut 1974, p. 312.

ous that the Nazi leader would at least continue the anti-Polish policy of the former chancellors. Therefore, the international public opinion was even more surprised when following a conversation between the German chancellor and the Polish envoy, Alfred Wysocki (on 2 May 1933) there was an unexpected relaxation of the tension in the relations between both countries, and on 26 January 1934 both countries signed a German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. A normalization of the relations with the Reich was a great success of Marshal Piłsudski and minister Józef Beck. The latter one was right when he said that the “breakthrough which had occurred recently in Polish-German relations was one of the most radical changes in European politics since the time of the war”³¹. The détente in the relations with the Reich expanded the room for manoeuvring for the government in Warsaw. The issue of reviewing the borders with Germany disappeared from the daily agenda, and Warsaw could make an attempt to settle the relations with Paris on partnership terms. As a Polish diplomat wrote, “Poland will no longer retreat from the course of independent politics but it is always ready for talks with France. Nobody desires a Franco-Polish alliance more than we do under the condition that it is a true alliance and based on equality”³².

The alliance with France was for Piłsudski and Beck the cornerstone and the main political safeguard against potential aggression from the Reich. Making this alliance stronger and, if the possibility arose, complementing it with a similar alliance with Great Britain would have been the ideal solution for the Polish leaders. Besides, in Warsaw they believed that the new German leaders would be more interested in expansion south-east and that they would be willing to abandon the typical for Prussia anti-Polish policy. It was also considered that the Nazis would need a lot of time to introduce changes in the Reich itself and to strengthen the regime³³. The problems in the western-southern direction were supposed to distract the attention of Berlin, “from the eastern issues, at least partially”³⁴. At the same time, it was firmly believed that, as Beck said in June 1935 at the conference with the Minister of the Interior, “settling our neighbourly relations with Germans had only become possible thanks to the Hitler revolution”³⁵.

The Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact signed in January 1934 was preceded by the Non-Aggression Pact signed with the Soviet Union in 1932. In a confidential document in the Foreign Ministry from 1935 it said, “by having regulated on our own relations with our two largest neighbours in the terms laid out in bilateral treaties, Poland at the same time has cancelled in a radical way the possibility of being treated as a bargaining item in the political game led by France. Automatically and by the same token, the times of Poland being treated as an object in French politics

³¹ The New Records Archives. Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11464, J. Beck’s speech at a conference with the Minister of the Interior 5 Jun 1935, p. 5.

³² T. Komarnicki (ed.), *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka [Diary and portfolios of Jan Szembek]* (hence: DPJS), vol. I, London 1964, doc. 38, p. 91-92.

³³ J. Beck, *Last report*, Warsaw 1987, p. 46.

³⁴ DPJS, I, doc. 31 (instructions issued by the Foreign Ministry for diplomatic posts, 31 Oct 1933).

³⁵ AAN Warsaw, Foreign Ministry 11464, J. Beck’s speech delivered at the meeting with the Minister of the Interior 5 June 1935, p. 6.

are over, and according to the Polish understanding this opens a new prospect of providing proper content for the Franco-Polish alliance by reinstating the so far compromised balance of rights and responsibilities within its scope"³⁶.

In an official communiqué from 1937, it was stated that, "there is a need to maintain a policy of equilibrium between the two neighbouring countries"³⁷. The term "policy of equilibrium" was sometimes also used in internal talks. In every day practice, however, there was no equilibrium in the political relations between Poland and both neighbouring large powers. The equilibrium was only a feature of the Polish strategy towards Berlin and Moscow, according to which Poland should not enter in an alliance with one of the powers against the other, and in terms of the agreements it should not exceed the scope of the Non-Aggression Pacts signed in 1932 and 1934. It was considered unacceptable to join either the block of countries which was being formed by Germany or the multilateral allied union with the USSR. There were worries, not without a reason, that in the former case Poland would run the risk of being vassalized by Germany and in the latter one the Red Army's advance on Polish territory in the role of an ally could trigger unaccountable consequences.

This was how far the so called policy of equilibrium reached. The completely incorrect view was that "the policy of equilibrium" was a result of the conviction that Warsaw first of all had to "strive for good relations with its most powerful neighbours, that is Germany and the Soviet Union because of its geo-political location. The basic guideline was abstaining from cooperation with one of the countries against the other. It was also assumed that any situations which could lead to that end were to be avoided"³⁸. A careful analysis of the Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations in the years 1934-1938 gives premises to deny each of the three statements. Poland made endeavours towards good relations not with the USSR but with Germany, attempting at the same time to isolate the USSR from "European matters". In addition, Warsaw did not hesitate to cooperate politically and diplomatically with Berlin in order to prevent initiatives which could strengthen the position of the Soviet Union (starting with issue of the Eastern Pact in 1934 until the Sudeten crisis in 1938). What is more, situations which opened opportunities for such cooperation were not at all avoided. Diplomatic cooperation with Germany was giving substantial political benefits as long as there was substantial caution on the Polish side. While not accepting the Nazi ideology and demonstrating doubts concerning Hitler's solutions, Polish leaders saw in the Third Reich a country with which it will be possible to strengthen its neighbourly relations. While a National Socialist Germany could not be isolated, it seemed possible to reduce and oust the Soviet Union's influence on the course of events.

³⁶ Quoted after P. Łossowski, *Polska w Europie i świecie 1918-1939* [Poland in Europe and in the World 1918-1939], Warsaw 1990, p. 218.

³⁷ DPJS, III, appendix. 70, p. 396.

³⁸ M. J. Zacharias, *Józef Beck i „polityka równowagi”* [Józef Beck and the 'equilibrium policy'], „Dzieje Najnowsze” 1988, No. 2, p. 8.

The Polish-German close relations initiated in 1933/34 (later on called the “Line of 26 January” from the date when the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed) were becoming closer and reached a peak during the Sudeten crisis. Simultaneously however, relations between Warsaw and Moscow were systematically deteriorating. In the mid 1930s Polish-Soviet relations were “in deep crisis which lasted, almost without any change until the end of the Second Polish Republic”³⁹.

POLAND BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE

Shortly after the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact had been signed, Józef Piłsudski said to his staff members that good relations with Germany are only a temporary state which will be difficult to uphold longer than four years⁴⁰. On another occasion he was reported to have said, “Having the two pacts [with Germany and the USSR – S. Ż.] we are sitting on two stools. This cannot last long. We need to know which one we will fall off first and when”⁴¹. Soon though in the Foreign Ministry leadership, especially after the Marshal’s death, the belief that the “pro-Polish” course in German politics was settling in became apparent. First of all, there were illusions concerning Hitler’s intentions. The Foreign Minister Józef Beck admitted it later himself writing in a letter to a friend, “On the basis of the nevertheless concrete evidence in 1934 I had reasons to regard him [Hitler] as a rare in Germany example of common sense in foreign policy”. The Nazi dictator had as if to say a sense of moderation, “which according to my estimation he tried to represent in a Bismarck fashion for the first time in Germany”. Beck also added that even in 1938 it was possible to talk with the *Führer* “sensibly about European politics”, and that it was only during the conversation in Berchtesgaden on 5 January 1939 that he had noticed “a dangerous change in this man”. Beck went on to reveal that “The Commander had once foreseen trouble which would come from “our unhealthy romances with the Germans”, but he was convinced that we would not be able to reach a sensible agreement with countries in Western Europe if we had not created, even only for some time, our own Polish-German politics”⁴².

In the new conception of Polish foreign policy which was starting to crystallize in Warsaw since 1933/34 the actual relations with Germany and France were in a

³⁹ S. Gregorowicz, *Polsko-radzieckie stosunki polityczne w latach 1932-1935* [Polish-Soviet relations in years 1932-1935], Warsaw 1982, p. 248.

⁴⁰ At the meeting in March 1934, “The Commander reckons that good relations between Poland and Germany can last for about four more years but because of the changes which are currently happening in the mentality of the German nation, the Commander cannot guarantee good relations in years to come” K. Świtalski, *Diariusz 1919-1935* [Diary 1919-1935], Warsaw 1992, p. 660-661.

⁴¹ Related by gen. Kazimierz Fabrycy, quoted after: W. Jędrzejewicz, *Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego 1867-1935* [Chronicle of Józef Piłsudski’s life], vol. II: 1921-1935, London 1986, p. 487.

⁴² PDD 1939, doc. 275 (private letter from Beck to B. Wieniawa-Długoszowski from 10 May 1939).

way mutually dependent. Better relations with Berlin were to be our reply to the conciliatory tendencies western powers demonstrated in their policy towards Germany. On the other hand, maintaining an alliance with Paris was considered as a reassurance of the “Line of 26 January”. Combining these two factors required huge dexterity. With time, however, it turned out that for the Polish minister more importance was attached to better relations with the Reich. The endeavours to maintain good neighbourly relations with Germany seemed a well justified policy but in practice it led to a crisis between Warsaw and Paris, and both sides were to blame.

By the end of 1935 the deputy foreign minister, Jan Szembek when talking to his superior quoted Piłsudski’s words from the previous year in which the Marshal had strongly emphasized that “although our alliance with France is as a matter of fact losing its importance, we cannot under any circumstances allow for it to be denounced”. The minister clearly ignored this admonition and replied that Piłsudski had always recommended that “the Polish-French talks should be limited to conversations between the foreign ministers of both countries during their meetings in Geneva”⁴³. General Kazimierz Sosnkowski did not voice any reservations concerning the idea of good neighbourly relations with Germany when he talked about these issues. In January 1936 he said that more than once he had wondered what aim Piłsudski had in mind in 1933 but “although I could never get a clear answer I had always presumed that all the effort was made to get France”. Sosnkowski did not deny that “France had acted in a very disloyal way towards us on more than one occasion”, but nevertheless he was “convinced that an improvement in Polish-French relations is in line with our interest because it is the primary condition of maintaining our present position in Berlin”⁴⁴. In fact Sosnkowski was emphatic for some time then that “if we are supposed to conduct German politics, the alliance with France is our counterbalance and a safeguard for our political interest (...)”⁴⁵. The advocates of the “Line of 26 January”, like for example Józef Lipski were aware of this and they agreed that “maintaining our alliance with France is an undeniable necessity most of all because of our policy of accord with Germany”⁴⁶.

The closer Polish-German relations had become the more blurred were becoming the relations between Warsaw and Paris. To a certain extent this state was independent of Poland since the French side made a lot of effort to stop the Polish Republic from trying to reach a consensus with our western neighbour. Notwithstanding, the Polish side not only responded with an allergic reaction to any attempts to force Warsaw to alter the new directions in our foreign policy, but it also with content retaliated as if in response to the injustice it had suffered in the past. Minister Beck was particularly famous for it. In effect the French allies could often hear words uttered

⁴³ Piłsudski’s opinion from 26 Dec 1934, quoted by J. Szembek in his conversation with J. Beck 13 Dec 1935, DPJS, I, p. 438-439.

⁴⁴ DPJS, II, p. 52 (24 Jan 1936).

⁴⁵ Ibidem, I, p. 225 (1 Feb 1935).

⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 307 (27 May 1935).

by the Polish in a style which had little in common with the still officially declared friendship. For example, in January 1936 minister Beck treated Alexis Léger, the secretary general in the French Foreign Office with arrogance unfit for a diplomat. The Polish minister must have felt satisfied afterwards but with such conduct he did not gain friends for his own country. When in March 1939 the idea of the British-French guarantees for Poland was being conceived, the same Léger was trying to convince the British ambassador in Paris that Beck cannot be trusted as he is “entirely cynical and false” and therefore he will take the first opportunity to betray his allies⁴⁷.

The distrust on the part of the French was not cleared even by Marshal Piłsudski's reassurance that “there is nothing more than what actually has been written down”⁴⁸ in the Polish-German Non-Aggression declaration from 26 January 1934, more so that it was more or less at the time when serious discrepancies between the two countries occurred concerning the project of the Eastern Pact. Warsaw fought against the idea of “Eastern Locarno” with the best intentions for Poland, but the Polish standpoint towards the plans of Barthou and Litwinow to a large extent overlapped the views represented by the Reich. It was already then that the prospect of Polish-German diplomatic cooperation was being mentioned in some European capitals. The increasingly frequent visits of Hitler's dignitaries to Poland were becoming an external sign not of what they actually were, that is an outcome of relaxation in the Polish-German relations, but they were taken as proof of the emerging Polish-German rapport. The French ambassador spoke about it on the first anniversary of signing the Polish-German declaration⁴⁹ in an explicit way misinterpreting Polish intentions in the following words, “What is seen as wrong by the French is that you come in too close contact with the Germans, and that you seek their advice in everything”. The same ambassador, Jules Laroche when talking to Szembek two days later during the first visit paid by Göring to Poland made a comment that “Your talks with Germany are perceived in France as a sign that you are starting to attach less value to the alliance with France. If the French government under the pressure of public opinion was forced to denounce this alliance, it would be very bad for France, and I do not know if it was good for Poland”⁵⁰. When Beck was informed about the comment made by Laroche he ignored the threat claiming that it really would be suicidal for France⁵¹. Besides, the Polish side did not cease trying to convince the French that their attempts to include Moscow into European politics, and especially the French-Soviet alliance (May 1935) can have disastrous consequences⁵².

⁴⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 3rd series, vol. IV, London 1951, doc. 405.

⁴⁸ J. Laroche, *Polska lat 1926-1935* [Poland in the years 1926-1935], p. 147.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 217.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 222 (28 Jan 1935).

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 223.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 372 (15 Oct 1935).

In view of the conciliatory tendencies prevalent in western countries towards Germany the “Line of 26 January” could prove to be at least for some time a cure for appeasement. Sensing that the verbally harsh reaction voiced in western capitals in response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 will not result in taking action the leadership of the Polish foreign policy made every effort to maintain the “Line of 26 January”. Already after the first visit paid by Göring to Poland in February 1935, Minister Beck said to his deputy that, “the relaxation of tension in relations between Poland and Germany constitutes the greatest and the most precious achievement of our foreign policy”. The minister added, “We would be in a right state today if we did not have the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact (...). Most likely in London talks we would have been sold for 2 pounds 13 shillings”⁵³. Such observations, undoubtedly right, were for Beck reassuring that his foreign policy while strengthening Polish national security it did not contain any elements of risk.

Although the possibility of a conflict with Germany was not excluded in the Foreign Office at Wierzbowa street, it was not considered probable. As the minister said in June 1935, “The Polish-German agreement” is respected by the Nazi government “with effort that is worthy of being recognized”. The National Socialist leadership “has additionally taken the burden of breaking the anti-Polish attitude in German mentality” and acting within its capacities it is trying to fulfill the task, and “some incidents which do occur from time to time are dampened down in Berlin”⁵⁴. In early July 1935 the head of the Polish diplomacy returned from his trip to Berlin in a very good mood, “very happy with having established personal contact with the leaders of German politics”. He confided in his deputy that “personally the impression he had after talking to Hitler was most positive”. Hitler seemed to him absolutely honest in his political ideas and very sincere in his reasoning”⁵⁵. According to Beck and the majority of his staff members all the plotting against Poland (especially around Gdańsk) was not instigated by Hitler but by Berlin’s conservative circles in *Auswärtiges Amt*⁵⁶. In this conception Hitler was supposed to be the guarantee of the good neighbourly policy of Berlin towards the Polish Republic. What is more, according to Beck’s words, which were uttered soon after Piłsudski had died, “Germany had to take more notice of Poland” since “the Polish state has been continuously gaining strength whereas south of the Carpathian Mountains there was permanent chaos”⁵⁷. Some of his co-workers shared his views, like for example Juliusz Łukasiewicz who was convinced (shortly before the German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland) that the value of Poland on an interna-

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 233 (13 Feb 1935).

⁵⁴ AAN Warsaw, Foreign Ministry 11464, J. Beck’s speech at the meeting with the Minister of the Interior 5 Jun 1935, p. 7.

⁵⁵ DPJS, I, p. 332 (9 Jul 1935).

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 323 (26 Jun 1935), p. 345 (7 Aug 1935).

⁵⁷ AAN Warsaw, Foreign Ministry 11464, speech by J. Beck at a meeting with the Minister of the Interior 5 Jun 1935, p. 5-6.

tional scale stems from the fact that both France and Germany are trying to keep Poland closer for fear of it joining the opposite camp. This makes Poland a kind of a pointer that can tip the balance (...)”⁵⁸. Indeed this was an incredibly apt depiction of the nature of the Polish policy of balancing between Paris and Berlin that remained valid until the break of 1938/39.

In Poland, however, the drive towards closer relations with Germany was increasingly criticized. Beck came under attack not only from the opposition but also from influential circles in the government, including military circles. The public attitude was strictly anti-German. In April 1937 Szembek complained to the Foreign Minister that the anti-German mood was thriving even in governmental circles, namely “Individual ministers made excuses not to organize a reception for Göring. Also, the difficulties experienced by him [Beck – S. Ż.] were symptomatic when he was going to appoint the chairman of the Polish-German Society in Warsaw”⁵⁹. Similarly, the Foreign Ministry had serious reservations when it came to the policy of local authorities towards the German minority. A permanent source of discontent for the Foreign Ministry was the tough policy towards the German minority waged by Michał Grażyński, the head of the Silesian Province⁶⁰.

Contrary to some opinions Piłsudski’s successor, Edward Rydz-Śmigły was not an opponent of the “Line of 26 January”. Yet, he would express his opinion that Berlin “cannot be absolutely trusted, that the Germans after all have had a hostile attitude towards us (sic!) and because of that we need a counterbalance in the form of our alliances with Romania, and first of all with France”⁶¹. When in mid 1936 he talked to Szembek while “stating the necessity to continue the policy of accord with Germany, the general stressed that at the same time it was essential to keep on guard. German armaments are undoubtedly also directed against us. At the moment the Reich needs 2-3 more years to reach its full operational readiness”⁶². General Rydz-Śmigły was unwilling to be convinced by the statement of the deputy Foreign Minister that the Nazi Reich will direct its expansion south and voiced his opinion that Gdańsk “will be the eye of the conflict which will start a Polish-German war (...)”⁶³. In general however, he did not disagree with the Foreign Ministry’s line of policy”.

The Polish side was eager to record all the anti-Soviet comments made by its German partners. Also, all more or less explicit offers of a more permanent bond between Poland and Germany and a closer cooperation directed against the Soviet Union, which would follow should Poland join the Anti-Comintern Pact, were noted

⁵⁸ DPJS, II, p. 96 (27 Feb 1936).

⁵⁹ Ibidem, III, p. 74 (12 Apr 1937). Finally senator Wojciech Gołuchowski, a person of secondary importance in governmental circles, was appointed the chairman of the Society.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, p. 271 (18 Apr 1935).

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 364 (8 Oct 1935).

⁶² Ibidem, vol. II, p. 238 (note from 30 Jun 1936).

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 239 (30 Jun 1936). “It should be stated that the general always takes into account the possibility of a future conflict with Germany”, *ibidem*, p. 272 (16 Sept 1936).

down. Although these offers were not accepted they were a source of satisfaction allowing to assume that the anti-Soviet attitude exhibited by the Nazi leadership, and personally by Hitler would render any agreement between Berlin and Moscow improbable. For the above reasons as well as due to the attitudes of the western powers, as it was said by Szembek in his conversation with the Prime Minister, Marian Zyndram Kościałkowski in March 1936, “the agreement reached with Germany in 1933/34 is for us of primary importance and cannot be under any circumstances compromised”. Minister Beck’s deputy stressed the fact that it was the Soviet Union and not Germany that was more threatening for Poland⁶⁴.

Statements made by Hitler and other German dignitaries in which they declared their willingness to establish the best possible relations with the Polish Republic became deeply imprinted in the conscious minds of Polish diplomats. It was also believed that the importance of good relations with Poland was so significant for Berlin, that it would be possible to evade from accepting German offers of much closer collaboration. At the same time however, attempts were made to obtain from the Reich confirmation of the *status quo* on the Polish-German border and a guarantee of the Polish rights concerning Gdańsk, and perhaps even having these rights strengthened (should any changes be made in the international legal regulations referring to the status of the Free City). As said by Beck in early 1936, the Polish side started to surmise that the most beneficial move for Poland would be to solve all pending disputable issues with Germany by means of “one grand *Ausgleich*”⁶⁵. Nevertheless, the Germans did not want to take up the matter until the autumn of 1938 when Joachim von Ribbentrop addressed ambassador Lipski with this kind of proposal. For the time being though Germany limited itself to some remarks that in future it may be possible to find a compromise, for example concerning “the Corridor” which would guarantee Poland’s access to the sea. On the whole, Germans took care to speak about it in a friendly tone but some remarks were starting to sound ominous. To illustrate, on 18 November 1936 ambassador Moltke following instructions from Berlin plainly warned Beck, who had come up with a proposal to examine the possibilities of extending Polish rights in the Free City, not to raise ‘the unpleasant matter’ of Gdańsk and threatened that this would meet with “a sharp reaction and ensue severe disturbances in Polish-German relations”⁶⁶. What is more, Moltke reiterated this statement to Rydz-Śmigły on 25 November. For the first time since 1933 the German side resorted to threats in talks with Poland.

When in the summer of 1937 Beck made an attempt to obtain from Germany any statement confirming the *status quo* in Gdańsk, at the beginning of September

⁶⁴ DPJS, II, p. 127-129 (15Mar 1936).

⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 65 (1 Feb 1936).

⁶⁶ ADAP, D, V, doc. 11, footnote 4 (fragment; the entire document is in DPJS, II, appendix 91, Moltke’s report from 18 Nov 1936), quoted after M. Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1938* [Polish-German relations 1933-1938], 2nd edition, Poznań 1980, p. 301. Polish note from the aforementioned conversation (in DPJS) does not contain the quoted fragment.

he received via Moltke reassurance that the “*Führer* and the Chancellor of the Reich considered the Gdańsk statute to be a reality (*eine Realität*) and did not intend to infringe upon it” but there is no way “a public statement containing this content could be issued”⁶⁷. Furthermore, in October minister Neurath ruthlessly told ambassador Lipski that sooner or later the Gdańsk issue “will have to be solved in a fundamental way” that is in the sense of “restoring the natural relation” between Gdańsk and the Reich with taking into account the economic interests of Poland. Lipski, astonished by the turn the matters had taken asked Neurath whether he intended to take up the issue in the near future but he did not receive any concrete reply⁶⁸. It appeared that concerning the Gdańsk issue the Polish side had to accept the interim solution offered by Germany. In a conversation with ambassador Lipski on 5 November 1937 Hitler announced that, “1) There will be no changes in the legal and political situation of Gdańsk (...), 2) The rights of the Polish residents in Gdańsk will be respected, 3) Poland’s rights in Gdańsk will not be violated”⁶⁹. This statement however, was not to be made public and in the official communiqué it was limited to a mention that “the meeting was concluded (...) with a statement that Polish-German relations cannot be disturbed by the Gdańsk problem”⁷⁰.

In the face of appeasement tendencies towards Germany gaining strength in the West, the Polish Foreign Ministry did not doubt that it was essential to hold on to the “Line of 26 January”. In the Polish governmental circles it was concluded that the “the policy of relaxation in our relations with Germany is the best defence against any attempts to pay for the so called pacification of Europe at the expense of Poland. What could have constituted a threat for us before 1934 is now a huge threat to Czechoslovakia”⁷¹. In a speech delivered in the Bruhla Palace *pro foro interno* it said, “Even at the moment when the Versailles Treaty has been shattered, even at the moment when the international economic tide is so strongly favouring Germany, (...) the Reich Chancellor is reiterating his declaration towards us as far as the need to maintain the *status quo* and Poland’s rights in Gdańsk are concerned”. A conclusion was drawn that Berlin’s attitude was a result of “a very sensible evaluation of the situation by the Germans”, who “must take into account the strong resistance on the Polish side concerning Gdańsk, that the gains obtained from its annexation could not cover the cost (...)”⁷².

⁶⁷ Quoted after B. Dopierała, *Gdańska polityka Józefa Becka* [The Gdańsk policy of Józef Beck], Poznań 1967, p. 239.

⁶⁸ ADAP, D, V, doc. 13.

⁶⁹ DPJS, III, appendix. 65; *Diplomat in Berlin*, doc. 73.

⁷⁰ Quoted after B. Dopierała, *Gdańska polityka...*, p. 243.

⁷¹ DPJS, III, p. 214 (14 Dec 1937).

⁷² AAN Warsaw, Foreign Ministry 117, “Przegląd Informacyjny Polska a Zagranica” [Information Review Poland and Abroad] nr 17 from 18 Dec 1937, quoted after S. Sierpowski, *Źródła do historii powszechnej okresu międzywojennego* [Sources for the general history of the inter-war period], vol. III, Poznań 1992, doc. 364.

The balancing of Poland between France, Great Britain and Germany reached a peak in 1938 during the Sudeten crisis. Poland did not have much room to manoeuvre and the pressure put by Paris and London on the Polish Republic to make its attitude towards Germany more firm was impossible to reconcile with the Polish interest under the conditions of *appeasement*. The demand issued by Paris in May to carry out a warning *démarche* in Berlin was unthinkable for Beck. As the minister said to his deputy, “we would immediately find ourselves in a conflict with the Germans and we would cross out any possibilities of conducting a policy of equilibrium”⁷³. However, Polish diplomacy having decided that the disunion of the Czechoslovakian state is in the interest of Poland, started to play a risky game which made it easier for Berlin to encircle Czechoslovakia. Starting with the first talks concerning Czechoslovakia which Hermann Göring had with Beck in Warsaw on 23 February, the contacts between both sides were becoming increasingly tighter. It was on this occasion that an attempt was made to obtain from Germany a decisive declaration concerning Gdańsk, the shared border and an extension of the Pact from 26 January 1934. The attempt ended in a failure, the German partners played for time and at the same time they were asking more explicitly about Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. After the Sudeten crisis Poland earned the opinion of being *de facto* an accomplice of the Reich, as well as imitating its methods. The relations with France laid in ruins, and there was nearly a military confrontation on the border with the Soviet Union, followed by a diplomatic note from Moscow to Warsaw in which a threat of denouncing the 1932 Non-Aggression Pact was clearly stated⁷⁴.

What is more, on the day when the Polish handed in their ultimatum in Prague demanding the evacuation of Czechoslovakians from Zaolzie, Minister Beck directed a question to Germany whether in case of a military conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia the Reich would resume an amicable approach towards Poland. The minister also asked whether in the case of Poland being attacked by the Soviet Union, Germany would show a friendly attitude”⁷⁵. The reply was delivered to Beck by Ribbentrop himself at noon on 1 October. Germany reassured officially that in the case of a war between Poland and Czechoslovakia Warsaw can count on an amicable attitude from Berlin. In the case of a Polish-Soviet war the Reich will take “a more-than-friendly approach, suggesting [Ribbentrop] clearly that the German government would offer help”⁷⁶. On the same day the ambassador also talked to Göring who

⁷³ DPJS, IV, p. 158. In his memoirs Beck noted maliciously but correctly that “The various actions taken by the French diplomats aimed at bringing a relief to the Czechs by spoiling Polish-German relations”; [J. Beck], *Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1926-1939*, edited by A. M. Cieniało, Paris 1990, p. 213.

⁷⁴ The Polish moves are analyzed by the present author in: S. Żerko, *Polen, die Sudetenkrise und die Folgen von München*, w: *Das Münchener Abkommen 1938 in europäischer Perspektive*, hrsg. im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (in press).

⁷⁵ ADAP, D, V, doc. 54.

⁷⁶ PDD 1938, doc. 364.

was even more open as he reassured that, “It is completely inconceivable that the Reich would not help Poland in its fight against the Soviets”⁷⁷. This incident emphatically shows that the notion “policy of equilibrium” in fact constituted an empty declaration.

Abroad in democratic countries the fact that Poland filed an ultimatum towards Prague and threatened Czechoslovakia, which had been abandoned by everybody, with a war mostly made a bad impression. The worries expressed by the deputy Prime Minister, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, who was against the ultimatum, materialized when he predicted that the decision from 30 September will cast a long shadow on the image of Poland⁷⁸. There were voices that Poland behaved like a hyena which attacks a victim already beaten in Munich. The title of the Swedish daily, “Dagens Nyheter” (4 Oct 1938), *Germany’s Followers* belonged to the more restrained ones. The commentators not very knowledgeable in what had motivated Poland’s actions became convinced that minister Beck is disloyal and deceitful acting as a matter of fact in league with the Nazi Reich. Many authorities in the West started to reach a conclusion that Poland does not deserve help, should it become the next target of German aggression⁷⁹. The Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, who himself not long before had been showing off in Munich, compensated his distastefulness with contemptuous remarks about Poland’s conduct⁸⁰. Even in the same month when Polish soldiers entered Zaolzie the French ambassador to Warsaw, Leon Noël presented to his superiors a memorandum calling for a reduction of the commitments towards Poland because of the fact that “it almost all the time in its everyday political life” is acting in the interest of France’s opponents “no matter who they are”⁸¹. Similarly in London, especially in the Foreign Office, the Poles were given a cold shoulder and treated with distrust⁸².

As it was related by the Polish consuls in the Reich, the opinions that now it will be “Poland’s turn” were not rare among the Germans. It was heard in conversations that Hitler will want the Poznań Province, Gdańsk Pomerania and Higher Silesia, and that Germans living in Poland “should be set free”⁸³. Similar views became common within the German minorities in Poland, which put the Polish authorities in a state of justified uneasiness.

⁷⁷ PDD 1938, doc. 364, also doc. 363 and Z. Landau, J. Tomaszewski, *Monachium 1938* [Munich 1938], doc. 463.

⁷⁸ E. Kwiatkowski, *W takim żyliśmy świecie* [The World we lived in], Kraków 1990, p. 103. See also [J. Beck] *Polska polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 223 and DPJS, IV, p. 283-284 (30 Sept 1938). On another occasion Beck wrote about Kwiatkowski that the deputy prime minister “was always afraid of taking any more serious decisions”, [J. Beck], *Polska polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 208.

⁷⁹ Wider about the reactions to the Polish ultimatum: S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1938-1939* [Polish-German relations 1938-1939], Poznań 1998, p. 98.

⁸⁰ This was reported in Washington by ambassador William Bullitt; FRUS, 1938, 1, p. 667.

⁸¹ L. Noël, *Agresja niemiecka na Polskę* [German invasion of Poland], Warsaw 1966, p. 206, quoted from p. 210.

⁸² E. Raczyński, *W sojusznicy Londynie* [In the allied London], London 1997, p. 22-23.

⁸³ New Files Archives, Warsaw, Embassy in Berlin 841, general consul in Leipzig F. Chiczewski to J. Lipski, 17 Nov 1938, p. 74.

Some German diplomats of the old Conservative-Nationalist school were reaching the same conclusions. The German diplomats who were unaware of Hitler's plans, started to deliberate whether Berlin should take advantage of the favourable circumstances and resort to some of the old revisionist issues. It was noted that if the Reich "took up the problem of the (Corridor) Poland could not count on any of its friends"⁸⁴. Ernst von Weizsäcker in his memoirs expressed his conviction that nobody would rush with help for a discredited and isolated Poland, "the jackal of Munich"⁸⁵. In the autumn of 1938 he decided that Germany should at last demand from the Polish government in Warsaw "being connected to Eastern Prussia" (the term "*Landbrücke nach Ostpreußen*" is unclear) as well as permission for Gdańsk to be annexed to the Reich. Poland was to be reduced to the role of a buffer state between Germany and Russia. It was also the advice Weizsäcker gave to Ribbentrop in December 1938⁸⁶. As Weizsäcker told Admiral Canaris, Great Britain and France would remain neutral in the case of a Polish-German conflict⁸⁷. In a similar vein, the German ambassador to London, Herbert von Dirksen argued that since the Sudeten crisis Warsaw has made itself unpopular on the Thames and that the British do take into consideration that the Reich will demand from Poland at least Gdańsk and the "Polish Corridor"⁸⁸. Nonetheless, Hitler had different plans concerning Poland.

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO ATTRACT POLAND AS ITS ALLY

For Hitler the motives to depart from the so far anti-Polish policy of Berlin were initially of a tactical nature. As he admitted in the autumn of 1938 in a closed meeting for German journalists, "Circumstances made me talk about peace for many years"⁸⁹. First, the *Führer* wanted to lead his regime through "the risky phase" that is while Germany was still weak, then he wanted to gain time, strengthen his rule, arm the Reich, weaken the French network of alliances by planting a wedge between France and Poland, sabotage all the attempts to create an anti-German coalition, mislead and disorientate potential opponents. In his speeches and diplomatic notes he invariably would assure about his alleged exclusively peaceful intentions. The Polish-German declaration was to be proof that he was ready to seek agreement even when conflict would seem invincible⁹⁰.

⁸⁴ R. Spitz, *So haben wir das Reich verspielt. Bekenntnisse eines Illegalen*, München-Wien 1986, p. 324.

⁸⁵ Earlier versions of Weizsäcker's memoirs, according to: R. A. Blasius, *Für Großdeutschland – gegen den großen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Frhr. von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39*, Köln – Wien 1981, p. 75-76.

⁸⁶ L. E. Hill (Hrsg.), *Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933-1950*, Frankfurt a.M.-Berlin-Wien 1974, p. 150. Not much in: E. von Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, München-Leipzig-Freiburg i. Br. 1950, p. 212.

⁸⁷ H. Groscurth, *Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940*, Stuttgart 1970, p. 159.

⁸⁸ ADAP, D, IV, doc. 287.

⁸⁹ H. von Kotze, H. Krausnick (Hrsg.), *Es spricht der Führer*, Gütersloh 1966, p. 269.

⁹⁰ See S. Żerko, *Niemiecka polityka zagraniczna 1933-1939*, Poznań 2005, chapter II, p. 59.

Soon however, the Nazi dictator decided that a tactical alliance with the eastern neighbour could be transformed into a more permanent bond. He somehow came to the conclusion that perhaps it would be possible to find for Poland a place in the future "German Europe". Poland dividing Germany from the USSR had at its disposal a sizeable military potential. Also the genuine recognition that Hitler and some other Nazi dignitaries had towards Piłsudski, the conqueror of the Red Army in 1920, played a significant part in Hitler's calculations. Additionally, the fact that the political system introduced by Piłsudski departed from the principles of parliamentary democracy, which Hitler despised, was of considerable importance. Since 1933 in almost every conversation with Polish diplomats, the chancellor referred to the Soviet threat and talked about Poland's significant role in the east⁹¹.

Soon intensive efforts were made to win over Poland as an ally. Hermann Göring, who was entrusted by Hitler to take care of relations with Poland, played a chief role in these endeavours⁹². Starting in February 1935, his regular hunting expeditions to the Białowieża Forest provided him with ample opportunities to present the German offer without mincing his words. Already during his first visit to Poland he "went far in his offer and suggested a division of interest zones concerning Russian matters"⁹³. When however, the Nazi dignitary took up this issue while speaking to Piłsudski, the Marshal dismissed the topic and explained that the Polish Republic intends to conduct a policy of caution with the USSR⁹⁴. Notwithstanding, Göring continued his efforts in the following years. In February 1936 a Polish high-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry summed up the reasoning of the German guests during another of Göring's visits to Poland in the following way, "Poland should go against the Soviets in an alliance with the Germans"⁹⁵. On another occasion the Nazi dignitary said to his Polish interlocutor that in the face of aggressive plans of the Kremlin "Poland and Germany will have to join forces whether they will or will not want to (...). In any way there is a great future before Poland and Germany since the centrifugal tendencies in Russia are gaining strength"⁹⁶. In February 1937 in an extensive speech he was trying to convince Rydz-Śmigły about the need to align Polish and German politics⁹⁷, and in November he made a casual comment that "The Baltic is not

⁹¹ More details in: S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie...*, p. 33.

⁹² A wider account of these activities of the Nazi dignitary in: S. Martens, *Hermann Göring: "Erster Paladin des Führers" und „Zweiter mann im Reich“*, Paderborn 1985; A. Kube, *Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich*, München 1987.

⁹³ The Polish Institute and General Sikorski Museum, London, A.11 E/144, A committee appointed in relation with the results of the war campaign of 1939, doc. 6, testimony by J. Lipski from 6 Mar 1941, p. 241; also DPJS, I, p. 225 and 230.

⁹⁴ More in: S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie...*, p. 43.

⁹⁵ DPJS, II, p. 93 (23 Feb 1936).

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 261 (12 Aug 1936).

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, III, doc. 7 (note by Szembek, corrected by Lipski, from the conversation between Göring-Śmigły 16 Feb 1937).

enough for Poland” as it should have “a window onto the Black Sea”⁹⁸. It was then that the international press wrote intensely about rumours that the Polish Republic might possibly join the Anti-Comintern Pact. On 9 November 1937 minister Beck felt obliged to instruct the Polish embassies and diplomatic missions that Poland had not received any propositions to join the pact, and in any way Warsaw would not join the Anti-Comintern Pact because of its “specific location as a neighbour country of the USSR, and its principal stance against blocks”⁹⁹. The same statement was repeated three days later in a communiqué released by the Polish Political Information agency with an additional mention of the need to maintain “the policy of equilibrium between the two neighbour countries”¹⁰⁰. Nevertheless, the effects of the above *dementi* were of limited appeal and the rumours of Poland’s possible accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact did not cease.

Also other Nazi dignitaries were involved in trying to draw Poland closer, like for example Joseph Goebbels was convinced, as he wrote in his private diary, that “the axis Berlin-London-Rome-Warsaw would be something not to throw away”¹⁰¹, or the future general governor, Hans Frank. The latter in early 1936 was trying to convince his hosts in Warsaw that “Poland and Germany going hand in hand constitute a power which will be difficult to resist in Europe; a block consisting of a compound mass of 100 million people”¹⁰². Attempts to attract the Polish side were also joined, among others by Joachim von Ribbentrop, relatively early well before he became the head of Hitler’s diplomacy. He said to deputy-minister Szembek, who was staying in Berlin on the occasion of the Olympic Games, that both nations “must come together” and the present then relaxation in Polish-German relations is only the beginning because Poland and Germany will together achieve “far greater things”. In view of these tasks all quarrels from the past should take second place¹⁰³. Ribbentrop made similar comments a short while later when talking to ambassador Raczyński in London.

Yet, the German public and a decisive majority of the conservative elites did not willingly accept the new policy towards Poland. Also, many leaders of the German minority in Poland did not hide their disappointment as they complained that Berlin left the compatriots stranded behind the eastern border. The new political course was accepted with clenched teeth in the German Foreign Office dominated by the advocates of the traditional anti-Polish attitude, and it was not infrequently sabotaged in various ways. Still the analysis of the *Auswärtiges Amt* revealed a more sober estimate of the Polish Republic’s foreign policy. Hence, in the material prepared for

⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 163-164 (4 Nov 1937).

⁹⁹ Ibidem, appendix 69.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, appendix 70.

¹⁰¹ E. Frohlich (Hrsg), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Bd. III, p. 4 (note from 4 Jan 1937).

¹⁰² DTJS, II, p. 82 (12 Feb 1936).

¹⁰³ Ibidem, notes from 8, 12 and 14 Aug 1936 (Ribbentrop talked to Szembek three times on that occasion).

minister Neurath dated 11 January 1938, it was aptly noted that the Polish-French alliance remains the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy¹⁰⁴. Anyway, also ambassador von Moltke, an advocate of good neighbourly relations between Warsaw and Berlin warned against drawing overoptimistic conclusions from an analysis of Polish political moves.

It is quite characteristic that the German dignitaries while repeating their attempts to recruit Poland would now and then imply the need to revise the *status quo* along the Polish-German border. Hitler also talked about it, for example to Lipski on 22 May 1935. He then reassured that although Germany does need “living space”, *Lebensraum* is not to be found in Poland. One could only infer that the chancellor meant USSR territory. Immediately Hitler added that he had a certain idea which could be implemented in about 15 years time, namely a special German railway line and a motorway across the Gdańsk Pomerania¹⁰⁵. This was not a novel idea and it had appeared in previous years. Also, in the following period the German side would return to this project (for example, Göring in the autumn of 1936 in a conversation with Lipski, in February 1937 in a conversation with Rydz-Śmigły, and first of all Hitler once more in his conversation with Lipski on 20 September 1938)¹⁰⁶.

The Polish side treated the advances made by Germany either with gentle refusal or at the most in an evasive way. Warsaw tried to maintain the best possible relations with Germany but without making a bond with the Reich. The Polish leadership almost by instinct felt that an alliance with Berlin would mean degrading the Polish Republic to the rank of a vassal of the Third Reich. Still the top priority was to obtain proper guarantees from France while at the same time creating appropriate circumstances for a closer relationship with Great Britain. Yet, abandoning the “Line of 26 January” would seem irresponsible in view of the dominant appeasement tendencies towards Germany in the policy conducted in Paris and especially in London

In the meantime however, the German dictator finally decided that Great Britain would not give him a free hand in the east. He was no longer satisfied by the policy of appeasement on the part of the western powers. As early as during the Sudeten crisis he was ready to risk a war with the western powers if they had decided to come with help should the Reich have attacked Czechoslovakia. Hitler believed that a military confrontation in the west was unavoidable. It would be difficult to think about implementing his major objective, which was building a German empire on the debris of the USSR, without having eliminated France and having isolated Great Britain. Indeed, before *the Wehrmacht* could set out east the Germans should secure the rear. Thus, the Anti-Comintern Pact was being perceived not only as a bloc with a blow aimed at the Soviet Union but as an alliance of countries ready to wage a war against Great Britain and France.

¹⁰⁴ ADAP, D, V, doc. 25.

¹⁰⁵ *Diplomat in Berlin*, doc. 44.

¹⁰⁶ S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie...*, p. 45.

For that matter while earlier on Hitler saw in Poland an ally during his attack on the USSR then, that is in the autumn of 1938 he “wanted” Poland to play a different part. The Polish divisions would first secure the Reich during its attack on the western powers, and the attack on the Soviet Union was supposed to come after France had been beaten. In any way, first it was essential to urge the Polish leaders to unequivocally declare themselves on the German side.

On 16 March 1938 during a conversation with Lipski, Göring “came up with a direct offer of Polish-German military cooperation against Russia”. The ambassador made a note in his records that the offer was much more detailed than the proposals put forward earlier on¹⁰⁷. On the last day of March Joachim von Ribbentrop, the then new foreign minister of the Reich, was encouraging Lipski to establish “wider cooperation” between Poland and Germany in the Anti-Comintern spirit. At the time Ribbentrop asked Lipski to treat his proposal as informal¹⁰⁸. On 10 August Göring repeated his arguments to Lipski aimed at closer cooperation between Poland and Germany in the anti-Soviet spirit¹⁰⁹. On the night of 27 and 28 of September Ribbentrop repeated to Lipski his offer of a permanent alliance with Poland within the Anti-Comintern Pact but this time he insisted that Lipski should inform minister Beck about the German suggestion¹¹⁰.

After the Polish campaign concerning Zaolzie Hitler and his paladins did not skimp on complements for Warsaw. On 1 October Göring in his telephone conversation with ambassador Lipski assessed the Polish move as “an incredibly bold operation carried out in an excellent style”. On the same day Ribbentrop said to Lipski that “the chancellor during his breakfast spoke to his entourage with great esteem about Polish politics”. Beck was informed by a Polish diplomat from Berlin that “our move was regarded there as an expression of great power and independent thinking, which constitutes the most certain guarantee of our good relations with the Reich’s government” (sic!)¹¹¹. The Polish-German discrepancies concerning the new demarcation line were quickly overcome because the Reich handed over to Poland the right to a key railway junction in Bohumin.

The Polish ambassador was invited for 24 October to Berchtesgaden where Ribbentrop was staying. The German minister was well prepared for the meeting and he conducted it very skillfully. He spoke in superlatives about the Polish stance during the Sudeten crisis. Among others he referred to Hitler’s words: “The Poles are a brave folk. Piłsudski would be proud of them”. Lipski almost immediately presented the real reason for his visit which was obtaining German support for the cause of adjoining the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to Hungary. Ribbentrop went on pretending

¹⁰⁷ *Diplomat in Berlin*, p. 353-354.

¹⁰⁸ PDD 1938, doc. 74; ADAP, D, V, doc. 34; DPJS, IV, p. 119 (4 Apr 1938).

¹⁰⁹ PDD1938, doc. 176.

¹¹⁰ The report of the Polish ambassador concerning this topic of the conversation is said to have been lost; the historian has access only to a note Lipski made later: *Diplomat in Berlin*, p. 427.

¹¹¹ PDD 1938, doc. 364.

that the plans of creating a common Polish-Hungarian border were something new to him and was evasive towards the matter, exaggerated potential obstacles and being straightforward he took up the issue which was meant to dominate the entire conversation. He stressed that “now the time has come to cleanse the relations between Germany and Poland from all existing problems” and this would be “the crowning achievement of the creation that Marshall Piłsudski and the *Führer* had started”. Thus, he proposed a “general regulation” of Polish-German relations. First of all, the problem of Gdańsk needed to be “solved” by incorporating it into the Reich. An extraterritorial Autobahn belonging to Germany and a railway connection to East Prussia was supposed to be built across the Gdańsk Pomerania. The joint border would receive a guarantee of being permanent and the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact from 1934 would be extended for a further 10 to 25 years. However, it was the two last points on Ribbentrop’s list that were the most important.

Not only was Warsaw to join the Anti-Comintern Pact but it also had to accept an additional consultation clause appended to the treaty from 1934 which would oblige Poland to negotiate its foreign policy with Berlin. Ribbentrop noted that he did not expect an immediate answer and asked Beck to carefully consider his proposal. More or less twenty minutes later the German minister called in Lipski again and added that “if the global regulation in the relations between Germany and Poland is achieved” then also in the case of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia “a beneficial agreement could be achieved”¹¹². The German proposals unambiguously aimed at making Poland the Reich’s satellite, although the demands concerning Gdańsk and the Autobahn were not in themselves exorbitant.

When deeply alarmed Lipski reported in person the subject matter of the conversation to Beck, he did not attach much importance to the German proposals. At a meeting called by the minister on 4 November with a small group of staff he did not mention a word about them. He assessed the Polish position in optimistic terms and when talking about relations with Germany he was joking that “lions are not so fierce when you live closer with them”. He maintained that Poland’s position is beneficial (“politically we are at a good point”). He still remained impressed by the “success” achieved at the expense of Czechoslovakia and kept on saying that “it was possible to get more from the Czechs without much resistance. The weakness of that country was beyond our expectations”¹¹³. It would be difficult to find a better example of being disorientated, careless and overestimating the role of one’s own country.

Beck gave orders to reply to Berlin in a polite manner nevertheless refusing their offer. The Polish minister believed that he would be able to continue his policy of balancing between Germany and the western powers, and that the Reich will come to terms with the Polish refusal also this time. He seemed to have paid less attention to

¹¹² Quotations based on the Polish document: PDD 1938, doc. German version: ADAP, D, V, doc. 81.

¹¹³ DPJS, IV, p. 357, 358.

the emerging prospect of confrontation with Germany than to the issue of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Incorporating this tiny country into Hungary would not only get rid of the “Ukrainian Piedmont” but it was first of all to be a stage in implementing a completely unrealistic conception of a “Third Europe”, that is a grouping of medium and smaller countries in Central and South-East Europe independent of Germany. Anyway, Beck considered the proposal from 24 October to be a scheme plotted by Ribbentrop. However, on 5 January 1939 during a meeting with the *Führer* in Berchtesgaden Beck was to realize himself that things were different than he had thought, and that it was Hitler himself who was behind the proposal. The chancellor made an effort to maintain a friendly tone in the conversation, but on the following day Ribbentrop was much more aggressive. Beck who had previously deluded himself that in the face of the Polish refusal Germany would not insist on the October proposals was then put straight.

As soon as the minister had returned to Warsaw, a consultation meeting was convened in a narrow group of top statesmen including president Mościcki and marshal Rydz-Śmigły. The leaders of the Polish state unanimously agreed that accepting the German offer (it needs to be reminded that it was still not a demand but a proposal) will inevitably take the Polish Republic “onto an inclined plane resulting in a loss of independence and assuming a role of Germany’s vassal”¹¹⁴. The Polish side did allow a margin of concessions concerning the issue of Gdańsk and access via “the Corridor” and expressed the willingness to seek a compromise but on the other hand an attempt was going to be made to strengthen relations with France and Great Britain. On 25 January 1939 (on the eve of the 5th anniversary of signing the Non-Aggression Pact) minister Ribbentrop was received in Warsaw with the utmost courtesy. The guest and the hosts were outdoing one another in their assurance of the will to maintain friendly relations. However, when Ribbentrop returned to the German proposal he practically did not achieve anything. Beck even warned Ribbentrop against being overoptimistic when relating the course of the Warsaw talks to Hitler¹¹⁵. Nevertheless, both sides cared about evading crisis. Other dignitaries of Hitler were coming to Warsaw (among others Hans Frank in December 1938 and Heinrich Himmler in the February of the following year). All the signs were there that the “Line of 26 January” was still being observed. The Polish refusal, after all not the first one, did not seem to be synonymous with breaking relations between Warsaw and Berlin.

It can be assumed that Hitler still counted on making Poland join the coalition headed by Germany. Following a note made by one of his aide-de-camps on 18 February 1939, the chancellor did no longer exclude resorting “if necessary to other than diplomatic means”¹¹⁶. A few days later Hitler revealed in confidence that he intended to send a strong group of *Kriegsmarine* to Gdańsk making in this way a demonstra-

¹¹⁴ [J. Beck], *Polska polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 240.

¹¹⁵ S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1938-1939*, chapters II and III.

¹¹⁶ H. von Kotze (Hrsg.), *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938-1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel*, Stuttgart 1974, p. 45.

tion of power (which however did not take place)¹¹⁷. Ribbentrop made the last attempt to convince the Polish in the second half of March 1939 after the final breakup of the Czechoslovakian state and the establishment of the Protectorate of Czech and Moravia. The reply passed on from Beck by ambassador Lipski on 26 March 1939 did not leave any room for delusion. "The Poles will remain our enemies" were the *Führer's* words noted down by Goebbels¹¹⁸. When a few days later on 31 March 1939 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons the British guarantees for Poland, Hitler had no doubts that Poland will remain a country connected with the western powers in the political and military sense. In early April orders were given to start preparations to attack Poland.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE POLISH DECISION

The decision made by the highest political authorities of the Polish Republic to turn down the *Führer's* magnanimous offer was made at the beginning of January 1939, that is before Great Britain expressed readiness to issue a guarantee of independence for Poland. The participants of the meeting in the Royal Castle were aware of the seriousness of the situation but they undoubtedly counted on overcoming the emerging crisis with diplomatic means.

When several weeks later the *Wehrmacht* army entered Prague the advocates of the appeasement were discredited and international opinion was alarmed as to the real objectives of Nazi Germany, the position of Poland appeared to have been strengthened. It needs to be remembered that the final refusal which was handed over by ambassador Lipski to Ribbentrop on 26 March 1939 took place in a radically changed situation. Although in effect of the German occupation of Czech and Moravia Poland became entrapped also from the south, its political position was clearly strengthened. Additionally, the British-French guarantees obtained by Poland five days later were evaluated as a great asset on the Polish side. Finally, the circumstances were there to stop the expansion of the Nazi Reich. It seemed that the Polish leadership in its contest with Berlin was at last holding a good hand of cards.

We know that it was not an easy decision to make at least for Beck; the minister of foreign affairs was very much aware of the risk he was burdened with¹¹⁹. Undoubtedly when taking the decision the Polish military potential was vastly overestimated and the military power of Germany was underestimated. It might be that the decision was made with awareness that any closer cooperation with the Reich, than what was until then determined by the "Line of 26 January", would not be accepted by the thoroughly anti-German Polish public, and the generals were mostly very distrust-

¹¹⁷ ADAP, D, VI, doc. 361, footnote 1.

¹¹⁸ E. Fröhlich (Hrsg.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels...*, Bd. III, p. 584 (note from 28 Mar 1939).

¹¹⁹ PDD 1939, doc. 275.

ful towards the Germans. Resigning from the alliance with France could even have brought about an internal political crisis and collapse of the existing government. The prospect that the Polish army would shield the Reich from the east in order to create good conditions for the *Wehrmacht* forces to beat France would not be acceptable for both the vast majority of the Polish elites as well as generally for public opinion. Minister Beck was even irritated by the enthusiasm with which the Poles welcomed severing relations with Germany. Nevertheless, when analyzing the situation of Poland in the spring of 1939 it was difficult to assume that the assets in the form of alliances with France and great Britain were of an illusory nature.

The months following the breaking of the relations between Warsaw and Berlin resulted in a war of nerves that Hitler waged on Poland and the western powers. However, the fear of the risky game played by their *Führer* was also shared by Hitler's political collaborators and army generals. Also, the German public was full of anxiety. On the one hand, it welcomed with satisfaction the collapse of close relations with the disliked neighbour and it was ready to willingly accept a short local war against Poland but it was on the other hand, paralyzed by the thought that a local campaign could transform into a widespread conflict. In Warsaw they believed that the war of nerves can be won by demonstrating a firm attitude. On Minister Beck's initiative and in line with the declaration that the Polish government will not be intimidated many attempts were made to re-establish relations with Germany. Signals were sent through the Japanese, Italians and Hungarians, Romanian and Bulgarian diplomats were used and even as it seems the chief-in-command of the Estonian army was involved. There were also attempts to establish relations directly with Germany¹²⁰. These however, remain almost unknown episodes in the history of the Second Polish Republic which nevertheless allow to question the stereotypical opinions about the alleged uncompromising Polish attitude.

Making an assumption that the final decisions made in Berlin will be rational proved to be false. The premise that the British guarantee for Poland would constitute a challenge for Hitler, who was making decisions in the manner of a *va banque* player, was unjustified. Another mistake was assuming that the western allies would eventually reject the defeatist strategy and in their best interests would take action directly after Germany had begun their war operations. It also proved to be false to assume that Hitler's anti-Soviet attitude rules out an alliance between Germany and the USSR. Notwithstanding it does not seem that, contrary to what is presently written, the German-Soviet Pact was the factor which finally made it possible for Hitler to attack Poland and unleash World War II.

¹²⁰ See S. Żerko, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1938-1939*, passim.

ZBIGNIEW MAZUR

Poznań

NEUE WACHE (1818-1993)

Since 1993 in the Federal Republic of Germany the Berlin Neue Wache has served as a central memorial commemorating the victims of war and tyranny, that is to say it represents in a synthetic gist the binding German canon of collective memory in the most sensitive area concerning the infamous history of the Third Reich. The interior decor of Neue Wache, the sculpture placed inside and the commemorative plaques speak a lot about the official historical policy of the German government. Also the symbolism of the place itself is of significance, and a plaque positioned to the left of the entrance contains information about its history. Indeed, the history of Neue Wache was extraordinary, starting as a utility building, though equipped with readable symbolic features, and ending up as a place for a national memorial which has been redesigned three times. Consequently, the process itself created a symbolic palimpsest with some layers completely obliterated and others remaining visible to the eye, and with new layers added which still retain a scent of freshness. The first layer is very strongly connected with the victorious war of “liberation” against Napoleonic France, which played the role of a myth that laid the foundations for the great power of Prussia and then of the later German Empire. The second layer was a reflection of the glorifying worship of the fallen soldiers which developed after World War I in European countries and also in Germany. The third one was an expression of the historical policy of the communist-run German Democratic Republic which emphasized the victims of class struggle with “militarism” and “fascism”. And then there is the latest layer which is the result of a lengthy debate in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the central memorial place to the German victims of World War II.

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The war with Napoleonic France was the first modern war to have been commemorated in Germany, and primarily in Prussia, on a mass scale not encountered before. Especially the victorious Battle of Leipzig (18 October 1813) was granted the halo of a great triumph. A year after the “Battle of the Nations” Napoleon’s defeat was celebrated with bell ringing, parades, performances and with bonfires lit in celebration of the victory. For several years the gymnastics association formed by

Friedrich Jahn would organize pilgrimages for the youth to the battlefields. A great demonstration was organized on 18 October 1817 in Wartburg to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, and of the famous 95 theses announced by Martin Luther in Wittenberg (30 October 1517). The celebration of the fight against Rome and Paris was conducted mainly under the slogan of “liberation”, but also of “liberty” which was demanded by the national-liberal forces which were still in their infancy. The Wartburg demonstration was organized by the people and it soon developed into a protest against the foundations of the feudal system. “Liberty” then meant freedom from the restrictions of a class society, equality in the eyes of law, freedom of thought, the possibility of creating unions and of public gatherings, and also the right to create a national representation with minor and major rights. It is hardly surprising that the demonstration in Wartburg with incidents of burning books, including the Napoleonic Code was not received with enthusiasm not only by the Prussian authorities. The Concert of Europe established eventually in 1815 was supposed not only to safeguard the balance among the international powers but it was also meant to guard the internal order in European countries. There were equal fears of both, a new Napoleon and a new Robespierre. The Prussian monarchy approved of celebrating “liberation” but not “liberty”.

In the official Prussian commemorative policy the merits of the ruling dynasty were glorified first of all. Karl Friedrich Schinkel designed *via Triumphalis* stretching from the Brandenburg Gate to the Royal Castle which was to serve for the glory of the dynasty during impressive military parades. The Brandenburg Gate (1789-1791) acquired a new role. It was erected as an ordinary functional construction equipped with a typically monarchist ideological scheme. It divided the city from its peripheries along the line of the city walls marking the tariff boundary. It thus distinguished the representative part of the city without cutting out the view onto the nice space around the exit route. The Gate was designed by distinguished artists, Carl Gotthard Langhans (the entire structure) and Johann Gottfried Schadow (Quadriga with Victoria, 1793). The design was based on the Greek propylaea (gate, columns, uneven number of passageways) although the Quadriga on top of the gate rushing towards the city was taken from Roman tradition. The Quadriga gained additional symbolic importance after 1806 when it was taken down on Napoleon’s orders and sent to France. In 1814 it was brought back with celebrations to its place in Berlin. Its triumphant return gave the Brandenburg Gate a new role of a memorial commemorating the victory over the French, more so that it was topped with the Iron Cross, the Prussian eagle and a wreath of oak leaves symbolizing power, glory and bravery. Peter Reichel rightly noticed that the symbolism was internally not very coherent: “a crowned eagle as a symbol of monarchy, an Iron Cross as a bourgeois-egalitarian feature and an oak wreath referring to the German-Germanic nation”¹. However, it

¹ P. Reichel, *Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Kleine Geschichte deutscher Nationalsymbole nach 1945*, München 2005, p. 102.

was precisely these contradictions which reflected very well the changes occurring in the Prussian ideological programmes of commemoration.

A combination of elements pertaining to the monarchist tradition with elements of the national programme can be seen in the monument designed by Schinkel and unveiled in 1821 at Tempelhofer Berg (later Kreuzberg). The idea for the monument was conceived by Christian Rauch with the thought of commemorating the fallen soldiers in the war with France. Friedrich Wilhelm III approved of the idea itself but he imposed on it the message of a monarchist artwork. The inscription it carried said that it was dedicated by the king to the nation, the people, who on his command sacrificed their blood and wealth for their homeland („Der König dem Volke, das auf seinen Ruf hochherzig Gut und Blut dem Vaterland darbrachte, den Gefallenen zum Gedächtnis, den Lebenden zur Anerkennung, den künftigen Geschlechtern zur Nacheiferung“). In the twelve niches statues of members of the Prussian and Russian dynasty and distinguished generals were placed but a distinct symbolic reference to the nation was missing. Thus, it was not in its pure form a monument of the “nation”, and more so not of “liberty”. Nevertheless, the inscription maintained in the tone of a monarchist message to the faithful subjects spoke of blood that was shed for the “homeland”. Although it did not meet the expectations of the liberals who dreamt about constitution and national unification, in comparison with the earlier commemorative practices it was still a small step forward. The national accent can be detected in the monument being styled as a Gothic tower, since Gothic was then considered the style that was utmost German, and able to express the spirit of the German nation in the best and fullest way. Making references to Gothic was synonymous with referring to the deepest Germanic heritage.

The second outstanding work by Schinkel, *Neue Wache*, that is the New Guard House, was also created in the air of triumph after Napoleon’s defeat². It was designed not as a monument but as a strictly functional building to be used as a guardhouse for the royal guard regiment, as the name indicated. The king Friedrich Wilhelm III resided not in the castle but in the Palace of the Crown Prince (Kronprinzipalais), at Unter den Linden. The Guard House was erected between 1816-1818 more or less opposite the palace, and until today is located between the armouries (Zeughaus), the present seat of the German Historical Museum and the university complex, which for years was named Friedrich Wilhelm Universität, and in 1948 renamed as Humboldt Universität. The New Guard House was unable and unwilling to compete with the nearby monumental buildings. In its conception it was supposed to be a building relatively modest in size but still in architectural harmony with the armoury, the university and the Palace of the Crown Prince. Initially, Schinkel planned to have three Renaissance style open arcades in the front. He also thought about having the two stylized side towers topped by a crenelage. Eventually, he resorted to the classical

² J. Tietz, *Schinkels Neue Wache Unter den Linden. Baugeschichte 1816-1993*, in: Ch. Stölzl (hg.), *Die Neue Wache Unter den Linden. Ein deutsches Denkmal im Wandel der Geschichte*, Berlin 1993, p. 9-94.

design and decorated the front with a portico of Doric columns. The entablature of the portico shows ten scenes of the goddess of victory, the winged Victoria, sculpted by Gottfried Schadow. In the tympanum Schinkel designed a relief, which caused some reservations from Friedrich Wilhelm III, and it was completed as late as 1846 at the order of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. It shows Victoria controlling a battle and deciding about the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. The winners are triumphant but full of grief at the death of the fallen heroes; the defeated are in distress after having lost and having abandoned the battlefield, their families are suffering after the loss of their nearest.

Although the reliefs on the fronton of Neue Wache only symbolically referred to the war of “liberation” and the Prussian victory over Napoleonic France, the symbolism and especially the multiple statuary of Victoria were then clear and readable to everybody. Schinkel however, also planned something in the form of the materialization of the symbolism by having two statues of Prussian generals placed on both frontal sides of Neue Wache adjacent to Unter den Linden. In 1822 Neue Wache was flanked with the slightly protruding statues of generals, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who gained fame as a reformer of the Prussian army, and Friedrich Wilhelm von Bülow. Both statues were designed by Christian Daniel Rauch and they were both a monarchist “offering”. The inscription on both monuments maintained the same tone, “Friedrich Wilhelm III dem gen. von Scharnhorst im Jahre 1822”. The reliefs were again motifs of Victoria with other classical features. A bit later in 1826 a statue of the field marshal Gebhard Blücher was added with a broadsword in his hand, and incredibly richly embellished in reliefs with classical and realistic motifs referring to the events of the period. Almost thirty years later (1855) two additional statues of generals, August Neithardt Gneisenau and Ludwig von Wartenburg Yorck were added on both sides of the statue of Blücher. They were all generals or field marshals who had contributed to the victory over Napoleonic France. Their statues constituted an inseparable part of the place broadly understood as Neue Wache. When talking about Neue Wache it should be kept in mind that it is not only the guard house itself which has a functional purpose but it is a larger symbolic facility strongly connected with the myth of the war of “liberation”.

Since Neue Wache was a military construction it is difficult to expect that it should be surrounded by statues of writers and philosophers. The figures of Prussian generals and field marshals famed during the war against Napoleon’s army, by themselves did add to the facility an aura of a commemorative place with very defined meaning connected with the triumphs of the Prussian army. This was additionally signified by the French cannons from the war of “liberation” positioned nearby, and later supplemented by the French cannons captured after the great victory of Prussia over France (1870). This continuity in the choice of “attributes” placed around Neue Wache was not incidental and carried a clearly anti-French message. This had a strong impact on the place itself, although it did not undergo any changes as such and remained a functional building. Until the fall of the German Empire (1918) it

served as the house for the regiment guarding the vast area around the Royal Castle. The building also served as a temporary prison. In 1900 a military telegraph exchange was located in the guard house. The interior as well as the exterior remained mostly unchanged. Still however, Neue Wache was used as an important place of state celebrations of a military nature. In front of the building magnificent military parades would take place and they were generally very popular among the Berliners. The ceremonial changing of the guard would always attract a crowd of spectators, and the chestnut tree park which surrounded the building on three sides was a popular place to relax. Although it is true that in the second half of the 19th century the new commemorative era moved Neue Wache into the background, it did not take away its symbolic character. The work of Schinkel found itself very well in the company of the new generation of monuments.

On 3 August 1924 that is on the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of World War I president Friedrich Ebert and chancellor Joseph Wirth suggested that a memorial should be built in which the Reich would commemorate the fallen soldiers, though they did not specify where it should be located. The suggestion caused debates as to where in the Reich it should be located, including whether it should be placed in the city or far away from the city hustle and close to nature. It was also debated whether the memorial could be of a functional nature, or whether it should be only of a symbolic nature adapted to ceremonial events. Among other things it was considered how the area around the memorial should look to be appropriate for military parades and national demonstrations. It was then that attention was turned towards Neue Wache, which after the collapse of the empire and the proclamation of a republic (9 November 1918) stood empty while still retaining together with its surroundings untouched symbolic qualities. The future of the building was uncertain; it was undecided whether it should become a cafe, or whether it should be used as bank premises, or something else. In 1924 Frida Schmottmüller came up with a proposal of converting Neue Wache into a war memorial. Her suggestion to clear the interior, place a sarcophagus inside surrounded by a group of figures mourning the dead soldiers would give the place an air of a graveyard chapel. The veteran unions protested against the proposal demanding a national memorial placed in open space, close to nature and far from the busy Unter den Linden. President Paul von Hindenburg reminded that the memorial to the fallen needed to glorify the heroic deeds of soldiers.

Since however, it was impossible to reach agreement as to a common German memorial, the Prussian prime minister Otto Braun (SPD) made a decision in the spring of 1929 to redesign Neue Wache as a Prussian war memorial. In October 1929 Volksbund Kriegsgräberfürsorge organised in Neue Wache a small exhibition depicting the ten years of the organisation's activity, which was a gentle herald of having the building converted into a war memorial. It was of course clear that a Prussian memorial situated in the centre of Berlin would soon become a memorial of central

significance. As a result the Reich's governments joined the Prussian initiative and in 1930 a competition was announced for the conversion and adaptation of Neue Wache as a memorial to the fallen soldiers. Indeed outstanding artists entered the competition including Peter Behrens, Erich Blunck, Hans Grube, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Hanz Poelzig and Heinrich Tessenow. Finally, the design which was accepted was by Heinrich Tessenow (1876-1950), who since 1926 had been teaching in Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg (Berlin). The interesting thing was that his classes attracted students with national-socialist orientation whereas the left-wing students attended seminars by Hans Poelzig. One of Tessenow's students was Albert Speer, later on Hitler's architect and dignitary who in his memoirs underlined his master's hostile attitude towards the Nazi movement but he nevertheless drew attention to the parallels between his teaching and Nazi ideology. Tessenow believed that architectural style grows out of the nation's spirit and that there is no such thing as culture outside nations. Also the dreams about a great leader were not unknown to him, a leader who would not be corrupted but able to communicate simple ideals to a confused society³. His designs were dictated by his dislike of modernism and eclecticism and he preferred simple and austere forms. It was in such a style that he planned the conversion of Neue Wache while drawing his general inspiration from the ideas voiced by Erika Schottmüller.

The exterior of Neue Wache did not require a specific conversion and neither did the nearest surroundings. In architectural terms the neoclassical style was rather in line with the then abiding taste which remained very critical towards pompous and the overloaded embellishments of the Wilhelmian Baroque. The style of a national memorial patterned on monuments of that period was totally unfit for application in the Weimar Republic whereas the new designs were a subject of heated disputes which made reaching any consensus practically impossible. In that situation the simplest solution was to accept an already existing facility which is not controversial, and which additionally enjoys the esteem of the outstanding work of Schinkel. The place had another great quality. Namely, it reminded about the changeability of the Prussian fate, first marked by a humiliating defeat in the war against Napoleon (1806), and later by a great reformatory movement crowned with the victorious war of "liberation" (1813-1814) which was the cornerstone of Prussian power in the 19th century. It was possible to notice in this an analogy to the situation of Germany after World War I. The Weimar Republic was convinced about the great wrongdoing it suffered from the victorious powers which imposed the "Versailles dictate" upon the defeated Germany. All the political parties from the Left to the Right rejected the peace treaty and dreamt about getting rid of the burden it laid. The Prussian past as testified by Neue Wache advised that one should not lose hope for reciprocation and restoration of German power⁴. The symbolic appeal of Neue Wache could be easily updated and this in itself was not insignificant.

³ A. Speer, *Erinnerungen*, Frankfurt a. M., Berlin (West), 1969, p.31-32.

⁴ J. Tietz, *op.cit.*, p. 23-25.

Tessenow entirely converted only the interior of the building and the exterior remained more or less unchanged. The side towers were topped with bowls in which fires were lit during special events; the windows were sealed, the entrance from the colonnade was altered with the Iron Cross positioned over the middle passageway. Initially, Tessenow wanted to permanently seal this entrance with bars which could possibly be opened only on special occasions while on other days it would remain closed protecting the interior from crowds of visitors. However, the solution was rightly considered impractical and the interior was made available to the public. The interior was cleared so that a large empty space was created. There was also a proposal to convert the building into an atrium but it was later on rejected. Instead a large oculus was made in the ceiling which acted as a skylight in the day and at night dark sky could be seen from inside. A block of black Swedish granite was placed inside the empty space. It was initially stylized as a sarcophagus, and later on as an altar, rectangular in shape and two metres high it was lit by the circular skylight from the oculus. If at all, it resembled a cenotaph rather than a classic tomb of the Unknown Soldier. A large wreath made of 235 silver-coated oak leaves symbolising victory (work by Ludwig Gies) was placed atop the block and by making reference to the Prussian tradition it symbolized victory. A bronze plaque was placed in front of the block with the simple inscription "1914-1918". Two massive but slender looking candelabra flanked the block. There was an air of simplicity and restraint in everything. The conversion by Tessenow was generally received with positive assessment, and the high artistic qualities were especially underlined. Yet, the significance of the entire place could evoke some doubts whether the artist did not too much succumb to the temptation to glorify the act of war at the service of the imperialist policy of the Wilhelmine Germany.

The monument functioned under the name of "The Memorial to the Fallen of the World War" (Gedächtnisstätte für die Gefallenen des Weltkrieges). The celebration of the rededication took place on 2 June 1931 in a quiet religious atmosphere. The participants did not include representatives of Stahlhelm, the aggressive right-wing veteran organisation but it gathered representatives of the social-democratic Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold and the Jewish veteran union, Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten. President Hindenburg was present at the event. The speeches delivered during the event spoke of the need for national unity, which however was practically unattainable in the Weimar Republic. Neue Wache converted into a memorial could not help much in this respect though it tried to reconcile various traditions and even different tastes. This is how Peter Reichel evaluated the situation, "One more time in the course of public commemoration of the fallen an inborn but with far-reaching consequences fault of the Weimar Republic was revealed. On the one hand, it had to consign to oblivion the empire which was authoritarian on the inside and aggressive on the outside, while on the other hand, it tried to sustain social continuity and obtain authorization and reconciliation through commemorating the war dead. Yet, precisely this did not succeed, it could not have succeeded. The society of the Weimar Republic was in deep argument over the past history, the blame for the war,

over the consequences of the war and the revolution. Republican forces made a lot of effort to symbolically honour the German fallen soldiers but in the dominant at the time belief the soldiers who died in the world war gave their lives for the homeland, the emperor but not for the republic”⁵.

The Weimar Republic did not manage to solve the problem of worship of the fallen soldiers, which because of the vast war damage constituted a living ingredient of collective memory skilfully used by the nationalist Right. Not completely without reason though, Wolfgang Kruse engaged in polemics with the sharply formulated accusation towards the Weimar elites that they were unable to cope with the war memory and passed the reverence of the dead into the hands of the right-wing parties. He admitted that the overpowering nationalist trend to create a mythology of war and glorify heroic death was not halted but he pointed to the incredibly complicated interrelatedness of the German memory of World War I, the lost war remembered in the context of heated arguments about the German blame for starting the war, and the responsibility for the defeat suffered by the empire. Soldiers fought and died on the frontline but also during the revolution, which after all started with the mutiny of the Cologne sailors. Kruse emphasized that the example of Neue Wache showed that efforts were made to honour the dead soldiers in an integrative manner and not to polarize that is to refer to death, suffering, and the valour of soldiers. However, the problem was that this had to logically lead to the entanglement in the acceptance of the war policy of the empire. “This form of commemoration was unable to integrate either the radical Left or the radical Right with the reservation that it did open widely towards the Right. It was incapable of making a symbolic breakthrough between the militarist monarchy and peaceful republic, and it made a close connection with the nationalist reverence of the fallen soldiers, its topoi and symbols, which eventually won in the fight for cultural hegemony”⁶. In fact the Weimar Republic faced a task which was unsolvable: how to reconcile the remembrance of the individual fallen soldiers with remembering about the very doubtful cause they gave their life for. This turned out to be even more difficult after World War II.

Neue Wache did not cause major objections from the Nazis. In 1933 after Hitler came to power the interior was slightly changed but generally Tessenow’s design remained unspoiled and untouched. The only change included a large oak cross placed in the back behind the block-altar. Its shape was similar to the cross inside the monument in Tannenberg (1927) as well as to the one next to the statue of Leo Schlageter (1931). This was a salute for the churches aimed at stressing the special symbiosis between Christianity and the German nation. Additionally, two large oak wreaths were fastened on the frontal walls of the towers. However, Neue Wache as

⁵ P. Reichel, *op.cit.*, p. 150.

⁶ W. Kruse, *Schinkels Neue Wache in Berlin. Zur Geschichte des modernen politischen Totenkultes in Deutschland*, „Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft“, 2002, No. 5, p. 423

a whole was very much rededicated. Until then it had functioned as a commemorative place (Gedächtnisstätte), after 1933 it became a Memorial in Honour of the Fallen (Ehrendenkmal), and later after 1936 as a Memorial in Honour of the Fallen in World War (Ehrendenkmal für die Gefallenen des Weltkrieges). That is to say it was not a place of grieving after the dead but a place of hero worship. During the Weimar period the memorial was guarded by two plain clothes policemen and there were no military parades staged around it. In March 1933 soldiers appeared in front of Neue Wache. Since 1935 a ceremonial change of the guard again became an attraction. During national holidays military parades were again staged in front of Neue Wache. On the Heroes' Memorial Day (Heldengedenkttag) a military parade would be organized and wreaths were laid on the granite block inside. Regularly on that day Hitler used to lay a wreath there. During World War II coffins with fallen generals would lie in state inside Neue Wache before the funeral ceremony.

Altogether, it turned out that Neue Wache did not require any special adaptation in the Nazi era and it could very well serve during celebrations organized by the new regime. The rededication of the memorial for a place of hero worship was done not by changes to the interior or its symbolism but due to the events organized by the Nazis both inside and outside the building.

As a result of the bombing by the allied forces the building of Neue Wache was quite badly damaged, especially its ceiling and the right side of the façade but it was still fit for restoration. The interior was in a pitiful condition. The altar plinth in the middle was misshapen and the oak wreath laid upon it was stolen in 1948; it was later, in 1960 recovered in pieces in West Berlin. For some time Neue Wache was endangered by the prospect of sharing the fate of the Royal Castle and being completely demolished. In 1949 young activists from the Berlin organisation, FDJ (a youth faction of SED) demanded that the building permeated with the Prussian "military spirit" should be destroyed. However, due to some influential defenders who as arguments used its architectural qualities Neue Wache was spared. Still, the problem of what to do with the building and how to utilize it remained. Tessenow suggested that the guard house should be left as a permanent ruin warning against war atrocities saying, "If I could decide I would not give any other form to the building. Damaged as it now is, it speaks about history. Just clean it and polish it a bit and leave it standing"⁷. There were suggestions to use the building as a museum of Schinkel, university bookshop or a commemorative place to Goethe. For a few years it did look as if Neue Wache would gradually become an eternal ruin. Until the mid fifties the building was falling into ruin with its frontal part collapsing. Finally, an idea emerged to use the building for the same purposes as in the interwar period, obviously with some significant changes in the message communicated by the entire

⁷ Ibidem, p. 425-426.

place. The restoration work was carried out between 1957-1960 as commissioned by the GDR authorities. The interior was restored to its design by Tessenow and with the renovation work completed Neue Wache was unveiled on 8 May 1960 as a central Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism.

The Memorial in Admonition to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism (Mahnmal für die Opfer des Faschismus und Militarismus) was completed in two stages. The first stage focused on renovation work and restoring order to the building. The misshapen granite block was left inside and the cross on the back wall was replaced with a grand inscription: To the Victims of Fascism and Militarism (Den Opfern des Faschismus und Militarismus). Earlier on the statues of the Prussian generals and field marshals had been removed. In the second stage more substantial alterations in the socialist spirit (design by Lothar Kwasnitz) were introduced. The mosaic floor by Tessenow disappeared as well as the granite block, replaced by a glass hexahedron with an eternal flame lit inside. The oculus was covered with a glass dome since below it the eternal flame was lit. The inscription on the back wall was moved to the side wall and the emblem of the GDR (a hammer and a compass surrounded by a ring of rye: a symbol of the union between workers-farmers-and intelligentsia) was fitted on the back wall. In 1969 the soil from nine battlefields and nine concentration camps was brought to Neue Wache, and two urns were brought with the ashes of the unknown soldier and unknown concentration camp prisoner. Two separate plaques carried inscriptions: "Unknown Fighter of the Resistance" (Unbekannter Widerstandskämpfer) and "Unknown Soldier" (Unbekannter Soldat). This was a very significant change since in 1969 Neue Wache assumed a character similar to the traditional tomb of the Unknown Soldier. This was additionally emphasized by the permanent guard (from 1 May 1962 to 2 October 1990) kept by soldiers from a special regiment called "Friedrich Engels". Berliners and tourists were attracted by the colourful ceremony of the change of the guard as well as by the parade organized on the 8th of May, on the anniversary of the "liberation of the German nation from fascism" (8 May 1945 when the Third Reich surrendered).

Neue Wache became the first central memorial commemorating in an all-inclusive manner the specifically perceived German victims of World War II. The memorial made no reference to non-German victims; it had the character of a typical tomb of the Unknown Soldier with the difference being that it also commemorated the "resistance fighter". It was an incredibly brave idea to honour the soldier of the system and the prisoner of the system under the same roof. The "unknown soldier" of Hitler's army was reduced to the role of a victim used by the regime, possibly lured by Nazi ideology. It was difficult to assume that he was killed in glorious action. Thus, a question would arise, 'what kind of the soldier's action was honoured?' Conquering Europe? Additionally, the ashes of the unknown soldier were laid next to the ashes of a concentration camp prisoner, who was in a very narrow way defined as a "resistance fighter". The concentration camp prisoner was promoted to the rank of an anti-fascist fighter (sacrificium), and a regular German soldier was reduced to the role of a victim of the Nazi regime (victima?). In a way then the prisoner and the

soldier were supposed to be united by the fraternity of fate since they were jointly commemorated. This was pure absurd. Despite the solemnity of the place there was something of a surreal grotesque in it all. Ironically it was brought to attention that in fact the soldier could have killed the resistance fighter and the fighter could have fought against the soldier, as the policy of mass extermination would have been unthinkable without Hitler's army. W. Kruse wrote about the east German interior design on Neue Wache in the following way, "In fact the problematic relations between two groups of 'victims', the soldier could have been the murderer of the resistance movement fighter, were not topicalized and neither were the crimes and suffering brought upon European nations by German soldiers"⁸.

In the East German edition Neue Wache not only mixed and homogenized extremely different categories of human losses suffered by the Germans in World War II but, in reality it additionally victimized in a summative manner a sizable part of the German nation, which apparently had fallen victim to the imposed from outside fascist regime. This was in fact the cornerstone of the entire GDR conception of "liberation" of the German nation in 1945. The German soldier and the German prisoner-fighter were shown as victims of the anonymous impersonal "fascism" and "militarism". Yet, the remains of the unknown Wehrmacht soldier were brought from Görlitz, where after all he did not fight either with "militarism" or with "fascism" but with the Red Army. The remains of the concentration camp prisoner were taken from the area of Buchenwald, a German camp which cannot be hidden under the word "fascism" and "militarism". In brief, the evil forces were pushed out in the sphere of "fascism" and "militarism", which occurred both in the past (the Third Reich) and in the present (West Germany). It was all done in an undefined and unexplained abstract manner and therefore by itself more dangerous and threatening. Searching for any traces of an honest attempt to face up to the nation's past would be in vain. However, it would be difficult to deny that in political terms the decision to rededicate Neue Wache as a tomb of the "Unknown Soldier" and "Resistance Fighter" was an exceptionally skilful move. What is more, although the place was marked by the Prussian traditions, politically they were not as touchy as it reminded about the war of "liberation" waged arm in arm with tsarist Russia. The building was finely located on the axis leading to the border crossing at the Brandenburg Gate and it had no equivalent either in West Berlin or in the whole of West Germany.

It was much more difficult to create an analogous commemorative place in the Federal Republic of Germany. While East Germany had the readymade Neue Wache, which only required some adaptation to fit the political needs, in West Germany there was no readymade facility that could be appropriate to be adapted in a similar style. The preserved ruin of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche in West Berlin was of a special character and could not function as a nation's central commemorative place. There was no adequate facility in Bonn, which anyway was a city treated

⁸ Ibidem, p. 429.

for many years as a makeshift capital. It was only in 1961, after the Berlin wall was erected and the hope for a relatively soon unification died down that plans were made to convert Bonn into a city that would meet all the requirements for a modern seat of the state authorities. It was also not incidental that in the 1960s voices were raised that there should be a memorial built in Bonn to honour the fallen soldiers in World War II. Some pressure was exerted by the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge as well as by the war veterans organisations. The federal authorities were also interested at least because they needed a place that would be appropriately designed so that delegations of foreign guests could lay wreaths and do their honours. This was something more than the question of protocol as it could symbolically improve the status of the Federal Republic in the international arena. Politicians while visiting Paris or London would lay wreaths at the tombs of the Unknown Soldier enshrouded in historical tradition whereas there was no such place in Bonn and the Federal Republic wanted to be treated like any other country. However, the problem was that German history was quite specific and erecting a memorial of the Unknown Soldier of Hitler's army would be an odd creation. Who, apart from the Germans themselves, would like to lay a wreath there?

In 1964 a grand bronze plaque was installed in the centre of Bonn (Hofgarten), nearby the university right in front of the Kunstmuseum, on the border between the old part of the city and the newly emerging government quarter. The inscription said, "To the victims of war and tyranny" (Den Opfern der Kriege und Gewaltherrschaft). On 16 June 1964 during the unveiling ceremony president Heinrich Lübke (CDU) laid a wreath with a sash saying, "Gedenken an die Opfer des Volksaufstandes am 17. Juni 1953". It would be difficult to find a more straightforward definition of what the Germans understood under the term "victims of tyranny". However, Hofgarten in the years of the revolt of the youth was constantly a place of demonstrations and it was not fit for protocol ceremonies. Consequently, in 1980 president Karl Carstens (CDU) had the plaque moved to the cemetery in the northern part of the city (Nordfriedhof) where truly better conditions were created for wreath laying ceremonies. It was a war cemetery. In 1933 a tall cross was erected to commemorate the fallen in World War I. Altogether 2,186 people had been buried there including the fallen in both world wars (17 soldiers of the Waffen-SS) and civilians (also 96 forced labourers). It was the place where since the 1950s wreaths were laid on the National Day of Mourning (Volkstrauertag). The plaque was installed on a plinth at some distance from the cross which gave enough room for official ceremonies but the whole place looked rather modest. In 1977 plans to erect a memorial to the fallen in both wars which would be located in a more representative place than the Bonn cemetery revived yet again. In 1981 the idea received support from chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) who suggested that not only the fallen soldiers should be commemorated but also German people murdered in concentration camps or killed during air raids⁹.

⁹ B. Schulz, *Kein Konsens im Land der Menschlichkeit. Zur Vorgeschichte einer Gedenkstätte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, w: Ch. Stölzl (hg.), op.cit., p. 176-177.

In 1982 the President of the Bundestag, Richard Stücklen submitted the conception of a memorial and admonition to commemorate millions of German soldiers buried in unknown places in the east or elsewhere. On 8 May 1983 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge submitted a memorandum which demanded that “a national memorial should be erected to commemorate the fallen of the German nation” (soldiers killed and those who died from wounds, those who died in prisoner-of-war camps, people killed during flight and “expulsion”, German victims of the Nazi aggression). The memorial was to be dedicated exclusively to the German victims, and also those of Jewish origin. Volksbund’s suggestion that a crown of thorns should be a part of the memorial was rejected by the Jewish community who were hostile towards Christian symbols. Finally, by the end of 1983 it was decided that the government would erect a joint memorial to all German victims of war and dictatorship¹⁰. Still the Right demanded a memorial for the fallen soldiers, while the Jews, Sinti and Roma did not want a shared memorial with German soldiers. Temporarily the whole idea collapsed only to be revived in 1985 during the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Third Reich’s capitulation. Volksbund again demanded a memorial and received full support from chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), who was dreaming about a beautiful place suitable for the wreath laying ceremonies during visits paid by foreign presidents and prime ministers. On 26 March 1985 the federal government made a decision to create a House of the History of the Federal Republic (Bonn), German Historical Museum (Berlin) and a war memorial to the fallen in the government quarter of Bonn.

The issue of the memorial was moved to the Bundestag. On 21 November 1985 the parliamentary faction SPD came with an initiative that the Bundestag should open a big public debate concerning the admonition memorial in Bonn and the construction of the Commemorative House (Denkhaus) showing terror and violation of human rights. At the same time SPD called for a broad action of commemorating all the places of the Nazi crimes in the entire republic¹¹. Shortly after on 11 December 1985 the faction Die Grünen submitted a motion including a protest against the memorial for the fallen being built. The motion read that the Federal Republic does not need a National Admonition Memorial on the Rhine and that foreign guests can lay wreaths as they had done so far at the Bonn cemetery. “The foreign state guests, who wish to honour the fallen soldiers in Bonn by laying a wreath or other gesture will show understanding, in the manner they have done in the past 36 years, for the fact that in the Federal Republic an attempt to erect a national admonition memorial has to clash with the unsolvable problem, namely the danger of equating in death the perpetrators and the victims of the national-socialist crimes against humanity”¹². In

¹⁰ W. Kruse, *op.cit.*, p.431; B. Schulz, *op.cit.*, p. 177-178.

¹¹ Antrag der Fraktion der SPD. Geplantes Mahnmal in Bonn. Deutscher Bundestag. 10. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 10/4293. 21.11.85.

¹² Antrag der Fraktion Die Grünen. Geplante zentrale Mahn- und Gedenkstätte im Regierungsviertel in Bonn. Deutscher Bundestag. 10. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 10/4521, 11.12.85.

response on 4 February 1986 the factions CDU/CSU and FDP submitted a motion in which they supported the government's initiative to create a new commemorative place in the capital. The motion said that Nordfriedhof does not fulfil the function of a central commemorative place, while such a place is needed in every nation because it "gives the opportunity to the representatives of foreign countries to show reverence for the fallen of the guest country"¹³. The memorial should be erected, as suggested by the government, in Gronau close to the centre of Bonn, in the parliamentary and government quarter of the city. On 25 April 1986 a two-hour debate on the memorial took place in the Bundestag which ended up with postponing the whole issue until sometime in the future¹⁴.

The Christian Democrat faction in their motion unanimously demanded that a central commemorative place should be created and dedicated "to the victims of war and tyranny, especially to the fallen of our nation". The Minister for Construction, Oscar Schneider representing the government in the debate stressed, "We can no longer linger with erecting a memorial to the fallen of our nation, the victims of war and dictatorship in our federal capital". Alfred Dregger (CDU) with great engagement defended the rights of Germans to commemorate their victims. He replied to the dilemmas as to who was a victim and who was the perpetrator with a straightforward answer saying that the entire nation was the victim.

"Let us test it against the horrendous balance of the losses suffered by our nation since 1914; since then 300,000 Germans died due to racial, religious and political persecutions; 500,000 Germans died as victims of war air raids against civilians; 2.2 million German people died as victims of flight and expulsion; 2 million German soldiers died during World War I; 3.1 million German soldiers died in World War II, and besides that 1.2 million German soldiers were pronounced missing. This mounts up to almost 10 million members of our nation who since 1914 had been by force deprived of life. As we know there is no family in our nation which has not lost some family members in one way or another. So I ask you, Who would want to take on the role of a judge of the dead who are silent and cannot defend themselves? Who will dare to divide them into the categories of victims and perpetrators? At least I, myself am not ready to do it. I do not exclude anybody from nearly 10 million people. I hold them all without exception in my prayers. I want to be only their defender and advocate while at the same time being an advocate of the martyred and decimated nation they came from".

Dregger demanded the commemoration of "the especially close" victims, that is Germans while at the same time fighting down the idea put forward by president Richard von Weizsäcker in his speech delivered on 8 May 1985 on the occasion of the anniversary of the capitulation of the Third Reich, in which a suggestion was made that the inscription on the memorial should take into account a catalogue of German and non-German victims. Dregger clearly demanded to honour the German

¹³ Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP. Zentrale Gedenkstätte in der Bundeshauptstadt. Deutscher Bundestag. 10. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 10/4998, 4 2. 86.

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag. 10. Wahlperiode. 214 Sitzung. Bonn Freitag den 25. April 1986, p. 16460-16477.

soldiers fallen on the frontlines of World War I and II, German prisoners murdered in concentration camps, Germans killed during their flight and “expulsion” and during the allied air raids. He strongly emphasized that all Germans had to be included without dividing the dead into “the right and the wrong ones”. He in particular defended commemorating the soldiers of Hitler’s Wehrmacht, who although had been used by the regime but they still deserved gratitude for having done their duty in an exemplary manner and for bravery on the battlefield (“Die Tatsache, daß unsere Soldaten von einem Unrechtsregime in einem sinnlosen Krieg mißbraucht worden sind, mindert nicht unsere Dankbarkeit für ihr Pflichtgefühl und ihre Tapferkeit”). He underlined several times that in death they are all equal and that they can only stand before God’s tribunal (“Im Tode sind wir alle gleich, und unsere Seelen – das glauben Christen, Moslems und Juden – sind in der Gerechtigkeit Gottes, die die unsere bei weitem übersteigt“). Although Dregger was known for his nationalist views, the fact that such words were spoken in the Bundestag forty years after WWII, must anyway call for reflection. One has the right to surmise that he was not at all in his own in such views. The image he presented was ghastly: brave soldiers in Hitler’s army, poor German civilians touched by war, the most wronged nation in European history. In death everybody is indeed equal at the moment of burial but death does not equate in terms of what has been before it (and in what name life was given) and what will happen afterwards (the place and the manner of commemoration). It seemed that Dregger had not decided as yet to take off his uniform of a Wehrmacht officer.

The Social Democrats in their motion drew attention to the fact that when commemorating the fallen one has to take into account both “the causes and consequences of World War II”, “political responsibility” and “moral guilt”. They rejected the idea of a “national memorial to the fallen” that is they did not agree to have a memorial which would obliterate the responsibility and the blame as well as being limited to the German victims and the German fallen. Horst Ehmke noticed that the Nazi past still had not been sufficiently accounted for and that erecting a “normal” memorial for German soldiers would mean relativizing crimes committed by the Third Reich. Therefore a potential memorial should include all the victims of war and tyranny without closing oneself in the circle of German victims. The inscription should name all the categories of victims from the speech delivered by president Weizsäcker that is both German and non-German. Thus the memorial should differentiate and not obliterate the differences between the victims. He also reminded that the Jewish circles decisively objected to commemorating in one memorial the victims and the perpetrators. Peter Conradi strongly emphasized that it is not about the graves, the right to burial and Antigone’s gesture but about the message to the living that would be sent by the memorial. “It is not about the cemetery and the rights of the dead but about a sign for the living. A memorial in admonition is something different from Antigone’s legacy towards her dead brother”. The SPD faction was not only against the memorial to the fallen soldiers but it placed in sharp focus the problem of commemorating the non-German victims.

Die Grünen followed in the same direction and in their motion they very firmly and straightforwardly opposed the idea of erecting a national memorial at the same time demanding that all the places of Nazi crimes should be adequately commemorated. The Green party believed that under no circumstances the victims should be put together with the perpetrators and that the problem of the blame should not be passed over in silence. In simple terms they regarded that combining in a single memorial various commemorative issues was impossible and undesired; thus instead of erecting one central memorial local memorials should be created to commemorate specific instances of Nazi crimes. The party's representative, Ströbe reiterated this in a parliamentary debate saying that the idea of a central memorial should be rejected, the murderers and the murdered cannot be commemorated in one place, the responsibility for the murders has to be acknowledged and it is a must to commemorate the people murdered in concentration camps. He said, "We reject the idea of a national admonition memorial on the Rhine. The state guests of the Federal Republic will certainly understand that honouring the fallen and laying wreaths is not a simple matter in the Federal Republic as it is in other countries". The attitude represented by the Greens and also by the social democrats reflected the growing sensitivity in the 1980s to the problem of the extermination of Jewish people. The problem could not be entirely ignored by the conservative Right. The Greens and the social democrats seemed to be saying that first the extermination of the Jews has to be thoroughly accounted for and the places where the crimes were committed have to be adequately commemorated, and there is no way that the German and non-German victims should be collectively homogenized. In the mid 1980s there was no chance for a consensus concerning the national memorial to be reached between the major political forces. The Minister for Construction, Oscar Schneider rightly noticed that "a national admonition memorial, a commemorative place for the entire German nation, for all the fallen because of war and tyranny required a national consensus". Waiting for such a consensus ended up only with the reunification of Germany.

The situation after the reunification was made easier by the fact that the central memorial was there in the form of Neue Wache. On 31 May 1990 that is already before the formal reunification East Germany's parliament passed a motion about having the GDR's emblem removed from Neue Wache while the guard was withdrawn on the day of the reunification (3 October 1990). The rest was left unchanged with the eternal flame still burning. According to the reunification act, Neue Wache as a central memorial to the victims of "militarism" and "fascism" was to be protected by the state authorities, which did not exclude changes to its decor. A discussion started over the future of the place. However, it did not involve considering a change in the functioning of the building but it focused on the nature of changes that should be introduced to the so far East German memorial. The course of events was speeded up by the decision about the seat of the government. Following the act from 31 August 1990, Berlin became the capital of the reunified Germany which, however did not mean that it would also be the seat of the central authorities. In June 1991 the Bundestag made a decision that the government will have its seat in Berlin. Im-

mediately, the issue of the future of Neue Wache was brought to attention. Between 1991-1993 a heated debate took place concerning changes to the interior decor but the final decision was left in the hands of politicians, and more specifically chancellor Helmut Kohl, who from the very beginning saw in Neue Wache a dream place for a representative memorial deserving wreath laying ceremonies by foreign delegations. What is more, Kohl had his own conception of redesigning the interior and was able in general to carry his point against the many reservations and doubts which were publicly raised. As recalled by Christian Stötzl, the then director of the German Historical Museum in Berlin, "It was quite rare that the national memorial would be so daringly planned and the plan implemented by the people responsible for political life almost independently from the multiple voices of criticism from cultural circles, which were incapable of changing anything in the course of events"¹⁵.

Generally speaking there were three conceptions of redesigning Neue Wache. The first was the simplest and meant that the building should be left unchanged as a kind of history's testimony. It was difficult to accept because, anyway the old inscription about victims of "militarism" and "fascism", as well as the plaque referring to the "Unknown Soldier" and the "Unknown Resistance Fighter" needed be changed. Besides, the glass hexahedron with an eternal flame inside caused serious reservations as it looked too tacky. The second conception involved restoration of the interior as designed by Tessenow, which had always been considered as flawless in aesthetic terms. Wolf Jobst Siedler and Julius Posener were, among others, advocates of this idea. However, in this way Neue Wache would again assume the character of a military memorial akin to a tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and if a wreath was added it would send a message glorifying soldiers' deeds. This solution would cause numerous objections not only in the Federal Republic but most likely also abroad. And finally, there was the third conception of restoring Tessenow's interior but replacing the plinth-altar with a sculpture, more specifically with an enlarged sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz. This was the idea advocated by chancellor Kohl in a consistent and incredibly perseverant way. In early 1992 he discussed the idea with experts from the German Historical Museum, then with the representatives of the parliamentary factions who agreed to make Neue Wache a national memorial but did not agree on their position as to the changes to its interior. On 8 October 1992 a model of the conversion in Tessenow's style was presented in the German Historical Museum, and in December 1992 Tessenow's interior with the sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz inside was initially accepted. On 27 January 1993 and under pressure by the chancellor the government made a decision to redesign Neue Wache. The fact came out in March 1993 during the proceedings of the budget committee in the Bundestag and it caused nearly unanimous discontent from the parliamentary factions, which felt offended by having been ignored in the debate about the central national memorial for the unified country. The idea itself however was not questioned. On 10

¹⁵ Ch. Stötzl, *Die Neue Wache*, in: M. Sabrow (hg.), *Erinnerungsorte der DDR*, München 2009, p. 170.

March 1993 the SPD faction from the opposition submitted a motion regarding Bundestag's support for the governmental project concerning the creation of a central memorial with a designation that the issue is not exclusively a matter of executive authorities, and that parliament should also formulate its opinion and the whole issue should be submitted for a public debate. The Social Democrats demanded from the government a detailed justification for the project of converting Neue Wache into a national memorial, with a presentation in the Bundestag of different versions for the interior design, and a debate on how to represent all the categories of victims with an unambiguous suggestion of adopting the formula from the speech by president Weizsäcker¹⁶. An hour-long debate was held in the Bundestag on 14 May 1993¹⁷. The question of the main inscription and whether or not additional plaques should be installed and with what inscriptions was not decided. In the summer and autumn disputes continued around the question while at the same time the reconstruction work on the interior of the building was carried on. Neue Wache was unveiled on 14 November, that is on the National Day of Mourning (Volkstrauertag)¹⁸ and since then it has been functioning under the name of central national memorial to the victims of war and tyranny (Zentrale Gedenkstätte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft).

Eventually in 1993 nobody questioned the creation of the central memorial to the victims and using for this purpose the building in Unter den Linden. There was a general consensus that a memorial was needed and that Neue Wache was perfectly suitable for that purpose. In the 1980s such a memorial in Bonn caused substantial doubts, there was even a dose of mockery that the chancellor just wanted to find a place for wreath laying ceremonies. Now this was absent. If so the biggest cause for discontent was the procedure applied by Kohl, who took the matter in his own hands by skipping the competition for the interior design, making quick decisions and indeed presenting others with the accomplished fact. The political parties felt offended, the intellectuals even more so but essentially it was the only method for an effective implementation of the project. The project itself did not require a lot of work. On the outside it looked the same as during the GDR times. Only the army guard disappeared because there were fears of military associations contradictory to the pacifist message of the interior. This requirement was also issued by the family of Käthe Kollwitz, whom chancellor Kohl himself asked for permission to use the sculpture. In the parliamentary debate Konrad Weiß (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) strongly rejected the army guard referring to the views held by the sculptress and there were no objections. For the same reason the statues of Scharnhorst and Bülow which originally flanked the front of Neue Wache were not reinstated. They were located on the other side of Unter den Linden, what looks slightly peculiar and still

¹⁶ Antrag der Fraktion der SPD. Zentrale Gedenkstätte des Bundes, Deutscher Bundestag. 12. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 12/4536. 10.03.93.

¹⁷ Deutscher Bundestag. 12. Wahlperiode. 159. Sitzung. 14 May 1993, p. 13445-13457.

¹⁸ E. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, München 2007, p. 529-530.

voices are heard to return to the old design by Schinkel. Behind the statues at some distance the statues of Blücher, York and Gneisenau were situated in a square among trees and invisible from the street. All the statues returned to places not too far away from Neue Wache but they are divided from it by the wide thoroughfare of Unter den Linden and they no longer create a commemorative wholeness.

The restoration of Tessenow's features in the interior did not cause reservations. The glass dome over the oculus was taken down, the mosaic floor was restored as well as the side walls and the glass block with the eternal flame was removed. From the GDR design the urns with ashes of the "unknown soldier" and "unknown resistance fighter" were retained but their location was not marked. The altar-like block by Tessenow was not restored, although it had its defenders who were for its restoration. Reinhard Koselleck claimed that the form of a block (obviously without the wreath) was ideally consonant with the unimaginable human losses during World War II¹⁹. Anyway, there is a quite widespread opinion that in case of commemorating victims of genocide reaching for more abstract forms rather than realistic sculptures seems more appropriate. After all, Neue Wache was to commemorate war victims and not a fallen soldier. Thus, everything appeared to provide arguments for the choice of an abstract form, however as observed by Christoph Stötzl, the restored block by Tessenow could cause in a contemporary viewer undesired associations with the old worship of the fallen. During the parliamentary debate on the matter Peter Conradi, a social democrat and Wolfgang Lüder, a liberal objected to the idea of restoring the block. Chancellor Kohl shared their views and anyway, he had his own idea of designing the interior. When in 1988 he was visiting an exhibition in the German Historical Museum he was enchanted by a small sculpture by Kollwitz portraying a mother holding in her arms her dead son. It reminded him of his mother's grief at the news of his older brother's death on the frontline. He was determined to have an enlarged replica of the sculpture placed inside Neue Wache. And he did it.

Although nobody questioned the high artistic quality of the sculpture by Kollwitz, not everybody was convinced that its enlarged replica should be placed in Neue Wache. During the debate in the Bundestag Kohl made a speech carefully prepared in defence of his conception. First of all, he reassured that the sculpture did not have a religious character and that this was confirmed by some notes from the artist's diary. Though the denial of the obvious motif of the Pietà seemed strange as the aim was to get as far as possible from Christian symbolism. The problem was that the Jewish circles had reservations towards the sculpture and that the chancellor obtained the consent to install the sculpture from Ignatz Bubis, the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community only in return for a solemn promise to build a memorial of the Holocaust in Berlin. Kohl also claimed that the pain and grief, which were very

¹⁹ R. Koselleck, *Bildverbot. Welches Totengedenken?* in: G. Stötzl (hg.), op.cit., p. 200-203.

well expressed in the sculpture, became a starting point for reflecting in an individual manner on the victims of war and tyranny. The work of art speaks of an individual fate and thus it approaches the problem of victims in the most modern way. Kollwitz depicted the greatest tragedy of the century in a manner understandable to all contemporary Germans through the prism of one person's fate.

"I think that the mother's grief is an expression of something more than pain. It reminds us that in the face of barbarity and systematic extermination of people in the 20th century it is our duty to raise awareness of the personal human dignity of an individual. The faith in the integrity of an individual constitutes the cornerstone of all religious and philosophical traditions that our western culture makes references to". Speaking on behalf of the opposition, Peter Conradi (SPD) praised the chancellor's choice saying, "Everybody will understand the Pietà. A tension will be created between the cool, dignified, reserved space by Tessenow and the reflective silent mother by Kollwitz".

Reinhart Koselleck was one of the most fervent opponents of placing the sculpture in Neue Wache and he firmly demanded to have the decision reconsidered²⁰. Koselleck argued that the sculpture in the symbolic (Christian) sense represents the Mother of God with Christ's body, which on the one hand communicates pain and grief, and on the other hand consolation and hope for resurrection and salvation. When the sculpture is interpreted in a realistic way it shows only the pain and grief of a mother after the loss of her son fallen at war. As he claimed, both interpretations were unacceptable for the Jewish community which does not accept Christian symbols and does not agree to have the memory about extermination reduced to the grief of a mother after the death of her son. He went on to point out that in the case of World War II "the relationship between mother and son does not constitute a dominant theme of grieving, as it was after World War I when about two million (German) soldiers lost their lives". It was equally likely that a father would grieve over his daughter killed during an air raid, and that children would be in distress having lost their parents. As it is, a realistic interpretation of the sculpture does not deliver what had happened, that mothers were being killed as well as the children. No matter how the sculpture is interpreted it does not encompass the memory of mass murders, and having the choice, a sculpture by Kollwitz (1932) of parents kneeling and overcome by grief but without the reference to the dead body would be better. This kind of argumentation keeps appearing even today. It is still reminded that the Pietà as a Christian symbol is not appropriate to commemorate the Holocaust of the Jewish people and that it automatically excludes non-Christian victims. Very recently, Peter Reichel returned to this issue and questioned the justness of the decision to place the sculpture by Kollwitz inside Neue Wache²¹.

The matter of the inscription was possibly even more controversial. Chancellor Kohl during the parliamentary debate supported the idea of a short inscription placed

²⁰ R. Koselleck, *op.cit.*, p. 200-203.

²¹ P. Reichel, *op.cit.*, p.154.

inside the building which would be closely connected with the tradition of the National Day of Mourning, namely, “To the victims of war and tyranny” (Den Opfern der Kriege und der Gewaltherrschaft”). Peter Conradi (SPD) responded that if so the “victims of tyranny” should be placed first and then “of war”. The Christian Democrats found it difficult to accept as they wanted to emphasize that first there was “war” and only later “tyranny”. In this way the Nazi “dictatorship” was somehow overshadowed with the communist “dictatorship” taking first place. Conradi, making a reference to the huge differences in the number of victims suggested that the inscription should be divided into two parts, “Den Opfern der Gewaltherrschaft und den Opfern der Kriege”. Irrespective of this, the social democrats demanded a separate plaque to be installed with a fragment of the speech by president Weizsäcker, in which he in a detailed way enumerated various categories of the victims. The situation developed into a paradox with the social democrats wanting a text from a speech by a Christian democratic president and the Christian Democrats were strongly against it. Ilja Seifert (PDS/Die Linke) altogether rejected the inscription about the victims of war and tyranny saying,

“In this non-binding formula, Mr Chancellor, a participant of a conference in Wannsee, who was later incidentally blown up by an air raid bomb would be equated with six million Jews who had been systematically exterminated. The communists and social democrats, Ernst Thälmann and Rudolf Breitscheid, murdered in the Buchenwald concentration camp would be on the same level with Goebbels and Göring, who were the victims of their own dictatorship. This thought is as absurd as commemorating the fallen from an SS division as well in Yad Vashem”.

The problem was that the Christian Democrats precisely wanted to use the ambiguity of the word “victim” (sacrificium and victima) and to blur the fundamental differences between the quite different categories of the fallen, murdered and persecuted. Ilja Seifert’s proposal to commemorate all who resisted tyranny caused strong associations with the East German commemoration and had no chance of gaining support in the Bundestag. Anyway, in the past of Neue Wache not only the “unknown resistance fighter” was commemorated but also the “unknown soldier”, though with separate plaques. However, in 1993 the tendency to homogenize victims did not meet with such fulmination as it was during the debate in 1986 on the central memorial. It did not help much that Reinhardt Koselleck openly wrote about the hypocrisy preserved in the formula about the victims of “war” and “tyranny”. Wolfgang Kruse assessed that in Neue Wache the glorifying worship of the fallen heroes was replaced by a foggy worship of victims which obliterated everything much more than the GDR worship of victims of “militarism” and “fascism”²². Nevertheless, Peter Reichel drew attention to the fact that although the inscription placed inside Neue Wache (“Den Opfern der Kriege und der Gewaltherrschaft”) does level the differences between different categories of victims, this is at least partially clarified

²² W. Kruse, *op.cit.*, p. 431.

by the plaque positioned outside to the right of the entrance to the building²³. Indeed, despite the initial defiance of Kohl and the right-wing parties, the outside plaque carried a text which seemed to make reference to the catalogue of victims enumerated in president Weizsäcker's speech. A visitor to Neue Wache when entering the building first encounters that register of victims, then inside sees the inscription about the victims of "war" and "tyranny", and finally the standing behind the inscription sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz.

The text of the inscription on the plaque outside the entrance only partially drew upon Weizsäcker's speech, and in fact it constituted a step backwards in the process of reckoning with the past²⁴. Weizsäcker said that the calamities started in 1933 and not only after 1945 following the unconditional surrender of Germany, and he did not hesitate to use the phrase "German concentration camp". Yet, the perpetrators were not indicated in the plaque. One can infer who they were from the word "war" and "tyranny", though this is made difficult by the lack of a chronological frame (no dates). The culprit is more legible only when the "totalitarian dictatorship after 1945" is mentioned (the only date on the plaque). Even the word "Nazism" does not occur and only communism was almost named. Something wrong has happened but it is not known when and on whose initiative. The empty space for the culprit has to be filled out by imagination since one cannot count on factual knowledge. However, what will happen in several years? The victims seem to say more about it although it is not so certain. They were enumerated in the following order: nations which suffered because of war, the fallen in the two world wars, the innocent who lost their lives as a result of war in their homeland, in prisoner-of-war camps and during "expulsion", millions of murdered Jews, murdered Sinti and Roma, those killed because of their background, homosexuality or illness, those who had to die because of their religion or views, women and men who were persecuted and murdered because they objected to dictatorship after 1945. The victims became completely and systematically mixed; the Jews, Sinti and Roma found themselves next to the victims (of course German) of "expulsion" and the "fallen" that is as one can suppose

²³ P. Reichel, *op.cit.*, p. 155.

²⁴ The text on the plaque in German reads with the following words (lines are divided by a slash): "Die Neue Wache ist der Ort der Erinnerung/und des Gedenkens an die Opfer / von Krieg und Gwalt-herrschaft . / Wir gedenken / der Völker, die durch Krieg gelitten haben / Wir gedenken ihrer Bürger, die verfolgt wurden / und ihr Leben verloren / Wir gedenken der Gefallenen der Weltkriege / Wir Gedenken der Unschuldigen / die durch Krieg und Folgen des Krieges / in der Heimat, die in Gefangenschaft und / bei der Vertreibung ums Leben gekommen sind / Wir gedenken aller, die umgebracht wurden / wegen ihrer Abstammung, ihrer Homosexualität / oder wegen Krankheit und Schwäche / Wir gedenken aller ermordeten, deren Recht auf / Leben geleugnet wurde / Wir gedenken der Menschen / die sterben mus-ten um ihrer religiösen oder / politischen Überzeugungen willen / Wir gedenken aller / die Opfer der Gewaltherrschaft wurden / und unschuldig den Tod fanden / Wir gedenken der Frauen und Männer/die im Widerstand gegen die Gewaltherrschaft / ihr Leben opferten / Wir ehren alle, die eher den Tod hin-nahmen / als ihr Gewissen zu beugen / Wir gedenken der Frauen und Männer / die verfolgt und ermordet wurden / weil sie sich totalitärer Diktatur nach 1945 / widersetzt haben".

the soldiers of the Wehrmacht. Weizsäcker also mentioned the Poles and the Soviet citizens but there was not enough space on the plaque for them.

From the plaque and the inscription placed in front of the sculpture, as well as from the sculpture itself an intriguing image of the past emerges. On the one hand, we have the “war” and “tyranny” that we have no information about (apart from the “totalitarian dictatorship after 1945), and on the other hand, we have the vast category of victims in which the doubtless culprits are hidden (e.g., Wehrmacht soldiers). On the one hand, we have the anonymous forces and, on the other hand the individual fate over which a mother is grieving holding in her arms her killed son. One can identify the victims, as well as the perpetrators according to one’s own estimation because universal victim worship opens a wide scope for imagination. However, it all blurs and obliterates the historical reality and constitutes a construct meant to be utilized by the German collective memory. According to Bill Niven, chancellor Kohl primarily wanted to abate the moral dimension of German-Jewish relations and weaken their perception through the prism of the victim-culprit relations, as well as to mark the presence of Germans as “innocent” victims comparable to Jewish victims. As pointed out by Niven, from the memorial emerges an outline of a new canon of the German collective memory which encompasses the experience of Nazism and communism, including also the human losses suffered during the war especially due to air raids and relocation. The canon aims at integrating German society freshly including two different communities the West and East German. “Considering the conflicts between East and West Germans after the reunification, this commemorative policy obviously aimed at the reconciliation of Germans not only with their own history but also with one another. In brief it was the commemorative policy meant to serve the purpose of national reconciliation” (B. Niven)²⁵.

The present Neue Wache can indeed evoke mixed feelings. For certain it is not exclusively a memorial to fallen German soldiers, victims of “expulsion” and killed in allied air raids, as it was demanded in the 1980s. It is also not a memorial exclusively to German victims. It does not contain any kind of symbolism connected with the fallen worship and more so with the glorification of soldiers’ deeds. The sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz irrespective of how it is interpreted, for certain has nothing in common with the worship of the fallen. Anyway, from the aesthetic point of view neither the building of Neue Wache, nor its interior decor causes reservation. There is nothing tacky about it and everything is done in good taste. Still, it is also not a memorial that is clear and unambiguous accounting for the Nazi, as well as for the communist past. It is more a memorial which represents escaping in the realm of universal victim worship, which in many respects breaks any correspondences with historical reality but which provides a cover for commemorating variously understood German victims. Naturally, all the understatements and concealments can

²⁵ B.Niven, *Introduction: German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millenium*, in: B.Niven (ed.), *Germans as Victims. Remembering the Past in the Contemporary Germany*, New York 2006, p. 6.

seem striking and cause justified objections. However, one has to objectively admit that after World War II, the German nation had to face the much more difficult problem of commemorating their human losses than after World War I. The desire to commemorate these losses is completely understandable but how is it possible to avoid relativising the German responsibility and putting the blame on all the people who fought against the Third Reich? Despite everything, this kind of commemoration should not result in blurring the historical context and evading a clear answer to the question, who made the soldiers to be killed, civilians die under air raid bombs and who is responsible for the mass relocation of German people.

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THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NAZI PAST

Periods of change connected with a transition from dictatorship to democracy are characterized by intensive search for a new binder of national unity and identity. Communities which have been affected by totalitarianism in order to build a new order have to define their attitude towards the old one. As it has been demonstrated by the two German states in their process of abandoning the Third Reich's policy and system of values, factors such as the defence of one's own history, and seeking an answer to the question of what should be retained in the memory and what should be eradicated, have shaped the political identity of German society of the political turn era in a significant way. The reunification of Germany in 1990 confirmed the truth that the process of democratization is accompanied by a social crisis which is also a crisis of the criteria determining what is remembered and what is forgotten, the integral elements of every history.

The way of perceiving National Socialism and positioning it in German history has played a fundamental role in the development of political cultures, first of two different German states, and then of a reunified Germany*. National consciousness and community spirit is shaped by reference to history, which can be glorified, sacralised, or pushed to the margins of public life. Establishing two separate German states with different ideological foundations brought far reaching consequences for the cultural memory of the divided community. In post-war Germany the discrepancy between the negative discredited past and the need to have its acceptable image in order to build a positive identity for the new state was a contradiction inherent from the very beginning in the construction of the new order .

The Nazi past was a burden for Germany. Contrary to the majority who hoped that with time the present will eradicate the past, the victims of the Third Reich' policy guarded the nation's memory and pressure from an international public did not allow to forget the past. For that reason both German states had to relate to the

*For a wider account see: A. Wolff-Powęska, *Pamięć – brzemień i uwolnienie. Niemcy wobec nazistowskiej przeszłości (1945-2010)* [Memory – burden and liberation. Germans towards the Nazi past (1945 – 2010)], Poznań 2010, 583 pages.

national-socialist past, reject all of the legacies of the Hitler state, and at the same time try to integrate the society on firm ideological principles and acceptable political values.

They had to combine different strategies and tactics of reckoning with the past, which were all meant to serve two basic functions: to legitimize the state and to build a new sense of community spirit. The challenges Germany had to face after World War II were various in nature. The partition of Europe and of Germany meant that both German states were in victorious camps. Initially, under pressure and with help of other victorious powers post-totalitarian cultures were seeking their own way of tackling the incriminating testimony of the nation's past. A significant impact on how the history of the Third Reich was perceived was exerted by the cold war. The ideological confrontation between the East and the West made it easier to escape from acknowledging the criminal nature of the war.

An additional problem appeared when two German states were established. Namely, the nation's history was also divided and without a common history it is not possible to define national self-identification. Thus, instead its prostheses, or fragmented identities based on two ideological homelands came into being. The only difference was that West Germans felt victims of National Socialism whereas East Germans felt victims of fascism. Members of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) declared themselves to be German patriots who regarded the “Americanization” and western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany as the gravest betrayal of the national interest. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was to function as a “bastion of the national struggle for liberation”. However, the attempt to create a socialist version of the German nation between the Elbe and the Oder did not succeed despite making references to the revolutionary tradition, the labour movement and claiming property rights to the anti-fascist resistance movement.

The reunification of Germany brought a new wave of literature reckoning with the past. An intensified interest in the evaluation of the so far reckoning with the national-socialist past resulted in numerous studies. The end of the cold war and the collapse of the GDR created new conditions which allowed to show the true face of the East German struggle with history and their strategies of breaking free from guilt without the veil of censorship.

IN THE SHADOW OF ANTI-FASCISM

Social democracy, that is the new political system introduced by the victorious Soviet power, being at the same time a new dictatorship decided about the way GDR citizens handled their recent past. In the GDR the assessment of war had its origins in a straight line from Marxism and Leninism. According to the principles formulated by Lenin in his work, *War and revolution*, every war is connected with the political order of the state created by a given social class. War has a class character and demonstrates the contradictions of the era: between imperialism and socialism. So-

cialism is a synonym of peace. Contrary to "bourgeois pacifism" the working class does not condemn every war. A just war is, among others a war in defence of the socialist homeland whereas the wars of the imperialist bourgeoisie were regarded by Lenin as unjust wars. He, on the other hand excluded the possibility of a war between socialist countries¹.

War as an instrument of the Nazi state policy occupied a prominent position in East German foreign policy and their internal political rituals. It fitted well into the frame of SED's binding doctrine and the confrontational cold war policy towards the closest enemy, West Germany and the other countries of the western block. The attitude of the party rule and executive elites of East Germany towards the Third Reich was founded on the definition of fascism taken over from Georgi Dimitrov, according to which the Nazi regime was defined as "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most imperialist and most chauvinistic elements of finance capital"². This approach allowed only for a class interpretation of the criminal regime and by the same token excluded any individual guilt and responsibility. Hence, the agricultural reform and deprivation of private property was in the GDR treated as an important step towards "overcoming" the past. The complementary tool was the employment policy which allowed to remove the old elites and employ the new ones in line with the criteria of the social background and the represented ideology. In the process the property was also taken away from the "bourgeois" representatives of the anti-Hitler resistance movement and social democrats, who did not express their willingness to blend into one party together with the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - KPD) and SED³. In this way they were being degraded to the role of fascist collaborators. Despite the fact that denazification was much more radical in the Soviet occupation zone than in the western zones, the situations in which many former Nazis could continue their careers in the new state were not avoided.

Jürgen Danyel, who devoted a substantial part of his research to analyzing the anatomy of the East German historical and political identity, distinguishes several fundamental features of the political profile of the ruling party in the GDR in the context of its attitude to fascism⁴. They include among others:

¹ B. Blanke, *Kriegs- und Feindbild der Nationalen Volksarmee*, in: H.-A. Jacobsen, G. Leptin, U. Scheuner, E. Schulz (eds.), *Drei Jahrzehnte Außenpolitik der DDR*, Oldenburg 1979, p. 325-332.

² *Protokoll des VII. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale*, Moskau 25. Juli – 20. August 1935, vol. II, Stuttgart 1976, p. 985.

³ See, among others, W. Müller, *Die DDR in der deutschen Geschichte*, "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" 28, 2001, p. 43-53; For a comprehensive analysis of literature on the topic see, *Die Nacht hat zwölf Stunden, dann kommt schon der Tag. Antifaschismus. Geschichte und Neubewertung*, ed. C. Keller und der literatur WERKstatt Berlin, Berlin 1996.

⁴ J. Danyel, *Die Opfer- und Verfolgtenperspektive als Gründungskonsens? Zum Umgang mit der Widerstandstradition und der Schuldfrage in der DDR*, in: J. Danyel (ed.), *Die geteilte Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten*, Berlin 1995, p. 31-46.

- thinking in the framework of enemy-friend categories and the ensuing irrational sense of being encircled and endangered. The anti-fascist ideology seemed to have been determined by the experience and mentality of a specific political generation in the German communist movement. The SED executives were an amalgam of people with experiences of the Weimar Republic, persecutions by the Nazis and from Stalin's gulags.
- being doubly obstructed by the experience of the persecutions from National Socialism and by being entangled in Stalin's policy of purge within the communist circles on emigration in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the communist elite felt endangered and this was reflected in the way they perceived their ideals and organization above the life of an individual. On the other hand, the situation brought about a mixture of fear, opportunism, the need to defend oneself, to resort to denunciation and cynical pragmatism. This is well attested by numerous psychographic records of the Moscow immigrants in their autobiographic literature⁵.
- the consciousness of the elites and their sense of moral superiority resting on the conviction that they not only suffered persecutions from the Nazis but that they from the very beginning were also actively involved in fighting Nazism. The Politburo of the Communist Party of Germany even declared to be a part of the USSR's victorious military rule. This consequently led to building hierarchies of various categories of victims and to excluding some of them from the GDR's consciousness.
- distrust towards majority of the German people, who between 1933 and 1945 lived a "happy and content" life and allowed themselves to be corrupted by the right to "acquire a *Volkswagen* and buy some public shares". In this way "the dictatorship of upbringing" came into being, which by using political strategies of pedagogical and propaganda practice, served the purpose of permanent mobilization of the masses.
- a symbiosis between the proletariat and lower-middle class view of the world which allowed to combine in the communist ideology typical resentments towards particular social groups and anti-Semitic attitudes.

Anti-fascism as the ideology which legitimized East Germany provided a specific platform for reckoning with the past. Mainly it served as an element of integrating society and as an instrument of excluding ideological enemies. On 26 February 1948, together with the denazification commission being dissolved in the Soviet occupied zone, the takeover of power was considered an accomplished act. Several months before that Walter Ulbricht explained the sense of denazification and made it clear that it is not about judging what a person was doing in the times of National Socialism but about where the individual is standing at the moment and how intensively the person is engaged in the "democratic" construction of the SED state⁶.

⁵ R. Müller (ed.), *Georg Lukács/Johannes R. Becher/Friedrich Wolf i inni. Die Säuberung - Moskau 1936: Stenogramm einer geschlossenen Parteiversammlung*, Reinbek b. Hamburg 1991.

⁶ W. Ulbricht, *Zur Auflösung der Entnazifizierungskommissionen*. "Neues Deutschland" 28. 2. 1948.

Antifascism fitted into the doctrine of socialist progress and signified the intention to level the past with the present. The aim was to highlight the role of the Communist Party in the anti-Nazi resistance movement and to use it for the current propaganda of the GDR as the successor of the movement. This stretching of the experiences of the pre-war communists as an ideological construction over the whole of East German society was the greatest swindle, and at the same time the most stable founding myth behind the establishment of the East German state. The principle, according to which the future belonged to East Germany while the past belonged to West Germany functioned as a smoke screen for the activity of party executives. The term "fascism" and "fascist" was reserved for political enemies. Hence, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was regarded as an act of "erecting an anti-fascist rampart". Any internal unrest, riots, any protests were interpreted as "fascist coup attempts". The terms "anti-fascism" and "anti-capitalism" were treated as synonyms of "loyalty towards the GDR".

Anti-fascism as the most important component legitimizing the new order attached special meaning to the victim and the communist resistance towards Nazism. "We in East Germany learnt our lesson from the incurable past. The legacy of the dead (...) and the great ideals of the anti-fascist struggle for freedom have become here a reality". The nationalized anti-fascism had as its attribute a wide range of political rituals for the victims of fascism, which were repeated according to the same script every year in the East Berlin *Babelplatz*, and which constituted an element of the anti-fascist socialization⁷.

The anti-fascist ideology was promoted to the moral rank of the GDR's only interpretation not just by the wide circles of East German intellectuals. Contrary to the common belief in West Germany that anti-fascism was only a manipulative instrument of power for the SED state, it provided a representative costume for many East German citizens. The anti-fascist consciousness was an important element which stabilized loyalty towards the state and which was a source of a programme for the later civil movements. Yet, the communist theory aided by anti-fascism was still unable to interpret all the problems of National Socialism. The churn of ideology of work and capital could not swallow anti-Semitism and racism and it soon contributed to universalizing National Socialism.

Antifascism fulfilled primarily a political function. It also led to the social integration of the former members of NSDAP, Wehrmacht soldiers and the majority of the East German citizens who had supported Hitler's Third Reich. In the process of implementing various strategies to overcome the past, the particular memory of individuals was replaced by antifascism as an ideological credo in the early stages of GDR. The presence of the other German state forced a quick integration of East

⁷ M. Maron, *Ich war ein antifaschistisches Kind*, in: M. Maron, *Nach Maßgabe meiner Befreiungskraft. Artikel und Essays*, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, p. 9-29; B. Wittich, *Initiationen zum Antifaschisten. Folgenreicher Antifaschismus*, in: B. Rauschenbach (ed.), *Erinnern, Wiederholen, Durcharbeiten. Zur Psycho-Analyse deutscher Wenden*, Berlin 1992, p. 180-188.

German society. Especially during the cold war, the SED propaganda by decreeing that West Germany was only an extension and a successor of the Third Reich, created a favourable climate for exonerating their own ranks. The last barrier on the way to the full integration of the perpetrators and victims within the East German state was removed in November 1949, right after the establishment of the GDR, by adopting a “Resolution lifting punishment for the former members and supporters of NSDAP and for Wehrmacht officers”. Three years later this was supplemented by the “Regulation about civil rights for former officers of the fascist Wehrmacht and former members and supporters of NSDAP”. This strategy of condoning trespasses in return for collaboration in the creation of the socialist East Germany was meant to strengthen loyalty towards the new political rule and bring internal political stability.

Although the programme of the Association of Persecuted by the Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – VVN), established in 1947 and later transformed into the Association of Female and Male Anti-fascists (Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten - VVN – BdA) made room for some elements of individual forms of activities for the sake of commemorating the past, with the establishment of the GDR commemoration was fully monopolized by the institutes of Marxism and Leninism. The nationalization of memory and anti-fascist socialization led to the omnipresent ritualization of commemoration in the form of mass staged mobilization carried out by Committees of Anti-fascist Resistance, which in 1953 replaced the dissolved organization VVN. They had their local branches all over the country.

On 1 April 1951 Franz Dahlem, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of SED, who was later persecuted as a “Zionist”, spoke in this spirit at a meeting of the central executive of VVN and pointed out the need to re-orientate the work done by the organizations of the persecuted and direct it against the former advocates of the Nazi regime. As the central task of East German policy he regarded “hampering the remilitarization of West Germany and halting American military plans. Now the main aim is to attract people who, for whatever reasons, are for peace”⁸.

Together with dissolving VVN the stage of transformation of individual memory into a commemorative policy based on the ideological foundations of the party ended. Commemorative practices became an empty formula stripped of any facts, diversity and individuality and then replaced by official symbols. This let the average citizen to get rid of the conflict of conscience, and by being granted a new political mentality to join in the construction of the new socialist state. In fact, not only the working class was included into the “anti-fascist resistance forces” but all the citizens of East Germany. In this way the anti-capitalist continuity was implied and it allowed to regard East German citizens as victims of Nazism and to fashion them into victors of history. The personal share people had in the Nazi crimes remained until

⁸ After J. Danyel, op. cit., p. 43.

the end of the GDR a taboo subject⁹. The auto portrait painted in this way assessed Hitler's Third Reich as a temporary stage of foreign rule. The status of the victims gave measurable privileges; it at least allowed to reject demands for reparations.

The policy towards the past adopted in the Soviet zone led to universalizing National Socialism as fascism¹⁰. The Soviet occupation created premises for a selective perception of the recent past. This was further facilitated by the fact that many of the party executives were communists who had been persecuted as early as before 1933. The fact allowed to create a myth of historical continuity and to relate it to the democratic tradition of 1848 as well as the revolutionary experiences of 1918. Following this approach the GDR could free itself in two ways from the Nazi past; through making reference to the renewed state authorities and through demonstrating distance towards West Germany as a bourgeois imperialist or post-fascist society. The existing situation meant that West Germany, which made endeavours to be regarded as the only representative of Germany on the international arena, was in a way forced to integrate the heritage of the recent past, and that became one of the main topics for their internal disputes.

From the very beginning a conflict of commemorating the past and priorities towards the past accompanied the ideological confrontation first in the western occupied zones and in the eastern zone, and later in both German states. The resistance movement came to the foreground. While in East Germany the legacy of the communist heroes and the anti-Hitler resistance movement were cherished, in West Germany the focus was on individual and military resistance. Still, neither the East German policy towards the Third Reich based on dual morality, nor the theory of totalitarianism created later in West Germany, which equated the Nazi dictatorship with that of SED, served well a rational reckoning with Hitler's policy¹¹.

Peter Reichel, an experienced researcher whose studies focus on the collective memory of Germans evaluates this situation as a gain in the case of East Germany, but as a burden in the case of West Germany¹². The state authorities of East Germany, retreated into history and used it in a selective way for their internal political

⁹ See, among others, K. Stephan, *Erinnerungen an den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Zum Zusammenhang von kollektiver Identität und kollektiver Erinnerung*, Gießen 2006; A. Blänsdorf, *Die Einordnung der NS-Zeit in das Bild der eigenen Geschichte: Österreich, die DDR und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich*, in: W. Bergmann, R. Erb, A. Lichtblau (eds.), *Schwieriges Erbe. Der Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus in Österreich, der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Frankfurt a. M., New York 1995, p. 18-45.

¹⁰ H. Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, München 1985.

¹¹ L. Niethammer (ed.), *Der gesäuberte Antifaschismus. Die SED und die roten Kapos von Buchenwald. Dokumente*, Berlin 1994; Ch. Kleßmann, *Das Problem der doppelten „Vergangenheitsbewältigung“ in der früheren DDR*, in: R. Eckert, W. Küttler, G. Seeber (eds.), *Krise – Umbruch – Neubeginn. Eine kritische und selbstkritische Dokumentation der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft 1989/1990*, afterword by J. Kock, Stuttgart 1992.

¹² P. Reichel, *Politik mit der Erinnerung. Gedächtnisorte im Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit*, München, Wien 1995, p. 37, 40.

benefits, and contrary to West Germany, which at least in the first two decades made successful attempts to free itself from the corset of the past by concentrating on contemporary problems. Nearly until the end of the functioning of the SED state the memory concerning National Socialism was rationed from the top and controlled with the help of many institutions of the system between the Elbe and the Oder. The binding arguments were based on the reasoning that the new socialist social order, which overpowered capitalism, was in itself a premise to breaking free from Nazism and its consequences. The SED state by connecting National Socialism with a “bourgeois society” managed to treat Hitler’s state in two ways as a contrast: with respect to the Third Reich and also with respect to every order of a “bourgeois state”¹³.

In the first years after the war the fashioning of the communist anti-fascist movement as the only anti-Nazi opposition was supported by the conviction that the Communist Party gathered the most consistent fighters. Historical truth was conducive to this thesis and it was difficult to reject; the extent of persecutions suffered by the communists and the number of victims provided a strong argument in the hands of the successors of the communist movement. This fact, however, was the basis of manipulation and political abuse. It allowed, among others, to spread the belief about the undisturbed continuity of the communist resistance against the Third Reich and to present the East German state as the only successor of the movement, and to perceive its representatives as “the best forces of the German nation”.

The complex content and functions of anti-fascism made it difficult for East German society to recognize the traps contained in the state’s ideology. The fact that the first government and party leaders in the GDR were opponents of Nazism frequently persecuted by Hitler’s regime, made their political programme and beliefs credible. This fact was also the source of idealism oriented towards the future and the conviction that East Germany represents a new and better Germany. In particular this was symptomatic of the left-wing writers returning from their immigration. The idealistic anti-fascism had a strong impact on the general public. The effectiveness of the party propaganda was corroborated by the fact that the East German public was not reached by the news of crimes committed due to Stalinism in the Soviet Union and in Spain¹⁴.

The central aspects of Nazism were eradicated from official commemorative places for quite a long time while censorship and monopoly held by the party effectively paralyzed every attempt at a discussion. Then it was easier to accredit the assumption of power by Hitler in 1933 to the “chauvinist part of imperialism and the

¹³ M. R. Lepsius, *Das Erbe des Nationalsozialismus und die politische Kultur der Nachfolgestaaten des „Großdeutschen Reiches“*, in: *Kultur und Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen des 24. Deutschen Soziologentags, des 11. Österreichischen Soziologentags und des 8. Kongresses der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Zürich 1988*, ed. M. Haller, H.-J. Hoffmann-Nowotny, W. Zapf, Frankfurt a. M., New York 1989, p. 252.

¹⁴ U. Herbert, *Zweierlei Bewältigung*, in: U. Herbert, O. Groehler (eds.), *Zweierlei Bewältigung*, Hamburg 1992, p. 21.

aggressive part of the German finance capital”, the view which had to lead to a specific interpretation of history. Academic and school textbooks carried information which was meant to convince people that Hitler's regime was directed against the working-class movement, proletarian revolution and the Soviet Union. The victims of the Dresden bombing could then in this context be used as a political argument in the cold war. In 1953 Lothar Bolz, the head of the National Democratic Party of Germany (National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands - NDPD) said, “We owe the ruins of our cities and corpses buried beneath them to America and England. What has sustained our nation (...) and gave strength to rebuild the country we owe to the Soviet Union”¹⁵.

The German nation, and in particular the working class, became victims of Nazism and the perpetration was attributed to the elites of great industry. In such a context the extermination of the Jews was entirely pushed to the margins and regarded as a result of German imperialism. This view freed East German citizens from the responsibility for the consequences of the Holocaust. The attractiveness of such a view of history meant that a group of perpetrators was pointed out and the others were cleared of guilt. The advocates of such an interpretation were immediately placed on the right side of history. Thus, National Socialism was becoming in the eyes of East German people a history of West Germany. The West German disputes around denazification, prosecution of the war criminals and reparations were treated by East German propaganda as evidence for the existence of the nationalist tradition carried on by the revanchists and neo-Nazi followers.

The cold war strengthened the belief that East Germany belonged to the most progressive, oriented towards the future nations which cherish peace. In this way Germany came out of the shadow of a nation of perpetrators. In 1949 Walter Ulbricht said in his speech:

“At present the criteria of who is a peace loving citizen and wants the unity of Germany do not include the question of what party membership somebody ascribed to earlier on, or whether somebody belonged to Hitler's party but the question of: Whether or not you are for the peace treaty and against the Atlantic Pact which wants to make West Germany into a war base?”¹⁶.

Having accepted anti-fascism as the representative reason of the state in the GDR had determined the consequences for the historiographic accounts of the Holocaust. Subordinating the research into the Holocaust to communist ideology must have led to false conclusions which, among others were a product of accepting false assumptions. In fact communist history education treated fascist anti-Semitism as of

¹⁵ After J. Danyel, *Die Erinnerung an die Wehrmacht in beiden deutschen Staaten. Vergangenheitspolitik und Gedenkrituale*, in: R.-D. Müller, H.-E. Volkmann (eds.), *Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität*, München 1999, p. 1144.

¹⁶ W. Ulbricht, *Warum nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschlands?* Aus dem Referat auf der Parteikonferenz der SED Groß-Berlin, 17 Mai 1949, in: idem, *Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*. Aus Reden und Aufsätzen, vol. 3: 1946-1950, Ost-Berlin 1954, p. 491.

secondary importance to anti-communism. The status of a victim was first of all reserved for the communists who had been freed from camps. Also, the Jews who were connected with communism and located in the eastern occupation zone, including among others Alexander Abusch, Albert Norden, Hanns Eisler, Walther Felsenstein, Anna Seghers and Arnold Zweig, did not play a significant part in the discussion of the Nazi genocide. The communist rhetoric from the 1930s was still binding in the later East Germany. Oskar Fischer, East Germany foreign minister as late as in 1988 said:

“The GDR is a German anti-fascist state in which racism, anti-Semitism and fascism have been eradicated with their roots. The East German government and the nation pay respect to the memory of the victims of Nazi barbarity including the six million murdered Jewish citizens. The young generation in our country has been consistently educated in the anti-fascist spirit, and everything in our capacity is being done so that the young generation will never forget the evil of Hitler’s fascism, as well as the immeasurable suffering of Jewish citizens and the heroic deeds of the anti-fascist resistance movement”¹⁷.

However, the declaration of the membership in the victorious camp, and especially of the fraternity with the Soviet power, required a mythology. Even the German catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad was used to create a legend. That is to say Stalingrad became for East Germany a starting point towards a better new future for Germany. In the official rhetoric the catastrophe was perceived as the source of the East German and Soviet friendship. Stalingrad was functioning as a “triumph of the just war” against the fascist invaders, and a “great lesson” for the nation¹⁸.

With the beginning of the 1950s history education in the GDR was made uniform. On 5 July 1952 the “Museum of German History” was opened in Berlin and it was meant to function as a centre for coordinating East German historiography. The opening date of the Museum almost coincided with the 2nd party conference of SED (9-12 July 1952) during which *Aufbau des Sozialismus* was established. The party devoted a lot of time and space to history education. This considered not only the institutions but the ideological and political dimension of the studies.

“The history of Germany has shown to the entire nation the pernicious route of imperialism and the necessity of peaceful coexistence with other nations in Europe, and in particular the need for friendship between the German nation and the nations of the powerful Soviet Union. History also proves how necessary it is to grant the working class a leading role in the struggle of the German nation to reinstate the unity of Germany”¹⁹.

¹⁷ After P. Reichel, op. cit., p. 39. See also, among others: H. Schmid, *Antifaschismus und Judenverfolgung. Die „Reichskristallnacht“ als politischer Gedenktag in der DDR*, Dresden 2004.

¹⁸ M. Kumpfmüller, *Die Schlacht von Stalingrad. Metamorphosen eines deutschen Mythos*, München 1996, p. 175. Cf. also J. Herf, *Zweierlei Erinnerung. Die NS-Vergangenheit im geteilten Deutschland*, Berlin 1998.

¹⁹ *Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED)*, vol. III, p. 581.

The resolutions of the Politburo from 5 July under the innocent title "Improvement of the research and education in GDR history education" clearly specified the task of historians. "Our history education can fulfill its national objectives only when it makes references to the only scientific theory of social development of the greatest sons of our nation, Marx and Engels, namely to historical materialism..."²⁰. The recommended topics focused not on the Third Reich but on the "social and national liberation movements", starting with the "fight for liberation against the Roman owners of slaves waged by the Germans". German historians at the conference on 12 January 1956 did not unanimously accept the party's directives. Some historians did not agree to the ideological primacy of SED and defended the science of history against making it completely political.

East German historiography was engaged in the construction of a new model of history in total opposition to West German research culture. Works by Alexander Abusch were a leading example of systematizing the entire German past according to the class criteria. The writer from the very beginning worked for communist journals. Between 1935 and 1939 while in exile he was the chief editor of "Rote Fahne", and after his return to Germany in 1946 he quickly made his way up, and in 1956 started his career in the Central Committee of SED to become the minister for culture in 1958. His publications belonged to exemplary and the most frequently cited literature. In his most popular publication from 1946 entitled *A nation on the wrong path (Irrweg einer Nation)* he described Hitler as an agent of the "monopolists of steel, coal and chemical industry", and regarded National Socialism as an outcome of the erroneous development of German history since the Middle Ages. His historical writings became political manifestos. The national route of mistakes committed by Germany started with Martin Luther, "the undertaker" of German freedom. In his opinion the most brutal enemy of the 20th century Germany was "the reactionary trust of the Junkers and capitalists", and he regarded the opposition between the "reactionary powers" versus "the progressive working classes" as the fundamental contradiction throwing a long shadow on the course of history²¹. Abusch's interpretation was tailored to the party programme.

"It is not possible to talk about the responsibility of Germans without at least mentioning the role of their closest environment. Namely the reactionary and capitalist primacy of the political interest of England and France, the victorious countries after World War I, helped to strengthen the reactionary forces in Germany after 1918. The West European countries saw the young Soviet Union as their enemy and they believed that they could target it with the bastion of the German Republic"²².

²⁰ After U. Neuhäuser-Wespy, *Geschichtswissenschaft unter der SED-Diktatur. Die Durchsetzung der Parteilinie in den fünfziger Jahren*, "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" 39/1996, s. 18. Cf. also, *Der Verband der Historiker Deutschlands und die Historiker der DDR*, in: W. Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945*, München 1989.

²¹ A. Abusch, *Irrweg einer Nation. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis deutscher Geschichte*, Berlin 1946, p. 215.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 260.

Walter Ulbricht, in the same vain as Alexander Abusch, interpreted National Socialism as a derailment within capitalism. In 1945 he wrote, "Hitler's party turned out to be a party of war waged by the German owners of the arms industry and banks (...) Hitler's imperialism emerged as the darkest reactionary force"²³. For Abusch the German route of mistakes and weaknesses ended in 1945 and the new socialist objective was to overcome the chain of false actors and replace them with progressive German forces. In a similar way for the First Secretary of SED together with the new order the great tradition of a revolutionary struggle would be revived. On 9 July in 1952 during SED's 2nd party conference Ulbricht made it clear how the fight for the past can become an important element of the confrontation between both adverse systems saying, "Everybody understands the great importance of the scientific study of German history for our struggle for national unity and for cherishing the whole great traditions of the German nation. This gains special importance in the face of the endeavours of the American occupant to bury the great achievements of our nation"²⁴.

Ideological deformation made the historiographic reckoning with the Holocaust impossible and identifying Jews with capitalism and the West added further difficulty. A specific philosophy of history was not without significance. Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, the leaders of German communism in Moscow attached primary attention to the suffering and triumph of the Soviet Union. There was no room for the Holocaust in the communist manifesto to the German nation from June 1945 and in a work by Ulbricht entitled, *The legend of German socialism* published in 50,000 copies; until January 1947 and a further 300,000 copies were printed, and from 1952 a new edition was published under the title, *The Fascist German Imperialism*. In the "Communist Party Manifesto" from June, which was referred to in the 1950s, one could read:

"The working people of Berlin!... You had failed to notice the warning from anti-fascists (...) and you had taken the Nazi poison of the ruffian imperialist ideology. You had become the instrument of Hitler's war and by the same token you had accepted the responsibility and joint blame. Now you will have to gradually free yourselves from the blame and clear the German name from the dirt left by Hitler's disgrace"²⁵.

The obligatory reading of the work by Ulbricht was freeing the masses from guilt. His analysis of anti-Semitism was consonant with the interpretation adopted in the 1930s and 1940s. After 1933 he wrote that Hitler's fascism started with the destruction of the Communist Party and SPD, as well as the trade unions and the pogrom of Jews²⁶.

²³ W. Ulbricht, *Die Legende vom „deutschen Sozialismus“*. Ein Lehrbuch für das schaffende Volk über das Wesen des deutschen Faschismus, Berlin 1945, p. 90.

²⁴ After E. Wolfrum, *Geschichte als Waffe. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Göttingen 2001, p. 69.

²⁵ After J. Herf, „Hegelianische Momente“. Gewinner und Verlierer in der ostdeutschen Erinnerung an Krieg, Diktatur und Holocaust, in: Ch. Cornelißen, L. Klinkhammer, W. Schwentker (eds.), *Erinnerungskulturen Deutschland, Italien und Japan seit 1945*, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 198-209.

²⁶ W. Ulbricht, *Der faschistische deutsche Imperialismus (1933-1945)*, Berlin 1952.

The reckoning with the past in the sense of individual diverse investigation of the nature and consequences of Hitler's regime was made impossible by the ideology which deprived people of civil rights in the understanding of western democracies. The East German statehood was built on collective class sovereignty with a limited right for interaction. The GDR's peculiarity was manifested by the fact that contrary to other countries of the communist block it could not refer to the nation's ideals and use national sovereignty to compensate for the deficit inherent in legitimating class sovereignty.

The East German symbols and rituals did not have much in common with the real victims of Nazism and the war. They all served the "struggle for peace". Every year in September an "International Remembrance Day of the Victims of Fascism" was celebrated. In the VVN Manifesto from 1951 the remembrance day was announced as "a day of fighting against war and fascism". The remembrance did not focus on the victims who were led into the gas chambers, shot and transported to work as forced labourers in the Third Reich but on those who were described as "11 million men and women from all European countries who were fighting against Hitler's fascism for the peace of mankind. (...) All those who then opposed fascism and resisted the regime (...) were above others fighters for peace"²⁷. In such rhetoric there was no room for German blame and responsibility since the term victim was justly ascribed only to "martyrs and heroes" murdered for political beliefs. The essence of the commemorative policy formulated by the communist dictatorship was contained in the text of a telegram sent by Stalin on the occasion of establishing the German Democratic Republic which said that "the greatest sacrifices in the war were made by the German nation and the Soviet nation", and that "both nations have the greatest potential in Europe to carry out great actions of international significance"²⁸. In this context the years between 1933 and 1945 were perceived as the time of foreign rule by a different class. The situation was made worse by the fact that East German historiography started to investigate the Nazi past more thoroughly only as late as in the 1960s. After 1945 "middle-class" historians did not have their say. There was no objective discipline dealing with history since historians were replaced by interpreters of history from communist executive circles.

The centrally controlled cultural policy in the GDR was subject to their own vision of history. While in western zones the term "West" was synonymous with values, and at the same time considered a bulwark against communism, in East Germany the discussed issues included cherishing the "great patriotic traditions and national cultural heritage". The "Cultural Federation for the Democratic Revival of Germany" (*Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands*) created in 1945 by the Russian administration from the very beginning aimed at "awakening the great German culture, the pride of our homeland, and justifying the new spiritual

²⁷ After J. Herf, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

²⁸ After H. Weber, *Kleine Geschichte der DDR*, Köln 1980, p. 53.

life". In 1949 the same organization regarded itself as a movement of spiritual restoration and made references to the "liberating, humanistic and truly national tradition of our culture. The Cultural Federation is in all spiritual capacities a fighter for an objective truth, humanistic measures and values, and an unfalsified view of history for the ideals of progress and freedom"²⁹. The East German authorities throughout all the decades of their existence cared for extending the infrastructure of carriers of memory. The directives issued in September 1970 which defined the "anti-fascist and humanistic foundations" of cultural policy spoke with pride about the achievements in a number of museums; The German Democratic Republic has 553 museums and places of commemoration which are annually visited by 18 million people. With respect to the density of the network of museums, the large number of visitors and the intensity of work, East Germany occupies the first place in Europe"³⁰.

SED also wanted to be a party for the revival of German culture and it is how it called itself in their 1946 manifesto. The intention was to associate socialism with humanism. The history of the class struggle of the working masses became synonymous with the history and the development of humanism. This constituted the real Germany, not the one signified by the swastika. The East German writer and politician, Werner Eggerath was asking about the German nature in the times of contempt, "Was it Germany which in hobnailed boots bashed the streets and disgraced humanity? Was it Germany which scattered our nation's blood across the battlefields of half of the world and let it rot? Was it Germany?". At the same time he provided an answer, "No, that was not Germany. The real Germany is a country of peace and human progress and cooperation of fraternal nations. Humanism must be won and not awoken"³¹.

The dominance of anti-fascism and the focus on the communist resistance movement meant that memory became an abstract amalgam, detached from particular people, places and events. The monumental nature of the commemorative topography in the places of torment led to the loss of historical consciousness. Martin Schönfeld in his study investigating the plaques commemorating the Nazi dictatorship in East Berlin pointed to the tendency to establish such a form of commemoration in which "the individuals and their biographies sunk in the normalized mesh" in which "their individuality was levelled and degraded to the sole representation of the resistance movement"³².

The East German commemorative places had their blade pointed in two directions: first against the culprits of the criminal war, and also against the West German state. The centre of the East German historical policy was dominated by the

²⁹ Kulturbund 1949: Grundaufgaben des Kulturbundes, in: E. Schubbe (ed.), *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur-, und Kulturpolitik der SED*, Stuttgart 1972, p.121.

³⁰ After E. Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990*, Darmstadt 1999, p. 298.

³¹ W. Eggerath, *Nur ein Mensch*, Weimar 1947, p. 187.

³² M. Schönfeld, *Gedenktafeln in Ost-Berlin*, Schriftenreihe Aktives Museum, vol. 4, Berlin 1991, p. 22.

command to “uproot militarism and fascism” in all areas of life. Each exposition commemorating the Nazi terror also needed to remind who is the continuator and successor of the militarist doctrine. This confrontational character of the East German memory towards their compatriots across the Elbe deprived it of credibility. The divided memory was expressed in the competition of victims which was most clearly exhibited in the former concentration camps. The camp in Buchenwald was a commemorative place which was the most suitable for such a confrontation. The nearby Weimar, the birthplace of the Republic and the heir of the humanistic tradition of Goethe and Schiller, and Buchenwald with the mass graves expressed the brilliance and misery of German history. Thus, the official propaganda instituted the Buchenwald concentration camp as a national memorial of liberation from fascism, as the “red Olympus”, essential for the construction of the GDR founding myth. Other East German camps, in Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück shared the same fate.

In the early German Democratic Republic a few types of political memorials could be distinguished: “to the anti-fascist resistance movement”, “to victims of fascism”, and the monuments serving as socialist models for the working-class movement and for the development of the GDR. The initial commemorative character with time gave way to the imperative function. The statues which dominated the memorials in the former concentration camps did not portray the suffering victims but the fearless victorious revolutionary activists³³. While the beaten West Germans commemorated their fallen soldiers, victims of air raids and of the resistance movement, East Germans exhibited symbols of the international victory over fascism. Their aim was also to demonstrate the dominance of the socialist community over imperialism and solidarity of the anti-fascist forces. The memorial in Buchenwald, the work of Fritz Cremer is distinguished by its huge expressiveness; a child and ten men create not a group of people sentenced to death but a group set in a combat pose with guns and a flag. It is not the overwrought victims but the victors with their clenched fists who constitute the dominant structure³⁴. Maoz Azaryahu, a historian from Tel Aviv brought it to attention how an artistic mode of expression can falsify history. The clenched fist raised in protest in the representative memorial in Buchenwald loses its subjectivity. The victims remain anonymous³⁵.

The area of the concentration camp became the place commemorating the anti-fascist resistance movement and liberation. In 1985, on the 40th anniversary of liberating the camp, a museum was opened which was supposed to fulfill primarily the educational functions with a clearly marked ideological opponent in the background. The verbal and visual messages were directed towards the Red Army, the Commu-

³³ H. Adam, *Erinnerungsrituale – Erinnerungsdiskurse – Erinnerungstabus. Politische Denkmäler der DDR zwischen Verhinderung, Veränderung und Realisierung*, „kritische berichte“ 3, 1992.

³⁴ P. Reichel, *op.cit.*, p.131.

³⁵ M. Azaryahu, *Vom Wilhelmplatz zum Thälmannplatz. Politische Symbole im öffentlichen Leben der DDR*, Schriftenreihe des Institut für Deutsche Geschichte der Universität Tel-Aviv, vol. 13, Gerlingen 1991, p. 189.

nist Party and the working class. Yet, the problematic question which remained was how to agree this image with the mass graves discovered in 1984 from the time of the special Soviet camps which existed between 1945 and 1950, which according to expert estimates contained the remains of 6,000 to 13,000 victims³⁶.

The dual history of the camp-museum expressed the dual memory; of the victims of Nazism and Stalinism. The reunification of Germany brought new features into the commemorative culture. Starting in 1991 a committee of experts headed by the historian, Eberhard Jäckel and established by the government of Thuringia prepared recommendations. The exhibition presenting the history of the concentration camp should account for the current research and free itself from the so far propaganda of East German historiography. A lot has been done to secure the documentation of the early commemorative places in East Germany as well as to weaken the monumental dimension of the political symbols.

The confrontation of memory on the level of pure propaganda assumed various forms. When in early 1965 the Federal Republic of Germany was facing a decision whether or not to extend the period of expiration of validity concerning war crimes, the East German parliament issued in February 1965 a "Statement to the Parliaments of the World" which said, "According to the will of the West German government and as enacted by the resolution of the Federal Cabinet from 5 November 1964, the date 8 May 1965 (...) is supposed to be the day of general amnesty for the thousands of Nazis and war criminals. This hideous plan is a blow to the sense of justice among nations. It also constitutes a serious threat to peace and security. (...) It is a constituent of the revanchist policy of the West German government"³⁷.

The dual heritage of Nazism and communism, that was revealed after the reunification, brought complex consequences. In the 1990s the media got interested in a particular case. In 1994 a former camp warden from Ravensbrück, Germany received 65,000 German marks in damages because she had spent 10 years in camps and prisons in East Germany. The Soviet war tribunal had sentenced her to 25 years in a penal labour camp. As one of the journalists commented the SS camp warden received 550 German marks for each month in prison, whereas the former camp prisoner from Ravensbrück can according to the federal law be awarded only 150 German marks for each month spent in the camp³⁸.

On the break of the 1960s and 1970s East Germany introduced some corrections in their view of history. In 1967, after the 7th party congress a lot of effort was made to position history closer to the nation's executive authorities. In response to the change of government in West Germany and the eastern policy of the SPD/FDP coalition the East German authorities made an unsuccessful attempt to construct a vision of a "socialist nation". The conception of a nation and the portrayal of his-

³⁶ Among others, M. Klonovsky, J. von Flocken, *Stalins Lager in Deutschland, 1945-1950*, München 1993.

³⁷ "Neues Deutschland" 4. 02. 1965.

³⁸ A. Schneider, *Alles Opfer, oder was?*, "taz" 1. 12. 1994.

tory constitute two categories which were continuously mutually dependant in East Germany. The primary aim of teaching history was the formation of the socialist consciousness, which in domestic policy was to result in developing socialist patriotism and abroad to be expressed as a class struggle.

When in May 1971 Erich Honecker came to power a new era began. The central research plan for historians for the years from 1972 to 1975 dictated the credo for history as a discipline which was determined by the conclusion that the international socialist system focused around the Soviet Union had developed as a result of the course of world history, and that "The Democratic Republic of Germany is a legitimate successor of the revolutionary, progressive and humanistic tradition of German history, and first of all of the German working-class movement"³⁹. The new East German conception assumed that the two German states represent two nations, whereas in 1968 the constitution of East Germany still admitted to national unity, "The German Democratic Republic is the socialist state of the German nation". The elements of national unity were erased from the 1974 constitution. Since then the GDR functioned as a "socialist state of workers and peasants". The adjective "German" was removed from the official language. The radio stations which in their names included the word "German" became thus "the voice of GDR", the German Academy of Science was renamed as the "The GDR Science Academy". The national anthem because of the words, "Germany - one homeland" could no longer be sang but only played as music.

However, it was not possible to mould the conception of the nation and its history completely according to the party's directive. The state could not be entirely separated from the nation. The wave of the renaissance of interest in history in West Germany could not remain without an impact on historical consciousness in East Germany. The 30 year anniversary of GDR provided an occasion to open a new historical perspective under the heading, "Heritage and Tradition". Prussia became the centre of attention but the historians had to make acrobatic efforts to select only these aspects from the Prussian heritage which were in line with class ideology. The public in both German states were overcome by a wave of nostalgia. The discussion around the Prussian legacy raised new questions about the national unity of Germans and their interpretation of history. The Prussian legacy had for East Germany dual significance. The negative image of Prussia as the homeland of militarism was in the 1980s complemented by the partially rehabilitated images of some Prussian personalities like, for example Karl von Clausewitz, Gerhard von Blücher and Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who were raised to the rank of "servants of progress" as they "stimulated the activity of the masses". The great reformers, Freiherr vom und zum Stein, Karl August von Hardenberg, and the general Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, who in 1812 signed the neutrality Convention of Tauroggen and provided arguments for the camaraderie of arms with Russia, could be used to extend the historical

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 299.

argumentation for the present friendship with the Soviet Union. Both German states needed founding myths, positive elements together with maintaining a bond with their own history. They both corrected and verified the past in various ways. In 1948 when the anti-fascist ideology became the basis for the historical narrative of the German Democratic Republic, the classical statue of the reformer, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the work of Christian Daniel Rauch, was removed as a symbol of Prussian militarism only for it to return 15 years later. The general was needed as a reformer, who had modernized the Prussian army, to legitimize the people's army in East Germany⁴⁰.

In a way the commonly shared German history returned to East Germany through the backstairs. Together with the sense of belonging to a nation with a shared culture came the awareness of history, which the state managed to divide only on the façade. The rehabilitation of the Prussian-Protestant tradition and the huge interest in Martin Luther, especially in 1983, the "Year of Luther", showed the shared German emotions which were running underground and which paved the way for the reunification of Germany. Although for all the 40 years both German states competed with one another in all areas of life, also in the domain of history which had to fulfill the external as well as internal political functions, the collapse of the Berlin Wall exposed the false glitz of ideology. East German historiography became overnight a museum exhibit demonstrating the role of political doctrine in shaping the vision of the past.

In the final stage of the GDR, that is in the short history of the democratic East Germany together with the declaration of independence came the delayed admission of guilt. On 12 April 1990 the democratically elected East German parliament announced a resolution which said, among others, "In the times of National Socialism the Germans caused immeasurable suffering to the nations of the world. Nationalism and racial madness led to genocide, especially on the Jews from all European countries, on the nations of the Soviet Union, the Polish nation, Sinti and Roma". The resolution expressed "on behalf of German men and women their shared responsibility for humiliation, expulsion and the murder of Jewish, women, men and children. (...) We ask all the Jews in the world for forgiveness. We ask the nation of Israel to forgive the hypocrisy and hostility towards Israel in East German policy as well as to forgive the persecutions and deprivation of dignity that Jewish citizens suffered also after 1945 in our country"⁴¹.

REMEMBRANCE DAYS

The East and West Germans in various ways tried to handle historical anniversaries. They all from the very beginning had a problem with how to call the 8 /9 May. Should it be "the end of war", "May 1945", "catastrophe", "capitulation", "collapse",

⁴⁰ G. Wolff-Bonekämper, *Schinkels Neue Wache Unter den Linden. Ein Denkmal in Deutschland*, in: Akademie der Künste (Hg.), *Streit um die Neue Wache. Zur Gestaltung einer zentralen Gedenkstätte*, Berlin 1993, p. 35.

⁴¹ After "Der Tagesspiegel" 14. 4. 1990.

“the zero hour”, or “the new beginning”? None of the terms was satisfying and each was evoking divergent associations, different vision of history, different memories, constructions of identity and a different ideology. The term “catastrophe” suggests that the outcome of war was in a way a stroke of fate, and that perspective weakens human responsibility. The word “capitulation” needs to be specified as “capitulation for whom? Before whom? What emotions come with the term? On the other hand, the term “the zero hour” and “the new beginning” are intended to define the caesura of an era. Declaring “the zero hour” signifies an attempt to erase time and thus means concealing the truth. “The unconditional capitulation as the new beginning is an absurd since the idea of the thousand-years-old Reich cannot disappear overnight, it is still alive. Such a manifestation is equivalent with an attempt to put the facts *ad acta*, for example the German annihilation strategy. Then the perpetrators and the onlookers would have to recognize how much they had been submitted to a mad leadership”⁴². In the recent past the question, “who was freed in 1945?” has become an object of reflection. Freed from what and what for? How many Germans interpreted capitulation as liberation? And then was it liberation only from the inhumane war, or from Hitler, who several years earlier had been worshipped as a providential spirit? Or was it liberation from one’s pangs of conscience?

What did the end of war mean? This question has remained disputable for many decades and as a result a peculiar mythology of the war ending emerged. It was not only that the two states differed in their interpretation but also internal German differences occurred. They concerned the communist resistance movement, the “self-liberation” of the concentration camp in Buchenwald and the role of the Red Army understood as an armed organ of the communist forces. In the early years after the war West Germany did not work out a commemorative tradition referring to the war ending. The date 8 May was not treated as an occasion for collective learning. Politicians ignored this day and the public did not see any reason why remembering about the defeat should be promoted to the rank of a celebration. Time was needed to make this anniversary the subject of a deeper and more profound reflection. For a long time this anniversary was treated in the Bonn Republic as a demonstration of political difference from East Germany, which treated this day as “liberation day”

From the very beginning in East Germany this day was an element of the anti-fascist reason of the state as ensured by the communists in the Soviet zone. The monumental memorial in Treptower Park was the most prominent symbol of liberation and the place of annual ceremonies in East Berlin. It was also the central commemorative site which marked the appropriation of the Soviet victory. As early as in 1946 the Soviet authorities announced a competition for the most important commemorative site in Berlin. On 8 May 1949 marking the 4th anniversary of the war ending a memorial to the Soviet soldiers was officially unveiled. The triumphal

⁴² A. Eckstaedt, *Nationalsozialismus in der „zweiten Generation“. Psychoanalyse von Hörigkeitsverhältnissen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 496.

arch at the entrance to the park honours the soldiers who according to the inscription “died for the freedom and independence of our homeland”. The route to the major memorial is lined with 16 white marble sarcophaguses ornamented with reliefs from the civil war of the Soviet nations and with inscriptions of citations from Joseph Stalin. The main memorial placed on an elevation shows a thirty-metre tall statue of the “Liberator”, a soldier with a sword in one hand, as an archetype of the angel of vengeance, and a child in the other arm, who with his boot squashes the swastika. The visiting route is similar to the Way of the Cross⁴³.

On 8 May 1945 a memorial of “The Camp Prisoner and Liberator” was unveiled in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. The memorial shows a relief of a Red Army soldier with a camp prisoner in his arms. The dominant message is a reminder of to whom the Germans owe their liberation. On 8 May 1960 the reconstructed from the war debris building of *Neue Wache* (The New Guard House) at *Unter den Linden*, work of K. Friedrich Schinkel, was rededicated as a memorial to the victims of fascism and militarism. On the 20th anniversary of the GDR the symbolism of *Neue Wache* was changed, namely a grand stone national emblem of East Germany was added and urns with soil from concentration camps and battlefields were placed before the eternal flame.

The 8 May served the purpose of monumentalizing and canonizing the heroics of the Soviet soldiers. The commemorative sites in East Germany were created on the Soviet initiative and according to their pattern. It was the representatives of the Red Army who in November 1967 opened the “Museum of the Unconditional Capitulation of Nazi Germany in the War of Independence 1941-1945”. In 1972 a commemoration site was opened on the Seelow Hills (Seelower Höhen). It was supposed to remind about the “The Victor’s Fighting Route”, that is of The Red Army, which in early 1944 lost 30,000 soldiers, as well as it was meant to confirm the “camaraderie of arms” between the East German and Soviet soldiers. The celebrations on the 8 May created favourable conditions to strengthen the East German interpretation of history; highlighting that the major glory of victory and the burden of losses are accredited to the Soviet Union while the role of the western allies was marginalized. The year 1945 was ascribed a role of a caesura of an era just as it was with the year 1917. Socialism finally overcame the fascist tyranny and the German guilt obliges to eternal gratitude and friendship with the liberator. Thus, the 8 May as a celebration of victory was simultaneously a celebration of socialism⁴⁴. The Nazi racist policy and its victims did not constitute a point of reference. The centre of attention was on the suffering of the civilians in the last months of the war and the bombed Dresden. These facts were used as political arguments. As in 1953 Lothar Bolz, the head of the East German National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) assured, “We owe the

⁴³ For a wider account see, H. Adam, op.cit., p. 10-35.

⁴⁴ B.-A. Rusinek, *Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs lokal, regional, international. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven*, in: idem (ed.), *Kriegsende 1945. Verbrechen, Katastrophen, Befreiungen in nationaler und internationaler Perspektive*, Göttingen 2004, p. 7-26.

ruins of our cities and corpses buried beneath them to America and England. What has sustained our nation (...) and gave strength to rebuild the country we owe to the Soviet Union"⁴⁵. When in 1965 Günter Paulus, a German historian took the courage to say that "liberty came to us Germans not as a friendly goddess with a palm twig in her hand" but "it drove in tanks into our streets", "it knocked on our door with the butt-ends of guns", the text was rejected by state censorship as "historically inappropriately formulated" and "politically unacceptable"⁴⁶.

In April 1950 the interim house of parliament established the 8 May and the 7 October to be official national holidays in East Germany. The May celebrations in East Germany, similar to the entire historical policy of the SED state, were a manifestation of friendship with the Soviet Union, and at the same time a performance condemning the political reality of West Germany. To illustrate, for example, on 8 May 1955 a demonstration took place in which 200,000 people participated and whose aim was to condemn West Germany which became a NATO member on the 5 May. The celebration of Liberation Day were always an occasion for a political update of the past. When in 1970 on the occasion of the anniversary of the war ending Willy Brandt spoke in the Bundestag, "Neues Deutschland" saw "pure revanchist ideology in all fragments of his speech"⁴⁷. Several years later, on the 28th anniversary of the German capitulation, it was yet again stressed that East German citizens are the victors of 1945. That is to say "the wheel of history has been turning forward on East German territory and it will keep turning forward"⁴⁸. In 1965 on the occasion of the 8 May the American war in Vietnam was condemned. Historically thus, anniversaries were an occasion to mobilize the masses and gain support for the SED, its "peace mission in the world", as well as to express opposition to the western powers, which were a threat to peace.

Ritualized celebrations enriched with the current elements of political conflicts between the East and the West were becoming a ceremony in which National Socialism was a marginal attachment devoid of content. Anti-fascism solved everything without explaining anything. It was an ideology of compensating, legitimating and separating from the past. Shame, guilt, sorrow were not suitable for the feelings of the victor. The 8 May had a strong position in the political calendar of the GDR and it contained the whole of East German mythology. In both German states metaphors were used to obscure the real meaning of the past. While on 8 May 1965 Walter Ulbricht spoke of the "swampy growth of German imperialism", Gustav Heinemann in 1970 spoke of the "dark hours of the gloomy era".

⁴⁵ After M. Sabrow, *Den zweiten Weltkrieg erinnern*, "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" 36-37, 2009, p. 15.

⁴⁶ After M. Sabrow, *Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs. Der Fall Günter Paulus*, "Initial" 4/5, 1995, p. 60.

⁴⁷ After J.-H. Kirsch, "Wir haben aus der Geschichte gelernt". *Der 8. Mai als politischer Gedenktag in Deutschland*, Köln, Weimer, Wien 1999, p. 66.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

It was as late as on the 40th anniversary of the war ending that a change of climate could be felt in East Germany⁴⁹. Again the memories of the allied air raids on Dresden, forgotten for some time, came to the fore. The anniversaries were celebrated apart from the state also in Christian churches, despite the fact that the sermons and public appearances of the more important church officials were censored. The public could watch documentaries which in a more realistic way showed the end of the war. There was also a new international perspective and the celebrations were accompanied by appeals for peace. In Torgau on the River Elbe a “coalition of reason and realism” was presented in which sixty US war veterans met with one hundred former Red Army soldiers to exchange their war memories forty years later.

In the whole history of East Germany efforts made to maintain the progressive tone and victorious atmosphere remained in sharp contrast with the authentic tenor of the day of German capitulation. The celebrations did not call up for grieving over the victims of National Socialism. They imposed an atmosphere of pompous triumph which was not consonant with the authentic feelings of the older generation which remembered the burden of the defeat and its consequences.

The real credibility test for the memory of the recent past was for East German citizens the anniversary of the *Kristallnacht* (Cristal Night). Today, remembering about the Holocaust is an important element of German identity but the route to integrate the memory of the Holocaust in German consciousness, first in a divided and then in a reunified state, was long and filled with difficulties. As it was put by Friedrich Nietzsche, “I did it – so says my memory. I could not have done it – says my pride and remains relentless. Eventually memory gives in”⁵⁰. Christian von Krockow writes about a double person and the split conscience in the Third Reich. After the war the situation was similar. In Germany there was deep silence.

Initially, those Jews who had survived the Holocaust could not imagine returning to German soil. It seemed that after Auschwitz the Jewish communities in Germany would be something unnatural. Robert Weltsch spoke on behalf of many when in 1946 after his visit to the defeated Germany he wrote, “We cannot expect that there will be some Jewish people who would want to live in Germany. Here it smells of human bodies, gas chambers and torture rooms. Yet, there are still a few thousand of them living in Germany. (...) These remaining Jewish quarters need to be liquidated as soon as possible. (...) Germany is not the land for Jews”⁵¹. Similar words full of resignation were spoken by Rabbi Leo Beck after he was liberated from the

⁴⁹ For an analysis of the press coverage on the 8 May celebrations see, M. Mederacke, W. Schaff, *Der „Tag der Befreiung“ in der DDR 1985. Die Berichterstattung des „Neuen Deutschlands“*, “deutsche studien“ annual XXIV, March 1986, p. 88-94.

⁵⁰ F. Nietzsche, *Beyond good and evil*, translated into Polish, edited and supplied with afterword by P. Pieniążek, Kraków 2005, p. 71.

⁵¹ After M. Richarz, *Juden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik seit 1945*, in: M. Brumlik, D. Kiesel, C. Kugelmann, J. Schoeps (eds.), *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945*, Frankfurt a. M. 1986, p. 14.

Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1945, "For us, Jews from Germany a certain epoch in history came to an end. Such epoch ends when hope, faith and trust need to be buried for good (...) The epoch of Jews in Germany has ended for good"⁵².

November in East Germany was reserved as a month of commemorating the October resolution (1917) and the November revolution (1918). Jews did not fit into any of the official definitions of victims of fascism. However, the consecutive anniversaries of the *Kristallnacht* which followed were used as an occasion to launch attacks on western imperialism and the revisionist West Germany. The political interdependencies in East Germany and lack of contact with the ecumenical circles abroad limited the necessary change of reasoning and reckoning with the past. The very few Jewish communities which still functioned in East Germany were ascribed the role of "Zionist agencies". The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a negative impact on the attitude towards Jewish people. The commemorative culture was determined by the propaganda of the SED state. For example, on the anniversary of the Jewish pogrom there was more information about anti-Semitic incidents and "fascist elements" in the neighbouring West Germany. The celebrations were limited to local ceremonies organized by the Jewish communities and participated by the local authorities. They were accompanied by assurances that racism, militarism, imperialism and anti-Semitism were "eradicated with their roots" in the "state of workers and peasants". When in 1955 the Museum of German History was opened in Berlin the SED's Politburo entered the Jewish pogrom in the official calendar of state commemoration.

The GDR authorities emphasized that their attitude to Israel described as an "aggressive state" had nothing in common with their attitude towards Jews. The East German media frequently stressed that they would not allow to be blackmailed by references to Auschwitz⁵³. The responsibility for Auschwitz and Majdanek was accredited to the ruling class of West Germany. Thus, the reports from the opening of Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem were considered as referring to the other German state. "The collaborators and henchmen of Eichmann enjoy today in the Bonn state even higher positions than they did once in the Nazi state"⁵⁴.

From the beginning the GDR authorities ignored the religious and racist nature of the Jewish persecutions. The directives laid out, among others in a circular of the Berlin Municipality social department from 25 June 1945 stated, "Jews, cross-breeds, Bible scholars, the majority of those who compromise the defensive capability of our country and critics cannot be enlisted in the narrowly defined frame as "victims of fascism"⁵⁵.

⁵² After T. Gidal, *Die Juden in Deutschland von der Römerzeit bis zur Weimarer Republik*, Gütersloh 1988, p. 426.

⁵³ This opinion of Albert Reisz from September 1975 is quoted by P. Dietmar, *DDR und Israel (I) Ambivalenz einer Nicht-Beziehung*, "Deutschland Archiv" 7, 1977, p. 738.

⁵⁴ *Der Henkersknecht des deutschen Imperialismus*, "Neues Deutschland" 2. 6. 1962.

⁵⁵ After A. Timm, *Der politische und propagandistische Umgang mit der „Reichskristallnacht“ in der DDR*, in: J. Danyel (ed.), op.cit., p. 214-215.

However, this view had to be soon verified since it was quickly remembered that 160,000 Berlin Jews had been deported to concentration camps and only 6,000 returned, including 87 children.

The first anniversary ceremonies took place in a narrow circle of the Jewish communities with the participation of the Central Committee for Victims of Fascism and the Association of the Persecuted by the Nazi Regime (VVN). Frequently Jewish communists including, Juliusz Meyer, Leon Löwenkopf, Leo Zuckermann took part in the events. The binding formula was defined by the historian, Walter Bartel, who belonged to the executive authorities of the Berlin VVN. In his 1948 speech delivered in the German Theatre he interpreted the Jewish pogrom from 9 November 1938 as an event which can be understood only in reference to 9 November 1918. "The underlying cause for the Cristal Night lies in the fact that in 1918 they had failed to break the rule of the generals, Thyssen and Krupp"⁵⁶.

Only as late as 1956 on the initiative of the Evangelical Church more attention was paid to the memorable anniversary. On the 18th anniversary of the Jewish pogrom Rector Heinrich Grüber, the deputy head of VVN, and since 1949 a representative of the Evangelical Church in Germany for the East German government, appealed to the German youth to clean the Jewish cemeteries and in this way to wash off at least a fraction of the "great German guilt". However, the initiative was not taken on and put into action for various reasons. Until 1978 the "Cristal Night" remained on the margin of the commemoration of the Bolshevik revolution. On the 50th anniversary of the pogrom, and a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall representatives of Israel were invited to the anniversary celebrations for the first time.

In November 1956 the prime minister Otto Grotenwohl spoke of the reparations paid by West Germany as the "so called compensation which Israel is using in their fight against the independence movement in the Middle East". He also demanded that West Germany should not support the "bulwark of imperialism"⁵⁷. The same year on the anniversary of the pogrom "Neues Deutschland" reported that "hundreds of faithful soldiers of Hitler and fascist murderers and arsonists manipulated the navigation equipment of Bonn's NATO machinery"⁵⁸. The responsibility for the pogrom belonged to the fascists whose descendants lived in Bonn and Munich, and it was them who "profaned the good name of Germany".

In the 1960s the commemorative culture in real socialism developed its own dynamics. Commemorative sites were opened in the former concentration camps. They were meant to authenticate the "aura of the anti-fascist martyrdom", and they constituted a conscious act of the offensive propaganda against West Germany, seen as their ideological enemy⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 216.

⁵⁷ I. Deutschkron, *Israel und die Deutschen. Das schwierige Verhältnis*, Köln 1983, p. 190.

⁵⁸ *Das Unkraut rechtzeitig jäten*, "Neues Deutschland" 10. 11. 1956.

⁵⁹ *Klage und Ausweg. Matinee zum 30. Jahrestag der "Kristallnacht"*, "Neues Deutschland" 11. 11. 1968.

Despite the difficulties and constraints imposed on the Jewish communities, the East German Evangelic Church managed to gradually earn a narrow margin of freedom for commemorating the anniversary of the November pogrom and for reconciliation with the Jewish community. The Synod of the National Church in Greifswald made appeals to the media for moderation and restraint in informing about the current problems concerning Israel and Jews.

An opportunity for a wider debate on difficult topics was provided by the regional *Kirchentag* in Leipzig in 1978, on the 40th anniversary of the "Cristal Night", and in 1983, the Year of Luther. The topic "Luther and Jews" became a subject of a statement issued by the East German Evangelical churches, in which it was stated, among others that, "there is no reason to worship Luther as a hero. (...) His critique of the Jewish religion amplified, against his intentions, contempt for Jews, which has had calamitous consequences for our nation"⁶⁰. In the last decade before reunification there was room for a wider dialogue of the churches with Judaism and its representatives.

When after Stalin's death the political climate improved in East Germany people of Jewish origin, among others Alexander Abusch, Albert Norden, Gerhard Eisler, Hilda Benjamin, Hermann Axen and Friedrich Karl Kaul assumed high positions in the party and in the state. Since that time as "victims of fascism" they received support in maintaining their religious practices and caring for their cemeteries⁶¹. The East Berlin Jewish community received annually 150,000 German marks to maintain the Berlin-Weißensee cemetery, the largest cemetery in Europe. For example, in 1980 when 800 Jews lived in East Germany and about 27,000 in West Germany, there were 115,000 graves in the cemetery. The Jews in East Germany expressed support for the official policy of the state. The East German attitude towards Israel defined the position of the modest East German Jewish community towards Jews in the world. A representative of the Jewish community explained the lack of contact with the international Jewish Diaspora and Israel saying, "Obviously, it is a painful issue for us. Most of us have friends and relatives there. But we also have relatives and friends in the USA, and the relations between East Germany and the USA are disheartening for us. After all, we are a socialist state and Israel is capitalist and this makes harmonious relations difficult. We have to be realistic and support the policy of our state"⁶².

INTEGRATION OF MEMORY?

Because of reunification Germany for the second time in the 20th century faced the challenge of "overcoming the past". However, the circumstances and the ideological climate by the end of the 20th century were fundamentally different from the

⁶⁰ H.-D. Peter, O. Schröder (eds.), *Vertrauen wagen. Kirchentage in der DDR im Lutherjahr 1983*, Berlin (Ost) 1984, p. 65.

⁶¹ L. Mertens, *Juden in der DDR. Eine schwindende Minderheit*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 11, 1986, p.1192.

⁶² Herbert Singer quoted by L. Mertens, op. cit., p. 1196-1197.

situation after 1945. The new conditions stimulated parallels between the attitudes of West Germans towards National Socialism and the attitudes of East Germans towards communism. A question about the consequences of the ideological interpretation of the past had to appear. Yet, the SED state differed from the NSDAP state in a comparable degree to the abyss which lies between the *Stasi* (Ministry of State Security of German Democratic Republic) records and the Auschwitz crematoria. The Third Reich lasted 12 years, it claimed an invasive war and genocide. The German Democratic Republic lasted for 40 years. It is not burdened with the consciously implemented policy of extermination against other nations. The Third Reich was a permanent state of emergency, while East Germany was a homeland for the normal living of millions of its citizens. While Hitler could count on the support of the nation because National Socialism was a native product, in East Germany communism was an imported article.

The way the past was treated by the general public in both German states was strongly influenced by the nature of the collapse of the Third Reich and of the East German "real socialism". The fate of post-war Germany was decided by the victorious powers and therefore the end of the war was not treated by Germans as liberation. In contrast the fall of the GDR was instigated by its citizens themselves. Also, the aims of National Socialism and the party establishment in East Germany were different. The former had the nationalist-racist programme, the latter, at least in the official version, the internationalist-fraternal-egalitarian one. The motifs for the acceptance of the system were different. While after 1945 both German states were facing the task of handling the Nazi past, after 1989 the reckoning with communism was a necessity only for the former East Germany. The reproach for adopting the "victor's mentality" does no longer refer to the foreign occupying powers, as it was the case after World War II, but it is *Wessis*. Contrary to the situation after 1945, when the old Third Reich elites out of life necessity were included quickly into the lifeblood of the new social and economic reality, after 1989 the positions of GDR officials dismissed from public life because of the communist past were filled by elites imported from the western part of Germany⁶³.

The reactions to fascism in West Germany and to communism in East Germany also had many tangent points. Both ideologies, of Nazism and communism although so different in their intentions, were directed against democracy and western values, and had an authoritarian character. Both kinds of dictatorship rejected pluralism, promised security instead of freedom, full harmony and community of interests instead of accommodation of conflicting interests. Their practice of authority was based on a peculiar seduction of society, repressions and terror. They both owed

⁶³ For a wider account see among others, P. Eisenmann, G. Hirscher (eds.), *Bilanz der zweiten Diktatur*; München 1993; B. Faulenbach, M. Meckel, H. Weber (eds.), *Die Partei hatte immer recht – Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur*; Essen 1994, A. von Plato, J. Schütrumpf (eds.), *Wendezeiten – Zeitwende. Zur „Entnazifizierung“ und „Entstalinisierung“*; Hamburg 1991; H. Orłowski, M. Tomczak (eds.), *Elity w jednoczących się Niemczech* [Elites in reunifying Germany]; Poznań 1999.

their stability to a large extent to a specific Prussian tradition of political culture which was expressed in various forms of adaptation, political passivity and trust in the authority of power.

The post-fascist and post-communist societies were confronted with similar problems. After 1989 the judiciary system faced the same dilemma as after 1945; how using the means available in a state of law can crimes that were committed in a state of lawlessness be tackled? In both cases it was equally difficult to solve the problem of legal and political responsibility and effectively document the charges imposed on the elites without excluding them altogether from life in a democratic state.

The acceptance of "quiet" integration of those burdened with cooperation with the regime was present after the end of World War II, as well as after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The practice of transformation has demonstrated that at least in transitory stages integrating people who had been involved in cooperation with the NSDAP state and the SED state turned out to be more important for the political consolidation of society than a moral renewal through radical exclusion of the group from the rest of society. The difference in the treatment of the guilty elites concerned the fact that after the war Germans could not afford a total exchange of the elites because of the large number of people entangled in the Nazi system. After the reunification of Germany an efficient and almost complete exchange of the executive management could be introduced in all areas of life since the discredited GDR elites were replaced by West German experts.

Both, after the end of World War II and after the collapse of the GDR the community of interests of the losers and the rejected proved to be strong. The experience of denazification and destasification did not help much in recognizing by Germans their role in the old system. For many Germans Nuremberg became a symbol of criminal pathology which, after all did not refer to normal citizens. After 1989, alike after 1945 it was difficult to come to terms with the whole scale of the change. In the assessment of the past system the same patterns of excusing people's attitudes occurred. I was either too young to bear responsibility, or I was only doing my duties for my state and my home country.

In both cases an emotional void prevailed. There was a lack of acceptance of the new order, which in its initial stage proved to be a democracy without democrats. It was common to vindicate one's own biography and defending it became more important than defending the collective community. It seemed that questioning an entire life as false in a false era, taking away the sense from the life effort caused the greatest resistance and was not favourable to the democratic turn.

Both German states, West Germany and the new Federal Republic of Germany needed founding myths, that is positive experiences. The choice between quick democratization and integration or ruthless treatment of the guilty ones proved to be ultimately an unsolvable problem. After 1945 as well as after 1990 individual reckoning with the past did not follow a public debate. Each call for drawing a "thick line" caused a new wave of discussions and an opposite reaction.

After the reunification in 1990 West Germans, enriched by forty years of wrestling with the past, did not want again in the same century to sweep the history under the carpet. Therefore, legal redress for the victims of Stalinist and communist repressions in East Germany became one of the priorities of the unified Germany. However, it proved extremely difficult to bring to justice those responsible for the SED dictatorship. Just as it was in Nuremberg where none of the war criminals pleaded guilty before the Tribunal, the attempt to settle the scores with the people responsible for the crimes and deviations of the communist system in the former East Germany disappointed all those who were awaiting long prison sentences for the political and economic elite.

To illustrate, a trial which took place between 1996 and 1999 against six members of the Politburo of the SED concerning responsibility for deaths during the attempts of citizens at escaping from East Berlin on the East German-West German border and the Berlin Wall showed difficulties encountered by a democratic state when settling accounts with an undemocratic system. Similar to the situation after 1945 the part of society which was put on trial assessed the efforts of the prosecutors as *Siegerjustiz*, and revenge of those who won the cold war over the defeated ones. All those who were charged pleaded not guilty and saw the court trial as illegal. Kurt Hager, the main ideologist of SED turned defence into prosecution saying, "Your aim is to make me into a criminal"⁶⁴. Erich Mückenberger, a trained metal worker claimed that "Moscow is responsible" for everything that was bad in the GDR. Egon Krenz, a teacher by occupation and the successor of Honecker, saw himself as a victim, "I have been accused because I opted for an anti-capitalist alternative on German soil". When he was opposing people fleeing East Germany he was only "defending the territorial integrity of the GDR state". In his opinion in East Germany "no order was given to shoot people (...) I have never ordered a soldier to kill (...) I am not a murderer" (...). It was West Germany that had an interest in casualties on the border, they organized such cases"⁶⁵. His defence lawyer claimed that the fact that E. Krenz handed over his power in a peaceful manner, preventing in this way larger numbers of victims, was to his advantage. With reference to that he compared him to the national heroes of the anti-Hitler resistance movement from 20 July 1944. Karin Schmidt, the auxiliary prosecutor, whose husband was killed during his attempt to flee the country in 1987, was of a different opinion⁶⁶. Horst Dohlus, a hair dresser by occupation, explained that his activity was always task oriented and always "in the interest of our society". Günther Kleiber, an electrician understood the grief of the

⁶⁴ R. Grafe, „Die Politbüro-Beschlüsse waren Bedingungen der tödlichen Schüsse“ *Der Prozess gegen sechs Mitglieder des SED-Politbüros (1996-1999)*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 1, 2000, p. 19.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 20.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 22. See also P. J. Winters, *Das Urteil gegen Krenz und andere*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 5, 1997, p. 693-696; *Auszüge aus dem Plädoyer der Staatsanwaltschaft, dem Schlusswort von Egon Krenz und der Urteilsbegründung*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 5, 1997, p. 697-699. P. J. Winters, *Der letzte Politbüro-Prozess*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 5, 2004, p. 752-757.

victims' families but "He had nothing to do with it all". Only Günter Schabowsky, the head of "Neues Deutschland" between 1978-1985 admitted to moral guilt and asked for forgiveness. The trials made an impression of party meetings and no sentence would satisfy the victims. In 1993 Erich Mielke, the head of the much hated Ministry of State Security (The *Stasi*) received a 6-year prison sentence only for complicity in the murder of two police officers in Berlin in 1931. Because of his old age (85) he was released in 1995. In most trials the sentences were symbolic, and most often suspended.

In the reunified Germany the lustration fervour was maintained within the framework of law. The first federal commissioner, Joachim Gauck who was implementing the resolution from 1991 concerning *Stasi* records, had at his disposal a staff of qualified specialists (3, 400 jobs were planned) and a budget of over 200 million German marks to verify the files measuring 178 km in length. The major aim was the defence of freedom and democracy. Despite the attacks launched mainly by the Democratic Socialist Party (PDS), the work of Gauck's commission ran smoothly, and it took into account primarily the perspective of the victims and the need to know the full truth about the GDR⁶⁷. Yet, in many cases the victims of the secret police and repressions from the former GDR communist state were disappointed. They soon found out that the legal guarantees in a democratic state refer not only to the victims but also to the perpetrators. Bärbel Bohley, the initiator of a civil movement, New Forum, and one of the first people to demand having the files opened expressed a view held by many when she said, "We expected justice and we received the state of law".

The turn of 1989/1990 changed the perspective of evaluating National Socialism. The collapse of the dictatorship in Eastern and Central Europe and the reunification of Germany did not bring "the end of history"⁶⁸. Quite on the contrary, the past reminded about itself with double force. West Germans expected that their compatriots from the east, who had not been involved in public debates concerning their part in the policy of Nazi Germany and their responsibility for the past, will make up for the history lesson they have missed with interest. However, the Former GDR citizens did not agree with the situation that their compatriots from across the Elbe should have the right to dictate the rules for reckoning with the past. Yet, international circles expected that the reunification of Germany would consequently bring a reunification of guilt and responsibility.

The new caesura opened a new chapter in the work on the past. The generation of witnesses and participants of the National Socialist state was bid farewell to. The "Children of war" came to have their say. The memory crossed all borders. The scope and the course of overcoming the past is determined by such factors as, among

⁶⁷ See among others, *Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz auf dem Prüfstein. Urteil des Bundesverwaltungsgerichtes vom 23. Juni 2004*, „Deutschland Archiv“ 5, 2004, p. 770-775.

⁶⁸ For a wider account of the significance of turns in German history see among others, D. Papenfuß, W. Schieder (eds.), *Deutsche Umbrüche im 20. Jahrhundert*, Köln, Weimar, Wien 2000.

others: the way in which the system is changed (whether one deals with the continuation of elites or a sudden revolutionary turn), the length of dictatorship and the manner of diverging from dictatorship. Democracy imposes certain practices and gives voice to all citizens. After 1989 in the post-communist countries the struggle with the past was supplemented with a new element. It was no longer the problem of political culture and historical enlightenment but of a concrete decision: open the records or not? It is a battle for one's own image. Contrary to some worries, the reunification of Germany did not weaken the research into the Nazi past. Quite the opposite, dealing with the past itself became an object of studies. Finally, it was discovered that the problem of reckoning with the past after the end of tyranny, civil wars and any armed conflicts is a topic with a long tradition.

A comparative analysis of the struggle with the past in both German states shows that one memory can be won against another⁶⁹. The time distance intensifies the process of building historical records of the Nazi past, whereas the GDR past is now a current political problem. The debate concerning the self-determination and self-identification of Germans with reference to German history is open and in progress. Both pasts are slowly becoming an integral element of the political culture of Germany.

⁶⁹ See among others, B. Faulenbach, *Probleme des Umgangs mit der Vergangenheit im vereinten Deutschland: Zur Gegenwartsbedeutung der jüngsten Geschichte*, in: W. Weidenfeld (ed.), *Deutschland. Eine Nation - doppelte Geschichte. Materialien zum deutschen Selbstverständnis*, Köln 1993, p. 175-190; idem, *Probleme einer Neuinterpretation der Vergangenheit angesichts des Umbruchs 1989/91*, in: W. Weidenfeld, M. Stadelmaier (eds.), *Diktatur und Emanzipation. Zur russischen und deutschen Entwicklung 1917-1991*, Essen 1993, p. 9-18.

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THE BORDER CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN THE POMERANIAN BAY

The collapse of the communist system and the abolition of the divisions it had imposed in Europe as symbolized by the Berlin Wall has directed the attention of historians and analysts of international relations towards studies into the reality of life within the system of all-embracing control and planning, as well as into the processes, which contrary to the system's mechanics have led to an eruption of democratic and liberating tendencies in Europe by the end of the 20th century. The archives, which are being opened without much haste, allow for an increasingly more comprehensive analysis of the political determinants and everyday life under the rule of the regime. The processes of democratization and transformation in the countries which were formerly under the rule of the Kremlin are being analyzed through the prism of their national idiosyncrasy and their position in the socialist block. The unprecedented case of the border conflict between the two countries belonging to the socialist block that is the dispute between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic concerning the Pomeranian Bay still remains little known. Recently the controversy was recounted by Tomasz Ślepowroński¹, whose publications offer a reconstruction of the genesis and the course of the dispute, as well as the reactions towards the conflict on the part of the authorities and the local communities of Western Pomerania. The author points out that even at the time of its escalation (1985-1989), the dispute was treated as a local irritation, whereas in reality it had all the characteristics of an international scale border conflict. The attitude of the regional authorities, interpellations of the MPs from the region submitted to the parliament, and even the efforts made by the church authorities in the Szczecin area all aimed at having the importance of the problem recognized and making the central authorities try to solve the problem.

¹ See: T. Ślepowroński, *NRD kontra PRL [GDR couter Poland]*, in: „Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej” No. 9-10/2005, p. 90-99, and *Konflikt w Zatoce Pomorskiej (1985-1989)[Conflict in the Pomeranian Bay (1985-1989)]*, in: B. Kerski, A. Kotula, K. Wóycicki, *Przyjaźń nakazana? Stosunki między NRD i Polską w latach 1949-1990*, Szczecin 2003, p. 87-94.

Information about the Polish-East German dispute is dispersed in articles published mostly in journals and these focus most frequently on the analysis of the legal standing of the treaty, as well as on the reconstruction of the course of the dispute in the years 1985-1989. However, viewing the dispute against a wider backdrop of the Polish-East German relations in the 1980s appears equally interesting. It seems that by taking into account the political and ideological realities in the socialist block, as well as the relations between the block countries, especially the GDR, the USSR and Poland with the Federal Republic of Germany, it is possible to evaluate the conflict in the Pomeranian Bay and to formulate hypotheses concerning the cause of its escalation and the unexpected rapid conclusion of the conflict. This is precisely the aim of the present article. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Pomeranian incident can be analyzed in other ways, for example from the perspective of the economic potential in the Baltic Sea area in the 1980s which would account for the trade and transit route to the Soviet Union, including among others the investment in the East German port of Mukran.

THE GENESIS AND THE OBJECT OF THE DISPUTE

The Genesis of the controversy goes back to the decisions of the Potsdam Conference by which Poland received the complex of ports in Szczecin and Świnoujście without the demarcation of the territorial waters in the Pomeranian Bay. The borderline was generally drawn along the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers forming the land border “east of the line from the Baltic Sea and directly west of Świnoujście and then along the river Oder” but there was no mention of the Pomeranian Bay². Also in September 1945 the mixed Polish-Soviet commission for the delimitation of the border did not regard itself competent enough to precisely divide the sea waters. The wording, “directly west of Świnoujście” did not leave room for any manoeuvring in the conditions of the local layout of the land. The first post-war president of Szczecin, Piotr Zaremba when describing the work of the delimitation commission mentioned considering the possibility of dividing the small town of Ahlbeck, which was finally rejected for the sake of drawing the borderline along the western border of the town of Świnoujście. The commission was aware of the consequences that the delimitation of the land borderline would have for its sea section.

² *The Agreement made by the heads of governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the western Polish border*; Potsdam, 2 August 1945, quoted after: K. Skubiszewski, *Zachodnia granica polski w świetle traktatów*, Poznań 1975, p. 330. The same formulation describing the borderline in the Pomeranian Bay was repeated in the Zgorzelec Treaty between Poland and East Germany from 6 July 1950, and in the treaty between Poland and West Germany concerning the normalization of their mutual relations signed on 7 December 1970.

“When formulating the border act the question of the demarcation line in the sea waters was raised since the territorial waters were stretching [at the time – added by N.J.] over the conventional distance of 3 nautical miles. This could cause ambiguity when considering the concave shoreline of the Pomeranian Bay between the Świna strait and the contact point between the land border and the sea. Our aim was to have the entire roadstead of the Świnoujście port within Poland’s territorial waters. However, the problem was not decided by the commission which did not regard itself competent enough to demarcate the sea section of the border”³.

The unconcern of the central authorities with the matter was nothing new. Since the end of the war Szczecin was left to its own devices not only with respect to setting up its administration or ensuring the basic conditions for the functioning of the city after the war activities had ceased but also in term of securing the border and the functioning of the sea ports. As it is recalled by Piotr Zaremba the Ministry of Maritime Navigation did not show any interest in the fate of the sea ports of Szczecin and Świnoujście throughout the whole of 1945.

The resolutions of the Potsdam Conference in this matter were repeated in the Zgorzelec Treaty between Poland and East Germany signed on 6 July 1950; some changes were introduced by the Frankfurt Act of 27 January 1951 including the adjustments of the mixed commission. It was precisely this document which introduced a slight readjustment to the advantage of Poland with respect to the access route to the port of Świnoujście. The Frankfurt Act was of importance to Polish interests because it, in fact expressed the recognition of both sides of the agreement concerning the special circumstances present in the Pomeranian Bay which allowed to be exempt from the conventional principles of maritime border delimitation, namely the median-line principle. At the same time however, the weakness of the document was in the incomprehensible end point of the maritime border, the so called point A/13 (54°01’42” latitude N and 14°15’16” longitude E), whose location (6 nautical miles from the seashore that is according to the then accepted rules 3 miles outside of the territorial waters in open sea) was unfavourable for Polish economic interest and the reason of the state. The borderline east of the axis of the access route to the ports of Szczecin/Świnoujście left a part of the access route and one of the anchorages out of Polish territorial waters. This atypical location of the point A/13 was according to the available sources a result of the alterations of the land borderline; since the water intakes by the lake Wolgast were incorporated into Poland, the German side received compensation of their surface in the area stretching from the water intakes and the shoreline of the Pomeranian Bay. This exchange resulted in a deviation of the land frontier of which the marine border was an extension⁴.

This erroneous statement in the Frankfurt Act became one of the fundamental arguments of the East German side in the later stages of the dispute. In the following years the Polish side did not make use of other occasions to secure the borderline

³ P. Zaremba, *Walka o polski Szczecin [The Battle for a Polish Szczecin]*, Wrocław 1986, p. 339.

⁴ K. Podgórski, *Drang nach Szczecin*, „Zeszyty Historyczne” Issue 88, Paris 1989, p. 40-41.

according to its own interest. Quite on the contrary, in the agreement on the division of the continental shelf from 1968 it allowed for a statement about the division according to the median-line principle, that is to say it willingly sanctioned having the anchorage and part of the access route located on German waters⁵. The attempt to unilaterally regulate the disputable question was made on 17 December 1977 by three regulations passed by the Polish parliament concerning the boundaries and sea fishing zones⁶. Yet, the regulation expanding the territorial sea boundaries to 12 nautical miles left a loophole by leaving the regulation of the sideline maritime border until later bilateral agreements. In fact there was no change concerning the disputable issue whereas five years later a similar regulation concerning the East German state borderline⁷ and its executive act⁸ determined (also unilaterally) the borderline in the Pomeranian Bay.

At this point it needs to be brought to attention that the East German side became involved in such activity concerning the issue of dividing its territorial waters only with reference to Poland; it takes only a glance at the map to realize that a much more complex situation concerned the borderline with West Germany and Denmark where natural conditions do not allow for the full use of the 12 mile zone by each country. Travemünde located on the border together with the access to the port of Lübeck and the Danish port of Gedser have a much more difficult access to the open sea. Yet, East Germany did not take any action which would threaten the freedom of sea navigation either towards West Germany or Denmark, and it demarcated the borderline of its territorial sea closer than 12 nautical miles.

As it is argued by Janusz Gilas, a delimitation effected by a unilateral act should be based on the median-line principle⁹. Since however, in the case of the Polish-East German border the Frankfurt Act had already introduced special regulations, the issue should become subject to bilateral negotiations. This however, was not the case and the East German legal acts determined the borderline with the use of the point A/13, which was unfavourable for Poland, and which in practice provided a threat that from the day of the regulation becoming effective, on 1 January 1985 the ports

⁵ *Agreement between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf on the Baltic Sea, drafted in Berlin on 29 October 1968*, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Legal Acts] 1969 No.15, item 106.

⁶ *Act from 17 December 1977 concerning the territorial sea of the Polish People's Republic*, Dziennik Ustaw 1977 No. 37 item 162, *Act from 17 December 1977 concerning the Polish sea fishery zone*, Dziennik Ustaw 1977 No. 37 item 163 and *Act from 17 December 1977 concerning the continental shelf of the Polish People's Republic*, Dziennik Ustaw 1977 No. 37 item 164.

⁷ *Gesetz über die Staatsgrenze der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, 25 March 1982, "Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" 1982 Teil II, p. 197.

⁸ The so called 2. *Durchführungsverordnung (2. Grenzverordnung)*, 20 December 1984, "Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" 1984 Teil I, p. 441.

⁹ J. Gilas, *Prawne problemy delimitacji wód terytorialnych w Zatoce Pomorskiej [Legal problems with the delimitation of territorial waters in the Pomeranian Bay]*, "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 1/1990, p. 55-56.

of Szczecin and Świnoujście would be deprived of access to the open sea. The access route would be then on East Germany's territory and sea navigation along other not deepened routes in the Pomeranian Bay would be impossible for larger vessels.

PRECEDENCE OR PREMEDITATED ACTION?

There is no doubt as to the seriousness of the controversy in the Pomeranian Bay and its significance for economic security, access to the sea ports and to the Oder region, and for the ease of Poland's maritime economy. The water access route to Świnoujście continuously deepened and maintained at a large cost and the anchorages provided all the circumstances of special conditions which justified the delimitation of the borderline in a manner divergent from the conventionally accepted principles of international law. Poland could have used these circumstances as an argument although their importance exceeded its exclusive economic interest. The anchorages located west of the borderline demarcated by East Germany were used for unloading by 75,000 - 100,000-tonnage ships which ferried to other ports, and the area was entered in the international records concerning sea navigation. Only the use of the Pomeranian Bay for fisheries constituted an exclusively Polish interest¹⁰, whereas the remaining factors decided about the supranational character of the interests which intersected in the disputable area; the sea ports of Szczecin and Świnoujście as the only ones in the Pomeranian Bay are of decisive importance for the transit not only from the Oder basin but also from the countries which share the Danube river basin.

However, it is worth to look at the border controversy between the GDR and Poland from a wider perspective of the international relations between both countries.

When in the late 1940s the division of Germany was becoming a permanent feature of European order, in the eastern occupation zone, which was initially treated by the Soviet Union as a war trophy, international elements became to be emphasized while in Poland the differences between the revanchist West Germany and East Germany involved in the creation of people's democracy were underlined. When in 1949 two German states were established in the occupation zones Poland treated this fact as a practical guarantee for the borderline drawn by the Potsdam Conference. After all, East Germany constituted a natural buffer separating Poland from the West and their joint membership in the pact subordinate to the Kremlin allowed to rule out the possibility of even a hypothetical alteration of the border without the consent of the eastern power. The rhetoric of the allied unity of political objectives and declarations of friendship and fraternity between communities became an index of official relations in which the political line of state authorities was convergent with the ideology of the ruling political parties: The Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). After the Zgorzelec Treaty

¹⁰ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 57-58.

the fact that the East German state respected the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers was a fundamental source of Polish support for the establishment of GDR. However, a few years later the events of October 1956 and the relative, as for the Warsaw Pact countries, political independence of Poland under the rule of Władysław Gomułka started to raise distrust on the part of East Germany. In 1957 the Polish Embassy in Berlin reported that, "There is a conviction that Poland underestimates the danger of the West German policy and that Poland is more interested in having closer relations with West Germany than in deeper cooperation with the GDR. There are also suspicions that Poland by having received American loans must have agreed to some undisclosed political terms"¹¹. The change in the bilateral relations was characterized by the complexes on both sides of the state-entrants in the internationalist fraternity. Poland started to notice in its western neighbour a critical observer and commentator of its actions (both in the international arena and at home) while East Germany started to suspect that Poland is treating its existence as temporary.

Amplifying such emotions and their impact on the relations between the countries was a part of a broader process bothering the states of real socialism which, contrary to the voiced declarations of cooperation and fraternity, plunged into the void caused by the lack of freedom of thought and being enclosed in the realm of ideals frequently dead and gone and irrelevant for the existing conditions of development in political and international relations. In the case of East Germany the faithfulness to the ideology it had adopted allowed for a denial of the legacy of National Socialism and the responsibility for the war, and created an image of a star country of the entire eastern bloc. The unquestionable successes in this respect were used in the early 1970s when the end of the Walter Ulbricht era and the takeover of power by Erich Honecker coincided with the time of enforcing the theory about the existence of two German nations. In view of the threat of a crisis the need to strengthen the East German legal validity was expressed in a thesis about the emergence in the GDR of "a socialist nation" whose "socialist national consciousness" allows to develop "ideological identity which, unlike for other Warsaw Pact member countries, was its destiny because of the lack of the deeply rooted national identity"¹². The role of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact was for the SED leadership and its ideologists, who after all were legitimized to take action and make declarations on behalf of the state and its society, was one of the available means to show their achievements in the competition with West Germany, to demonstrate its growing part in the relations between East and West, and to strengthen the effectiveness of the "ideological identity", which was in fact a prosthesis of statehood.

¹¹ Quoted after: M. Tomala, *Bilans oficjalnych stosunków pomiędzy NRD i Polską [Balance of official relations between GDR and Poland]*, in: B. Kerski, A. Kotula, K. Wóycicki, op. cit., p. 75.

¹² H. A. Winkler, *Długa droga na Zachód. Dzieje Niemiec [Long road West. History of Germany]*, vol. II 1933-1990, Wrocław 2007, p. 324-325, 421.

However, shaping this image and the position of East Germany in European politics was not only the priority for the East Germans themselves. When together with the strengthening of the position of West Germany in the integrative structures of the European Economic Community and the defence treaty of the North Atlantic Pact it became clear that the unification of Germany, especially according to the East German conception was being postponed, the efforts of its eastern allies were redirected to “support and empower the GDR”. East Germany was to function as a symbolic display window for the achievements of real socialism, and in political terms it was supposed to hamper the unification tendencies which appeared in West Germany. The words uttered by Leonid Brezhnev, “We have to be friends with the GDR where 17 to 18 million German people are for socialism. It is our great post-war achievement”, marked the direction for the government led by Edward Gierek after the era of tension and distrust between Władysław Gomułka and Walter Ulbricht¹³ was closed. The special interest of Poland as its closest neighbour meant that the role of East Germany as a guarantor of the borderline established in Potsdam was emphasized throughout the entire period of its existence. The strategy of the normalization of the relations between Poland and West Germany was dependant on the regulations of relations between both German states. Indications of international recognition of the separate GDR statehood were consonant with the SED ideology that was developed around this slogan.

The distrust exhibited by East Germany towards Poland in the 1980s was not only a reaction to the establishment of “Solidarność” and postulates it articulated. It should be rather regarded as a climax of the process which had been developing since the late 1950s. Paradoxically it may seem Poland itself had the least influence on the climate in the relations between East Germany and Poland. The diplomatic controversy around the borderline in the Pomeranian Bay, which assumed nearly the form of an open conflict, appeared to be a perfectly used occasion to again manifest the strengthening of East Germany’s position as a member of the eastern block and its significance as a state of the “socialist nation”. These efforts were also related to the nature of German-German relations and the policy of détente conducted by Helmut Schmidt, which was based on the recognition of the post-war *status quo* in Europe. The opinion expressed by the social-democratic journalist, Günter Gaus that Western Europe to survive needs a stable Eastern Europe seemed as difficult to agree with the reality as predictions forecasting an evolutionary transformation in Eastern Europe¹⁴. The fear of an uncontrolled course of events in the heart of the divided continent meant that despite the change of the ruling coalition in Bonn and the takeover of power by the CDU/CSU under chancellor Helmut Kohl, the reconciliatory gestures towards East Germany were continued. The loans worth bil-

¹³ See: B. Koszel, *Między dogmatyzmem a pragmatyzmem (1971-1989)* [Between dogmatism and pragmatism (1971-1989)], in: A. Wolff-Powęska (ed.), *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989*, Poznań 1993, p. 122.

¹⁴ H. A. Winkler, op. cit., p. 383-385.

lions DM which became available to East Germany thanks to the efforts made by Franz Joseph Strauss indeed saved East Germany from bankruptcy in view of the reductions of oil supply from the Soviet Union. Still, Honecker unmoved by these symptoms continued his conservative policy towards West Germany using as a pretext the deployment of American medium-range missiles in West Germany. The government under Kohl, among others, tried to liberate the rigor of movement on the German-German border as a reaction to the repetitive cases of fatalities reported during attempts to cross the border illegally. Still, in the mid 1980s the real measure of the efforts made to encourage the GDR to enter into more open German-German relations was the fact that even the contacts on the highest level took place only on the occasion of both governmental delegations meeting in Moscow for the funeral celebrations of the consecutive Soviet leaders. It was precisely on such an occasion that on 12 March 1985 E. Honecker and H. Kohl issued a joint statement in which they declared that the cornerstone of preserving European peace is constituted by the “inviolability of borders and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the European countries within their present borders”¹⁵. Such formulations, self-evident for Bonn, were treated in Berlin as further evidence of the recognition by West Germany of the separate East German statehood. Eventually, E Honecker’s visit to the Federal Republic of Germany between 7 and 11 September 1987 contributed to his improved position among West German public opinion, which was then more willing to minimize the fundamental differences between the political systems in both German states. The GDR considered it a success to have its separate statehood recognized by the Bonn government, although it was taken into account that a further normalization in the relations between East Germany and West Germany might instigate a spree of far-reaching expectations, which were articulated also by its own citizens and which could shake its political foundations.

However, reaching this level of acceptance of its statehood by East Germany coincided with the time of political openness and transformation taken up by Mikhail Gorbachev, which initiated the deconstruction of the system of the Kremlin’s dominance. The social movements which with an increasingly louder voice were expressing the need to enlarge the range of civil rights in the countries of the people’s democracy reached a dynamics which was difficult to hide from their own societies and from international public opinion. In this situation the strategy adopted by the GDR authorities had to aim not only at maintaining the ruling government but, perhaps first of all at preventing a fundamental political crisis, which nevertheless occurred not only in a spontaneous but in a mass-scale manner. While in every other country of the people’s democracy national identity constituted state integrity and provided the common platform linking the ruling authorities with society, in East Germany

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 417-418.

it was an artificial creation. In this context taking a strict political course was an attempt to stop the processes which in consequence showed a radically different outcome from the GDR's reason of the state created by E. Honecker's government.

The conflict with Poland, which at the time was taking place not only in official cabinets and offices but on the Baltic waters, was to demonstrate the real capacities of East German self-determination. It might have been treated by the authorities as an element of a political game sustaining the artificial identity of East Germany. However, it seems that the German side evaluated its political potential too hastily. Using the weakening of Poland's position among the Warsaw Pact countries caused by the establishment of "Solidarność" and the martial law with its political consequences, East Germany overestimated its capacity. The difference in the potential seemed to be at Poland's advantage. This was underlined by the opinions formulated with reference to the border dispute on the Baltic sea which accounted for the efforts made by E. Honecker's government to recognize the equal legal and political status of both German states as described above. Bogdan Dopierała, a Szczecin historian wrote in his diary on 30 November 1987,

"At the moment East Germany needs the Polish support to obtain a full legal international recognition from West Germany, and because of that it is additionally dependent on Poland in the way in which we can demand a compensation for our support. (...) In the light of the so far experiences the Polish reason of the state requires a permanent existence of the GDR state but it should never be too strong a country. However, it should continuously care about Poland's help and support. It should know that for such support it will always have to pay People's Poland"¹⁶.

The harsh political drive continued by East Germany despite the signs referring to the changes, which had been taking place in the Soviet Union since M. Gorbachev came to power, could result rather in diminishing the importance of East Germany and minimizing its position in the socialist block.

The fact that this did not happen on the occasion of the border dispute was decided by the carelessness of the Polish side. Ignoring the signs indicating the attempt to expand the territorial waters to the disadvantage of the complex of the ports of Szczecin-Świnoujście (the resolution from 1982 providing a directive for the East German Council of Ministers to issue an executive act to alter the zone of the territorial waters was such a sign), and then complete disregard and lack of information showing administrative and diplomatic passivity demonstrated the scale of neglect of the fundamental national and economic interest of Poland. In passing, it can be noted that if the escalation of the dispute is regarded as a direct countercharge of East Germany towards Poland as a "rebellious" ally in the Warsaw Pact, then East Germany could have taken this opportunity directly after the resolution about the

¹⁶ Quoted after: T. Ślepowroński, *Stanowisko elit politycznych i naukowych Pomorza Zachodniego wobec konfliktu między PRL a NRD w Zatoce Pomorskiej (1985-1989)* [Attitude of political and intellectual elites of Western Pomerania towards the Polish - East German conflict in the Pomeranian Bay (1985-1989)], „Zapiski Historyczne” No. 3-4/2000, p. 147-148.

state border from 1982 became effective, and this would coincide with the martial law in Poland. However, resorting to it three years later gave evidence of a coldly calculated attempt to weaken the economic importance of Szczecin/Świnoujście. The port of Mukran created at the time in Rugia, which was able to provide services for the rail and ferry traffic to Klaipeda amounting to 80,000 rail carriages per year (which constituted half of the exports to the Soviet Union), could have effectively eliminated Poland as a transit route between East Germany and the Soviet Union¹⁷. Despite the opportunities which existed within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as early as at the stage of planning the investment, the Polish government did not object to marginalizing the west Pomeranian ports. Alterations within the territorial water zone could in practice make these ports unavailable for deep water ships and so not competitive in the Baltic.

ESCALATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE DISPUTE

When after 1 January 1985 the access route and the anchorage were officially located in the territorial waters of East Germany, the possible solutions to the situation faced by the Polish authorities could be described as peculiar. The alarm raised by the local authorities and maritime administration in Szczecin, which initially had been in vain, only as late as 20 February 1985 resulted in a diplomatic note issued by the Polish government expressing a lack of recognition of the unilateral decision made by East Germany. There was a possibility of submitting the case to be decided on by the International Court of Justice with the high probability that the decision would be beneficial for Poland. This however, would constitute an unprecedented manifestation of the lack of unity among the socialist states. Yet, Warsaw did not make use of this possibility even as a means of putting unofficial pressure on Berlin. Instead it was suggested that the territorial waters should be divided according to the median-line principle, and this would sanction a bigger part of the “capture” already appropriated by East Germany. Another idea, which was even more difficult to justify in a rational way, was a proposal to give up the area of the access route and the anchorage under the condition that the cost of its construction and maintenance work should be returned and Poland could continue to use them (?), or building a new anchorage and access route to Świnoujście from the side of Ławica Odrzana. This with respect to the existing natural conditions would require inconceivable financial resources, which were estimated only for the maintenance of these facilities as four or five times higher than the cost of the disputable access route¹⁸.

The attitude of the local authorities in Szczecin and the central authorities in Warsaw was characterized by their desire to conceal from the general public the fact that a dispute existed and the arguments which were used in the attempt to solve it. It

¹⁷ K. Podgórski, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 54-56.

is difficult to find any symptoms of trouble in the official line of policy represented by Warsaw. On 16 September 1986 during the PZPR election conference proceedings in Zielona Góra Wojciech Jaruzelski declared saying that “Today the borderline between the Polish People’s Republic and the German Democratic Republic runs not far from Zielona Góra. It is a border of peace and quiet, of friendship and cooperation which unites two socialist states. It is a huge achievement of our nations, and at the same time one of the major components of European peaceful order and an instructive example of overcoming historically layered traumas and distrust”¹⁹. The emphasis put on the importance of cooperation between border regions sounded almost ironical in the speech as well as a mention of the “revanchists on duty” from West Germany, which belonged to the canon of the People’s Poland rhetoric.

At the same time the activities performed in the sea by the East German patrol boats had all the features of piracy which put in danger not only the ease of shipping but also posed a threat to the safety of small sports boats sailing according to the international maritime law along the coastline. There were even some incidents of yachts being rammed by unmarked German vessels. Protests filed in the German Embassy by the yacht captains did not bring any effects and neither did they win the support of the Polish Foreign Office. On the other hand, the attempts to appropriate anchorage nr 3 and the access route, located according to the East German law after 1 January 1985 on the territorial waters of that country, were ignored by the captains of container ships and small patrol boats could not do much about it. Altogether the number of sea incidents reported in the four years of the conflict is estimated at 180²⁰.

The expert talks held at the central level in 1986 between the cabinets of Zbigniew Messner and Willi Stoph did not bring a solution. However, the Polish side treated the matter seriously enough not to consider a proposal to establish a condominium over the disputable area; the Polish stance was categorical and, as it was stated in *aide-mémoire* from 30 January 1987, aimed at having the access route to the ports and the anchorage entirely in the area of Polish territorial waters²¹. Since there was no prospect of reaching an agreement, the talks were moved to the political level in the following year. The German side was represented by Hermann Axen, a former chief editor of the ruling party newspaper, “Neues Deutschland”, and later on a member of SED’s Central Committee. Since the end of the 1960s he was considered to be the architect of East German foreign policy, among others responsible for the preparation of E. Honecker’s visits to western countries. The Polish side was represented by Józef Czyrek, the former foreign minister and at the time the secretary

¹⁹ Quoted after: http://www.geocities.com/wojciech_jaruzelski/zielona.html, text according to: W. Jaruzelski, *Przemówienia 1986 [Speeches 1986]*, Warszawa 1987, p. 256-281.

²⁰ This number is given in Tomasz Ślepowroński’s analyses, see footnote 1; a similar account in earlier publications by Karol Podgórski in journals published on immigration, see footnote 17.

²¹ See: B. Olschowsky, *Die SED im Drang nach Osten? Der Territorialgewässerstreit zwischen der DDR und Polen 1985 bis 1989*, „Deutschland Archiv“ No. 5/2001, p. 818.

of the Central Committee of PZPR and a member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo responsible for foreign affairs. The arguments used by the East Germans referred to the ideology of the class fraternity of both states allied against the west European threat. H. Axen declared, among others, the readiness of the Germans to defend the borders of the socialist Poland along the river Elbe (!). J. Czyrek in his reply used the argument of the still alive historical connotations related to the idea of "the corridor" in territorial disputes, which cannot be accepted without risking a loss of public support for the ruling party²². "Czyrek's Line" was interpreted in East Germany as an expression of Polish nationalism, whereas in the confidential opinions of advisors to general W. Jaruzelski in Szczecin which made efforts to force Warsaw to solve the conflict Poland's position, it was treated as defeatist.

The question of whether in 1987 the Polish ruling party (PZPR) really cared for the public support reflected in the elections remains debatable²³. This factor however, started to change faster than the progress made in talks between Poland and East Germany concerning the Pomeranian Bay. The censorship directive to block all the information concerning the dispute was not sufficient to keep the problem completely secret. The pressure exerted by the opinion forming circles in Pomerania took an unprecedented form in the history of the Polish People's Republic when the local authorities, opposition leaders and the church represented by bishop Kazimierz Majdański spoke in unison²⁴. The passivity of the central authorities left Szczecin on its own, and the public mood was reflected, among others in the results of the 1987 referendum which differed from other regions, or in hosting M. Gorbachev who arrived on a state visit, and who was perceived as a guarantor of the Polish reason of the state. Also the fear of the party executives related to the growing political crisis which led to the Round Table talks was not without significance. Polish negotiators in their talks with East Germany used the arguments of the risk of instigating anti-German feelings in Polish society, although the fear of criticism from the consolidating opposition was more prevalent.

In view of the fact that further attempts to solve the dispute did not bring any results, the Pomeranian Bay issue became a topic of talks between E. Honecker and W. Jaruzelski during a meeting in Wrocław on 24 June 1988. General W. Jaruzelski recalls it as a talk of last chance during which he presented the issue "in a principal and even dramatic way"²⁵. The talks between experts which continued in July 1988

²² Ibidem, p. 818-819.

²³ The events under discussion occurred almost in the middle of the parliamentary term of office (1985-1989), however on 29 November 1987 a referendum connected with the so called second stage of the reform took place. Although the subject of the referendum diverged from the originally planned political changes (introducing the office of a president), it in reality was an attempt to probe the political support for the ruling authorities.

²⁴ See: T. Ślepowski, *Stanowisko elit politycznych i naukowych Pomorza...*, p. 149-155.

²⁵ W. Jaruzelski, *Historyczny wiraż [Historical tight bend]*, commentary for the weekly "Przegląd" on the minutes from talks with German politicians, in: http://www.geocities.com/wojciech_jaruzelski/Niemcy.htm.

headed by Hermann Schwiesau and Władysław Napieraj did not run without problems and the Polish side ruled out, among others any changes to the Frankfurt Act of 1951. The compromise seemed closer after the proposal included in a letter from W. Jaruzelski to E. Honecker in which it was suggested that East Germany would receive, in return for having the borderline moved to the west of the access route and the anchorage, an area of the fishery zone and of the continental shelf to the east of the disputable area. The last argument used by E. Honecker to maintain his line of reasoning was the issue of the Soviet cable running under the seabed beneath anchorage nr 3. However, the Polish side referring to the Soviet expert opinions showed a lack of the USSR's strategic interests in the area²⁶. Eventually, the agreement signed on 22 May 1989 in Berlin by the foreign ministers Tadeusz Olechowski and Oskar Fischer demarcated the borderline of the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the fishery zones in line with the proposed compromise in a way that the entire access route to the port of Szczecin/Świnoujście, as well as the anchorage were located within the Polish territorial waters or in open sea²⁷.

The negotiations ending the dispute over the delimitation of territorial waters developed an unexpected speed which was difficult to expect after the earlier escalation of the conflict between 1985 and 1989. Taking into consideration the final concessions made by the East German side, it is difficult to conclude that the question of border delimitation was the only cause of the dispute. The steps taken by East Germany to unilaterally demarcate the borderline at the expense of neighbouring countries were not a result of one decision or an unintentional mistake. It is also difficult to see the only reason for the conflict in the willingness to use the social and political crisis in Poland in the 1980s to manifest East Germany's position as a faithful guard of ideology and political practice in the Warsaw Pact. This kind of motivation would require fundamental support for East Germany's actions from the Soviet Union. As it was, the climax of the conflict between Poland and the GDR coincided with the period of accelerated changes in the ruling elites of the Kremlin, and eventually with the deconstruction of the authoritarian order under the slogans of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The conservative attitude of the East German authorities towards the changes lasted until the final days of Honecker's rule; crossing out the Soviet journal "Sputnik" from the list of press imported from the USSR was ranked as a symbol of this attitude. M. Gorbachev recalled his futile attempts to convince E. Honecker about "the need to stop impeding the process of introducing reforms in the country and in the party. (...) Each time I came against a wall of lack of understanding"²⁸. The unquestionable success of the East German policy in the form of recognition of the German dual statehood by West Germany and also, not so much on the legal/

²⁶ See: B. Olschowsky, op. cit., p. 822-824.

²⁷ *Agreement between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic concerning the delimitation of sea areas in the Pomeranian Bay from 22 May 1989*, Dziennik Ustaw 1989 No. 43 item 233.

²⁸ M. Gorbachev, *Wspomnienia [Memoirs]*, quoted after: H. A. Winkler, op. cit., p. 476.

international but on a political level by other countries was not discounted at the time of the breakthrough. Seeking answers to the question whether it could have been used to extend the existence of the GDR in the context of the changes which occurred in Europe in 1989 can only be done by entering a collection of unused scripts of history. However, taking into account the conservative approach factor in the East German policy in the late 1980s allows to explain the quick change of attitude in the dispute over the Pomeranian Bay as their willingness to support the position of the Polish party leaders in view of approaching talks with the Solidarity opposition.

A detailed and multithreaded analysis by Włodzimierz Kalicki includes a suggestion that the reason for the sudden change of the East German attitude in the dispute over the Pomeranian Bay was the information about the course of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of PZPR from 20-21 December 1988 which reached E. Honecker. During the meeting W. Jaruzelski threatened with his resignation to convince the conservative wing of the party to seek agreement with the opposition. The vision of the allied forces of party liberals and Solidarity opposition directed against the GDR might have persuaded the Berlin leader to make concessions as a form of saving the ideological comrades in Warsaw²⁹. The words of the German negotiators willingly voicing arguments about the internationalist fraternity and allied struggle for peace and security in the face of the threat from the West appear in this context not necessarily as an outdated cliché. For the East German party elites the plight for staying in power was also a struggle to maintain the existence of the country which functioned as an exposition for the entire socialist block. In Poland the party executives did not appreciate the growing risk of losing their power or even their existing privileges. The words spoken *ex post* by W. Jaruzelski read, "If we were political players we would have overblown the conflict with East Germany and mobilized the society around us under patriotic anti-German slogans. Then we would have lost the access route but perhaps not power. Or in any way much later"³⁰. Yet, it does not seem plausible that the events related to the Pomeranian Bay could have stopped the social pressure which launched the political change in 1989.

The news of signing the agreement on 22 May 1989 coincided with the final preparations for the parliamentary election in result of which PZPR lost power. Still, one further manipulation was performed namely the fact that Poland gave up for the benefit of East Germany the fishery zone east of Swinoujście was not disclosed. Although the press published the text of the agreement, which however only included the geographical coordinates of the delimited areas, the price of the compromise was difficult to notice for a lay person. The map included in the publication did not have the fishery zone marked³¹, and the official joint communiqué after W. Jaruzelski's visit to Berlin although lengthy included only one sentence about signing the agree-

²⁹ See: W. Kalicki, *Awantura o rynnę [Row about the waterpipe]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 2-3 July 1994, p. 16.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

³¹ Daily "Rzeczpospolita" 24-25 May 1989, p. 6.

ment. Even then such news was accompanied by reassurances on the part of the highest Foreign Office representatives that the conflict in the Pomeranian Bay hardly took place, and certainly not on the scale reported by western mass media³².

The dispute over the delimitation of the Baltic border between Poland and East Germany with its genesis in the post-war decisions of the victorious powers included aspects of economic and political interests, which exceeded the seemingly trivial matter of dividing territorial waters. Taking into account the factors such as the reason of the state of East Germany and Poland, the attitude of West Germany and the beginning of the political change in the Soviet Union allows for a better understanding of the events which caused so much frustration in Szczecin in the late 1980s. The behaviour of the state authorities and party executives both in the GDR and in Poland, who were trying to defend their interests, exposes the weaknesses of the ideology and state institutions by the end of the era and their lack of awareness of the approaching end. The position of East Germany calls for a reflection on the transience of the ideology of separate statehood which was built up over many years, and for which the lack of reaction to the impulses of changes coming from outside proved pernicious.

³² Interview with Władysław Napieraj, "Rzeczpospolita" 24-25 May 1989, p. 1, 6.

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THE MIGRATION OF POLES TO GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MOST COMMON POLISH SURNAMES

INTRODUCTION

One of the methods used in studies on the origin of populations is the analysis of the distribution of the surnames that are characteristic for a given nationality. Without going into too much detail as far as the literature on the subject, what should be noted are the fundamental advantages and disadvantages of the method:

- 1) It yields rather general information on the directions of migration with respect to certain countries and nationality groups;
- 2) It is not possible to determine the actual number of migrants, or the scale of their influx in a given period, unless comparable data for different periods are available;
- 3) The presence of a particular surname in a given area is conditioned not only by external migrations, but also by internal ones (secondary migration).

With the abovementioned shortcomings in mind, we present an analysis of the 20 most frequent Polish surnames in Germany around the year 2000. Among others, the study uses data provided by the Internet website *Verwandt* (www.verwandt.de).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of the presence of Polish surnames in Germany is undoubtedly long, and dates back to when modern surnames were beginning to form in Poland. This fact stems from the close contact between the two countries, which entailed a constant migration exchange. The earliest Polish surnames began to appear as early as in the late Middle Ages, and emerged with increased frequency during the periods of the Renaissance and Reformation. Surnames were usually borne by students at Universities and emigrants (religious, political and economic). Already at that time many of those who arrived from Poland settled in Germany permanently, and very often their Polish surnames were kept by the following generations. However, as family names were adjusted to the German rules of pronunciation and spelling, they

usually became heavily distorted. In the eastern part of Germany (Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Pomerania) there were also indigenous surnames cognate with Polish ones, resulting from the assimilation of Polabian Slavs and Pomeranians.

The political relations between the German and Polish territories made population exchange smoother. Silesia was part of the dominion of the Austrian House of Habsburg, and subsequently the Brandenburg Hohenzollern line (since 1742). Pomerania and the Duchy of Prussia were affiliated with Brandenburg since the 17th century, and in the subsequent hundred years they became part of the Kingdom of Prussia. The Polish migrations to Saxony were also facilitated by a personal union between the two states (1697-1764).

Surnames of Polish origin were present primarily in the southern part of the Duchy of Prussia, i.e. Masuria¹. People of Polish decent constituted approximately 30% of the population of Königsberg². Many Polish surnames were also present in the eastern part of the Duchy of Pomerania, chiefly in the area of the Lębork (Lauenburg) and Bytów (Bütow) Land³. To a large extent these were indigenous inhabitants of Polish or Pomeranian descent. As a result of the migration exchange, Polish surnames permeated from the territories of the borderland into Brandenburg (chiefly to the capital city of Berlin), as well as into other German states. The territorial mobility of particular migrants from the Duchy of Prussia was so great, that in the 18th century it was possible to find some individuals originating from this province and named “Kowalsky” or “Drosky” even in Dutch South Africa, where the largest group of settlers, next to the Dutch, were emigrants from Germany⁴.

The Partitioning of the Republic of Poland extended the scope of Prussian rule over Polish territories, and the final reach of this authority – lasting until 1920 – was established by the Congress of Vienna (1815). Regions that were part of the Kingdom of Prussia included Pomerania, West Prussia, East Prussia, the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Posen) and Silesia, where occurrences of Polish surnames stemmed from the presence of clusters of indigenous Polish inhabitants, as well as Brandenburg, Rhineland and Westphalia, where more and more immigrants arrived from the eastern part of the Prussian state. This process intensified in the second half of the 19th century and was referred to as *Ostflucht* (“escape to the East”). Its causes are typically associated with the development of industrial areas and large urban centres in central and western parts of Prussia and Germany. This, as a result, enticed immigrants from the East seeking work and a better life (Table 1). Close-knit groups of inhabitants of Polish descent and upholding Polish traditions were formed in many towns. This was

¹ G. Białuński, “Nazwy osobowe na Mazurach (XV-XVIII w.),” *Onomastica* 41 (1996): 83-95; M. Biolik, “Germanizacja nazwisk polskich mieszkańców okolic Węgorzewa w latach 1653-1853,” *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Olsztynie. Prace Językoznawcze* 1 (1997): 5-19.

² S. Augustiewicz, J. Jasiński, T. Oracki, *Wybitni Polacy w Królewcu XVI-XX wiek* (Olsztyn, 2005); M. Kałuski, “Polacy w Królewcu,” in *Głos z nad Pregoly* 6/119 (2006): 7.

³ M. Dzięcielski, “Pochodzenie szlachty lęborskiej i rozwój własności ziemskiej na przykładzie Dzięciela i rodziny Dzięcielskich,” *Biuletyn Historyczny* 10 (1999): 12-23.

⁴ M. Kowalski, “Polish Boer Families, The influence of early Polish immigration on Boer families,” *Familia – Quarterly Journal of the Genealogical Society of South Africa* 43 (2006): 38-46.

particularly true of the Ruhr district, developing between Rhineland and Westphalia. For instance, at the beginning of the 20th century, those inhabitants of Polish origin constituted 40% of the population⁵ of Bottrop urban centre, which was why the town was also known as Little Warsaw⁶. Even on the level of districts (*Kreise*), the percentage of Polish inhabitants sometimes exceeded 10% of the entire population (Table 2). However, these are only the official data, which due to various considerations should be perceived as underestimated. There must have been many more people of Polish origin, as well as an additional number of inhabitants bearing Polish surnames, as many Germans – immigrants from the East – who had had Polish surnames for generations should also have been taken into consideration. In the decades that followed the majority of the inhabitants of the Ruhr of Polish descent became Germanised, and what remained were the surnames along with other traces of a Polish presence.

The process of Germanisation also took place in the eastern Prussian provinces, where the Polish inhabitants were indigenous. The main factors constituting this process were the actions of German institutions, as well as the direct influence of German society. It should be noted, however, that the opposite process – the Polonisation of German people, both on territories belonging to Prussia and beyond its eastern border – also occurred. One of the effects of this centuries-long mutual influence was the emergence of both a large group of Germans bearing Polish surnames, as well as a large group of Poles with German surnames. Representatives of these groups left a mark on the histories of both nations. In the case of Germany, these were e.g. Otto Skorzeny, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, Günter Schabowski, Herbert Hupka and Horst Bienek. On the other hand, in Poland, such examples were among others: Wincenty Pohl, Jędrzej Giertych, Józef Haller, Władysław Anders, Emil Wedel and Antoni Blikle.

Table 1

The national background of miners in the Ruhr region in 1893.

Region (country or province) of origin	thousands	%
Westphalia	67.2	42.5
Rhineland	32.0	20.2
East Prussia, West Prussia, the Poznań province, Silesia	39.4	24.9
Other parts of Germany	4.0	9.0
Austria-Hungary	1.9	1.2
The Netherlands	1.3	0.8
Italy	0.7	0.5
Other	1.4	0.9
Total	158.2	100.0

Source: *Timelines and History of Migration: Germany. The "Ruhrpolen" - Poles in the Ruhr area.* http://www.ghs-mh.de/migration/projects/timeline/tl_ge_2.htm

⁵ F. Heckmann, *Ethnische Minderheit, Volk und Nation*, (Stuttgart, 1993).

⁶ B. Frilling, *Bottrop – Bergbaustadt im Ruhrgebiet*, 1971, http://www.bernhard-frilling.de/Seminararbeit/Seminararbeit_Inhalt.html

Table 2

Districts (Städte or Kreise) of the Ruhr region with the largest percentages of inhabitants declaring Polish as their native language in 1900 and 1910.

District	1900	1910
Gelsenkirchen (<i>Stadt</i>)	13.1%	17.7%
Recklinghausen (<i>Kreis</i>)	13.8%	15.7%
Bochum (<i>Stadt</i>)	9.1%	n/a
Dortmund (<i>Stadt</i>)	7.3%	12.2%

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs...*, 1903; B. Czopek-Kopciuch, *Nazwiska polskie w Zagłębiu Ruhry* (Kraków, 2004).

The large wave of inhabitants of the Polish-German borderlands moving to the territory of contemporary Germany was also caused by Germany losing some of its eastern provinces (most of the Posen district and West Prussia, a smaller part of Upper Silesia). Many Germans, also those bearing Polish surnames, did not see a future for themselves in the newly formed Polish state, and chose to emigrate to the West.

The greatest population movements affecting the people of the Polish-German frontier were a consequence of World War II. The first emigration wave was caused by the eastern front drawing nearer. Germans, but also Poles, left their homes for fear of the Red Army, but also due to a regulation issued by the German authorities. The second wave took place already after the war, and was an effect of the resolutions of the great powers, which decided to expel the German population from the territories of Central Europe, including Poland (Fig. 1).

Subsequent emigration waves were related to the exodus of the so-called native population in the decades following World War II. These were primarily members of families, which had declared Polish nationality immediately after the war. Due to political and economic considerations, a large part of that population exercised their right to a German citizenship. Between 1956 and 1989 this turned out to be the case for about 1 million people, including practically all the inhabitants of Masuria, a majority of those living in Warmia and a large number of Silesians, as well as a number of smaller population groups. Such migrations can also be observed today; however, in recent years the dynamics of this exodus have dwindled. This is connected both with the exhaustion of migration resources, as well as with the assimilation processes. Another important factor is related to the opening of borders and Poland's accession to the European Union. The possibility of free travel discourages people from making the decision to emigrate permanently. Also, it has been observed that many emigrants are returning home. The 2002 population census indicated that almost 20% of the inhabitants of the Opolskie voivodeship have German citizenship (in most cases a Polish one as well); which however, does not constitute an incentive to emigrate permanently.

Figure 1

The percentage of migrants in the populations of German regions in 1950 and the main destinations of resettlement from the territories granted to Poland.



Source: based on *Putzger – Historischer Weltatlas*, 2002

Apart from the people who either had German citizenship or had the right to one – similarly as it was before the Partitions – the migrations also pertained to the inhabitants of those Polish territories that did not constitute a part of the Prussian (German) state. The industrial centres deep inside Germany attracted Poles from Congress Poland and Galicia, and after 1918 also from independent Poland. These population movements also continued after the war and are still happening today. In fact, they were not hindered by the obstacles introduced by communism, or the restrictions on the number of Poles working in Germany after Poland joined the European Union. According to a report prepared by the plenipotentiary of the German government for immigration, within the German population there are over 2 million people who came from Poland – mostly the so-called “late resettlers” (*Spätaussiedler*). Over 300,000 of them have Polish citizenship only⁷.

⁷ J. Kowalski, B. Dudek, “Niemcy, kraj imigrantów,” 2007, <http://www.dw.de/niemcy-kraj-imigrantow/a-3015011>.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLISH SURNAMES IN GERMANY

The historical background outlined above indicates that the strong connection between Polish and German territories and frequent migrations contributed to the relatively common presence of Polish-sounding surnames beyond the western border. What is interesting, knowledge of the fact is well rooted in Germany. For instance, the German edition of the popular online encyclopaedia – Wikipedia – reports that 13% of the inhabitants of Germany (approximately 10 million) with surnames of Polish origin. Nonetheless, this figure does seem excessive, and the authors do not give any reference for this information.

The best known and the most thoroughly studied area of Germany with respect to the incidence of surnames of Polish origin is undoubtedly the Ruhr. The unique status of this area has – among other things – caused it to be the object of numerous linguistic publications by specialists in onomastics⁸. With respect to the number of Polish surnames, such places as Recklinghausen, Dortmund, Wesel, Essen and Bochum have the largest numbers. In fact, practically the entire area of this industrial district is characterized by a higher percentage of Polish surnames (Fig. 2).

The most characteristic of all Polish surnames is “Kowalski” and it is also common in this region. The communes where the number of inhabitants under this name is particularly large are the same ones where the percentage of Poles at the beginning of the 20th century (Tables 2 and 3) was the largest. The number of people named “Kowalski” is so high that it even matches some towns in Poland. In Castrop-Rauxel, a city with 76.900 inhabitants, there are about 60 people under this name, which equals 80 persons named “Kowalski” per 100,000 inhabitants (Table 3). In Suwałki, a Polish city with a similar number of inhabitants (69,600) there are 50 people named “Kowalski”, which translates into a slightly lower ratio (72 per 100,000). However, the northeast borderlands of Poland are not a representative area in this respect. For the entire country, this ratio is 359, and reaches “record” values in the Ciechanów district, where the frequency is 1,300, i.e. 1.3% of the inhabitants are named “Kowalski”. It can be assumed that in the case of surnames more geographically concentrated in Poland, and still commonplace in Germany (e.g. Lewandowski), the areas where the incidence of these surnames is smaller in Poland than in the Ruhr can be much larger.

⁸ B. Czopek-Kopciuch, *Nazwiska polskie...*; K. Rymut, J. Hoffmann, *Lexikon der Familiennamen polnischer Herkunft im Ruhrgebiet*, (Kraków, 2006).

⁹ There are more inhabitants under the name “Nowak”; however, it is also popular in other Slavic nations, in particular among Czechs.


Table 3
*Communes in Westphalia with the greatest number of telephone subscribers under
 the name "Kowalski"*

City (commune)	Number of telephone subscribers in 2005	Number of surnames per 100,000 telephone subscribers	Number of inhabitants in the city (commune) in 2007	Estimated number of inhabitants named "Kowalski"
Dortmund	76	36.9	586,909	217
Gelsenkirchen	54	60.9	264,765	161
Bochum	45	32.3	378,596	122
Hagen	31	42.6	193,748	83
Recklinghausen	24	55.4	120,536	67
Castrop-Rauxel	23	81.0	76,876	62
Bottrop	23	53.9	118,597	64
Herne	21	37.8	168,454	64
Hamm	21	33.6	183,065	62
Lünen	20	63.4	88,832	56

Source: http://www.lwl.org/LWL/Kultur/komuna/online_projekte/familienamengeografie. See also: R. Damme, *Familiengeografie im Internet am Beispiel des Internetportals "Westfälische Familiengeografie"*, in: G. von Cornelissen, H. Eickmans (ed.), *Familienmamen an Niederrhein und Maas*, Bottrop 2010, p. 83-92.

Figure 2

The number of persons named “Kowalski” among telephone subscribers in the Westphalia’s communes (per 100,000 subscribers).




Source: Source: http://www.lwl.org/LWL/Kultur/komuna/online_projekte/familiennamengeografie.

Thanks to the presented maps, it is also possible to point out other areas where persons of Polish descent and with Polish surnames are found (Fig. 4). Many of them live in the large urban centres of northern Germany, primarily in Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover, and Bremen. Relative values, however, are not on a par with those observed in the Ruhr. In this respect, many smaller towns in North Germany are characterised by high figures. In order to illustrate this phenomenon, one can analyse the incidence of the surname “Kowalski”. In Lower Saxony, districts such as Soltau-Fallingb., Peine, Wolfsburg, Vechta, Braunschweig and Helmstedt present a higher percentage of persons with this surname; in Mecklenburg – Schwerin, Parchim and Güstrow; in Vorpommern these are Rügen and Nordvorpommern, and in Brandenburg – Oberhavel, Prignitz, Potsdam and Frankfurt (Oder).

Figure 3

The distribution of telephone subscribers named “Kowalski” before the resettlement of the German population, according to the Reichstelefonbuch 1942.



Source: <http://www.gen-evolu.de>.

In the case of large and medium cities, the concentration of Polish surnames is undoubtedly a result of economic emigration dating back to the years of the industrial revolution at the turn of the 19th century. Consequently, Polish surnames are borne by the descendants of old emigrants from Polish territories, which at the time were Prussian provinces. This process was to an extent supplemented by economic and political migrations (among others, the so called “late resettlers”), which took place after World War II. In the cases of a high frequency of persons with Polish surnames in the poorly urbanised areas of Northern Germany, it can be assumed that these were the results of compulsory resettlement during and immediately after the Second World War. The groups of people expelled from the territories lost to Poland – where surnames of Polish origin were frequent – were transferred primarily to the northern part of Germany¹⁰ (Fig. 1). This is probably why this area now has a high percentage of inhabitants with family names such as Kowalski, Lewandowski, Kamiński, Zieliński, Jankowski, Grabowski and Piotrowski (Fig. 4).


¹⁰ T. Kraus, E. Meynen, H. Mortensen, H. Schlenger, *Atlas Östliches Mitteleuropa* (Bielefeld-Berlin-Hannover, 1959).

Thanks to maps illustrating surname distribution one can also trace how the inhabitants of particular regions were dispersed. It is possible by analysing the incidence of surnames characteristic of a given area. Among others, this pertains to the name “Kaczmarek” typical to the region of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska). The scope of its expansion includes Brandenburg and Saxony in particular (Fig. 4).


Figure 4

The relative and absolute distribution of the selected, most common Polish surnames in Germany



Kamiński




Kowalski



Szymański



Mazur

Source: www.verwandt.de.

A detailed comparison indicates that the hierarchy of the most common Polish surnames according to the frequency of their incidence is slightly different in Germany than that observed in Poland. In Poland these are: Nowak, Kowalski, Wiśniewski, Wójcik, Kowalczyk and Kamiński respectively. In Germany, on the other hand, the ordering is as follows: Nowak¹¹, Kamiński, Kowalski, Grabowski, Dąbrowski, Jankowski. This fact illustrates the selectiveness of emigration, which pertained chiefly to the territories of the ethnic borderland, which from the point of view of onomastics was apparently not representative of the entire area of Poland. Considering only the 4% ratio calculated on the basis of the number of the most frequent Polish surnames (Table 5), one might conclude that the number of German inhabitants with Polish surnames is only about a third of what is suggested by e.g. Wikipedia or other German sources. It should be borne in mind, however, that in Germany the structure of surnames originating from the Polish language is exceptionally not representative of the structure of surnames in contemporary Poland. This can be observed when comparing statistics pertaining to the 20 most frequent surnames in Poland and those in Germany. Of the “top 20” most common Polish surnames in Germany, six achieved an incidence of over 5% with respect to their total number in Poland (Nowak, Grabowski, Kamiński, Kozłowski, Jankowski, Dąbrowski), while

¹¹ It should be noted that many contemporary Germans named “Nowak” have their roots also in Czech territories (see also note 9).

in the case of “Wójcik” and “Kowalczyk” these ratios equalled only 0.7% and 1.5% respectively. However, none of the surnames exceeded the level of 10% (or, for that matter, the aforementioned 13%).

Still, the percentage of German inhabitants with Polish surnames is not necessarily restricted to 4% of the population. One can assume, that the structure of the surnames originating from Polish in Germany is characteristic of the former Polish-German borderlands, rather than the entire territory of Poland. Undoubtedly, certain surnames – absent from other regions of Poland – must be overrepresented there, whereas some of the most commonplace names in Poland (among others, the above-mentioned “top 20”) are much less frequent.

Analysing the distribution of the Silesian surname “Kowol” can facilitate illustrating this phenomenon. In Poland, there are approximately 2,500 people with this surname; in Germany, in turn, about 1,300 citizens have surnames spelled “Kowol” or “Kowoll”. Quite similar is the case of the name “Piechowski” concentrated in the region of Kashubia. There are 1,534 persons with this name in Poland and 426 in Germany. One can infer that the situation will be identical with respect to many other surnames present in area of the former Polish-German borderlands. These examples may indicate that there could be slightly more than just 4% of German inhabitants with surnames of Polish origin.


No doubt, the group of surnames present in the former Polish-German borderlands includes the following ones, which are widespread in Germany: Janke, Radtke, Reschke, Liedtke, Mielke, Paschke. According to E. Breza¹² (2000), they originate from diminutive forms such as: Janek, Radek, Lutek, Miłek, or Paszek, characteristic among others for the Polish Kashubia. They are also very commonplace in Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, and Saxony (in the region of Lusatia in particular), and even in the eastern part of the historic region of Holstein. This clearly demonstrates that the surnames are West Slavonic, rather than Polish. These were not only the names of Germanised Poles, but also – or maybe even above all – Pomeranians, Obotrites, Veleti, and Sorbs. Consequently, it would be difficult to classify such surnames as being strictly of Polish origin.

The examples presented above indicate that the problem of German surnames originating from Polish cannot be treated separately from the issue of surnames originating from West Slavonic. In some cases it is impossible to determine unequivocally whether they stem from Polish, Czech or Polabian territories. With these reservations in mind, however, it is possible to claim that 4% is the lowest possible estimate of the number of German inhabitants with surnames originating from Polish in the entire German population. Nonetheless, it does not seem plausible that this figure could reach 13%. Still, this percentage might refer to the number of persons in Germany who bear surnames not of Polish, but rather of Slavic origin.

¹² E. Breza, *Nazwiska Pomorzan: pochodzenie i zmiany* (Gdańsk, 2000).

Figure 5

The distribution of the surname “Janke” in Germany indicates its origins in the northern part of the historic region of Polabia (among others: Mecklenburg, Wendland, Vorpommern, of the western part of Holstein).



Source: www.verwandt.de.

An exact estimation of the number of people in Germany with surnames of Polish and Slavic origin does seem to be a feasible task. It would require access to a state register of the population of Germany as well as the participation of competent linguists. The obtained results, however, would not automatically translate into the number of persons of Polish or Slavic descent among the ancestors of contemporary Germans. It would also be necessary to include people whose forefathers changed their names to typically German ones, as well as those whose lineage originally had a German-sounding name from its very beginning. In such cases, due to the lack of materials documenting the majority of these phenomena, only rough estimates are possible. Consequently, the attained number of people with surnames of Polish and Slavic roots would, in this case constitute, the lowest possible estimate of the number of the ancestors of contemporary Germans who were Polish with Slavic descent.

Table 4

A comparative characteristic of the 20 most frequent Polish surnames in Poland and Germany.

Surname	Etymological category	Number of surnames		Number of surnames per 100,000 inhabitants		Ratio of the number of surnames in Germany to that in Poland (%)
		Poland	Germany	Poland	Germany	
Nowak*	general	19,008	37,730	522	46	8.8
Kowalski	cognominal (occupation)	136,937	10,313	359	13	3.5
Wiśniewski	cognominal (plant)	108,072	8,089	283	10	3.5
Wójcik	various (chiefly patronymic)	97,995	1,394	257	2	0.7
Kowalczyk	cognominal (occupation)	96,435	3,187	253	4	1.5
Kamiński	cognominal (nature)	92,831	12,602	243	15	6.3
Lewandowski	cognominal (plant)/ neophytic	90,935	5,636	238	7	2.9
Zieliński	cognominal (plant) / neophytic	89,118	6,666	234	8	3.5
Szymański	patronymic	87,570	7,225	230	9	3.8
Woźniak	cognominal (occupation)	87,155	2,322	229	3	1.2
Dąbrowski	cognominal (plant)	84,497	9,044	222	11	5.0
Kozłowski	cognominal (animal)	74,790	8,309	196	10	5.2
Jankowski	patronymic	67,243	7,467	176	9	5.2
Mazur	ethnic/cognominal (district)	66,034	4,517	173	6	3.2
Wojciechowski	patronymic	65,239	1,866	171	2	1.3
Kwiatkowski	cognominal (plant)	64,963	2,719	170	3	1.9
Krawczyk	cognominal (occupation)	62,832	2,834	165	3	2.1
Kaczmarek	toponymic	60,713	5,716	159	7	4.4
Piotrowski	patronymic	60,255	5,356	158	7	4.1
Grabowski	cognominal (plant)	57,426	9,702	151	12	7.9
Total	Total	1,750,048	12,694	4,589	186	4.1

*a surname popular also in other Slavic countries, particularly in the Czech Republic and Slovenia (most frequent surname: see also notes 9 and 11). Interestingly, the geographic distribution of the name "Nowak" to a large extent also involves Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, i.e. regions (especially in the case of the former) closest to the Czech Republic in terms of physical distance.

Table 5

The estimated number of inhabitants with Polish surnames in the German population.

Number of persons with one of the 20 most frequent Polish surnames in Poland	1,750,048
Percentage of people with one of the “top 20” surnames to entire Polish population	4.59%
Number of persons with one of the 20 most frequent Polish surnames in Germany	15,694
Estimated number of people with Polish surnames in Germany, assuming 152,694 constitutes 4.59% of the population	3,328,642
Estimated percentage of people with surnames of Polish origin in the German population	4.06%

CONCLUSIONS

Surname distribution analysis is a valuable method of studying migrations, albeit one not without certain flaws. It produces rather detailed information on the direction of movements with respect to certain countries of nationality groups. However, it is not possible to assess the actual number of migrants or the magnitude of the influx with the use of this method, unless comparable data for various time periods are available. Moreover, the presence of a particular surname in a given area is conditioned not only by external migrations, but internal ones as well (secondary migrations).

In the case of Polish-German migrations, what has had a particularly significant impact on the current and past distribution of surnames was the complicated historical past, connected among others with the strong processes of Germanisation taking place in Polish territories. What is more, in many areas, the migration waves occurring at various points in time must have undoubtedly overlapped.

Solely on the basis of the presence of Polish surnames, without conducting more detailed research, it is difficult to determine where the immigrants with Polish names came from, and when their movements took place. Nonetheless, the presented method makes it possible to tentatively identify the distribution of minorities, and may supplement other, more accurate, sources – ones based on population registers in particular. A comparison of the data from both these sources may be of particular use in the historic studies of migrations that go beyond archive sources, or in the case of a lack of thereof.

The large number of Polish surnames among Germans, and similarly German surnames borne by Poles¹³ also encourages more general reflections. It must be as-

¹³ The surname *Müller* (*Miller*, *Miler*, *Mueller*) occurs in 15,000 people in Poland, and taking into consideration also the spelling *Meller* – 20,000 (calculations on the basis of the data from the website www.moikrewni.pl). These persons inhabit areas where population registers indicate only isolated

sumed that many Germans had Polish ancestors, just like numerous Poles have German roots. The number of surnames in this situation serves as a general indicator, since on both sides of the border surnames were changed so as to blend in with the environment better. Surname distribution analysis, however, proves beyond any doubt that both nations – although belonging to different linguistic families and separated by historical antagonisms – are strongly intermingled.

One can only hope that with time surnames in public register systems will become more accessible for scientific purposes; currently, chiefly due to personal data privacy considerations, obtaining lists of surnames from smaller territorial units is not possible. Simultaneously, the development of information technologies such as GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and data mining techniques (statistical processing of large databases) creates enormous possibilities for using the above-mentioned sources of information for the purpose of research on migration, history and linguistics.

cases of inhabitants with German nationality, which means that the majority of these people consider themselves to be Polish. Similar figures pertain to the number of people with the name *Schmidt* (*Szmit*, *Szmyd*).

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REALIZATION OF THE RIGHTS OF POLES IN GERMANY FOLLOWING THE TREATY ON GOOD NEIGHBOURSHIP

SELECTED ASPECTS ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE PARLIAMENTS
OF POLAND AND GERMANY

The rights of national minorities in Germany, and in particular the rights of the Polish minority belong to a set of issues which have caused a lot of controversies in Polish-German relations in the past and at present.

Having chosen the parliaments of both countries for the present analysis of the realization of the rights of Poles in Germany the author assumed that parliaments are assemblies representing the societies of both countries and views of different social groups, as well as bodies which participate in the formulation (and sometimes in the realization) of interior policy and to some extent of foreign policy¹. On the other hand, parliaments are also a forum where the government's attitude towards the above issue can be presented.

The parallel sessions of both parliaments, the Bundestag and the Sejm (the lower house of parliament) of the third Republic of Poland on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of signing the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation, and the relevant resolutions passed by the parliaments have become a symbol of cooperation and coordination of actions of both assemblies in the shaping of Polish-German relations. The sessions were held on 21 June 2001 (during the 111th session of the Polish Sejm 3rd term of office and 176th session of the Bundestag 14th term of office)².

¹ A piece of evidence confirming this thesis is, for example a resolution of the Bundestag from 10 Feb 2011, *60 years of the Expellees Charter. Bringing reconciliation to an end*, which included controversial statements which were damaging for Polish-German relations, or an earlier resolution from 29 May 1998 *The expelled, the displaced and German minorities as a bridge between Germany and its eastern neighbours* which became the reason for the so called paper war between the parliaments of Poland and Germany.

² Polish-German parliamentary groups function in the Sejm and in the Bundestag. Many sessions were held by the joint committees of both parliaments (e.g., foreign affairs committees) or presidia (e.g., in Słubice in 2004, in Berlin in 2006 and 2009, in Wrocław and Krzyżowa on 23-24 Nov 2008). In 2009 a plaque commemorating the achievements of 'Solidarność' was installed in the Reichstag. It is

EARLIER LEGAL REGULATIONS – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The protection of national minorities in Germany was ensured by the constitutional law in the past. Special articles devoted to minorities were already present in the Frankfurt constitution from 1849. The constitution of the Weimar Republic from 11 August 1919 in article 113 ensured that foreign language national groups (*fremdsprachige Volksteile*) in the Reich have freedom of development and it prohibited imposing any legal and administrative restrictions concerning using their native language especially in education, administration and courts of law³.

The Prussian Constitution from 30 November 1920 in article 73 on the area of particular provinces allowed for the use of other languages apart from the German language as the language of instruction in schools for **foreign language groups** (*fremdsprachige Volksteile*) and as official languages⁴.

Despite these constitutional regulations it proved necessary for the protection of minorities in the divided Upper Silesia to have an article included in the Geneva Convention from 15 May 1922 concerning a guarantee for 15 years of equal rights for Poles and Germans living in the former plebiscite areas. On these grounds the Polish minority inhabiting the area incorporated into Germany obtained the right to use the Polish language, to have minority education and to develop their cultural, sports, professional and political activity. However, both the constitutional provisions and the Geneva Convention's regulations were violated with reference to Polish people in the inter-war period (especially in the Opole Silesia)⁵.

The status of national minority for Poles in Germany was denounced by Hermann Göring's decree from 27 February 1940 followed by a dissolution of all Polish unions and associations and the confiscation of their property.

After World War II a considerable number of Poles lived on German territory, although the group was diverse with respect to the time and reason of having arrived to Germany. The group included the descendants of the so called old immigration and people who arrived to Germany at the time of the war (forced labour work-

also worth mentioning that on 21 Feb 2011 the first joint session of the foreign affairs committees of the Sejm, the Bundestag and the Russian Duma was held and was devoted to the issue of visa-free movement for the residents of the Kaliningrad region.

³ "Die fremdsprachigen Volksteile des Reichs dürfen durch die Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung nicht in ihrer freien, volkstümlichen Entwicklung, besonders nicht im Gebrauch ihrer Muttersprache beim Unterricht, sowie bei der inneren Verwaltung und der Rechtspflege beeinträchtigt werde". http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/wrv.html#ERSTER_ABSCHNITT02.

⁴ „Die Provinziallandtage können durch Provinzialgesetz neben der deutschen Sprache zulassen: a) eine andere Unterrichtssprache für fremdsprachige Volksteile, wobei für den Schutz deutscher Minderheiten zu sorgen ist;

b) eine andere Amtssprache in gemischtsprachigen Landesteilen“. <http://www.verfassungen.de/de/preussen/preussen20.htm>.

⁵ [M.S. Korowicz], S. Komar [pseud.], *Górnośląska konwencja genewska pomiędzy Polską a Niemcami 1922–1937 [The Upper Silesian Geneva convention between Poland and Germany]*, Katowice–Warszawa 1937.

ers, prisoners-of-war, soldiers conscripted to the German army units, etc.) who for various reasons did not return to Poland. The Polish emigration to Germany did not cease after 1945. Groups of Polish immigrants continued to arrive in both German countries that were established in 1949. The largest group was constituted by the so called displaced persons (*Aussiedler*), that is people who claimed their presumed German origin (according to article 116 of the Basic Law), and who upon arrival to the Federal Republic of Germany received (in the German nomenclature – regained) German citizenship, and until the 1990s were using privileges provided by the expellee law.

However, rights for national minorities were not guaranteed either in the Basic Law (BL) of West Germany from 23 May 1949 or in the Basic Law of the reunified Germany from 1990. Only article 3 item 3 BL included a provision saying that “nobody can be disadvantaged or privileged because of their sex, birth, race, language, place of origin, social background, religion and political or religious views (...)”⁶.

The East Germany constitution from 1 October 1949 by reference to the Weimar constitution included article 11 item 1 saying that a free national development of foreign language groups in the GDR should be supported by law and administration in the Republic. In particular these groups cannot be discriminated against in teaching their native language, in administration and in legislation⁷. However, this article was missing from the GDR’s constitution from 6 April 1968 and from its amendment from 7 October 1974. There were only articles about the equality of rights and responsibilities of all the citizens of the GDR irrespective of their nationality, race, views, religion, social background and position (art. 20), and about the constitutionally protected Sorbo-Lusatian minority (art. 40)⁸.

In practice the Poles in East Germany were not recognized as a minority and thus they could not establish their own organizations or publically cultivate their own culture and language.

In West Germany the status of recognized national minorities was granted to: Danes, Frisians, Lusatian Sorbs and Roma. The rights of the first three minorities are included in the constitutions of the member states inhabited by these minorities⁹.

⁶ *Basic Law (constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany from 23 May 1949/Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. May 1949. German and Polish version with all the consecutive amendments. 2nd edition according to the text from 31 Dec 1996, Poznań 1997, p. 71.*

⁷ „Die fremdsprachigen Volksteile der Republik sind durch Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung in ihrer freien volkstümlichen Entwicklung zu fördern; sie dürfen insbesondere am Gebrauch ihrer Muttersprache im Unterricht, in der inneren Verwaltung und in der Rechtspflege nicht gehindert werden“. <http://www.documentarchiv.de/ddr/verfddr1949.html>.

⁸ “Bürger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik sorbischer Nationalität haben das Recht zur Pflege ihrer Muttersprache und Kultur. Die Ausübung dieses Rechts wird vom Staat gefördert“.

⁹ In the constitution of Brandenburg from 20 Aug 1992 the rights of the Sorbo-Lusatians are written in art. 25; in the constitution of Saxony from 27 May 1992 in art. 6. In the constitution of Schleswig-Holstein from 13 Dec 1949 the rights of national minorities were guaranteed in art. 5. In addition, the

TREATY REGULATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE POLISH GROUP IN GERMANY

The rights for the German minority in Poland and for the Polish people in the Federal Republic of Germany are guaranteed on the principle of mutuality in the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation from 17 June 1991 in articles 20, 21 and 22, as well as in the attached letters of the foreign ministers.

On 13 September 1991 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs when speaking in the Parliament of the Republic of Poland during the debate concerning the ratification of the Treaty on Good Neighbourship by the government stated that “the issue of the position of Polish people in Germany was not easy” but nevertheless “negotiations resulted in beneficial solutions”¹⁰.

Poles in Germany were defined in article 20 item 1 of the Treaty as “persons in the Federal Republic of Germany with German citizenship who are of Polish origin or who identify themselves with the Polish language, culture or traditions”¹¹.

The act stated that they have the right individually or together with other members of their community to freely express, maintain and develop their ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity without any attempts to assimilate them against their will”¹².

In the latter sections of article 20 it was stated that this right in particular refers to:

- freedom of using the native language in private and public life, access to information in that language, and freedom in disseminating and exchanging information in that language

- freedom of establishing and maintaining institutions, organizations or educational, cultural and religious associations which have the right to apply for voluntary and other financial means, as well as for public aid in line with the national law, and which have equal access to the mass media of their region, (...)

- freedom to establish and maintain undisturbed contacts among themselves within their own country, as well as across borders with citizens of other countries with whom they share their joint ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage or religious beliefs,

- the use of their first names and surnames in the original form of their native language,

- freedom to establish and maintain organizations or associations within their own country and to subscribe to international non-governmental organizations,

rights of Danes were regulated by the so called Köln Declaration from 26 Sept 1949 (*Erklärung der Landesregierung Schleswig-Holstein über die Stellung der dänischen Minderheit*) and by the Bonn-Copenhagen declarations from 29 March 1955.

¹⁰ Shorthand report from the 73rd session of the Polish Sejm, in: *Polska – Niemcy: dobre sąsiedztwo i przyjazna współpraca*, ed. by J. Barcz and M. Tomala, Warszawa 1992, p. 123.

¹¹ Quoted after: *Polacy i Niemcy. Płaszczyzny i drogi normalizacji. Bilans pierwszego pięciolecia*, ed. by M. Lis and A. Trzcielińska-Polus, Opole 1997, p. 208.

¹² Ibidem.

- enjoying on equal terms with others the effective legal provisions to realize their rights in line with national law”¹³.

Article 1 item 2 stated that “The parties to the Treaty will in particular: (...) despite the need to learn the official language of the relevant country strive in agreement with the binding regulations of the national law to ensure for the members of the groups defined in article 20 item 1 the adequate possibilities to teach their native language, or in their native language in state schools, as well as where it is possible and necessary to use the language in communication with public authorities”¹⁴.

Additionally, the German side declared in two identical letters of foreign ministers of the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany attached to the Treaty on Good Neighbourship that it will make endeavours to create opportunities also for the persons of Polish origin or those who identify themselves with the Polish language, culture and traditions, who are not subject to article 20, that is they do not hold German citizenship to have the capacity to enjoy the broadly understood scope of rights listed in article 20 and 21.

POLISH MATTERS IN GERMANY IN THE BUNDESTAG FORUM

The issues concerning the realization of the German minority rights in Poland and of the Polish group in Germany many a time have been an object of interest of the German Bundestag, although the former group has received much more attention.

From the very beginning it was pointed out that both these groups can act as bridges in the mutual contacts between their nations and states. Such convictions, hopes and expectations were explicitly verbalized in a motion put forward by the SPD faction on 16 October 1991 which granted Polish people in Germany (similar to the German minority in Poland) the role of a **bridge** between both nations¹⁵. Also the CDU/CSU and FDP factions indirectly expressed similar views as they initially wrote about the participation of “parallel groups”, although they focused on the role of the German minority and the Germans “expelled from their home areas”¹⁶.

In September 2000 in the motion submitted by the MPs: Katherine Reiche, Volker Rühle, dr Friedbert Pflüger, Karl Lamers, Hartmut Koschyk, dr Andreas Schockenhoff, Hans-Dirk Bierling, Clemens Schwalbe and the CDU/CSU faction entitled “Towards future directions for Polish-German friendship” appeals were made in the Bundestag to include Poles living in Germany and people of Polish origin in the various projects concerning German-Polish cooperation¹⁷.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 209.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache (henceforth: DB Drs.) 12/1319, 16 Oct 1991, p. 2.

¹⁶ DB Drs. 12/1107, 3 Sept 1991.

¹⁷ DB Drs. 14/4162, 26 Sept 2000, p. 2.

In the later documents, for example in the draft of the resolution from 23 January 2001 the CDU/CSU faction drew attention to the fact that in the further development and expansion of bilateral relations it is important to include in the course of regular consultations the matter of the Germans expelled from their home territory, the German minorities in Poland and the Poles living in Germany¹⁸.

In the draft of the resolution submitted by the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens factions entitled, “Towards a common future: Germans and Poles in Europe” from 7 February 2001 it was stated, among others that “the members of the German minority in Poland and the Poles living in Germany as well as persons of Polish origin, and the many expellees from their home territory play **an important and constructive part** in Polish-German relations”.

Also in the joint motion concerning the resolution of the factions SPD, CDU/CSU, Alliance 90/The Greens and F.D.P. from 20 June 2001 entitled, “Germans and Poles in Europe: joint future” the following statement was included: “The German Bundestag calls the federal government to: (...) recognize that the members of the German minority in Poland and Poles and citizens of Polish origin living in Germany as well as many expellees from their home territory play an **active, bridging and constructive role** in the bilateral relations. Their matters need to be considered in line with the Good Neighbourship Treaty during the scheduled regular consultations”¹⁹.

During the debate from 21 June 2001 Markus Meckel, an MP (SPD) pointed to the “hundreds of thousands of German citizens who have language, cultural and family ties with Poland and to many Polish citizens who live or study in Germany as those who fulfill their “important role as **mediators** in bringing both countries together”²⁰.

In the early 1990s occurrences of German right-wing extremists publically turning against Poles in Germany became an irritable issue in the context of the Polish community. This topic was raised by Ulla Jelpke, an MP together with the PDS/Left List group in the Bundestag forum²¹. One of the replies obtained from the government said that in Germany the number of attacks against Polish citizens rose in particular after the introduction of the visa-free movement in the borderland areas. In consequence, for example on 8 April 1991 41 people were arrested and until mid 1993 36 anti-Polish incidents were reported²². It is worth noting that when on 27 May 1994 the government of the Federal Republic of Germany was replying to the question raised by Hartmut Koschyk from the CSU concerning the attacks of Polish extremists on members of the German minority it informed about the government’s firm reaction, and about the fact that the Polish side had not only started legal action

¹⁸ DB Drs. 14/5138, 23 Jan 2001, p. 2-3.

¹⁹ DB Drs. 14/6322, 20 Jun 2001, p. 4.

²⁰ DB Plenarprotokolle (henceforth: PIPr.) 14/176, 21 Jun 2001, p. 17280.

²¹ DB Drs. 12/5507, p. 11.

²² DB Drs. 12/5507, 28 Jul 1993, p. 6-7.

but also the Polish Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice condemned these attacks in the parliamentary forum²³. Yet, no words of condemnation concerning the attacks on Polish people in Germany or any other anti-Polish incidents were uttered by the German government in the Bundestag²⁴.

The issue of the unequal status of the German minority in Poland and the Polish group in Germany was raised in the Bundestag relatively early by MPs from the opposition. Disregarding the different status written in the Treaty some members of parliament used in the Bundestag the term “Polish minority” to describe Poles in Germany (e.g. Gerd Poppe from the Green Party during a debate on 6 September 1991 concerning the ratification of the German-Polish treaties called for respecting and realizing the rights of “**the Polish minority in Germany**” in compliance with the articles of the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and the letters of foreign ministers²⁵.

The term “**Polish minority in West Germany**” also appeared in a small question raised by Ulla Jelpke from PDS on 31 March 1995²⁶. Anyway, already in 1992 Ulla Jelpke, Gregor Gysi and other MPs from the PDS/Left List put forward an independent motion in the Bundestag concerning granting the status of national minority to Poles living in Germany. Among the postulated rights which should be guaranteed by such status the following ones were emphasized: safe residency status, unlimited right to employment and bringing up their family members, recognizing Polish diplomas and certificates, introducing Polish broadcasts and supporting the teaching of Polish as a foreign language in German schools²⁷.

In 1993 the MPs from the opposition PDS by referring to a conference organized in Berlin in 1992, “Poles in Germany – guests or minority?” asked about the general political and legal steps the government had taken since the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation with the Republic of Poland to ensure the same legal position of Poles who live in Germany as in the case of Germans (they, among others, pointed to the unequal treatment of the same qualifications held by Polish people who are foreigners and by the Poles-*Aussiedler*). The reply they received said that the members of the Polish group in Germany are by virtue of the Basic Law treated as equal to German citizens and the Treaty with Poland was not needed to

²³ DB Drs. 12/7781, p. 1.

²⁴ For example, when an MP from the PDS/Left List group suggested that the government should cut itself off from statements such as: ‘Silesia is a part of Germany’ uttered at the Meeting of Silesians (co-financed by the federal government), she received a reply that the “federal government can see no reason to assess statements of private persons” and that “the government could only apologize for private statements if it had initiated them earlier on” (26 Aug 1993). The government reply to the interpellation of Ulla Jelpke and the PDS/Left List group DB Drs. 12/5591, 26 Aug 1993, p. 2-5.

²⁵ DB Plenarprotokolle (henceforth: PIPr.) 12/39 Sitz., 6 Sept 1991, p. 2159.

²⁶ DB Drs. 12/3631, 5 Nov 1992.

²⁷ DB Drs. 12/3631, 5 Nov 1992.

ensure it. The Treaty, however guarantees them the same rights as those of the German minority in Poland, among others to express, maintain and develop their ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity²⁸.

The PDS MPs were also interested in the question of the right to vote and to participate in political life for both groups. They received a detailed reply from the government in this matter referring to the number of candidates from the German minority lists for the Sejm and Senate in Poland²⁹ as well as the number of councilors in local and regional representative bodies³⁰. However, when replying to the part of the question regarding the participation of Poles, the representative of the government described the electoral law binding for all German citizens and no data was provided regarding the participation of Polish people in any representative bodies³¹.

The objection formulated in 1995 by the PDS that the German government does not regard as a national minority persons who have German citizenship and who are Polish in origin or identify themselves with the Polish language, culture or traditions was overruled by the argument that in the case of that group the requirement of the residency on the traditional home territory was not met³².

Establishing the number of the German Polonia was problematic. The Federal government when answering the questions from the PDS MPs stated that it does not have any detailed data concerning the matter and it does not know how many Poles have arrived to Germany in the last 100 years, neither how many were brought to Germany as forced labour workers but the “number in question may be **ca. 2 million people**”. The representative of the government went on to explain that there is also no data concerning the number of people who stayed in Germany after the war and received German citizenship³³.

²⁸ BD Drs 12/5507 from 28 Jul 1993 Reply of the federal government to a small question by the MP, Ulla Jelpke and the PDS/Left List group concerning the Polish minority in Germany.

²⁹ They received a reply that the minority is represented in the Sejm by 4 MPs and in the Senate by 1 senator.

³⁰ They received a reply that the members of the minority were standing for election from the minority lists in the Opole, Katowice and Częstochowa voivodeships. Altogether they were elected to 57 local councils (*gminas*) and to all three regional councils (*sejmiki wojewódzkie*). In the Opole voivodeship consisting of 65 local areas the minority is represented by 524 representatives in 38 *gminas*. In 26 *gminas* the minority received the majority of seats in the councils, in 22 *gminas* it has its own mayors, in 26 *gminas* it has its own chairs in the councils. 31 representatives of the German minority were delegated to the regional councils. In the Katowice voivodeship 60 people were elected from the minority lists to 12 local councils. In 5 *gminas* the mayor is from the minority and in 2 *gminas* the chairs of local councils represent the minority. The regional council includes 8 minority representatives. In the Częstochowa voivodeship the minority is represented by 7 councilors, in 4 *gminas* they are mayors, in one the chair of the local council. There are 3 representatives in the regional council.

³¹ DB Drs. 13/1036 from 31 Mar 1995 – the government’s reply to the small question by the MP, Ulla Jelpke and other MPs from the PDS faction entitled, “Minority rights in the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation with the Republic of Poland”.

³² DB Drs. 13/1036, 31 Mar 1995, p. 3-4.

³³ BD Drs 12/5507 from 28 Jul 1993 – reply of the federal government to a small question by the MP, Ulla Jelpke and the PDS/Left List group concerning the Polish minority in Germany.

However, the German government was able to quote precise numerical data concerning the number of Polish people in East Germany and their residency status. From 7 October 1949 till 2 October 1990 as many as 9,177 Polish citizens arrived to East Germany. Among those 709 had a permanent residency permit (*unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*), 2,061 had the right to stay (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*), 434 had permission to stay (*Aufenthaltsbewilligung*), and 5 persons were authorized to stay (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis*).

According to the data from 12 June 1993 as many as 268,254 Polish people (that is foreigners holding only Polish citizenship) lived in the unified Germany. However, the government representatives were not able to estimate how many Poles had dual citizenship³⁴. The number of people holding Polish citizenship and registered in the German offices for foreigners reached 263,381 on 31 December 1994³⁵.

In the consecutive parliamentary terms when the Polish issues in Germany stopped being a problem and were rarely raised information about their situation can be found in reports presented to the Bundestag concerning migration (*Migrationsberichte*)³⁶. In report No. 8 discussed in the parliament on 17 January 2011 there is first of all information that Poles constitute the third largest national group (after Turks and Italians) in Germany³⁷. As far as concrete numbers are concerned Poles (counted together with *Aussiedler* who had arrived from Poland) defined as Poles “with the migration experience/with migration in the background” (*mit Migrationshintergrund*) by the end of 2009 constituted a group of 1,103,000 people whereas an additional 195,000 Poles were defined as persons who did not personally experience migration (*ohne Migrationshintergrund*). Adding up the numbers in both groups we obtain altogether ca. 1.3 million people³⁸.

Another issue raised in the Bundestag was the rights of the Polish group. The realization of the Treaty provisions was mainly of interest to the parliamentary opposition representatives (MPs from the PDS party showed particular initiative) and the voices of criticism were not singular and referred to the lack of fulfillment of the commitments by the German government. This mainly referred to the right to obtain financial support from the German government for teaching the Polish language and cultivating Polish culture.

The PDS opposition MPs asked very detailed questions addressed to the government, that is how the support for teaching the Polish language increased after the Treaty with the Republic of Poland from 1991 (with respect to consecutive years), namely how much financing was provided, how many teachers were employed and

³⁴ DB Drs. 12/5507, 28 Jul 1993, p. 2-3.

³⁵ DB Drs. 13/1036, 31 Mar 1995, p. 4.

³⁶ On 8 June 2000 the German federal parliament obliged the government to present reports concerning the migration processes in the parliamentary forum.

³⁷ DB Drs. 17/4580, 19 Jan 2011, p. 205. Cf. also DB PIPr 17/83 Sitz. from 17 Jan 2011, p. 9291-9298.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 219.

specially trained, how many institutions to upgrade teachers' qualifications were created, how many advisors were employed, how many Polish and/or German institutes were included in the process, and what legal steps were taken by the federal government to support the Polish language in Germany. The reply they received said that the educational matters are in the capacity of the constituent countries. They were also informed that within the scope of the realization of the Treaty two working groups were created: for the Polish language and for the German language. A permanent German-Polish working group "Teaching Polish and Polish studies in Germany" was established on 27 February 1991. It met 5 times but the evaluation of the state of teaching the Polish language in Germany will be presented at the 6th meeting in early 1996³⁹.

When replying to the question asked by the PDS MPs about the support provided for the Polish group concerning teaching the Polish language and developing their cultural life the representatives of the German government said that the government supports only projects of **nationwide** relevance and the constituent countries are responsible for fulfilling the other tasks⁴⁰. The same answer was given by the government representative to Fritz Wittmann, an MP from the ruling coalition who quoted the provisions included in article 21 of the Treaty on Good Neighbourship. Manfred Carstens, the parliamentary secretary of state referred to articles 70 and 30 of the Basic Law about the division of the powers between the federation and the constituent countries. He also added that the German Foreign Office initiated in 1993 efforts which aimed at creating an "umbrella association" (in the whole of Germany) for the Polish groups, which could become a partner in talks with the German government. As it was presented by the Foreign Office the Federal Association of the Polish Council in Germany which in 1997 associated 100 organizations and 11 Landen unions was supposed to become such an association. In 1996 on the 5th anniversary of signing the Treaty the Association prepared a cultural project for the whole of Germany for which it altogether received 400,000 DM⁴¹.

The MPs many times asked about the financial support provided by the German government for the cultural activity and cultivating the identity of people with Polish origin who have German citizenship, as well as of the German minority in Poland. The answers provided by the government point to huge disproportions between the situation of both groups⁴².

³⁹ DB Drs. 13/1036 from 31 Mar 1995.

⁴⁰ DB Drs. 13/1036, 31 Mar 1995, p. 4.

⁴¹ DB Drs. 13/8310, 9 Jul 1997, p. 3-4

⁴² The Polish group in Germany received in 1992 25,000 DM via the East-European Cultural Centre, IGNIS. In 1994 the German Foreign Office allocated 240,000 DM out of which only 85,000 DM were used for the federal cultural projects organized by Poles – DB Drs. 13/1036, 31 Mar 1995, p. 6. In the following years the finances allocated for such projects amounted to: 399,200 DM in 1996, 421,500 DM in 1997, 294,800 DM in 1998, 178,000 DM in 1999, and the planned amount for 2000 was 405,000 DM (however, the document did not have information about how much of the money was actually used) – DB Drs. 14/4045, 6 Sept 2000, p. 5.

Questions were also asked about the Polish language mass media. The German government informed the MPs in 1993 that as far as the programmes in Polish were concerned, apart from the broadcasting by private stations, the DLF and Deutsche Welle have for years broadcast programmes in Polish. The TV channel two in the series “Neighbours in Europe – reports and information in foreign languages” televised a series “This is Poland” over the span of 14 days. The ZDF channel was adding a 5-minute information slot about events in Germany in Polish with German subtitles. The ARD station decided to have a daily 20-minute broadcast (at the time in 1993 it was in the preparation stage). The WDR station in the programme “Radio Dortmund” transmitted a weekly 25-minute programme in Polish. The Saara country offered to make such a programme but, as they said, Poles have not as yet taken up the offer.

The German government also informed that the Deutsche Bibliothek receives 5 copies of obligatory Polish language newspapers printed in Germany. However, the papers’ circulation was unknown to the government although it was added that the papers did not receive financial support from the budget of the German government⁴³.

The PDS MP, Gerhard Zwerenz during the debate on 29 May 1998 said that if the German government wants to be credible it should support, not only the German minorities in other countries and care for their identity, but it should also take similar measures towards the minorities living in the Federal Republic of Germany since the different treatment of the German minorities abroad and of the national minorities in one’s own country is “a policy of discrediting persons of other nationalities”⁴⁴.

The document prepared by the MPs from the SPD and the Green Party (Drs. 14/5244) from 7 February 2001 called the government, among others to expand the opportunities to teach Polish at schools, universities and in various institutions for adult education.

The MP, Helmut Lippelt (Alliance 90/The Greens) also stated during a debate from 21 June 2001 that “In the Treaty from 1991 both sides committed themselves to supporting the language of the other country. In this respect Germans have a lot to make up for. Polish friends in Berlin continuously point out how difficult it is to find a school for their children in which Polish would be accepted as the language of instruction, and not only as the language of the expellees who as soon as possible want to achieve language integration in Germany.

We step forward to obtain support for teaching the Polish language in our schools. The Polish language, Polish literature, Polish history must gain in importance in our schools and universities”⁴⁵.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ DB PIPr. 13/239 Sitz., 29 May 1998, p. 22036.

⁴⁵ DB PIPr 14/ 176, 21 Jun 2001, p. 17283.

THE ISSUES OF POLES IN GERMANY IN THE PARLIAMENTARY FORUM OF THE SEJM
AND SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

During the time of the Polish People's Republic Edmund Jan Osmańczyk was the proponent of the Polish diaspora (Polonia) including the Poles in Germany. He was a parliamentary representative of the Opole region for many years, and after the democratic changes he was a senator and the first head of the Senate Committee for Emigration and Poles Abroad. He called for putting an end to the Polish-Polish wars and for building "a lasting two way bridge between the country and the emigration"⁴⁶, which in the context of the modern mass labour-related emigration, and in the context of the disputes within the German Polonia and on the Polish political scene seems especially topical.

After signing the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation the MPs in their speeches and interpellations pointed out to the Polish government first of all the asymmetry in the Treaty articles, and the lack of full realization of the resolutions by the German side towards Poles in Germany. The MPs demanded identical realization of the rights of Poles in Germany and Germans in Poland, though they frequently admitted that the fact that Poles in Germany are conflicted and divided is an obstacle. Sometimes however, the blame for this state of affairs was ascribed to the German side (e.g., Ryszard Matusiak in his speech on 21 June 2001).

Already on 13 September 1991 during the first debate on the project of the act concerning the ratification of the Treaty several MPs pointed out the lack of equal guarantees of the rights for the German minority in Poland and for the Poles in Germany. The MP, Józef Oleksy speaking on behalf of the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left said that with reference to the Poles in Germany these are modest regulations which seem insufficient⁴⁷. The MP, Urszula Jarosz from the Parliamentary Club of Christian-Social Union expressed a view that "the Polish minority in Germany is a problem for our country" since its legal status as a minority had not been regulated and this has "negative consequences for its consciousness and behaviour"⁴⁸.

However, it needs to be added that the minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in his reply to the MPs did not share their opinion about the asymmetry of the regulations concerning the minorities⁴⁹.

During the second debate over the above mentioned ratification act the same problem was raised by the following MPs:

⁴⁶ Cf. e.g., E. Osmańczyk, *Kraj i emigracja. Mowy sejmowe posła ziemi opolskiej [The country and emigration. Sejm speeches of the Opole region MP]*, Opole 1983, p. 70-75, 91.

⁴⁷ Shorthand report from 73rd session of the Polish Sejm, in: *Polska – Niemcy...*, p. 129.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 138-139.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 145.

- Ryszard Gajewski from the Parliamentary Club of the Catholic-Social Union who expressed his hope that “the Polish government will do everything so that the Polish minority in Germany is treated not in a worse manner than the German minority in Poland”⁵⁰;

- Tadeusz Kijonka (independent) who described the issues of the national minority in the Treaty as “key issues”. The MP asked a rhetorical question whether Poland will in an equal degree to the German state be able to ensure support and show interest in the group of Poles settled in Germany and “whether it will be able to meet the criteria of equal benefits and factual aid”⁵¹;

- Jerzy Wuttke from the Civic Parliamentary Club who expressed the opinion that “the most important thing is that the Polish groups use the opportunities which have been created by the Treaty”. As the speaker maintained some people of Polish origin for various reasons do not want to admit to their Polish roots. With reference to this the MP appealed for Poland’s active help, primarily from the government and the parliament for the Polish communities in Germany⁵²;

- Marek Jurek from the Civic Parliamentary Club. He described the regulations concerning the minorities as one of the three basic gains for Germany, which were negotiated by that country with the vision of “historical and prospective national interests”. He regarded the naming of one group as a minority, and the other as “persons from the Polish culture or of Polish origin” as a disproportion⁵³.

Eight years after signing the Treaty professor Bronisław Germek, the Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1999 when providing an answer for the interpellation No. 2099 said that in the social estimation “the assessment of the realization by the German side of the articles from the 1991 Treaty which refer to the German citizens declaring Polish identity is the least positive”.

In the opinion of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs “the problems of the German Polonia and the difficulties in the realization of the relevant guarantees of the Treaty stem (...) not from the content of the document but from the policy conducted by some German offices and from the lack of good will and adequate understanding of the articles of the Treaty”. In conclusion the Minister stated that “we assess the scope of complying with the articles of the Treaty concerning the rights of the Polish group (...) by the German side as insufficient”⁵⁴.

In the resolution of the Parliament of the Republic of Poland on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of signing the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany

⁵⁰ Shorthand report from the 78th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in: *Polska – Niemcy...*, p. 165.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 169.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 173.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 175.

⁵⁴ Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the interpellation No. 2099 from 13 Jul 1999.

(document No. 3082) from 21 June 2001 a hope was expressed that the Polish community in Germany will make increasing use of the rights and privileges guaranteed for minorities in the Treaty.

However, according to the Government information (document No. 1328) concerning the realization of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation from 17 June 1991 which was presented on 25 January 2007 during the 33rd session of the Parliament, 5th term of office, the foreign minister Anna Fotyga described the Treaty articles regarding Poles in Germany as an area which is “open, unfinished and raising some doubts”. She evaluated the functioning of the Polish group as “showing certain asymmetry (...) taking into account the rights and opportunities enjoyed by the German minority on Polish territory”⁵⁵. She added that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany made a commitment to support persons of Polish origin or those who identify themselves with the Polish language and identity, however this commitment is realized very poorly or it is mostly not realized⁵⁶.

Detailed issues connected with the situation of Poles in Germany raised in the Sejm were almost identical to the ones discussed in the Bundestag and concerned the following matters:

- 1/ lack of minority status
- 2/ problems of Polish language education
- 3/ low financial resources provided by the German side for the functioning of Polish organizations in Germany
- 4/ discriminating Polish persons in contacts with their children supervised by the Child and Youth Welfare Council
- 5/ the situation of Poles settling down in the borderland area

Answer to point 1/ The topic of the status of the Polish community in Germany, apart from the above mentioned debate about the ratification of the Treaty, was raised also later. On 17 June 1999 (on the occasion of the 8th anniversary of signing the Treaty) a group of MPs represented by Halina Nowina-Konopka (Parliamentary Circle of Polish Alliance) and Ryszard Matusiak (independent MP) submitted to the government an interpellation concerning the situation of Poles in Germany (interpellation No. 2099). The MPs demanded that the government takes adequate measures to reinstate the status of the national minority for the Polonia in Germany in the context of such status being granted to Sinti and Roma who arrived in Germany (that is who do not inhabit the traditional home territory) and who do not live in compound communities, and who therefore also do not meet the criteria which are used to refuse to regard the German Polonia as a minority.

The issue of the lack of a minority status was also raised by Jan Dobrosz on behalf of the Parliamentary Club of the Polish Peasant Party (21 June 2001).

⁵⁵ Shorthand report from the 33rd session of the Sejm, 5th term from 25 Jan 2007, p. 128.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

Gabriela Masłowska, an MP for the Law and Justice Party (PiS) addressed her interpellation to the President of the Council of Ministers in which she demanded from the Polish government to launch negotiations with the German government concerning repealing the resolution from the Nazi times which revoked the rights of the Polish minority⁵⁷. The reply provided by Jan Borkowski, the secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads that, among others: “the Potsdam Agreement from 2 August 1945 introduced a general rule of superiority of the occupational law above the German law, especially in the scope of these legal acts which are of a discriminating nature” (...) “Additionally art. 123 of the Basic Law from 1949 states that: <<the laws from the period before the assembly of the federal parliament is still binding as long as they do not contradict the Basic Law>>”. Jan Borkowski concluded by saying that the directive from 27 February 1949 about the liquidation of Polish organizations and nationalization of their property was undoubtedly in contradiction with the principles set out in the Basic Law, thus it ceased to be binding after the war.

Answer to point 2/ According to the Foreign Ministry the problems of Polonia with the lack of opportunities to teach Polish in German state schools stem from the fact that the educational issues remain in the capacity of the authorities of the constituent countries. As the Polish Foreign Minister, Bronisław Geremek explained to the Polish Senate the fact that the Polish community is dispersed over the German territory is unfavourable to the introduction of teaching the Polish language within the German system of education. In some large cities like Bremen, Düsseldorf, Bonn, Köln, Bergisch-Gladbach, Duisburg and Bremerhaven teaching Polish as a native language was introduced in the form of supplementary classes (*muttersprachlicher Ergänzungsunterricht*). Minister B. Geremek also informed that in 1998 a German-Polish European School was established in Berlin-Charlottenburg. Nevertheless, he noted that progress in this area requires also “a decisive and consistent attitude of the Polonia communities”⁵⁸.

The MP, Stanisław Kalemba during the parliamentary debate on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Treaty spoke about the limited and underfunded teaching of the Polish language in Germany (21 June 2001).

Aleksander Zajac, the head of the Convent of Polish Organizations in Germany in his speech from 30 April 2002 delivered during the 15th session of the Polish Senate said that the German side consistently refuses to protect the Polish ethnic group in Germany and the situation of the German Polonia is steadily deteriorating.

He added that the problems concerning the teaching of the Polish language in state schools and financing the Polonia community schools in constituent countries are still awaiting a solution.

⁵⁷ Interpellation No. 11196 from 27 Aug 2009.

⁵⁸ Information from the Foreign Minister, Bronisław Geremek from 27 Jul 1999 in reply to the statement by the Senator, Józef Kuczyński made during the 37th session of the Senate.

The Senator, Czesław Ryszka (PiS) in his speech from 20 June 2006 for the joint committees for Culture and Mass Media and for Emigration and Contacts with Poles Abroad on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of signing the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourship said that

“Altogether 6,300 children learn the Polish language in Germany. This includes about 2,300 children learning within the system of German state schools and 4,000 in schools which function within the Polonia organizations, with the largest schools run by the Christian Centre for Disseminating Polish Culture, Traditions and Language in Germany, the society functioning within the Polish Catholic Mission in Germany, by the Polish Homeland School in the North-Rhine and Westphalia, and the Polish School Society ‘Oświata’ in Berlin. The German state provides financial support for the teaching of Polish as a foreign language in state schools for about 2,300 children, although this support is not equal everywhere, whereas the Polonia organizations provide education for 4,000 children and they receive only symbolic financial support in the range of 10,000 Euros”.

The senator claimed that the main factor which hinders the teaching of Polish as a native language within the Polonia associations is the lack of financial resources caused first of all by the unwillingness on the German side to fulfill the resolutions of the Treaty from 17 June 1991 concerning teaching Polish as a native language.

In the same context it was said many times in the Parliament that the financial means from the Polish budget for the German minority in the Opole region are disproportionately higher than the funds granted by the Germans for the Polish minority in their country.

Answer to point 3/ In the above mentioned interpellation No. 2099 from 17 June 1999 the MPs drew attention to the lack of respecting the rights of Poles in Germany which are guaranteed by the Treaty including the lack of financing by the German side towards the functioning of the Polonia organizations. When replying to this interpellation the Polish Foreign Minister, B. Geremek stated that in 1999 the German side allocated 391,000 DM from the federal budget for financing the Polonia cultural projects which encompass at least three constituent countries; however up to the moment of the minister’s reply only six applications were approved of for the total amount of 70,000 marks. The Minister also added that the Polonia organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany receive in many constituent countries grants for cultural events organized on a smaller scale. To illustrate, in 1998 the cultural activity including educational projects of the Berlin Polonia organizations received funding of ca. 270,000 DM⁵⁹.

When answering the interpellation by the MP Jan Kulas from 11 June 2008 (interpellation No. 3574) concerning the situation and the care over the Poles in Germany provided by the Polish state, Grażyna Bernatowicz, the secretary of state in the Foreign Office said that there were around 200 Polonia organizations in Germany. The Association of Poles in Germany and The Association of Poles ‘Zgoda’ have their own federal structures. The remaining organizations are associated in several

⁵⁹ Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the interpellation No. 2099 from 13 Jul 1999.

umbrella organizations; Congress of the German Polonia associates 25 organizations, the Christian Centre for Disseminating Polish Culture, Traditions and Language in Germany includes 25 local organizations, whereas the Polish Council in Germany, a federal association includes 106 organizations. The Polish Catholic Mission is the most important organizer of the Polonia's religious life. It employs over 100 Polish priests. Minister G. Bernatowicz admitted that the Polonia communities do complain about the problems with obtaining funds from the federal authorities to finance their statutory activity, especially for the Polonia education. She put the blame for the present state of affairs on the representatives of various governmental bodies who do not have sufficient knowledge of the commitments stemming from the Polish-German Treaty. She also said that in Germany there is "lack of real political will to realize them"⁶⁰.

It was repeated in the document that the Polish authorities are in a continuous dialogue concerning this matter with the German partners (On 17 January 2008 the under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Education, Krzysztof Stanowski took part in a session of the Permanent Polish-German Working Group for Teaching Polish and Polish Studies in the Federal Republic of Germany; On 11 April 2008 the secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Jan Borkowski held meetings with the representatives of the governments of the North-Rhine and Westphalia, and Hessen where he raised the question of the availability of teaching Polish in Germany)

Answer to point 4/ An interpellation was sent to the Foreign Minister much earlier, on 22 December 2005 by the MP, Jacek Tomczak concerning the cases of discriminating Poles in Germany in contacts with their children supervised by the Child and Youth Welfare Council (*Jugendamt*) which were publicized in 2008 in the Polish media⁶¹.

The MP provided examples of discrimination against Polish parents from mixed marriages who after a divorce faced difficulties in contacts with their children, and during their meetings which were taking place under the supervision of a German official they were forbidden to use the Polish language. The interpellation included information that the parents with such concerns sent a letter on the matter to the Petition Committee in the European Parliament.

The MP issued an appeal for intervention to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the subordinate consular services in Germany.

Minister Stefan Meller in his reply to the interpellation on 18 January 2006 stated that "there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude that the German institutions use discrimination practices towards Polish citizens", which would necessitate formal protests directed at the German Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. He also accused the press publications which described such cases of insufficiently balanced and objective judgment. Ac-

⁶⁰ Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the interpellation No. 3574 from 23 Jul 2008.

⁶¹ Interpellation No. 453 from 22 Dec 2005.

According to the Minister similar problems have also been reported by parents of other nationalities who live in Germany. For example, in 1999 the number and the specific gravity of such legal disputes in German-French relations caused that a special mixed mediation group was established with the participation of the representatives of the foreign offices and parliaments from both countries.

The Minister observed that Polish citizens in Germany constitute the largest group in all mixed marriages (for example, only in 2004 about 6,000 Polish-German marriages were contracted). With reference to this he concluded that establishing a Polish-German mediation group, following the example of France and Germany, should be considered⁶².

Answer to point 5/ Especially in 2008 the topic of Poles settling in the borderland areas on the territory of Germany and acts of violence against them (e.g., destroying their property) was raised in the questions and interpellations of MPs.

The Civic Platform (PO) MP, Sławomir Nitras informed that, for example in the borderland administrative district of Ücker-Randow out of 70,000 inhabitants there are 5,000 Poles. In some areas of the district Polish people constitute 30% of their residents. Unfortunately, because of the fact that the populist far-right parties are vastly supported in these areas acts of violence against Poles do occur. The MP issued an appeal to the Polish government to formulate a policy aimed at protecting the interests of these communities⁶³.

Apart from the above mentioned issues another topic raised in the Parliament referred to granting privileges to the German minority in Poland during the parliamentary election with reference to making it exempt from the condition of exceeding the 5% threshold of votes, while Poles in Germany do not have a chance to sit in the Landtags or in the Bundestag from Polish lists (Jan Dobrosz, MP).

In 1999 Minister B. Geremek assured the MPs that the Polish side makes endeavours towards a fuller realization of the rights of the Polonia communities by the German authorities, as well as towards maintaining current contacts with the representatives of the Polish organizations. As an example of such interventions he gave March 1998 when the head of the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy presented the stance of the Polish Embassy in these matters to the director of the relevant department in the German Foreign Office; also in May 1998 the ambassador of Poland submitted *pro memoria* and held talks with the under-secretary of state in the German Foreign Office; in June 1998 the ambassador of the Republic of Poland in his talk with the secretary of state in the Federal Foreign Office firmly emphasized the right of the Polish community to a full sovereign choice of form of their representation towards the German authorities. Also Minister Stefan Meller and the under-secretary of state, Grażyna Bernatowicz assured that they held similar meetings and interventions.

⁶² Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the interpellation No. 453 from 18 Jan 2006.

⁶³ Shorthand report from the 20th session of the Polish Parliament, 6th term from 24 Jul 2008.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the Parliament of the Republic of Poland it was frequently emphasized with satisfaction that the regulations concerning the minority rights in the Polish-German relations were in the Treaty from 1991 based on international standards (documents of the CSCE and the Council of Europe), and not on the special decisions of both countries which were valid in the inter-war period.

Attention was drawn to the fact that the above mentioned articles of the Treaty became a model solution for regulating similar issues in other countries.

Unfortunately, as follows from the presented materials these regulations with reference to the Polonia communities in Germany have not been and are not at present fully realized.

The present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski in his parliamentary exposé from 8 April 2010 said, among others, “In the scope of reviewing the realization of the Polish-German Treaty we shall look for better ways of the realization of the rights of the Polish minority in Germany and the teaching of the Polish language”⁶⁴.

The prevalent opinion among the Polish analysts of the Polish-German relations is that the terminological disparity used in the treaty with reference to the German minority in our country and the Polish group in Germany is not an obstacle in the realization of the rights stemming from its articles. They argue that in the situation of such diversity within the Polonia if the term “Polish minority” was used some persons would become excluded from the guaranteed protection and deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the rights they have at present. This primarily refers to the group of *Aussiedlers* who maintain the spirit of Polish identity.

It is well known that the German side is not willing to grant minority status to new groups, besides the four recognized groups (*anerkennungte, angesiedelte Minderheiten*) for fear of a flood of claims from other national groups (e.g., Turks).

Mieczysław Gil, an MP when speaking on 13 September 1991 on behalf of the Civic Parliamentary Club during the debate on the ratification of the Treaty expressed hope that the articles concerning the German minority in Poland and the Polish communities in Germany should facilitate the “the role of both communities as a uniting and not antagonizing agent for both nations”⁶⁵. Also the representatives in the Bundestag expressed their desire for both groups to act as a bridge and a mediator in closer cooperation between both states. However, looking at the role of the

⁶⁴ *Information of the Foreign Minister concerning the guidelines for Polish foreign policy in 2010*, submitted during the 64th session of the Polish Parliament, 6th term (orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata6.nsf/main/583C4C86, accessed on 30 Oct 2010).

⁶⁵ Shorthand report from the 73rd session of the Polish Sejm, in: *Polska – Niemcy...*, p. 126.

German minority in Poland and the role of Poles in Germany from the perspective of 20 years since the signing of the Treaty it needs to be concluded that these postulates have not indeed been realized.

The hope in this matter is at present located within the work done by the so called Polish-German quadrangle, with the participation of the Polish and German governments and representatives of the German minority in Poland and Poles in Germany, which is aimed at ensuring a better realization of the rights that the group described in this article is eligible for in line with the Treaty.

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POLES ON THE GERMAN JOB MARKET

Due to still alive war memories on the one hand and because of completely different visions concerning the Polish western borderline on the other hand, decades had to pass before the diplomatic relations could be established between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. This took place as late as 1970 and after the post-war *status quo* was recognized by that country. Nevertheless, even in decades prior to that economic relations started to be established. In order to intensify these relations representative business agencies were established in both countries. Over the course of many years they were the only official state posts functioning on mutual terms in Poland and in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The situation was completely different in the case of the German Democratic Republic which already in 1950 recognized the border along the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse rivers. This was followed by establishing full diplomatic relations. Also, economic relations started to be developed. However, it has to be reminded that because of the fact that both countries belonged to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) these relations were far from normal. The economy functioning in the east of Europe with its ordered and distributive character meant that also in the relations between the countries cost value did not play the most important part. The decisions to localize certain branches of industry were often made arbitrarily and they affected the directions and the volume of goods flow referring both to supply and to the ready-made products.

Taking into account the historical perspective of the years which have passed since the reunification of Germany the thesis that the process was perceived by Poland as carrying both opportunities and dangers from the economic point of view seems justified. For this reason the fact that the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation signed between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on 17 June 1991 included as many as 4 articles devoted to economic issues was received with huge satisfaction.

For instance, article 8 is devoted to the efforts towards European unity. The Federal Republic of Germany made a commitment in this article to support Polish efforts towards accession to the European Union. Article 10 in turn focuses on the financial aspects of the bilateral economic relations, and the following one discusses the issues pertaining to agricultural production and turnover of food products.

From the point of view of the present analysis article 9 deserves special attention. It, among others, states that,

“The parties to the Treaty will strive towards broadening and enriching mutual economic relations in all areas. They will create the most favourable premises, especially economic, legal and organizational for economic activity including industry and services offered by single and legal entities in the scope of their state legislation, as well as within their commitments stemming from international agreements, including the obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany due to its membership in the European Union. The parties to the agreement agree that the process of economic transformation which has been initiated in the Republic of Poland, should be supported by international cooperation. The Federal Republic of Germany is ready to operate on both the bilateral and multilateral platform to provide support for the economic development of Poland within the fully developed social market economy. By the same token adequate conditions should be created for a significant reduction of the existing developmental differences”¹.

Considering the degree of the realization of this provision it needs to be remembered, especially taking into account the above mentioned experiences from the Polish-East German relations, that the role of the state is only to create frame conditions enabling the free operation of business entities irrespective of their origin.

In this context special attention should be paid to the fragment of article 9 in which both sides make an obligation to create the most favourable premises including especially legal ones for economic activity concerning industry and services provided by single and legal entities.

One of the fundamental premises enabling normal activity is the freedom of movement and lack of any restrictions either with reference to taking up paid employment or setting up one's own company in another country. An analysis of the migration streams between Poland and the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany allows to put forward a thesis that the realization of article 9 of the Treaty from June 1991 leaves much to be desired. The Federal Republic of Germany shows far-reaching caution in creating the same conditions for the Poles as those enjoyed on the German job market by German passport holders.

The situation did not change following Poland's accession to the European Union in May 2004. This must seem surprising at least because of the fact that as early as in 1952 in the treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community the freedom of movement for the workers of the two branches of industry was introduced. Relying on these experiences also the Rome Treaty which established the European Economic Community in article 48 predicted the gradual lifting of the restrictions in this respect. The full freedom of movement of workers was supposed to be granted by the end of the transition period, that is by 1969. After that period all differences in the treatment of the workers were to be lifted irrespective of the country they come from. From that time onwards persons from the member states who were willing to take up employment in any other country belonging to the EEC

¹ Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw-Dz. U.) 1992, No. 14, item 56.

were to be treated on equal terms with respect to employment, payment and work conditions. In practice it meant that a citizen of any member state could apply for a job if the requirements of qualifications were met.

However, the interpretation of this seemingly clear provision by the decision-makers in the countries of the old European Union was not uniform. Because of that, for the first time in the history of the community a decision was made to leave the decision about opening their job markets for the citizens of the new member states up to the individual member countries. From 1 May 2004 only the inhabitants of Cyprus and Malta were granted the same rights on the job markets of the European Union as the ones available to the citizens of the old member states. Notwithstanding, three old EU countries (Ireland, Sweden and Great Britain) complied with the earlier mentioned EEC regulations concerning the freedom of movement for the workforce. This meant that beginning from 1 May 2004 citizens of the new member states were able to take up employment in those countries without any restrictions. The remaining countries made use of the 2+3+2 formula provided for by the Accession Treaty. Consequently, the individual countries gradually worked towards opening their job markets for workers from the new EU member states. Austria and Germany were the last two countries to ensure from May 2011 equal legal treatment by the employers for Polish citizens who seek employment.

Such decisions and their argumentation have stimulated heated debates in Poland with major focus on the solutions accepted in this matter in the Federal Republic of Germany. This focus of interest is due to many reasons. For the Polish economy the relations with its western neighbour are not to be underestimated. The tradition of the labour-related migration to that country on the one hand and the resulting extensive ties with Poles living in Germany as well as with many German citizens on the other hand, have resulted in the fact that interest in taking up employment in Germany has always been and remains very high. The research done on a representative sample of students in vocational schools showed that as many as a half of the respondents expressed a lot of interest in working in the European Union, with 19% declaring that they will definitely seek such employment and 34% saw this option as highly probable. Those who were definite about working abroad showed the following preferences: Germany (37%), Great Britain (31%), Holland (14%), Italy (14%) and France (9%)². The substantial interest in working for the western neighbour, apart from the above mentioned reasons, is caused by the geographical proximity of both countries, and contrary to the common although unjustified views, far-reaching similarities in the broadly understood cultural domain. The results also show close similarity with the opinion polls carried out at the beginning of the 1980s which demonstrated that over a half of Poles going abroad went to Germany (55%), 12% to Great Britain and 8% to the USA.

² A. Rogala, *Młodzież na saksach* [The Youth working in Germany], "The European Union Monitor" 2005, No 1, p. 37.

It is possible to follow the course of various kinds of professional activity of Poles in Germany taking into account, on the one hand the regulations of the Treaty from June 1991 and on the other hand, the restrictions imposed by the German authorities on the freedom of movement of the workforce within the enlarged European Union.

The following types of labour-related migration need to be analyzed:

- Traveling to take up seasonal work
- Taking up work based on a work contract
- Work contracted by persons employed by Polish companies which provide services in Germany

Seasonal migration has for years been the type of labour-related migration which has occupied a significant position in the migration stream from Poland to Germany, and which has also in a significant way shaped the way Poles are perceived by their western neighbours. This kind of labour-related migration has been known in Europe for many decades and it is most frequently regulated by the international bilateral agreements. These agreements aim at channeling the influx of workers and preventing the influx of illegal foreign workers. The cooperation between the relevant units of state administration, including especially the job market sector allows as far as possible to match the demand for a workforce with the work supply from abroad. The term seasonal work includes paid work done on the basis of a special permit, often including the name of the worker, issued for the duration of time not longer than one year. To illustrate, until quite recently such a permit in Germany was issued for 3 months, in France for 6 months, and in Spain and Switzerland for 9 months. Such permits are very often issued when it is clear that the native workers or the unemployed are not ready to take up such types of work. Seasonal work is predominant in those branches of industry where the physical labour plays a significant role and is difficult to replace by mechanical devices. The branches which need to be enumerated include some part of the agriculture, forestry, wood processing industry, catering and hotel industry as well as construction services³.

The agreements which regulated seasonal work were known also in the times of the Polish People's Republic and they regulated the entirety of issues connected with legal work provided by Polish people in the former Czechoslovakia, East Germany and also in West Germany. This kind of agreement with West Germany was the only one Poland had at the time with a country from outside the COMECON. In the historic year of 1990 Poland signed several agreements with the unified Germany which regulated taking up employment by Polish persons in Germany. As M. Okólski rightly observed the agreement concerning seasonal workers "was the most important agreement concerning labour-related migration that Poland has ever

³ H. Werner, *Befristete Zuwanderung von ausländischen Arbeitnehmern. Dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ost-West-Wanderungen*, „Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung“, 1996, No. 1, p.46., cf. also: K. Wach, *Europejski rynek pracy* [European job market], Kraków 2007, pp. 299 - 300.

signed⁴. It was reflected in a whole range of agreements which the Federal Republic of Germany signed with other post-communist countries in the early 1990s. In 1991 that is a year after signing the bilateral agreement Poles received 68,500 seasonal work permits⁵. The Polish contingent was decisively the largest and the fact that the number of seasonal workers from Poland exceeded the combined numbers of seasonal workers from other East and Central European countries does not come as a surprise (cf. table 1).

Table 1
Seasonal workers in Germany between 1993-1995

Country of origin	Years		
	1993	1994	1995
Poland	143,861	136,659	170,576
Croatia	6,948	5,753	5,574
Slovakia	7,781	3,939	5,442
Romania	3,853	2,272	3,879
Czech Republic	12,027	3,465	3,722
Hungary	5,346	2,458	2,841
Slovenia	1,114	601	600
Bulgaria	71	70	131

Source: H. Werner, op.cit., p.46.

A decisive majority of the seasonal workers went to Germany on the basis of a personal demand from the employer. In the initial period the trade or territorial restrictions were not observed. However, from April 1993 the employment offices were obliged to observe the four-week withdrawal period. If during that time there is no interest to take up the job from a German passport holder, the job can be taken by a foreigner. Also starting with September of the same year the upper time limit for seasonal work was introduced at three months with a clear specification of those branches of industry in which such work is allowed. These included: agriculture, forestry, agricultural produce processing industry, the hotel and catering industry, exhibition industry and work in timber mills. In the following years the number of Poles working legally in Germany for a period of several months has remained high (cf. table 2).

⁴ M. Okólski, *Przepływ siły roboczej w świetle niemiecko-polskiej umowy dwustronnej o pracownikach sezonowych* [The flow of workforce in the light of the German-Polish bilateral agreement concerning seasonal workers], in: *Polscy pracownicy na rynku Unii Europejskiej* ed. by: P. Kaczmarczyk and W. Łukowski, Warszawa 2004, p. 27.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

Table 2

Polish seasonal workers in Germany in the years 2003-2009

Years	Number of permits for		
	Seasonal workers	Students wanting to work during their holiday	Highly qualified professionals in a deficit professions in Germany
2003	265,414	5,799	690
2004	324,340	5,017	671
2005	272,757	5,858	606
2006	230,353	5,869	389
2007	228,807	5,406	316
2008	190,582	3,971	154
2009	183,553	(.)	108

Source: Information concerning the employment of Polish citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland and the inhabitants of the EEA in Poland, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, October 2004, p.5, October 2005 p. 6, April 2007, p. 10, April 2008, p. 14, May 2009, p. 41, May 2010, p. 24

In the first half of 2010 on average 5,884 workers delegated from Poland worked in Germany on construction sites which constituted a slight rise (8%) in comparison with the previous year⁶. It is worth noting here that Poland for years has not used the contingent of permits for seasonal work. To illustrate, in 2006 the contingent assigned by the German side for seasonal work per person per month was used in 74%, in 2009 the percentage dropped to 42%⁷.

This shows that the Federal Republic of Germany is becoming relatively a less attractive place for taking up paid work. The existing situation was without doubt significantly affected by the opening of borders of other EU countries with Great Britain and Ireland at the forefront, as well as by an improved situation on the Polish job market in those years. A rise in the value of the Polish currency especially in confrontation with the pay offered by German employers was also not without significance. Still, Polish citizens are a decisive majority in the group of seasonal workers working in Germany. However, this domination of Poland is steadily dropping. In the period from June 2009 to the same month of the following year the percentage of Poles among foreign seasonal workers dropped from 70% to 61%. Romanian citizens constitute 34% of the workers and now take second place⁸. This number is

⁶ Information concerning the employment of Polish citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland and the inhabitants of the EEA in Poland, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, April 2007, p. 10.

⁷ Information concerning the employment of Polish citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland and the inhabitants of the EEA in Poland, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, October 2004, p. 5, October 2005 p. 6, April 2007, p. 10 and November 2010, p. 23.

⁸ Information concerning the employment of Polish citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland and the inhabitants of the EEA in Poland, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, November 2010, p. 22.

not surprising due to the fact that Romania in terms of population takes second place after Poland in the group of the new member countries in the European Union as far as the number of people is concerned. The fact that seasonal work is so popular among Romanians despite the relatively long distance from Germany shows that the level of economic development and in consequence the differences in pay between Germany and Romania are of major importance. The problems emerging more and more frequently on the German job market led in 2008 to a decision to extend the allowed period of employment for seasonal workers from 4 to 6 months from 1 January of the following year.

Students constitute a specific group of temporary employees. In their case the condition for taking up work is not obtaining a work permit but making them exempt from obtaining such kind of concession. The number of employees from this group is remaining quite stable, however in 2008 there was a clear drop. Students generally find employment in the same branches of industry where most Poles work in seasonal jobs. They are especially frequently employed to work in German vineyards where the bulk of the work accumulates by the end of the summer, that is when students are on holiday.

Apart from the seasonal work there are also very limited possibilities of employing Poles on the basis of a work contract. Exacerbating problems with finding highly qualified workers which became visible in the second half of the 1990s forced the authorities to take some steps to selectively liberalize access to the German job market. More and more often permits were issued to employ foreign workers, the higher their qualifications were the more willingly the permits were given. Simultaneously, a kind of headhunting campaign was initiated aimed at recruiting representatives of these professions, which were in a significant deficit, in Germany. For example, in 2000 an attempt was made to recruit a large number of computer experts. The offer was taken first of all by Asians (Hindu) and to a lesser degree by Bulgarians and Romanians. However, contrary to German expectations and Polish fears the offer of receiving the so called 'green card' to a very limited degree aroused interest among specialists in Poland.

Shortages of qualified workers forced the German authorities to intensify activities aimed at attracting highly qualified specialists to take up work in Germany. The recruitment area included primarily European countries. In October 2007 the procedures for taking up employment were substantially facilitated for graduates of the German universities of foreign origin. An identical liberalization of formalities became available to engineers of certain specializations, namely, electronics engineers and specialists in mechanical and motor engineering.

Also starting with January 2009 a significant barrier was lifted for graduates of higher education institutions from the new EU member states which frequently made it impossible for them to take up employment in Germany. Namely, they no longer have to undergo the so called market test that is the checking procedure whether there is no native candidate who could take the job offer.

At the same time the minimum level of annual salary which justifies taking up employment by a citizen of the new EU member states was lowered to € 66,500 from the so far then € 85,000. This means that in applying for work permits priority is given to persons who are highly qualified. However, practice has shown that the efficiency of this job market instrument is very limited. The number of people who receive a work permit on the basis of a predicted high level of pay does not exceed 1,000 per year⁹.

The process of the aging of German society which is gaining speed on the one hand, and on the other hand the society's relative affluence supported by the well developed system of social insurance have resulted in a serious problem of the need to provide care for the elderly and the disabled. In view of the fact that the supply of the native workforce trained for this kind of services turned out to be insufficient a broad recruitment campaign was launched abroad. Traditionally, Poles have shown a lot of interest in this kind of work. The increasing demand for providing such services resulted in 2010 in the liberalization of requirements for care providers. The requirement of certified qualifications similar to the ones expected of a qualified German nurse was dropped. Besides, as the practice shows the German controlling bodies display far-reaching tolerance towards the growing practice of illegal employment of foreigners as care providers for the disabled and elderly.

When analyzing the selective opening of the German job market for the representatives of some deficit professions it needs to be remembered that these decisions originate in the desire to improve the situation in some selected segments of the job market. These offers are addressed most frequently to the citizens of the new EU member states including Poland. However, these gestures towards Polish citizens do not stem from the willingness to comply with the articles of the Treaty and they are rather included in a broader strategy of the German authorities aiming to improve the situation on their job market.

Another group which requires a closer examination with respect to the realization of the articles of the Treaty relevant for this analysis is constituted by persons employed by Polish companies which provide services on German territory. The situation of these companies is not easy.

The barriers imposed by Germany in employing workers from Poland are not only discordant with the articles of the Treaty but they are also far from being in line with the spirit of European integration and the letter of the relevant legal acts which were the cornerstone of the European Economic Community. To illustrate, article 49 of the EEC founding Treaty states that a company can temporarily provide services also on the territory of another member state. The condition is that the company has to be a registered business in its own country. This should mean that a Polish company can provide services in Germany, France, or any other EU country, and the employees of that company should not be obliged to apply for an additional work permit.

⁹ H. Brücker, *Brain Gain oder Brain Drain, Deutschland und Europa fallen im Wettbewerb um die besten Köpfe zurück*. "IAB-Forum" No. 2/2010, p. 6, cf. also: K. Wach, op.cit., pp.294-295.

This, however is not the case. In Germany (similar to Austria) some important restrictions are imposed on Polish companies in this respect. As long as until 1 May 2011, that is until the expiry date of the maximum seven-year transition period applied by Germany, Polish companies were not allowed to provide some services. The restrictions involved construction services (and similar activities), cleaning buildings and interior design¹⁰.

The difficulties encountered by Polish companies which intend to provide services on the territory of the EU member countries stem to a large extent from the lack of unequivocal interpretation of the EU regulations in this respect. To illustrate, directive No. 96/71/WE of the European Parliament and the EU Council from 16 December 1996 about delegating workers of service providers did not include any restrictions on employing workers for the purpose of contracting them to provide services for individual persons or companies outside the country where the company is based. The approaching enlargement of the European Union to include the post-communist countries caused a heated debate around this issue. In effect a straightforward statutory interpretation in this matter was adopted which is known as Bolkestein's directive, after the name of its author, the then liberal Dutch commissioner of the EU. The regulation was adopted in January 2004 and already in March the following year the EU Council of Ministers made a decision about the need to revise the directive. This happened as a result of protests articulated mostly in France and Germany, that is in the countries where there is an especially strong fear of competition from cheaper service providers. However, it should be noted that this phenomenon did not have a mass character. From May 2004 until February 2005 the number of people delegated from Poland to provide services in the EU countries (including Norway and Switzerland) altogether reached 89,000¹¹.

The Bolkestein's directive recommended a departure from any forms of discrimination of companies because of their origin. This would mean that a Polish enterprise could provide services on the territory of the whole European Union. The op-

¹⁰ In this context it should be underlined that we deal with a similar discrimination of Polish companies providing services also in other EU member states. It is also present in those countries which before May 2004 declared to open their borders and job markets for the newcomers from the East, and shortly before that date they tightened their procedures without introducing legal restrictions as it was the case with Austria and Germany. Such a situation is present, for example in Holland. To safeguard the interests of the native companies the Dutch authorities discriminate against those companies providing services from the new member states (these restrictions do not refer to companies from Cyprus and Malta). If, for example a Polish building company enters into a contract in Holland then the condition that it can be realized is obtaining a work permit for its workers. This procedure is difficult to describe otherwise than a discrimination practice and a divergence from the letter and the spirit of the Accession Treaty. It is not surprising then that the European Commission appealed to the Hague authorities to change their attitude in this matter. It should be also noted at this point that a similar treatment of Polish companies started to be practiced also in Italy. After the intervention of the Polish government these procedures were dropped. Also Denmark considered the possibility of introducing work permits for the workers of Polish construction companies (A Słojewska, *Dyskryminacja polskich firm* [Discrimination of Polish companies], "Rzeczpospolita" 28 July 2005, p. B.2.

¹¹ *Labour-related migration to and from Poland*, "The European Union Monitor" 2005, No. 5, p. 22.

ponents of this resolution fearing the danger of the so called social dumping, which in their opinion was an inherent consequence of adopting the directive, created an international initiative under the name *Stop Bolkestein*. In their initiative they drew attention allegedly to the dangers of the introduction of the full freedom of providing services for the job market of the old EU member states. This broad campaign was conducted under the slogan: *No to a Europe of social cuts (Nein zu einem Europa des Sozialabbaus)*. The initiators of the campaign in their information spread via the internet made references to persons and institutions which supported their initiative. A closer examination of the list allows to notice that it includes almost exclusively left-wing trade unions and parties with communist orientation that is these organizations which advocate a close and broad-ranged intervention of the state in the economic processes which, among others, is demonstrated by well developed social benefits, which in turn are determined by a far-reaching fiscal policy. The support for the campaign from such organizations does not alter the fact that the majority of the member states seemed to be in favour of implementing the recommendations formulated by the then Dutch commissioner of the EU, the fact which was sadly underscored by the initiators of the campaign. The opponents of the introduction of the freedom to provide services reached for arguments of both, a legal and economic nature. For example, there were accusations that the directive does not at all introduce the category of public utility services which in their opinion should be exempt from free competition. The opponents also did not like the lack of attention to special requirements with reference to providing services which, in their opinion, should be accounted for as far as health and safety are concerned. According to the opponents it cannot be allowed that services in the area of health, culture and education on the one hand are treated in an identical way with services like repairing a car or hairdressing on the other hand. They criticized the solution suggested by the directive according to which a company providing services would be subject to legal rigor binding only in the country in which the company is registered. It is difficult to resist an impression that accepting such a line of reasoning assumes a priori a superiority of legal provisions in the old EU countries over those in the new ones. The same assumption was present in the reservation of the opponents concerning the lack of possibilities to control the working conditions.

Nevertheless, it seems that the above accusations were only more or less of a formal nature. Undoubtedly, the reservations of an economic character were the most important. The signatories of the *Stop Bolkestein* campaign stressed that the realization of the recommendations would mean liquidation, or far-reaching difficulties in the use of such important instruments as the minimum wage or tariff agreements¹². The German government picked up the idea of the opponents and it gradually extended the list of industries in which the minimum wage would be binding (also for foreign companies). Earlier on such minimum limits were binding only in the construction industry (€ 12.47 per hour in the west and € 10.01 in the east).

¹² www.stopbolkenstein.org, pp. 1-4.

It is not unreasonable at this moment to mention here that there is a general consensus among the analysts of the complex problems of the job market as far as the major reasons for high unemployment in most EU countries are concerned, namely the over-regulation of the market. Practice shows that the level of unemployment is relatively low where the state intervenes in the relations between the employer and the employee only to a very slight degree. Because of this, it is not surprising that in western Europe there was no shortage of voices articulating the need to implement Bolkestein's directive. According to many economists it would allow to make efforts to rationalize employment. In consequence, there might be some rise in unemployment over a short period of time but also its significant reduction in the long-run. Such a conclusion was reached, among others by the authors of a report concerning this issue prepared by the Copenhagen Economics Institute. The report shows that after the restrictions on providing services on the territory of the whole European Union are lifted, the value of consumption in Germany and France will increase by 0.8%. Countries like Belgium, Great Britain, Finland and Italy would benefit even more from the liberalization of the service market. The value of consumption in those countries would rise by 1.2%. When summing up the report the Danish analysts concluded decisively that Germany and France by opposing the directive were acting against their own interests¹³. Many specialists in Germany itself voiced similar views. The opinion of C. Hefeker from the Hamburg HWWA seems sufficient to quote. In a straightforward way he states that by opposing the implementation of Bolkestein's directive France and Germany from being once the motor of integration are now contributing to its slow down. By acting as they do they will lead to a definite collapse of the Lisbon strategy which after all was supposed to be anchored on the improvement of Europe's competitiveness towards the United States. Hefeker, similar to the analysts from the Copenhagen Institute underlines that the liberalization of services in the European Union will in the mid and long-term bring positive results. The appearance of cheaper service providers from the new countries would contribute to a rise of demand also for services provided by the native companies. Apart from that, reducing the role of illegal work would undoubtedly be a positive outcome¹⁴.

Yet, the above arguments did not convince the decision-makers in the "old" member states. In April 2006 the European Commission presented a new draft of a directive concerning providing services. It diverts from the principle of the country of origin introducing at the same time a kind of protection in the third sector. The new directive for service providers was adopted by the European Parliament in November of the same year. According to the new regulations companies operating on the territory of a given country will have to pay their employees wages not lower

¹³ J. Bielecki, *Francja strzela sobie gola* [France scores own goal], „Rzeczpospolita“ 17 October 2005, p. B 1.

¹⁴ C. Hefeker, *Dienstleistungsfreiheit und Europäische Wettbewerbsfähigkeit*, „Wirtschaftsdienst“ 2005, No. 3, p. 136.

than the minimum wage valid for that country. On the other hand, the authors of the directive distanced themselves from the demands issued by the workers unions in the "old" countries including the requirement to verify the professional qualifications of the workers recruited from Eastern Europe. In this respect the qualifications acquired in the country of origin were regarded as sufficient. A similar tendency to limit the access of Polish workers to the German job market was characteristic of the efforts made by the German administration.

Indeed, it is difficult to resist an impression that the German decision-makers do not read specialist economic journals or, what cannot be overruled, that they consider arguments raised by authors who publish there as not convincing enough. This assumption is justified by the steps taken by the Berlin administration which aimed at limiting the influx of service providing companies from Poland to a maximum level.

The increasing limitations of access to the German job market for the Polish companies providing services, on the one hand by reducing the number of branches accessible to foreign companies and on the other hand, by limiting the number of Poles employed in Germany makes Poles seek ways of making use of the still attractive differences which exist in the level of pay between the two countries. They do it by setting up their own sole proprietorship which most frequently offer construction services and related services. The example from Berlin reached anecdotal dimensions where it was estimated that under one and the same address of a flat owned by a Polish citizen over 100 one-person companies providing services were registered. This is an exemplification of Polish entrepreneurship well known and variously appreciated in Europe. This kind of phenomenon is reflected in the results of comparative studies. It turns out that in 2004 the entrepreneurship index understood as the percentage of persons aged 18 to 64 engaged in a new business activity was the highest in Poland and reached the level of 8.8%. In Ireland which was ranked second in this category it was lower by 1.1 of a percentage point, in Great Britain it reached 6.3% and in France 6.0%¹⁵.

It needs to be underlined at this point that in recent years, namely almost all the time since 1 May 2004, we are dealing with a relatively continuous growth of interest of Polish people in taking up professional activity abroad by going self-employed. This conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the statistics from the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). The institution in compliance with the EU regulations issues an adequate form (E 1010) to persons employed (and conducting their individual business activity in Poland) who apply for jobs in other EU countries. Unfortunately, the analysis of the number of collected forms does not allow for drawing unambiguous conclusions as to the size of the phenomenon because the form confirming that a person is eligible for social insurance in Poland can be

¹⁵ P. Blajer, *Bardziej konieczność niż pomysł na życie* [Necessity rather than a life plan] „Rzeczpospolita” 26 October 2005, p. B 2.

issued even several times in the same year. Bearing in mind this limitation an investigation of tendencies which occur in this respect seems nevertheless justified. To illustrate, in the first full calendar year since Poland's accession to the European Union the form was collected by 3,300 persons intending to take up business activity abroad, but in 2007 the number of forms issued was nearly quadrupled (13,400). In 2009 as many as 15,800 Poles took steps allowing to conduct their own business activity abroad¹⁶.

It is worth undelining that a decisive majority of Poles who intend to run their own businesses abroad want to do it in Germany. In 2009 as many as 52.1% of the above mentioned forms were collected by persons intending to go to that country. The following countries were also chosen as destinations: Belgium (10.8%), Norway (7.7%), France (6.7%), Holland (6.4%) and Sweden (4.7%)¹⁷. This is confirmed by German statistics. According to the data from the Berlin Craft Workers Union there were 26,500 registered companies run by Polish citizens which constituted as much as 86% of companies owned by citizens from the new member states of the European Union. Although Poland is definitely the largest country from the new ones which joined the EU in 2004 this relative dominance is not as big as the statistics show. Undoubtedly, the factor which contributes to the overrepresentation of Poles is the geographical proximity. However, it is not difficult to observe that in this respect our country is not more "privileged" than the Czech Republic whose inhabitants show nevertheless a much smaller initiative in setting up business activity abroad.

As it was already mentioned, in line with the EU regulations the E 1010 form is issued for persons who run their own businesses as well as for those who are delegated by Polish companies within the trans-border service providing. After some increase of interest in this kind of work the number of applications shows a dropping tendency. To illustrate, in 2005 the number reached 81,000 and went up to 112,000 two years later. In the following years it reached the number of 105,000 and 99,000¹⁸.

The statistics presented above demonstrate that Polish workers continue to show considerable interest in taking up work in Germany which still remains the most popular country in this respect in the whole European Union. It needs to be pointed out that from the first decade of the new century we dealt with a gradual drop of interest in labour-related migration to the United States. The dissatisfaction from maintaining the quite troublesome visa procedures, which are perceived by many Polish people as humiliating, on the one hand and on the other hand, the de-

¹⁶ Information concerning the employment of Polish citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland and the inhabitants of the EEA in Poland, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, May 2009, p. 22. Appendix 2 and Information ... from May 2010, p. 42.

¹⁷ Information concerning..., May 2010, p. 42.

¹⁸ Information concerning, May 2009, p. 22. Appendix 2 and Information ... from May 2010, p. 42.

crease of the relative value of the dollar mean that a substantial number of potential migrants would change their destination for the anyway closer Federal Republic of Germany. In this context the rigorous regulations which are maintained by Germany and which impede access to their job market is perceived by a vast majority of the Polish public as unfair treatment directed against the eastern neighbour. It should be noted that the critics of the restrictive policy adopted by the authorities in Berlin emphasize the EU context of the problem. They remember that Germany (apart from Austria) used the maximum seven-year transition period during which the citizens of the new UE states were unable to take up jobs without the relevant permission from an adequate employment office.

The average Pole is not aware of the fact that these regulations are at least in contradiction with the spirit of the Polish-German Treaty from June 1991. Indeed, the Treaty says about creating the most favourable premises, especially economic, legal and organizational for business activity including industry and services provided by single and legal entities.

At this point it needs to be emphasized that it is difficult to see the spirit of the Treaty in the analyses published by German job market experts. In a way it is hard to lay claims against the German economists for whom after all the most important objective is the good condition of their native economy. However, the German economy, as they themselves point out in numerous publications may in the near future come up against a serious growth barrier in the form of a workforce shortage. This deficit will first of all concern highly qualified employees. German experts emphasize that in this context the Federal Republic of Germany missed a great chance which became available together with the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries. It is not difficult any more to come cross a statement that closing the borders of Germany for citizens of the new member states from eastern Europe was a mistake¹⁹. The majority of labour migrants from these countries (including first of all Poles) went to Ireland and Great Britain and contributed to the growing prosperity in these countries²⁰. Yet, also in this context no reference is made to the articles of the Polish-German Treaty from June 1991.

Instead, the German analysts draw attention to the fact that contrary to some OECD countries Germany does not conduct any well-considered migration policy which would allow for determining its shape. First of all, the lack of decisive steps to recruit foreigners with high professional qualifications is emphasized. The results

¹⁹ J. Möller, *Standpunkt. Mindestlohn muss die Dienstleistungsfreiheit in der EU absichern*, „IAB-Forum“ 2/2010, p. 25, cf. also: H. Bonin, *Der Finanzierungsbeitrag der Ausländer zu den deutschen Staatsfinanzen: Eine Bilanz für 2004*, „IZA Discussion Papers Series“, November 2006 and H. Brücker, E.J. Jahn, *Arbeitswirkungen der Migration. Einheimische Arbeitskräfte gewinnen durch Zuwanderung*, „IAB-Kurzbericht“ No. 26/2010, pp. 1-7.

²⁰ H. Hinte, K.F. Zimmermann, *Agenda Zuwanderung. Ein Zehn-Punkte-Aktionsplan für gesteuerte Arbeitsmigration und bessere Integration*, „Wochenbericht des DIW“ Berlin No. 46/ 2010, p. 19.

of the last census in the OECD countries carried out in 2000/2001 show huge disproportions in the direction of this kind of migration. It turns out that as many as 73% of emigrants with a higher education degree chose four countries as their destination: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA while 22% chose the European Union countries (out of this only 5% chose Germany). However, it needs to be noted that only 60% of the migrants are recruited from the OECD countries and about 40% are citizens of countries from outside of this organization²¹.

The opinions suggesting that Germany should take steps to recruit highly qualified foreign professionals are not rarely accompanied by opinions suggesting that some measures should be also taken to limit the influx of people with poor or no professional qualifications. According to the views of a significant number of German experts the best instrument to achieve this aim is the minimum wage. Introducing it would prevent redundancies in the companies which employ a significant proportion of workers of this kind²².

Summing up, it needs to be stated that contrary to the provisions in article 9 of the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany from 17 June 1991 the most favourable premises provided by the article have not been created, especially the economic, legal and organizational ones for economic activity including industry and services provided by single and legal entities. Poles could not count on any privileges on the German job market. Special difficulties were experienced by companies providing services on the territory of Germany. The far-reaching protectionism of the German job market resulted in some negative consequences in the mutual perception of Polish and German citizens. This became especially visible after Poland's accession to the European Union. Despite the fact that a decisive majority of Poles intending to work abroad were going to go to Germany, the political decisions meant that Great Britain and Ireland were the countries where the migrants found employment. This enforced change of direction for the labour-related migration did not have a significant impact on the development of the economic situation in Poland. It seems, however that it is right to agree with the opinion of German experts who in the majority were critical towards the decisions of the Berlin administration, both in the middle of the first decade of the new century and today. As they demonstrate because of these decisions the German economy suffered considerable losses. It is difficult to predict that the opening of the border in May 2011 will result in a mass influx of Poles. However, it can be expected that a vast majority of the labour-related migrants will consist of poorly qualified persons and these are not really anxiously awaited by German employers.

²¹ H. Brücker, op.cit., p. 4, cf. also: Ch. Anger, A. Plünnecke, *Signalisiert die Akademikerlücke eine Lücke bei den Hochqualifizierten? – Deutschland und die USA im Vergleich*, „IW – Trends“ No. 3/ 2009, pp. 19-30.

²² J. Möller, op. cit., p. 27.

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CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS (1990-2010)

The cultural exchange and cooperation between Poland and Germany has for years been a kind of phenomenon in Polish-German relations because of its richness, scope, variety and intensity. Also in the last two decades it was realized on many levels including governmental, national, community, regional and institutional cooperation.

The political and ideological changes in Poland, and in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s resulted also in a change of the conditions for foreign cultural policy, as well as for the realia of cultural cooperation between Poland and other countries in Europe and in the world, including also the Federal Republic of Germany. This has significantly increased the possibility for Polish culture to enter a wider circulation of international exchange. Finally, the political and ideological barriers which were holding back the flow into Poland of the cultural values from other countries, as well as the creative output of Polish authors living in immigration, disappeared. The lifting of the regulations restricting the freedom of the development of cultural activity opened new possibilities for initiative pertaining to various entities including cultural institutions, local governments, private persons, etc. It was no longer important to meticulously calculate the balance of artistic exchange, which in the past was used to demonstrate the “injustice in cultural relations” as proof that we in Poland translate more German literary works, stage more theatre performances by German authors, or show more films produced in Germany than our partners across the river Oder do with reference to Poland¹. The change of external determinants at the threshold of the 1990s meant that the cultural cooperation between Poland and Germany (and other countries) started to develop on different terms.

¹ K. Krzysztofek, A few suggestions for the speech of Minister I. Cywińska at the conference of ministers for culture of the EEC countries; Ministry for Culture and National Heritage Archives [henceforth MKiDN], General materials, sign. 1511/21.

LEGAL REGULATIONS

Both, the Polish and the German side has always attached (and still attaches) a lot of importance to cultural matters, cooperation and cultural exchange with foreign countries. It has been appreciated that international exchange “facilitates the exchange of ideas and values, mitigates ethnic and religious conflicts, is conducive to political stability, political and economic partnership, and that it helps to implement human rights which form one of the cornerstones of the modern world”².

The cultural exchange between two countries is based, on the one hand, on official treaties and agreements made by the governments and, on the other hand, it is based on bottom-up initiatives, frequently spontaneous ones. It should be underlined that state agreements and treaties are indeed a kind of official declaration and an expression of good will of both states to establish and develop a cultural dialogue. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that the provisions of a treaty have primarily a symbolic meaning; in themselves they can remain a lifeless wording which can be brought to life only by concrete people who by their concrete actions become the driving force behind the fulfilment of international agreements. The frequency of mutual contacts is to a large extent dependent on the resilience and personal involvement of the partners in a dialogue. However, governmental declarations are of utmost significance because they are proof that governments see the measure of the problem and grant it the status of national importance by official agreements in the form of the provisions of a treaty. These provisions however, mark out only a general frame of cultural cooperation and regulate its scope by giving a green light for taking specific steps towards maintaining the existing bilateral cultural relations and establishing new ones.

The first treaty which laid the foundations for the improvement of the relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany was the treaty between the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) and West Germany concerning the normalization of the relations between both countries signed by Józef Cyrankiewicz and Willy Brandt in Warsaw on 7 December 1970. Both sides then committed themselves, among others, to taking steps aimed at full normalization and comprehensive development of mutual economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations. Several years later, on 11 June 1976 the first official agreement concerning cultural cooperation was signed between Warsaw and Bonn³. It marked the beginnings of many bottom-up initiatives taken up on both sides at the level of institutions, cul-

² See “Foreign cultural policy and its priorities”, Archives of MKiDN, Department for International Cooperation [henceforth DFIC], Realization of cultural exchange (notes, reports) 2002-2006, BE 5, sign. 2242/5.

³ Agreement between the government of the Polish People’s Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on cultural cooperation from 11 June 1976.

tural centres, as well as by private persons committed to building mutual understanding between both nations. The agreement provided legal grounds and widened the possibilities to work towards a dialogue between cultures.

However, a significant breakthrough in Polish-German relations, including the cultural ones took place as late as in 1989. In this respect the visit of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl in Poland on 8-14 November 1989 was of huge significance as it resulted in signing several agreements and documents important for the development of Polish-German relations. It was on the basis of the then accepted regulations by the Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Chancellor Helmut Kohl that, among others, “the executive programme for the years 1990-1992” was signed in Warsaw on 16 March 1990. The document was appended to the agreement on cultural cooperation from 1976 and signed by Bolesław Kułski (on behalf of the Polish government) and Barthold Witte (on behalf of the German government)⁴. It included a lot of detailed agreements concerning mutual cooperation regarding: science and higher education institutions, education, partner’s language, training and professional development, institutes of culture and scientific and technological information, culture (including music and theatre, museums, preservation of cultural heritage and the visual arts, books and publishing houses, libraries, artistic schools, amateur artistic movement, film, days and weeks of culture). The document also referred to cooperation between archives, the youth, the press, radio and television, sports exchange and other areas.

The executive programme not only contained a directive for the activities conducted by entities interested in bilateral exchange and cooperation in the area of culture, science and education but it also was later on reflected in the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991, which opened a wider perspective for the development of Polish-German relations. However, the relevant provision concerning cooperation between both countries in the area of culture was very general and basically included only a declaration that both countries are willing to continue and develop bilateral cultural exchange based on the agreements made so far. In article 23 point 1 we read, “The parties to the Treaty in compliance with the existing agreements and programmes will intensify and develop cultural exchange in all areas and at all levels making in this way a contribution to European cultural identity”⁵. The above provision was thus of an intentional nature. In the latter part

⁴ See attachment nr 2. Executive programme for the years 1990-1992 appended to the Agreement between the government of the Polish People’s Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on cultural cooperation from 11 June 1976 in: *Polska – Niemcy. Na drodze ku porozumieniu i pojednaniu [Poland-Germany on the way to mutual understanding and reconciliation]. A collection of documents connected with the visit of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Poland 9-14 November 1989*, Introduction and editing prepared by Jan Barcz, Poznań 1990, doc. nr 17, pp. 77-88.

⁵ Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany from 17 June 1991, art. 23, point 1, Journal of Laws [henceforth the Polish abbreviation: Dz. U.] 1992, nr 14, item 56.

a commitment was made to support cooperation between associations of artists and authors, between cultural institutions and organizations, as well as to support direct contacts between Polish and German authors and artists.

Recognizing the importance and significance of culture in the life of societies and nations, the governments of both countries “deeply convinced about the great importance of cultural and scientific cooperation for the mutual understanding and reconciliation between the Polish and German nations” signed a new “Agreement about cultural cooperation” in Bonn on 14 July 1997⁶. Both governments intending, among others, “to develop and broaden the relations which exist between both countries in the spirit of good neighbourship and friendly cooperation”, and conscious of “the mutual infiltration and enrichment of both cultures over many past centuries” while striving to “expand the cultural relations in all areas including science and education” made many detailed agreements regulating cooperation between both countries, among others, in the area of culture, education, science, the media, the youth and sport.

The agreement specified and particularized the articles of the Treaty from 1991. To illustrate, article 2 of the agreement closely defined the areas of cooperation aimed at “the popularization of better knowledge of the other nation’s culture”. Both sides made a commitment to implement projects devoted to this aim and to provide mutual support within their capacities, especially when organizing the visits of representatives of various domains of cultural life (writers, artists, composers, film makers, radio and television producers, etc.) aimed at exchanging ideas and experiences and at establishing further cooperation. The mutual support also included organizing events such as exhibitions, guest performances involving individual artists and theatre groups, musicians, dancers, etc. as well as organizing cultural events (also days of culture). The commitments concerned providing support in bookselling, publishing and libraries; encouraging cooperation between associations and unions of artists and publishers, writers and translators, museums and archives; support in translating literary, scientific and specialist works, in organizing meetings of specialists, exchange of materials, etc. Separate articles of the agreement referred to providing support for bilateral cooperation in the area of cinematography (art. 11) and mutual relations between cultural associations and societies (art. 12).

The realization of the provisions of the treaty is guarded by the special Polish-German Mixed Committee for Culture (and Science) whose aim and responsibilities were defined in article 23 point 2 of the treaty. The mixed committee was supposed to meet at least once a year to evaluate the state of cultural exchange in all areas and to coordinate further undertakings⁷. This provision was later changed in the agreement about cultural cooperation from 1997 in which it was decided that both sides will organize sessions of the Mixed Committee when the need arises and when applied for by one of the sides (but at least once in two years) alternating between Po-

⁶ Agreement between the government of the Republic of Poland and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on cultural cooperation, Bonn, 14 July 1997, (Dz. U. from 10 April 1999).

⁷ Treaty between the Republic of Poland..., 1991, op. cit.

land and Germany. Their aim is to sum up the course of cooperation so far, as well as to work out directives and programmes for further activities⁸. The Committee is headed by the directors of departments of culture in the German and Polish Foreign Office. It consists of delegates of the Foreign Office, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, Ministry of Education (optionally representatives of Polish radio and TV Polonia)⁹. The Committee is an instrument supporting cooperation between both countries in the area of culture.

INTERMEDIARIES OF POLISH-GERMAN CULTURAL COOPERATION

The federal system of government in Germany with its division of powers concerning culture between the government (responsible for nationwide issues and foreign cultural policy) and the authorities in federal states – *Länder* (responsible for the development of culture and science on the territory of the given federal state) determines a direction for the Polish initiative aimed at establishing relations and promoting Polish culture in Germany. In this respect the activities undertaken by the Polish government and other bodies and institutions concerned with popularizing Polish culture in the Federal Republic of Germany are decentralized; they are not addressed to a single recipient but to many more. The majority of the Polish promotional activities take place not only on the governmental level but in direct cooperation with the constituent countries of the federation, towns and cities, local communities and cultural and educational institutions on the territory of the whole of Germany.

This situation determines the need to organize a much more extensive network of Polish diplomatic and cultural posts than it is the case in centralized countries. It also requires a different promotion strategy in view of the fact that the talks need to be held not only with one minister for culture but with 16 ministers for culture, science, research and education in constituent countries¹⁰, and since 1998 also with the Federal Republic's minister for culture and media who is responsible for matters of nationwide and international importance (Bernd Neumann has fulfilled that function since 2005)¹¹.

⁸ Agreement between the government of the Republic of Poland ..., 1997, op. cit.

⁹ See: „Polsko-niemiecka współpraca kulturalna i naukowa” [Polish-German cultural and scientific cooperation] (selected aspects in recent years), Department of Culture in the Polish Embassy in Cologne, August 1998, Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Department of International Cooperation and European Integration, Materials concerning the meeting of Minister A. Zakrzewski with Mminister M. Naumann, sign. 1908/ 40.

¹⁰ In different federal countries there is a different structure of ministries, e.g., minister for culture and minister for research and education can constitute two different institutions. In the so-called Permanent Conference of Ministers for Culture and the Federal Countries of Germany (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der BRD) there are altogether 30 ministers.

¹¹ For a wider account see: M. Wagińska-Marzec, *Wokół federalizmu w sferze kultury w Republice Federalnej Niemiec* [Around the issue of federalism in the area of culture in the Federal Republic of

The network of intermediaries who realize the activities connected with promoting Polish culture in Germany and German culture in Poland is relatively dense. The first ones to enumerate include the diplomatic posts of both countries. On the Polish side they include: The Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Berlin (Dr. Marek Prawda, ambassador since September 2006, Renata Eichert, expert for culture) and the Consulate General of Poland in Cologne (Jolanta Róża Kozłowska, Consul General since 10 October 2009, Jakub Wawrzyniak, in charge of cultural issues and promotion), the Consulate General of Poland in Leipzig (liquidated on 1 January 2009; from 27 October 2008 its consular duties from the area of Saxony and Thuringia were taken over by the consular department of Poland in Berlin), the Consulate General of Poland in Hamburg (Consul General Andrzej Osiak, cultural attaché Magdalena Erdman) and the Consulate General of Poland in Munich (Elżbieta Sobótka, Consul General since 16 May 2006, consul for culture Dr. Grażyna Strzelecka).

On the German side these functions are in the capacity of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Warsaw (Rüdiger Freiherr von Fritsch, ambassador since July 2010, Director of Cultural Department, Michaela Spaeth), the Consulate General of Germany in Gdańsk (Consul General since 2008, Joachim Bleicke, cultural issues are handled by a department for culture), the Consulate General of Germany in Wrocław (Consul General since August 2009 Bernhard Brasack, department for culture in the years 2008-2011 headed by consul Dr. Anette Bußmann), the Consulate General of Germany in Kraków (Consul General since July 2009 Dr. Heinz Peters, department for culture), the Consulate General of Germany in Opole (Consul General since 2010 Peter Eck).

MAIN CENTRES FOR POPULARIZING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT POLISH CULTURE IN GERMANY

In 1989 during the visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland, among others, an agreement was signed concerning cultural institutes and scientific and technological information. In the agreement the governments of Poland and Germany decided to establish on mutual terms Institutes for Culture and Scientific and Technological Information being convinced that they will contribute to “a better mutual understanding” (art. 1)¹². It was decided that these Institutes will: organize cultural events and events referring to scientific and technological issues, to economy and knowledge about the country; gather collections of newspapers, journals, books, records, etc.

Germany], *Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego*, No. 37/2005, pp. 45; see also: idem, *Pełnomocnicy ds. kultury i mediów w Republice Federalnej Niemiec [Representatives for culture and the media in the Federal Republic of Germany]*, *Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego*, No. 39/ 2006, pp. 71.

¹² See: Agreement between the government of the Polish People’s Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany from 10 November 1989 on the mutual establishment and functioning of the institutes of culture and scientific and technological information, in: *Polska-Niemcy. Na drodze ku porozumieniu i pojednaniu...*

and make them available to people and institutions who are interested in them free of charge; offer general and specialist language courses, courses in didactics and methodology, etc. (art. 5). The provisions of this agreement were also reflected in the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation from 1991 (art. 24)¹³ and in the agreement on cultural cooperation from 1997, in which both sides confirmed that within the capacity of the current regulations they will facilitate in their own country the establishing and functioning of cultural posts of the other country (art. 17 point 1).

At present there are two (previously three) Polish Institutes in Germany: **The Polish Institute in Berlin** established in 1956 (Tomasz Dąbrowski is the acting Director), **The Polish Institute in Leipzig** which functioned independently in the years 1969-2009, and at present it is a branch of The Polish Institute in Berlin (Tomasz Dąbrowski is the acting Director and Agnieszka Surwiłło-Hahn is the vice-director), and **The Polish Institute in Düsseldorf** established in 1993 (Katarzyna Sokołowska is the acting Director).

In fact, the Polish Institutes in Germany play a much broader role than presenting and promoting Polish culture in the neighbour country. They operate smoothly and efficiently without limiting their scope only to the broadly understood domain of culture but they also implement the basic assumptions of Polish foreign policy. The overriding aim of their activity is presenting Poland as “an important country in the EU and a significant partner for Germany”¹⁴. Polish Institutes function as an important link in the workings of Polish diplomacy within the influential circles of German politicians and intellectuals constituting an instrument of lobbying for the benefit of Poland and Polish culture. Primarily, however they try to arouse interest in Polish culture, history and traditions and in the engagement of Poland towards European integration.

The institutes fulfill their duties and reach their objectives by organizing exhibitions, concerts, literary evenings, theatre performances, by showing films, organizing discussions and conferences on topics related with film, music, literature, theatre and the arts. The major focus of their activity is presenting current trends and the most recent achievements of Polish contemporary art and on promoting Polish artists and their works.

The Polish Institute in Berlin operates mainly within the capital city of Germany where it tries to ensure the permanent presence of Polish culture in Berlin’s cultural landscape and in the northern countries of the federation. Its branch in Leipzig operates mainly within Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia.

The Polish Institute in Düsseldorf takes an active part in the cultural life of the North Rhine and Westphalia regions and in the neighbouring constituent countries

¹³ See: Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of Poland...

¹⁴ Activity of the Polish Institute in Berlin and its branch in Leipzig, <http://bip.msz.gov.pl/Dzialalnosc,IP,w,Berlinie,i,Lipsku,w,2011,r.,40856.html>.

of the federation, namely Hessen, Rhine Palatinate and the Saar region. Using attractive cultural projects it tries to change the image of Poland in the eyes of its western neighbours which however is still laden with many stereotypes.

The role of the Polish Institutes in Germany is well reflected in an appeal raised against the plans to liquidate the post in Leipzig which drew attention to the fact that the Institute is engaged in various political, historical and cultural projects not only on the territory of the region but also throughout the whole of Germany. The Institute propagates Polish culture in Germany and constitutes a unique platform for Polish-German relations. Therefore liquidating the Institute would mark the end of many valuable projects and the end of the forum for the Polish-German dialogue. Therefore the consequences of such a decision would be dramatic for the further development of cultural cooperation between Central Germany and Poland¹⁵. As it stands, the arguments raised by the advocates of maintaining the endangered post in Leipzig appealed to the decision-makers and eventually the Institute in Leipzig was not liquidated but it now operates as a branch of the Polish Institute in Berlin.

The German Institute of Polish Culture in Darmstadt (*Deutsches Polen-Institut*) was created in 1979 on the initiative of Karl Dedecius, a distinguished expert and translator of Polish literature into German (who was the acting director of the Institute for 20 years) and it was officially opened in March 1980. *Deutsches Polen-Institut* is financed by funds from the federal government and constituent countries including Hessen and Rhine Palatinate as well as by the city of Darmstadt; specific projects also receive support from the R. Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart. From the very beginning one of the fundamental objectives of the Institute was to popularize Polish literature and culture in Germany, as well as to deepen knowledge about the cultural, religious and social life of Poles and Germans¹⁶. The Institute fulfils the above tasks through conducting research, publishing activity, organizing exhibitions, literary and music evenings and other kinds of cultural events, as well as through interdisciplinary collaboration and cultivating contacts with persons and institutions in Germany, Poland and in other European countries¹⁷. In 1999 the function of the director of the *Deutsches Polen-Institut* was taken over from K. Dedecius by Dieter Bingen, a political analyst and historian. This had a substantial impact on the change of the Institute's profile with social topics coming to the fore together with the problems bordering the area of politics, culture, society and economy. Also new forms of dialogue in the cultural domain were initiated. *Deutsches Polen-Institut* is the most important institution in Germany of scientific-research, informational and publishing character in the domain of Polish culture and literature as well as in the area of politics, society and Polish-German relations in the European context.

¹⁵ Appeal against liquidating the Polish Institute in Leipzig, <http://www.kas.de/polen/pl/publications/15682/>.

¹⁶ For information about the establishment of the Institute see: B. Kwilecka, M. Wagińska-Marzec, *Deutsches Polen-Institut in Darmstadt*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 1981 No. 1/2, p. 188-191.

¹⁷ Wider about the present tasks and the activity of DPI see: *Deutsches Polen-Institut in a dialogue with Poland*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 2007 No. 4, pp. 11-25.

Polish Cultural Centre (*Polnisches Kulturzentrum*) was established in Munich in 2001. It does not have the status of an Institute of Culture like the Polish Institutes in Berlin, Leipzig and Düsseldorf but it is the cultural department of the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland, and it has its own gallery. The Centre organizes many cultural events in the area of music, art, literature and education. Most of the time they are held in the German language (with some exceptions). The head of the Polish Cultural Centre is the consul for culture elected for the period of 4 years; in 2011 it was Dr. Grażyna Strzelecka who fulfilled this function¹⁸.

The Adam Mickiewicz Institute (IAM) (earlier: Adam Mickiewicz Institute, The Centre for International Cooperation) in Warsaw is an important state institution for culture established on 1 March 2000 by the Minister for Culture and National Heritage in cooperation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 2005 the Adam Mickiewicz Institute merged with The National Centre for Culture and Maciej Domański was elected the head of IAM on 5 June 2005¹⁹. The merger of both institutions caused a lot of controversies²⁰. Since 2 June 2008 Paweł Potoczyn²¹ has been the head of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute and Joanna Kiliszek, an art historian and the former director of the Polish Institute in Berlin became the deputy head of the Institute²².

¹⁸ Polnisches Kulturzentrum in München, <http://www.polnisches-kulturzentrum.de/>.

¹⁹ „Maciej Domański nowym dyrektorem Instytutu im. Adama Mickiewicza” [Maciej Domański the new director of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute], 7 Jun 2005, <http://www.ksiazka.net.pl/?id=archiwum09&uid=4688>, see also: *Domański do Instytutu [Domański to the Institute]* daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 6 Jun 2005.

²⁰ For more information about the competition for the new director of the Institute and the conflict around the Institute see, among others: *Kto do Instytutu Mickiewicza? [Who for the Mickiewicz Institute?]*, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 26 May 2005, see also K. Kowalewicz, *Instytut im. Mickiewicza rozreklamuje polską kulturę na świecie [The Adam Mickiewicz Institute will promote Polish culture in the world]*, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 15 Jul 2005, see also R. Pawłowski: *Konflikt wokół IAM” [Conflict around the IAM]*, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 8 Dec 2005, see also a very critical article about the functioning of the IAM by M. Sawicka, M. Nadzieja, *Wydmuszka im. Adama Mickiewicza [Empty egg-shell of the IAM]*, weekly „Wprost” 4 Dec 2005; see also: *Odwolanie Domańskiego: Poszło o słowo? [Domański recalled: Was it all about a word?]*, interview with M. Domański by R. Pawłowski, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 16 Feb 2006.

²¹ Paweł Potoczyn (b. 1961): cultural manager, journalist, publicist, entrepreneur, diplomat. From 1995 he was the consul for culture in the Consulate General in Los Angeles; in 2000 he was appointed the director of the Institute of Polish Culture in New York; in 2005 he became the director of the Polish Institute in London. He was the initiator of many concerts and performances by outstanding Polish artists and music groups in famous concert halls abroad.

²² Wider about the changes in the IAM see: *Potoczyn dyrektorem Instytutu Adama Mickiewicza [Potoczyn the director of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute]*, daily „Rzeczpospolita” 2 Jun 2008; see also: Paweł Potoczyn nowym dyrektorem Instytutu Adama Mickiewicza [Paweł Potoczyn the new director of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute], <http://ksiazki.wp.pl/tytul,Pawel-Potoczyn-nowym-dyrektorem-Instytutu-Adama-Mickiewicza,wid,11750,wiadomosc.html>; about his vision of promoting Polish culture abroad see: *Autostradą do opery [Highway to the opera]*. An interview with Paweł Potoczyn, weekly „Polityka” 29 Sept 2009.

Currently the functions and the responsibilities of the Institute are defined by a new statute granted by the Minister for Culture and National Heritage, Bogdan Zdrojewski with directive No. 19 from 1 June 2008²³. The basic duties of the Institute include, among others, popularizing knowledge about Polish history and its pluralist cultural heritage; preparing and coordinating the implementation of projects promoting Polish culture, updating the integrated system of information about Polish culture, Polish heritage and language; preparing informational and promotional materials, etc. The Institute also fulfills its duties by funding scholarships abroad for Polish artists and specialists in the area of culture and scholarships in Poland for foreign artists, etc. The Institute is also responsible for preparing and implementing the Polish cultural offer during international cultural events abroad, as well as for coordinating projects connected with the celebrations of important anniversaries and other events of significant importance for Polish culture organized in Poland and abroad, etc. The Adam Mickiewicz Institute cooperates with other institutions (including national cultural institutions) in order to provide support for their initiatives of international importance. To ensure sufficient financial resources for the realization of its tasks the Institute takes steps to attract funds from outside the budget²⁴.

Bogdan Zdrojewski, the Minister for Culture and National Heritage recognizing the importance of culture in international relations announced some modifications concerning the principles of the Institute's operations. In his opinion a long-term policy is needed concerning promoting Poland through its culture with the use of experience and output of Polish artists, and the Institute should deal with something more than facilitating the performances of Polish artists abroad²⁵.

The Adam Mickiewicz Institute was the organizer (or co-organizer) and coordinator of the majority of events which took place in Germany in the last decade, and in particular of the entire programme of cultural projects within the Polish-German Year of 2005/2006. The Institute was also involved in promoting the celebration of the Year of Chopin, "Chopin 2010" in Germany, and in popularizing the knowledge about Chopin and his compositions. Apart from that it participated in the realization of many other projects and artistic events popularizing Poland's cultural and artistic heritage in Germany.

²³ Statute of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute, directive of the Minister for Culture and National Heritage, Bogdan Zdrojewski, nr 19 from 1 Jun 2008, (based on art. 13 item 1 of the act from 25 Oct 1991 about organizing and conducting cultural activity, Journal of Laws from 2001, No. 13, item 123, with later changes).

²⁴ Wider about the tasks and the scope of activity of the IAM, about its organization and management, about the Institute Council and financial policy see: Statute of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute ...

²⁵ *Minister Zdrojewski powola nowych ambasadorów kultury polskiej za granicą, z ministrem kultury Bogdanem Zdrojewskim rozmawiał R. Pawłowski [Minister Zdrojewski will appoint new ambassadors of Polish culture abroad]*, Interview with Minister for Culture Bogdan Zdrojewski by R. Pawłowski, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 17 Apr 2008.

Many other entities have also participated in the development of the Polish-German social dialogue, and they include organizations, societies and associations. In this respect many **Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaften**²⁶ operating in Germany play an extremely important role.

To intensify the cooperation in the area of the conservation of monuments and cultural heritage the governments of both countries established in 2007 the Polish-German Foundation for the Preservation of Culture and Cultural Heritage (*Deutsch-Polnische Stiftung Kulturpflege und Denkmalschutz*). Also the Polonia organizations and associations are actively involved in efforts aiming at a cultural dialogue between Poland and Germany. They include, for example, The “Polonica” Cultural Society in Bonn (*Deutsch-Polnische Kulturgesellschaft Polonica e.V.*), The Association of Polish Artists in Germany based in Essen, “Polonia arte”, a Polonia organization in Munich which supports the promotion of Polish projects in the Bavaria region²⁷, The German Chopin Societies in Darmstadt and Oberhausen, The German-Polish Cultural Society “Polonica” in Cologne, and many others.

MAJOR INTERMEDIARIES IN POPULARIZING GERMAN CULTURE IN POLAND

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs having recognized that one of the most important tasks is giving shape and taking responsibility for German foreign policy concerning culture and education established close cooperation with intermediary institutions which promote German culture, science and education abroad. These include, among others, the *Goethe-Institut*, The German Head-Office for Academic Exchange (*Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, DAAD*), The Foreign Relations Institute (*Instituts für Auslandsbeziehungen, IFA*), etc. They are financed mainly by *Auswärtiges Amt*. The aim of their activity is to convey the current and diverse

²⁶ See the Register of German-Polish Societies (ca. 80) operating in Germany (together with addresses and telephones, etc.): „Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaften in Deutschland. http://www.deutsch-polnische-mv.de/dpg_sliste.htm, The example of the Polish-German Society in Poznań illustrates how vibrant their activity has been for years; it has maintained close contacts with the Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft in Hannover, for a wider account see: Ł. Owczarek, *Towarzystwo Polsko-Niemieckie w Poznaniu, [Polish-German Society in Poznań]* „Przegląd Zachodni” 2007 No. 4, pp. 87-106; see also: H. Katenkamp, *Różnorodne przedsięwzięcia Bremy i Gdańska. Towarzystwo Niemiecko-Polskie jako motor współpracy [Various projects of Bremen and Gdańsk. The German-Polish Society as an engine of cooperation]*, „Dialog” 1997 No. 1, pp. 64-67; see also: P. Adamowicz, *Kontakty między Gdańskiem i województwem gdańskim a miastami i landami północnych Niemiec po 1989 [Contacts between Gdańsk and Gdańsk Voivodeship and the cities and federal states of Northern Germany after 1989]*, „Dialog” 1997 No. 1, p. 66; see: H. Koschnick about the partnership between towns/cities, „Dialog” 1997 No. 1, p. 63; see also: I. Heinisch, *Stosunki Polska-Hamburg: gospodarka: bardzo dobry, kultura: dobry, zachowanie: zmienne [Poland-Hamburg relations: economy: very good, culture: good, conduct: changeable]*, „Dialog” 1998 No. 1, pp. 92-94.

²⁷ On other organizations see: J. Lewandowski, *Polskie organizacje w Bawarii [Polish organizations in Bavaria]*, „Dialog” 1996 No. 1, p. 116-117.

image of Germany and German culture to the inhabitants of a given country. In the 2009 election programme of the Green Party there was a separate point in which the need to intensify international cultural exchange was underlined, as well as the need for a closer integration of a foreign and interior cultural policy. With reference to that it was advocated that more support should be given to intermediary institutions such as the *Goethe Institutes* and *DAAD*²⁸.

The *Goethe-Institut* was established in 1951 as an institution which would continue the activity of the *Deutsche Akademie (DA)*. The Institute's head office is in Munich and Prof. Klaus-Dieter Lehmann (born in Wrocław) is the president (*Präsident*). In 2009 there were altogether 135 institutes in 91 countries and a network of 905 language centres in 128 countries. In 1997 the budget of the *Goethe-Institut* amounted to 3.23 billion DM (which constitutes 0.25% of the federal budget)²⁹. The Goethe Institute has three fundamental objectives: 1) to support the knowledge of the German language abroad; 2) to cultivate international cultural cooperation; 3) to popularize an all-embracing image of Germany in the world through conveying information about its cultural, social and political life³⁰.

In Poland the Goethe Institute started its activity in 1990 and opened its first centre in Warsaw by virtue of the Polish-German agreement from 10 November 1989³¹. The Institute through its activity intends to facilitate access to German culture and to intensify contacts between the Polish and German cultural and educational institutions, as well as artists and intellectuals³². In the work of the Institute priority is given also to difficult issues connected with the mutual perception of both nations in the past and at present, as well as to organizing cultural events.

Dr. Martin Wälde is the president of the *Goethe-Institut* in Warsaw. Patrycja Tajer is responsible for the cultural programme and for coordinating the activity of German cultural societies in Poland. Renata Prokurat is the coordinator of cultural

²⁸ Der Grüne neue Gesellschaftsvertrag. Klima. Arbeit. Gerechtigkeit. Freiheit. Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen. Beschluss der 30. Ordentlichen Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz von Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, 8-10 May 2009, Berlin.

²⁹ See: Polsko-niemiecka współpraca kulturalna i naukowa (wybrane aspekty w ostatnich kilku latach) [Polish-German cultural and scientific cooperation (selected aspects in recent years), Department of Culture of the Polish Embassy in Cologne, August 1998., Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Dep. for International Cooperation and European Integration, Materials concerning the meeting of Minister A. Zakrzewski with Minister M. Naumann sign. 1908/ 40.

³⁰ Goethe-Institut, <http://www.goethe.de/uun/org/deindex.htm>.

³¹ See: Agreement between the government of the Polish People's Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany from 10 Nov 1989 on mutual establishment and functioning of institutes of culture and scientific and technological information (art. 3. point 2). The agreement contains detailed regulations (art. 1-16) concerning the statute, role and activity of the Polish Institutes of Culture in Germany and German ones in Poland, see: *Polska – Niemcy. Na drodze ku porozumieniu i pojednaniu*..., Document No. 17, pp. 69-72.

³² Goethe-Institut Warschau, <http://www.goethe.de/ins/pl/war/uun/plindex.htm>.

projects in the area of film, media, dance, conferences and seminars, and Dorota Swinarska is the coordinator of cultural projects in the area of the visual arts, theatre, music and literature³³.

Apart from Warsaw the *Goethe Institute* operates also in Kraków (*Goethe-Institut Krakau*). It was established in 1990 and since March 2009 it has been headed by Dr. Roland Goll; the issues of the cultural programme are in the hands of Dorota Krakowska and Izabela Szaszkiewicz. Besides there are also several German reading rooms in Katowice, Poznań, Szczecin and Wrocław. There is also the *Goethe-Zentrum* in Lublin and other examination centres (altogether 19) some of which function jointly with Foreign Language Centres. The *Goethe-Institut* remains in contact with all the interested cultural and educational institutions in Poland; it perceives itself as a partner for everybody who is actively involved with Germany and German language and culture³⁴.

Institute for Foreign Relations (*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, IFA*), is one of the oldest intermediary organizations and it was established in 1917. Its activity with the head office in Stuttgart is mainly focused on supporting the German language and culture abroad by German language media, exchange programmes, organizing German language courses and many other projects. The Institute is also actively involved in organizing cultural exchange in the area of the arts; it grants scholarships, prepares and organizes exhibitions of German artwork, as well as exchange programmes and international conferences. Since 18 May 2006 Ursula Seiler-Albring has been its president. The Institute is also involved in supporting activities concerning culture, the youth and education of German minorities within the scope of programmes realized in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe including Poland³⁵.

The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation (*FWPN*) (*Stiftung für Deutsch-Polnische Zusammenarbeit*) has been in existence since 1991. The aim of its activity is primarily to provide financial support for projects which are of common interest to Poland and Germany in various domains. Its role, especially in supporting all kinds of smaller and larger Polish-German initiatives and cultural projects is very much appreciated. The Foundation is providing finances, among others, for various kinds of activity towards partnership and cooperation between local governments and other institutions, as well as financing projects to popularize the German language and culture in Poland and the Polish language and culture in Germany, knowledge competitions, cultural and scientific exchange, literary and artistic activity concerning Poland, Germany and the European Union, and projects connected with the preservation of a common cultural heritage, etc³⁶.

³³ See: Institutsleitung, Kulturprogramme, <http://www.goethe.de/ins/pl/war/uun/mit/kul/deindex.htm>.

³⁴ See: Goethe-Institut Warschau, www.goethe.de/warschau.

³⁵ See: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, <http://cms.ifa.de>.

³⁶ See: Statute of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation from 30 Jul 2002, www.fwpn.org.pl.

To illustrate, in 2001 as many as 174 joint scientific and cultural projects received grants to the total amount of 10 million PLN (which constituted 27.7% of the entire financial support of the Foundation), 48 projects concerning the dissemination of the German language and culture in Poland received financial support to the total amount of 3 million PLN (7.52%); in 2002 as many as 276 projects were financed to the total amount of 8 million PLN (56.7%); in 2003 there was a substantial drop in the financed projects (148) and the amount of money for supporting them was decreased by half (about 4,830,000 PLN), but the number of financed projects which popularize the German language and culture in Poland and the Polish language and culture in Germany was increased (59 projects financed by a total amount of over 5,804,000 PLN)³⁷. That year received the highest financial support devoted to the area of culture from the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation. Also in 2009 the financial support remained high (273 projects for the total amount of 7,730,000 PLN) and in 2008 (271 projects for the amount of over 5,020,000 PLN). The lowest financial support was provided in 2004 (only 134 projects in the area of culture)³⁸. In 2010 the Foundation supported 161 cultural projects to the total amount of over 4,600,000 PLN³⁹.

The financial support provided by the Foundation included smaller and larger projects (music events, exhibitions, involving museums, film and workshop events, etc.) submitted by both Polish and German applicants, by cultural institutions (for example opera theatres, museums), as well as by associations of students, artistic societies, school teams, cultural centres, local governments, and by other entities. For example, in 2008 the following projects received financing from The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation: the project “Meetings of Gdańsk and Dresden”, the choir a cappella concert (The University Choir from Dresden), The Polish Film Week in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the preparation of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s opera by the Grand Theatre in Poznań, the project “Polish and German school goes make a film about Lake Turawskie” (High School nr 2 in Opole), the Polish-German jazz meetings in Gliwice, and many others⁴⁰.

In 2009 the Foundation granted financial support, among others, for the following projects: “Partners from across the Oder in joint undertakings” (Barlin) – 25,000 PLN, the exhibition “Bauhaus 20th-21st century. Legacy still alive” (Kraków) – 40,000 PLN, the project “Polen anders – Germans in a different way”, a documentary about the activity of the *Deutsches Polen-Institut* in Darmstadt – 58,750 PLN,

³⁷ See: Report from the activity of the Foundation for 2003, <http://www.fwpm.org.pl/?module=articles&id=70>

³⁸ See: Report from the activity of the Foundation for 2004, <http://www.fwpm.org.pl/?module=articles&id=69>

³⁹ See: Report from the activity of the Foundation for 2010, <http://www.fwpm.org.pl/?module=articles&id=736>

⁴⁰ For a wider account see the list of projects supported by the Foundation, Report from the activity of the Foundation for 2008, http://www.fwpm.org.pl/etc/_gfi/literatura_i_kultura.pdf

the Feliks Nowowiejski Festival (Berlin) – 47,000 PLN, 3rd exhibition of contemporary art, “Poland – Germany 4:6” (Katowice - 14,000 PLN, the project “Euro-city 2030 – a festival of the twin towns Gubin-Guben” – 15,000 PLN, A German Cinema Week in Poland – 28,200 PLN, the concert “Polish musicians in Berlin”, a photo exhibition “Polonia in photographs by Stefan Dybowski” organized within the project “We Berliners – Wir Berliner” (Berlin) – 35,250 PLN, and many other projects⁴¹. The above examples demonstrate how diverse projects (submitted by various entities) received financial support from the Foundation. Most probably many projects within the Polish-German cultural cooperation would not have been realized if it was not for the substantial financial support of The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation.

FORMS AND LEVELS OF CULTURAL COOPERATION

Cultural cooperation with foreign countries including Germany is executed on various levels including: 1) the level of the state (international agreements on cultural cooperation and the executive programmes and directives appended to the agreements); 2) regional and local level (agreements made between regions, voivodeships, local governments, towns and cities); 3) the level of institutions (agreements between particular institutions, cultural centres, etc.); 4) the level of particular branches (through direct contacts between societies, unions and associations of artists); 5) the level of individual contacts between artists and authors); 6) on commercial grounds (this form has developed mainly thanks to the legal and political transformations and is dependent on the inventiveness and resilience of the interested entities).

Transborder cooperation between regions and towns

The agreement on cultural cooperation from 1997 included a provision concerning mutual cooperation at the level of regions and local governments in various areas. Article 16 says, “The parties to the agreement will facilitate and encourage all-embracing cooperation and partnership at the regional and local level with special importance attached to cooperation in the borderland regions”⁴². The cooperation and cultural exchange between both countries gained momentum especially after Poland’s accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. Since then joint initiatives and projects were undertaken on a much larger scale than before. The projects realized within the scope of partnership between towns were the most visible and the best financed. The example of mutual contacts between Słubice and Frankfurt on the Oder provide some evidence for the lively cooperation in various areas of life including first of all the domain of culture⁴³.

⁴¹ For a wider account see the list of projects supported by the Foundation, Report from the activity of the Foundation for 2009, http://www.fwpn.org.pl/etc/_gfi/listaWWW_pl.pdf

⁴² Agreement between the government of the Republic of Poland ... 1997, art. 16.

⁴³ The initiative “Słubfurt” is one of the more interesting cultural projects by both towns for more information see: M. Kurzwelly, *Słubfurt – miasto na granicy dwóch krajów [Słubfurt a town on the border of two countries]*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 2007 No. 4, pp. 60-68.

Interesting initiatives were also undertaken by two twin towns divided by the border, Zgorzelec and Görlitz. The authorities of both towns convinced that they can play an important role in the process of European integration decided to grant a special significance to the region and on 5 May 1998 made a Declaration of creating the Europe-Town of Zgorzelec/Görlitz⁴⁴. On the 5th anniversary of signing the Declaration (5 May 2003) the Town Council in Zgorzelec and the Town Council in Görlitz confirmed the mutual partnership of both towns established on 14 March 1980⁴⁵. During a session on 5 May 2003 they issued a “joint statement concerning the preparation and realization of the project entitled “Park of Bridges” as “a commonly shared centre of one divided town of two nations”⁴⁶. The idea was to create a meeting area accessible to all the inhabitants. The project “Park of Bridges” is an artistic vision and also the first joint infrastructural undertaking by a Polish and German town of an urban character⁴⁷. The aim of the project was to give the town a new quality of life and to make “a spiritual bond” between both nations possible. The Park of Bridges is hoped in future to constitute “a German gateway to Polish culture and a Polish gateway to German culture”⁴⁸.

A new agreement on partnership and cooperation between both towns was signed on 29 April 2004. The agreement underlined the fact that the broadening of the cooperation aims at closer relations between the inhabitants of both towns, and by the same token at supporting the process of European integration⁴⁹. In the annex to the agreement both sides decided, among others, to make efforts to support the candidacy of Görlitz together with the twin town of Zgorzelec for the title of the European Capital of Culture in 2010, as well as to further the development of the joint town centre, “The Park of Bridges” and raise the necessary financial resources on both sides of the river Neisse.

The architectural vision of the Park of Bridges was prepared and presented at the beginning of 2004 by a special international team headed by Thomas Sprengel. It included renown creators of culture, among others Milada Šlizińska (international art curator in the Centre for Contemporary Art in Warsaw), Max Hollein (Director of *Schirn Kunsthalle* in Frankfurt on the Main), and also architects: Josef Peter Meier-Scupin (Munich), Frank Geppert (Görlitz) and Piotr Pawłowicz (Zgorzelec) and a landscape architect Prof. Udo Weilacher from Hannover.

⁴⁴ Declaration of creating the Europe-Town of Zgorzelec/Görlitz, <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>

⁴⁵ Joint statement concerning the modification of the partnership agreement, Zgorzelec, 5 May 2003, <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>

⁴⁶ Joint statement of the towns of Zgorzelec and Görlitz concerning the preparation and realization of the project “Park of Bridges”, <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>

⁴⁷ Görlitz-Zgorzelec European Capital of Culture. “Park of Bridges”, Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Department for International Cooperation, realization of cultural exchange 2002-2006, BE 5, sign. 2242/5.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ Agreement on partnership cooperation between the towns of Zgorzelec (Poland) and Görlitz (Germany), <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>

The project included, among others plans for establishing an Art and Media Forum, creating a modern Centre for Communication and Culture on the eastern bank of the border crossing, reconstructing the *Stadthalle* in Görlitz and creating there a multifunctional concert hall of supra-regional importance, renovating the Town Cultural Centre in Zgorzelec⁵⁰, renovating the former synagogue in Görlitz and transforming it into an international Cultural Centre, and many other undertakings in the area of communication and education.

The Art and Media Forum is supposed to be not only a centre for modern art but also a place of creative work for artists. The project, among others, includes plans for making use of new media, interdisciplinary artistic processes, development of new forms of constructional art and giving an artistic shape to public space. The Park of Bridges has also plans for creating a Literary House (Literaturhaus Arno Schmidt – Miron Białoszewski), a meeting centre for Polish and German literature with the aim to support contacts and collaboration between writers, scientists, translators, critics and publishers on both sides of the border. The fundamental assumption of the large-scale Park of Bridges project is that all the institutions, that is the Polish Centre for Communication and Culture, the German *Stadthalle*, the Polish Cultural Centre, as well as the former synagogue would function as communal institutions of joint utility.

There are also many other initiatives undertaken jointly by theatres and philharmonics on both sides of the border (concerts, opera performances, operettas, musicals, ballet, etc.), as well as discussion forums (“The Görlitz-Zgorzelec Wednesday”, “The Polish-German Salon”) which are meant to serve the purpose of integrating the communities of both towns. Since 1995 every summer Görlitz in cooperation with Zgorzelec and Jelenia Góra have organized a street theatre festival *Via Thea*, as well as many other festivals, e.g. Görlitz Jazz Days, National Festival of Greek Song in Zgorzelec, *Schlesische Musikfeste*, the festival of three countries Triad (*Dreiklang*), The Week of Bach (*Bachwoche*), the Old Town Festival (*Altstadtfest*), The Görlitz Organ Night (*Orgelnacht*), A Day of Open Monuments (*Tag des offenen Denkmals*), *Folklorum – Festival der Kulturen*, and many others⁵¹.

Despite the fact that the efforts of both towns to obtain the title “European Capital of Culture” did not succeed⁵², the inhabitants of the Europe-Towns of Zgorzelec/Görlitz have not given up their plans⁵³. Soon afterwards, on 16 May 2006 the coun-

⁵⁰ The building of the present Municipal Cultural Centre in Zgorzelec was erected in the years 1898-1902; it was designed by Hugo Behr. It was meant to be a memorial to the glory of the emperors Wilhelm I and Frederick III who died in 1888. The building called Górnoluzycza Hala Chwały [Hihg-Lusatian Hall of Glory] was financed by the inhabitants of Górne Łuzyce. The ceremonial opening was performed by Emperor Wilhelm II on 28 November 1902. Two years later, on 1 June 1904 a Museum was opened there (*Kaiser-Friedrich Museum*).

⁵¹ For a wider account see: “Görlitz-Zgorzelec, European...”

⁵² The European Commission Jury granted the title of “the European Capital of Culture 2010” to the cities of: Essen, Istanbul and Pecs.

⁵³ We are building together a town of European Culture, Zgorzelec/Görlitz, <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>; see also: M. Kokot, *Görlitz and Zgorzelec will not be the European Capital of Culture in 2010*, daily “Gazeta Wyborcza” (Toruń) No. 87, 12 Apr 2006.

cillors of both towns issued a special statement which, among others, reads, “Here in Zgorzelec/Görlitz a town of two languages, two nations and two cultures is coming into being, it is a model of European integration”⁵⁴. The Project Park of Bridges with an estimated cost of 40 million Euros is to be financed mainly by the German side.

Even if not all the plans will be fully realized, or their implementation will stretch over time and their effects are, at least at the moment, relatively little visible, they nevertheless deserve attention at least because they are an expression of the intention on both sides of the border to create a common space in the towns friendly for the inhabitants on both, the right and the left bank of the Neisse river.

Cooperation within the partnership of towns

Partnership between twin cities/towns is one of the lively and vibrant forms of bilateral cooperation. The first partnership agreements between Polish and German cities/towns were signed at the end of the 1970s. With the passage of time, it was noticed that it is a very beneficial and effective form of collaboration for both sides on many levels, and especially with reference to the cultural domain. In 1999 there were about 250 active partnerships established between large cities and small towns⁵⁵. Some of them function in a better or worse way. The agreement signed between Poznań and Hannover on 29 October 1979 is one of the oldest partnerships⁵⁶. Ever since, it has been renewed every year and supplemented with an annex including specific tasks for the current year.

The “active” partnership between Kraków and Nuremberg established on 2 October 1979 can also be given as an example of successfully developing cooperation with a model quality in terms of versatility and intensity of relations⁵⁷. Over ten years later, on 9 December 1991 both cities signed an agreement on cooperation based on the principles of twin cities. It embraces almost all areas of life including cooperation between institutions of higher education and cultural institutions⁵⁸. A festive celebration of 25 years of the partnership took place in 2004 and it was combined with the mutual presentations of both cities. Five years later there were joint celebrations of 30 years of the partnership. In May 2009 a conference was held in Nuremberg entitled “The significance of partnership between local governments for Polish-Ger-

⁵⁴ Statement given by the councillors of the Zgorzelec Town Council and of the Görlitz Town Council at the joint session on 16 May 2006; <http://www.bip.zgorzelec.iap.pl>

⁵⁵ See: *Polsko-niemiecka współpraca kulturalna i naukowa (wybrane aspekty w ostatnich kilku latach)* [Polish-German cultural and scientific cooperation] (selected aspects in recent years), Department of Culture in the Polish Embassy in Cologne, August 1998, Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Department of International Cooperation and European Integration, Materials concerning the meeting of Minister A. Zakrzewski with Minister M. Naumann, sign. 1908/ 40, p. 10.

⁵⁶ For a wider account see: A. Soboń, *Partnerzy od lat: Poznań-Hanower [Partners for years: Poznań-Hannover]*, in: *Wielkopolska – niemieckie kraje związkowe. Czas współpracy*, vol. 1: *Konteksty. Kontakty*, ed. by S. Piontek, Poznań 2009, pp. 77-82; see also: M. Wagińska-Marzec, *Polsko-niemieckie kontakty kulturalne w latach 1990-2008. Poznań – RFN – Hanower [Polish-German cultural contacts in the years 1990-2008. Poznań – Federal Republic of Germany – Hannover]*, in: *ibidem*, pp. 97-117.

⁵⁷ What should one know about Nuremberg and the cooperation between both cities? http://www.krakow.pl/get_pdf.php?dok_id=3999.

⁵⁸ P. Schremser, *Eine aktive Partnerschaft. Active partnership*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 1, pp. 78-79.

man relations". The participants of the conference included the President of Kraków, Mayor of Nuremberg, the chair of the Kraków City Council and Kraków's councilors. The cultural programme of the conference included a performance by "Motion Trio" from Kraków and "ensemble KONTRASTE" from Nuremberg. Apart from that there was an exhibition by young graphic artists from Kraków and an exhibition of photographs by Jutta Missbach entitled "Jelly sweets and Mercedes cars. Polish associations with Germany". Additionally, in the Langwasser Cultural Centre there was an exhibition prepared by the Cultural Centre from Nowa Huta entitled "Contemporary paintings from Kraków"⁵⁹.

The functioning of two exceptional centres is a distinctive expression of the realization of partnership ideals, namely the Kraków House in Nuremberg and the Nuremberg House in Kraków. Both centres organize every year many exhibitions, concerts, literary meetings and film events. In the Kraków House there is also an information centre about Kraków and a restaurant, as well as the head office of the Polish-German Society in Franconia and of the "Kraków Tower" Association. The Nuremberg House in Kraków organizes various cultural projects and periodic events, like for example the German Film Festival, or the Bavarian Film Festival⁶⁰.

It is impossible to enumerate all expressions of the bilateral cooperation between both cities but a close cooperation between music groups from Nuremberg and the Jagiellonian University Academic Choir and the Ballet of Modern Forms of the University of Science and Technology can be mentioned, as well as the effect of the cooperation in the form of the "Nuremberg Concerts" in Kraków (July 2009). Since 1987 there has been a regular exchange programme concerning work practice and student training practice between the Fine Arts Academy in Kraków and in Nuremberg. Some of the projects were implemented thanks to the merits of the great "friend of Kraków", Dizzy Nürnberger, the owner of one of Nuremberg's galleries.

Another visible sign of the friendship between Nuremberg and Kraków was the help of the Nuremberg City Council and many other institutions and Nuremberg music lovers in the restoration of the organ in the Kraków Philharmonics following a fire in 1991. The partnership between Kraków and Nuremberg has for years been supported (also financially) by the *Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft in Franken* which was established in 1997. In the opinion of the Consul General of Germany, Heinz Peters "Minor Poland has good cooperation with Thuringia and Kraków with Nuremberg"⁶¹.

⁵⁹ „Kraków – Nuremberg – 30 years of partnership”, http://www.dom-norymberski.com/dama/krakow_norymberga.html ; see also: "Celebrations of 30 years of partnership between the cities: http://www.po-prostu.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2048&Itemid=1.

⁶⁰ As a curiosity it can be mentioned that the so called "Nuremberg trams" are a noticeable symbol of partnership between both cities. They are still running in Kraków. Since 1988 about 130 tram carriages have been given to the Kraków Municipal Transport Company by Nuremberg (mostly free of charge). In recent years two-way tram carriages were bought at preferential prices in Nuremberg.

⁶¹ *Diplomatic Exchange of DJs*, Interview with Dr. Heinz Peters, the new Consul General of Germany in Kraków, daily „Gazeta Wyborcza” 19 Jul 2009.

Cooperation within partnership between schools

There is also extensive partnership between schools including music schools, which is mainly due to the engagement of private persons, including among others, teachers in music schools in Germany and in Poland⁶². A good example is the successful school exchange programme undertaken in 2000 at the initiative of Gerard Hartwig, a teacher from the German Musikschule in Tettngang and Grzegorz Walaszczyk from the J. Paderewski State Music School of first degree in Tarnowskie Góry. The first visit of the Tarnowskie Góry music school in Germany took place in September/October 2000. The return visit of the German students took place in May 2001 and since then the school exchange has been a regular event; the school from Tarnowskie Góry has hosted the students and teachers from Tettngang, and the same number of times the school from Tarnowskie Góry has been to Germany⁶³. Each time the cultural exchange was subsidized by the *Deutsch-Polnisches Jugendwerk* in Potsdam.

On the occasion of 5 years of cooperation between both schools, which coincided with the jubilee of 30 years of the Musikschule in Tettngang a joint CD was recorded with performances of students from both schools with chamber music and orchestra compositions. Both schools are aware of how much they gain thanks to the exchange: the opportunity to perform in the neighbouring country and mutually present achievements of the students. Thanks to the joint music sessions with time a lasting bond of friendship between the Polish and German youth has frequently been created. Also the exchange of the teaching experience and didactics between the teachers from both schools is beneficial for both sides. However, the most important success of the exchange is undoubtedly the fact that through joint concerts it contributes to the popularization of Polish and German music in both countries⁶⁴.

As a consequence of the close contacts the students and the teachers have a chance to get to know the other country as well as the culture and traditions of both countries. The exchange programmes purposefully combined artistic performances with the sightseeing of historical monuments and attractive places of a given region. For example, Polish students could become familiar with the charming places in Baden-Württemberg and the guests from Tettngang got to know the surrounding area of Tarnowskie Góry⁶⁵. It is worth emphasizing that the music school in Tarnowskie Góry was on the list of as many as eight schools in the Silesian

⁶² More about the partnership between schools see: Th. Mechtenberg, *Polsko-niemieckie partnerstwa szkół [Polish-German school partnerships]*, „Dialog” 1004, No. 1-4, pp. 82-83.

⁶³ I. J. Paderewski State Music School in Tarnowskie Góry, www.szkolamuz.tgory.nei.pl/wymiana.php.

⁶⁴ Zob. Program wymiany szkół muzycznych z Tarnowskich Gór i Tettngang, 2-6. 10. 2008, www.szkolamuz.tgory.nei.pl/wymiana.php.

⁶⁵ See: Report from the exchange, www.szkolamuz.tgory.nei.pl/wymiana.php.

Voivodeship which have had cultural exchange programmes with music schools in Baden-Württemberg. This shows that the number of schools which cultivate this form of bilateral collaboration is not at all small.

THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS (1990-2010)

The interest in our country concerning cultural contacts with Poland has significantly increased since 1989. It included initiatives submitted at the central level as well as those passed on directly to regional governments, institutions and cultural centres in Poland, or to the associations of authors and individual artists⁶⁶. It is virtually impossible to count all of the cultural events which have taken place in Germany and in Poland within the cooperation between both countries since 1990 until the present moment. They were taking place in large cities as well as in small towns. The events were organized not only as a way of realizing the provisions of the treaty and fulfilling international agreements. The initiators of continuing the existing mutual contacts as well as of establishing new ones included institutions and state authorities as well as regional and local governments, numerous organizations, associations, artistic societies, schools as well as, and perhaps primarily, private persons. Especially the cooperation at the local level was very vibrant. Perhaps it did not receive a lot of publicity but it was extremely important for local communities. Analyzing the examples of Polish projects realized in Germany and German projects in Poland in the last twenty years it is noticeable that there is still a disproportion between the numbers of organized events, namely decisively more Polish artists presented their achievements and output in Germany than the other way round.

Apart from many individual exhibitions and concerts, the performances of bands and theatre groups as well as theatrical performances, film showings, literary meetings, etc. organized in both countries on mutual terms, the Polish artists and cultural institutions (opera theatres, classical theatres and ballets) took part in music, theatre and film festivals in Germany and German artists did the same in Poland (although to a significantly lesser degree). Another event which should be noticed is the participation of Polish authors and publishing houses in the International Book Fair in Leipzig and in Frankfurt on the Main⁶⁷, and Germany's participation in the International Book Fair in Warsaw. Besides, the trilateral cultural cooperation between Poland, Germany and France within the Weimar Triangle needs to be remembered.

Undoubtedly the most noticed, effective and versatile undertakings were the all-embracing events like the Polish Days (Polish Weeks) organized on a wider scale

⁶⁶ See: Cultural cooperation with Western Europe and the USA, May 1990 r., Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, General draft, sign. 1511 nr 21/3.

⁶⁷ For a wider account, among others, see: J. Skibińska, *Pelna gotowość do Frankfurtu 2000? [Full readiness for Frankfurt 2000?]*, „Dialog” 1999, autumn/winter, pp. 100-101.

in various cities and towns on the territory of both, the old and the new constituent countries of the Federal Republic of Germany, for example Days of Polish Culture in Lübeck⁶⁸, Polish Week in Berlin⁶⁹, Polish Cultural Weeks in Aachen⁷⁰, Days of Polish Culture in Brunswick⁷¹ and similar German events which took place in Poland, for example Days of Bavarian Culture in Kraków⁷², Days of Saxony in Wrocław⁷³, Thuringia Days in Kraków⁷⁴.

More publicity because of the scope (regional) and the time (almost the whole year) was attracted by the project in the region Baden-Württemberg under the title "Poland Baden-Württemberg Cultural Meetings 1997/1998" ("Kulturbegegnungen Polen/Baden-Württemberg 1997/1998"⁷⁵). The decisions concerning the theme and the organization of the event were conducted at the governmental level between the Polish government and the government of Baden-Württemberg. The event was one of the largest presentations of Polish art and culture in the last twenty years in that country. The Polish-Baden-Württemberg Meetings were accompanied by a Festival by Lake Constance (*Bodensee-Festival*) in which artists and symphonic orchestras from Poland took part.

Unquestionably however, it was the Polish-German Year 2005/2006 which was the most important and the most spectacular event of recent years. It aimed, among others, at strengthening the cooperation between institutions and citizens of Poland and Germany in the enlarged European Union. The cultural programme of the Polish-German year included about 160 various events (concerning music, theatre, literature, film, exhibitions of paintings and graphic art, multimedia projects, etc.) and meetings, conferences, etc. on topics related to culture, art and history. They were held, among others, in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Hamburg, Bremen and Frankfurt on the Main over the period of time from April 2005 to the autumn of 2006⁷⁶.

⁶⁸ For a wider account see: R. Reche, *Polnische Kulturtage Lübeck. Days of Polish Culture in Lübeck*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 107.

⁶⁹ For a wider account see: W. Pomianowski, *Polska – cóż leży bliżej? [Poland – well, what is closer? Polish Week in Berlin]* *Polen – was liegt näher? Polnische Woche in Berlin*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, pp. 105-106.

⁷⁰ O. Müller, *Akwizgran uczcił Bronisława Geremka [Aachen honoured Bronisław Geremek]. Dialogue and Fete – Polish Weeks of Culture, Aachen feierte Bronisław Geremek. Dialog und Fest – Polnische Kulturwochen*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 104.

⁷¹ For a wider account see: D. Bonkowski, *Days of Polish Culture in Braunschweig, Polnische Kulturtage in Braunschweig*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 109.

⁷² For a wider account see: R. Kopyto, *Bavarian Culture Days*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 1, p. 73.

⁷³ For a wider account see: *Saksonia we Wrocławiu. [Saxony in Wrocław] Sachsen in Breslau*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 105.

⁷⁴ For a wider account see: A. Bugajska, *Thuringia Days in Kraków. Thüringer Kulturtage in Krakau*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 108.

⁷⁵ For a wider account see: M. Wagińska-Marzec, *Rozwój polsko-niemieckich stosunków kulturalnych w latach 1990-2010 [Development of Polish-German cultural relations in the years 1990-2010]*, in: *Polsko-niemieckie stosunki społeczne i kulturalne*, (ed.) A. Sakson (in preparation).

⁷⁶ A wider account of the Polish-German Year see: *ibidem*.

It is also impossible to forget about the numerous events connected with the celebrations of the Year of Chopin, “Chopin 2010” in Germany. They included first of all concerts with the participation of Polish and foreign pianists as well as exhibitions, lectures and talks about the composer and his creative output. An example of an interesting German-Polish initiative is the idea of a joint edition (in Poland and in Germany) of a postal stamp showing the image of Queen Richeza⁷⁷. The Project was successfully completed in 1988. In May 1999 the Polish School at the Embassy in Cologne received the name of Queen Richeza.

THE CELEBRATION OF THE TREATY’S ANNIVERSARY – THE CULTURAL PROGRAMME

The year 2011 was marked by two important events: 20 years since the signing of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation (17 June 1991) and the Polish presidency in the EU Council (second half of 2011). The celebrations of 20 years since the signing of the Treaty both, in Germany and in Poland included many meetings, discussions and conferences as well as artistic events including, among others, the Polish-German Festival of Modern Neighbourship under the title “**Neighbours 2.0**”. It took place from 6 May to 17 June 2011. It was a nationwide event with the central events organized in Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań and Gdańsk. The programme included about 30 projects reflecting “the authentic, vibrant and multilateral cooperation between Poles and Germans”; it was supposed to encourage “further dialogue, participation and collaboration in creating together with Germany a future model of neighbourship in Europe”⁷⁸. The projects showed mainly the technological progress in the world of digitalization and cultural programmes prepared with the use of new media. Many institutions were involved in the completion of the project, among others: The New Theatre in Warsaw, The Old Theatre in Kraków, *Theater Hebbel am Ufer* in Berlin, The Nuremberg House in Kraków, The National Audio-Visual Institute, The Polish Institute in Berlin, *Planete Doc Film Festival*, The Monte Video Photo Foundation, The German Council for Music, The Contemporary Art Centre “Łaźnia” in Gdańsk, The German Fashion Film Award, The Heinrich Böll Foundation, The Copernicus Science Centre and the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ Queen Richeza (died in 1063) – Princess from the North Rhine area, daughter of the Rhine Palatine Eriemfried, niece to Otton III, wife of Mieszko II, mother of Casimir the Renewer; for a wider account see: „Rycheza, królowa Polska [Richesa the Queen of Poland], http://historia_kobiet.w.interia.pl/teksty/rycheza.html; see also: A. Schweiger, Rycheza z Nadrenii, królową na polskim tronie – symbol jedności Europy? [Richesa from North Rhine, queen on the Polish throne – symbol of European unity], http://v1.p Polonia-viva.eu/index.php?option=com_content&id=6%3Arycheza-z-nadrenii-krolow-na-polskim-tronie-symbol-jednoci-europy&Itemid=5.

⁷⁸ „Neighbours 2.0”, http://www.warschau.diplo.de/Vertretung/warschau/pl/AKTUELLES/Nachbarn_202.0/Projekt.html.

⁷⁹ Ibidem.

EVALUATION ATTEMPT

The external conditions have changed in the integrating Europe and in the face of the new challenges there was no room for the sole “export” of national culture. A cooperation based on different principles became a must; it was more about collaboration and “intellectual osmosis”⁸⁰. The transition to a new form of cooperation for both sides consisted in the commonly shared promotion of national culture in the neighbouring country as well as in the presentation of interesting phenomena, events and cultural transformations in both countries. It was noticed that this kind of cooperation will be both, more effective as well as less expensive when compared with the (frequently insufficiently considered) “export” of national culture.

Poland occupies an important place in German cultural and scientific cooperation with other countries, and Polish-German cultural cooperation “fits very well into (...) the new European paradigm”⁸¹. The interest in Germany in bilateral cultural cooperation, on the one hand opens new perspectives for a permanent place of Polish culture and science in the Federal Republic of Germany but, on the other hand, it faces us with huge requirements and challenges. The factors which are favourable for promoting Polish culture in Germany include the rich cultural infrastructure resulting from the federal system of government and the relatively high public expenditure on culture. Although, in the period of the economic crisis in recent years severe financial cuts were imposed on various sectors including culture.

On the break of 1999/2000 the Ministry of Culture and the Arts positively assessed Polish-German cooperation in the area of culture both, at the level of the state (between the Polish and German government) and at the ministerial level (between the Polish Ministry of Culture and the Arts and the relevant institutions in the government of the constituent countries of the federation)⁸². The presence of both countries in the Pan-European forums (e.g. the Council of Europe) and regional ones (e.g., ARS-Baltica) was evaluated as “satisfactory”. The Silesian Cultural Award (*Kulturpreis Schlesien*) granted since 1991 to distinguished persons of culture and science from Poland and Germany in recognition of their services for Silesia was quoted as an example of a successful “friendly” cooperation in the area of culture. This award

⁸⁰ See: Polsko-niemiecka współpraca kulturalna i naukowa [Polish-German cultural and scientific cooperation (selected aspects in recent years), Department of Culture of the Polish Embassy in Cologne, August 1998., Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Dep. for International Cooperation and European Integration, Materials concerning the meeting of Minister A. Zakrzewski with Minister M. Naumann sign. 1908/40.

⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁸² See: A. Niewiadomska, Tezy do rozmów z Ministrem Michaellem Naumannem, [Theses for talks with Minister Michael Naumann]. Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Dep. for International Cooperation and European Integration, sign. 1908/40.

has become “an element of cultural neighbourship of Poles and Germans”⁸³. The laureates in the past included, among others, the poet, Tadeusz Różewicz (1994), Prof. Fritz Stern (1996), a composer Henryk Mikołaj Górecki (1997), and others⁸⁴.

In the estimation of the Ministry for Culture and the Arts by the end of the 1990s the signing of the agreement on cultural cooperation between Poland and Germany in Bonn in 1997 “did not cause any significant changes in Polish-German cultural relations”⁸⁵. This means that the cultural cooperation and exchange was continued and took its own course. The difficult topics in the mutual cultural relations included: 1) the return of the robbed and displaced cultural goods during the wartime; 2) the support for the cultural activity of national minorities in Poland and in Germany (the main issue was increasing support for the Polish minority in Germany and making it less bureaucratic); 3) problems related with the illegal trade of works of art (casus of the Jagiellonian Library)⁸⁶.

The negative image of Poland and Poles shaped by the German media which exists in the consciousness of German society was regarded as the most difficult social problem. Another set of controversial issues included the social and historical problems concerning, among others, national memorials and commemorating World War II⁸⁷.

In the scope of fulfilling the provisions of the Treaty the case of renovation of the J.I. Kraszewski Museum in Dresden was one of the most arduous matters⁸⁸. The problem was that the building of the Museum after 30 years of having been in use was in a disastrous technical state and needed a thorough renovation, which eventually was carried out as late as in 2000-2001⁸⁹. The official ceremonial opening of the new exhibition took place on 17 June 2001 within the celebration events on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of signing the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and

⁸³ For a wider account see: R. Reche, *Nagroda Kulturalna Śląska 1997 [Silesian Cultural Award 1997]*, „Dialog” 1997 No. 3-4, p. 67.

⁸⁴ See: R. Reche, *Nagroda Kulturalna Śląska landu Dolna Saksonia za rok 1998 [Silesian Cultural Award from Lower Saxony for 1998]*, „Dialog” 1998, No. 3-4, p. 69.

⁸⁵ See: *Tezy do rozmów z zakresu problematyki bilateralnej – współpraca kulturalna [Theses for talks on bilateral problems – cultural cooperation]*, Archives of the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage, Dep. for International Cooperation and European Integration, sign. 1908/40.

⁸⁶ See A. Niewiadomska, op.cit.

⁸⁷ The problem concerned a memorial in the cemetery in Braunschweig, where the bodies of newborn babies of Polish forced labourers were buried, as well as difficulties encountered by the Polish side in their attempts to place a Polish exhibition in the former concentration camp in Dachau.

⁸⁸ The museum is located in the building in Nordstrasse in Neustadt district, where the writer lived during his stay in this town. The building in terms of administration is a branch of the Dresden City Museum (*Stadtmuseum Dresden*) and its exhibits come from the collection of the A. Mickiewicz Literature Museum in Warsaw. The Museum organizes various periodic exhibitions devoted to various current cultural events, as well as discussions and chamber music concerts., see, among others, P. Chemnitz, *Józef Ignacy Kraszewski in Dresden*, „Dialog” 1996 No. 1, p. 2.

⁸⁹ E. Szymańska, *Muzemu Literatury im. Adam Mickiewicza w Warszawie [A. Mickiewicz Literature Museum in Warsaw]*, Warsaw 2005, see: J. I. Kraszewski Museum in Dresden, www.culture.pl.

Friendly Cooperation between Germany and Poland. During a flood in 2002 the museum suffered serious damage and after the damage was repaired it resumed its activity in 2003.

* * * *

A considerable impact on the favourable development of cultural relations between both countries was made by the change of the political and social climate, and external conditions following the 1990 breakthrough, and especially after Poland's accession to the EU in 2004. The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the largest partners of Poland in the area of culture and it decisively dominates over other countries with respect to the intensity and the quality of cultural contacts. When it comes to fulfilling the commitments of the Treaty and provisions of the agreements on cultural cooperation and exchange by both sides, the most important is the conviction about the purposefulness and reasonableness of realizing them as well as the good will to cooperate in this respect. There are many examples which demonstrate that this conviction is certainly present on the Polish and on the German side. Both sides are aware of the role of culture in shaping the social identity and the image of one's own country and nation in the country of the neighbour. They perceive culture as an instrument serving international dialogue and contributing to soothing political and social tension.

Although not all the planned cultural projects were realized it was rather a result of problems of a financial nature (especially on the Polish side the lack of financial means was frequently a significant constraint). However, the ideological and political barriers disappeared, as well as the phenomenon of imposed "friendship" as it was the case with relations with the former East Germany. Yet, what remains is the question of the mutual attractiveness of both cultures. Certainly Polish artists and authors are more attracted to the culture of the West than the other way round, and Poles are more interested in the opportunity to enter the German market than German artists are with reference to Poland. This may be one of the reasons for a kind of asymmetry in the presence of Polish culture in Germany and German culture in Poland (a reverse phenomenon can be, for example observed in literature, although the reasons for this are most likely complex). It is difficult to give a straightforward answer to the question concerning the interest in the Polish culture in the country of its western neighbour because such research has not been conducted. The answer can also differ depending on the viewpoint and expectations of the interlocutor.

Recently, especially after Poland's accession to the EU structures, there has been a noticeable change in the forms of cooperation and in the nature of the events. Large-scale joint projects embracing various areas of culture and the arts started to be realized more frequently. This however did not result in resigning from, or ousting the individual exchange of artists and authors. Another characteristic feature was aiming at a search for new, original forms of cooperation, realization of multimedia projects and organizing artistic events with the use of modern technology and means of expression. A tendency to promote young little known authors and avant-garde

experimental artists was also noticeable. The number of Polish-German undertakings on the local level has substantially increased (in comparison with the time before 1990) which although were unable to get through to the common consciousness they nevertheless played an important part in local communities. In order to realize how many of them there were and how versatile they were it is enough to look at the list of projects supported by the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation in the last decade (2001-2009).

Undoubtedly, a significant role in popularizing the Polish culture in Germany has been played by: the Polish Institute in Berlin and its branch in Leipzig, by the Polish Institute in Düsseldorf, as well as by the Polish Embassy in Berlin and the Consulate General in Cologne, Munich and Hamburg. Their activity translated itself clearly into the number and the quality of the projects and cultural events organized within the radius of the area where they operate. This had a substantial importance for the shaping of the image of Poland and Polish culture in Germany. A similar assessment should go for the efforts made by the German Embassy in Warsaw and the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Wrocław, Gdańsk and Kraków towards cultural exchange and shaping a positive image of Germany in Poland, as well as for the vibrant centres of the *Goethe-Institut* in Warsaw and Kraków. Also the role of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation deserves to be underlined as well as its substantial financial support which made it possible to complete many Polish-German ventures and artistic projects. Undoubtedly, without the initiative and commitment of many entities and people for the cause of cooperation and cultural exchange the provisions of the Treaty and of various agreements would remain only empty declarations.

The opening of the borders, free flow of information and the possibility to communicate, the development of technology facilitating the transfer of ideas and values, and finally a change of approach to the way cultural exchange can be realized, altogether influenced the growing intensity of the cooperation and cultural exchange between Poland and Germany in the last twenty years.

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“A NEW OPENING?” POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE RULE OF THE PO-PSL COALITION (2007-2009)

RESTORATION OF TRUST

Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004 was supposed to give rise to further cooperation between Poland and Germany in many areas and on a qualitatively higher level. Soon however, one could talk about disappointment as the mutual interaction was hugely affected by the consequences of the parliamentary election in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as by the parliamentary and presidential election in Poland in the autumn of 2005. After the change of governments in both countries there soon appeared misunderstandings, controversies and distrust. Words about a crisis, regression and “kitsch” of Polish-German reconciliation were uttered by politicians and journalists. The Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power by fanning the flame of anti-German resentment still present in a substantial part of the Polish society. Advocates of a dialogue and mutual understanding with Germany were called traitors or naïve persons. Conservative ideologists denied that there is any Polish-German community of interests, not even in the EU or in NATO, and instead they gave priority to the “community of conflict”. It was not difficult to notice that this aggressive propaganda weighed down the opposition including the Civic Platform (PO) and also the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and rarely any matter-of-fact polemics was raised.

The shared achievements of the neighbourship earned with substantial difficulties since 1989 were more and more frequently questioned. The right-wing of the Polish political scene was accusing Germans of relativizing the historical process and the crimes of National Socialism, and the major calling slogans used included “expulsion”, Erika Steinbach and the Prussian Trust. Germans, on the other hand, welcomed the new Polish government run by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and later by Jarosław Kaczyński with clear reluctance and disapproval and blamed it for extreme nationalism, narrow-mindedness, quarrelsome disposition, and egoistic treatment towards not only their German neighbour but towards the entire European Union.

The minority government, initially under PiS and later on in coalition with the League of Polish Families (LPR) and “Samobrona”, as a matter of fact did not work out any coherent conception for constructive cooperation with Germany. It contami-

nated the atmosphere in bilateral relations and, what was worse it tried to disavow the achievements of its predecessors towards Polish-German mutual understanding and reconciliation. Yet, their attempts to convince western partners about German dominance in the European Union using the language of the cold war fell on deaf ears. The anti-German phobias demonstrated on the outside by PiS and LPR politicians were first of all serving the needs of their internal propaganda and incessant mobilization of the electorate around the new alleged threats to Polish sovereignty and independence coming from Brussels and Berlin¹.

The results of the parliamentary elections in October showed that the vision of the foreign policy and relations with Germany offered by the so-called government of the 4th Republic of Poland despite all the tremendous efforts ended up in failure. It is worth mentioning that during the election campaign in 2007 relations with Germany played an important role in the propaganda rhetoric used by PiS. PO was accused of being “dependant on Germany”, of cooperation with the German Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, and Donald Tusk, a Gdańsk resident was criticized for the “intellectual fascination with Germanhood typical of the Gdańsk community”. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński talked about his fears that the victory of Tusk’s party will mean a departure from “our hard foreign policy, especially concerning building partnership relations with Berlin”².

After the parliamentary elections in October 2007 which brought a new governmental coalition PO-PSL Poland adopted as a starting point for mutual relations the objective to rebuild reciprocal trust and to expand bilateral cooperation. This was considered to be a long-term process. It was announced that the former Foreign Minister, Władysław Bartoszewski would be appointed a special representative of the government whose task was to help in repairing relations with Germany³.

According to expectations on 23 November 2007 there was a new tone in the *exposé* delivered by Prime Minister D. Tusk:

¹ Cf. A. Holesch, *Verpasster Neuanfang. Deutschland, Polen und die EU*, Bonn 2007; also, *Von Kaczyński zu Tusk: eine deutsch-polnische Tragödie*, Bonn 2008; B. Koszel, *Polska i Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Pola konfliktów i płaszczyzny współpracy [Poland and Germany in the European Union. Conflict areas and platforms for cooperation]*, Poznań 2008.

² Cf. Z. Krasnodębski, *Niemcy poprzę każdego przeciw Kaczyńskim [Germans will support anyone against the Kaczyńskis]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 21.08.07; *Premier Kaczyński: PO jest uzależniona od Niemców [Prime Minister Kaczyński: PO is dependant on Germans]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 19.08.2007. German reactions: Th. Urban, *Feindbild Deutschland*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” from 20.08.2007; *Kaczyński auf Konfrontationskurs*, ibidem; *Das polnische Bild vom “deutschen Erbfeind”*, ibidem; *Kaczyński: Liberale zu deutschfreundlich*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 20.08.2007. Cf. K. Schuller, *Der Furor der “Tugend”*: von revolutionären Elan zu jakobinischem Säuberungswahn; *Polen unter der Regierung der Gebrüder Kaczyński*, “Internationale Politik” No 62/2007, p. 22-25.

³ P. Wroński, *Z Niemcami się dogadamy, z tarczą zobaczymy [We will reach agreement with the Germans, with the shield we will see]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 6.11.2007; *Donald Tusk: Polnischer Wahlsieger lobt deutsche Kanzlerin*, “Die Welt” 5.11.2007.

“We want to develop strategic relations with Germany without avoiding difficult issues. We all in Poland know that Polish-German relations are crucial for the good position of both countries in the European Union but they at the same time require special care, lack of complexes, clear, tough when needed and friendly presentation of mutual problems and expectations. I can guarantee that these relations will bring satisfaction to the whole European Union and to both partners”⁴.

On 5 December 2008 the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. Sikorski returned to the idea of revitalizing the Polish-German “community of interests”. When participating in the 13th Polish-German Forum in Berlin he not only made reference to the term “community of interests and values” but he was also encouraging to “look for new and brave formulas to consolidate the Polish-German partnership, which constitutes one of the more important elements of the European landscape”⁵.

Undoubtedly, a good example and a symbol of successfully developing Polish-German cooperation, especially within the European Union was the election of Jerzy Buzek as the President of the European Parliament with a substantial majority vote on 14 July 2009. This was possible thanks to support from German Christian Democrats, who are the most influential group in the European People’s Party of European Democrats, as well as thanks to the kind attitude of SPD from the Party of European Socialists. The candidacy as well as the election caused many positive comments in the press and among the general public in Germany⁶.

IN THE SHADOW OF “VISIBLE SIGN”

In view of the fact that the government under J. Kaczyński strongly highlighted historical issues in Polish-German relations, Tusk’s government was first of all compelled to calm down the emotions and mood in this particular area. On 21 November 2007 W. Bartoszewski, who was very much respected as an authority in the Federal Republic of Germany, assumed his duties as the Secretary of State for International Dialogue in the Office of the Prime Minister.

⁴ Text of exposé of Prime Minister Donald Tusk see “Rzeczpospolita” from 23.11.2007.

⁵ 13th Polish-German Forum. Polish Embassy in Berlin: <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=1479>; A. Krzemiński, *Polska i Niemcy. Pomysł na przełom [Poland and Germany. Idea for a breakthrough]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 10.-11.01.2009.

⁶ G. Gnauck, *Jerzy Buzek: Ein Pole wird Europas wichtigster Parlamentarier*, “Die Welt” from 9.09.2009; *EU-Parlament - Buzek ist neuer Präsident*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” from 19.07.2009; N. Busse, *EU-Parlamentspräsident: Pole Buzek mit großer Mehrheit gewählt*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 14.07.2009; *Pole Buzek ist Präsident des EU-Parlaments*, “Der Tagesspiegel” from 15.07.2009; *Jerzy Buzek: Zeuge des Wandels*, “Frankfurter Rundschau” from 9.09.2009; *Erstmals Pole Präsident des EU-Parlaments*, ibidem. Cf. Lammert: *Buzek ma niemieckie głosy [Buzek has German votes]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 17.06.2009.

Polish declarations of rebuilding friendly relations with Germany received a friendly response in Berlin. Quickly a discreet first visit of W. Bartoszewski to Berlin was organized and it prepared the ground for the visit of Prime Minister D. Tusk to the Federal Republic of Germany just before the European Council summit in Lisbon.

The head of the Polish government arrived in Berlin on 11 December 2007 and his meeting with A. Merkel was rather a symbol of a new chapter opening in the relations with Germany than it was meant to bring solutions to specific problems. However, it cannot be ruled out that the Polish side counted on some gestures from the German government concerning the building of “Visible Sign” – the centre commemorating expulsions after World War II⁷. Poland suggested including the issue of expulsions in the exhibition proposed by Tusk and the Foreign Minister R. Sikorski. Also a different approach was expected concerning the construction of the northern gas pipe-line, and closing the issue of claims for compensation of the “expellees” by the German government assuming financial liability if courts found such claims legitimate. Although these matters were not discussed the climate of the meeting was important as well as joint agreements about the continuation of talks on the line between Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin concerning the gas pipe-line, reanimating the Weimar Triangle, more funding for the Polish-German youth exchange programmes and the establishment of the Polish-German Science Foundation. The Chancellor warmly welcomed the Polish initiative of building a museum of World War II in Gdańsk and promised her help in creating the museum. She again rejected any claims for compensation from Poland for lost property filed by the Federation of Expellees⁸.

Before the meeting in Berlin on 10 December 2007 the German government announced that, irrespective of Polish intentions, the Centre commemorating expulsions would be created in Berlin because this had been decided upon in the coalition agreement with the Social Democrats in 2005. According to the plans the centre would have the form of a foundation subordinate to the prestigious German Historical Museum in Berlin, and it would be financed from the central budget. For 2008 1.2 million Euros were reserved for that purpose. The exposition would take as its basis the exhibition which was prepared two years earlier in Bonn entitled, “Flight, expulsion, integration”. Foreign historians would have the task of giving the exposi-

⁷ For a wider account see Z. Mazur, *Centrum przeciwko Wypędzeniom (1999-2005) [Centre against expulsions (1999-2005)]*, Poznań 2006.

⁸ *Tusks Antrittsbesuch: Merkel: Erinnerung an Vertreibungen bleibt in Berlin*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 12.12.2007; *Merkel und Tusk auf Schnupperkurs*, “Der Tagesspiegel”, from 11.12.2007; P. Flückiger, *Tusks Zusammenprall mit “Eisberg” Merkel*, “Die Welt” from 12.12.2007; C. Gmyz, P. Jendroszczyk, *Warszawa – Berlin: zbliżenie, ale bez przełomu [Warsaw - Berlin: coming close but without a breakthrough]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 12.12.2007; B. T. Wieliński, *Ciepłej w Berlinie [Warmer in Berlin]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 13.12.2007.

tion a more European character. This solution was accepted by SPD in the coalition government under the condition that establishing such a centre cannot be “provocation” towards Poland and that E. Steinbach would not participate in the project⁹.

When matters connected with building “Visible Sign” started to take a more real shape on 5 February 2008 talks were held in Warsaw and were kept in secrecy between Minister Bartoszewski and the German Secretary of State in the Chancellor’s Office, Berndt Neumann, the government representative for culture and the media. The official communiqué from the meeting talked about the importance of an open historical dialogue for Polish-German relations and “the need to find such forms for it which would favour historical truth and prevent misunderstanding”. It was decided that on both sides people from governmental positions and from foundations who oppose or sabotage Polish-German cooperation and reconciliation would be removed from their positions¹⁰. In the most important question of building “Visible Sign” Poland decided to maintain “well-wishing neutrality”. This was decided after reassurance from the German side about presenting a fair historical context of “expulsions”. Although Poland did not intend any formal participation in the project, the participation by Polish historians was not excluded. Bartoszewski and Neumann agreed to activate cooperation within the European Network “Memory and Solidarity”. An agreement was also reached concerning the preparation of a project to build the “Museum of War and Peace in the 20th century” in Gdańsk, and concerning German participation in the renovation of the commemorative site at Westerplatte¹¹.

A series of friendly gestures was continued during Angela Merkel’s short visit to Gdańsk on 16 June 2008. Prime Minister Tusk and Chancellor Merkel reached agreement with regard to German support for the Eastern Partnership and decided that a quick ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon was necessary. The Polish side came in with a proposal to build the so-called Polish-German meeting centre in Berlin. It could be built on the undeveloped site in Berlin where the Polish embassy was located before WW II and which belongs to Poland. The value of the land was estimated at 6 million Euros and this would constitute the Polish contribution to this undertaking. Also the decision about Poland not participating in the building project

⁹ A. Kazimierczuk, M. Mackiewicz, *SPD: Upamiętnienie wypędzonych nie może być “prowokacją”* [Commemorating expellees cannot be a provocation], “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 5.11.2007; *Gedenken an Vertreibungen. Scharfe Attacke*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” from 21.8.2008.

¹⁰ See interview: W. Bartoszewski *Polacy i Niemcy. Starzy przyjaciele i młodzi awanturnicy* [Poles and Germans. Old friends and young rebels], “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 13.08.2009.

¹¹ Polish-German talks concerning historical problems chaired by the Secretary of State, Prof. W. Bartoszewski and the Secretary of State in the German Chancellor’s Office Mr. Neumann, Warsaw, 6.02.2008, Polish Embassy in Berlin, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=1029>. Cf. Ł.S, AKU, *Wizyta Neumanna w Polsce. W tajemnicy o “widocznym znaku”* [Neumann’s visit to Poland. In secret about “Visible Sign”], “Nasz Dziennik” 6.02.2008; *Bartoszewski: Niemcy gotowi na ustępstwa* [Germans ready for concessions], “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 4.02.2008; P. Semka, *Utracona cześć Władysława B.* [Lost esteem of Władysław B.], “Rzeczpospolita”, from 27.03.2009; *Geschichte: Polen bleibt beim Nein zum Vertriebenenzentrum*, “Der Spiegel” from 5.02.2008.

of “Visible Sign” was upheld. With reference to that the head of the Polish government expressed his hope that Chancellor Merkel would find a “good solution” to stop E. Steinbach’s participation in the “Visible Sign” project and her determination to become a member of the executive board of the planned foundation¹².

On 3 September 2008 the German government adopted the project of a resolution which established the foundation called “Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation” which would govern the “Visible Sign” museum subordinate to the Historical Museum in Berlin¹³. On 24 September, before the project was passed on to the Bundestag Chancellor Merkel arrived in Wrocław where she received an honorary doctorate from Wrocław Polytechnic. On 9 October Prime Minister Tusk paid a short visit to Berlin concerning EU matters and at the beginning of December Minister Sikorski arrived for talks in the German capital¹⁴.

On 4 December 2008 before the Polish Minister’s arrival the Bundestag with a small number of MPs had adopted the resolution establishing the foundation. The project was passed mainly thanks to the votes of the CDU/CSU faction and some liberals. An official objection to the project was expressed by Lukrezia Jochimsen on behalf of the Die Linke Party and Katrin Göring-Eckhardt authorized by the Green Party¹⁵.

The Executive Council of the Foundation was planned to consist of 13 members. The members *ex officio* included the President of the German Historical Museum Foundation and the President of the Foundation House of the History of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn. Two members were the representatives of the Bundestag whereas the Foreign Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the government representative for culture and the media were to be represented by one member

¹² T. h. Urban, *Merkel in Danzig*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” from 16.06.2008; B. T. Wieliński, *Merkel u Tuska, czyli przyjaźń w rozkwicie [Merkel visits Tusk, or friendship in full bloom]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 14.06.2008; by the same author, *Pielęgnujmy normalność w stosunkach z Niemcami [Let’s cherish normality in relations with Germans]*, *ibidem* 17.06.2008.

¹³ Regierungspressekonferenz vom 3. September 2008. Die Bundesregierung, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2008/09/2008-09-03-regpk_layoutVariant=Druckansicht.html; Bart, “*Widoczny znak*” do Bundestagu [*“Visible Sign” goes to the Bundestag*], “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 4.08.2008; *Beschluss für Erinnerungsstätte Sichtbares Zeichen gegen die Vertreibung*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” from 21.08.2008; *Vertriebenenzentrum - Lob und freie Hand für Steinbach*, *ibidem*.

¹⁴ P. Wroński, B. T. Wieliński, *Stosunki z Niemcami do muzeum [Relations with Germans to museum]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 6.12.2007.

¹⁵ Text of the resolution in: R. Formuszewicz, *Przyszły status prawny Widocznego Znak. Rządowy projekt ustawy o utworzeniu Fundacji Niemieckie Muzeum Historyczne [Future legal status of the “Visible Sign”]. The governmental project of the resolution about establishing the Foundation of the German Historical Museum*, “Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego”, nr 3/2008, http://www.iz.poznan.pl/news/56_Biuletyn%20IZ%20nr%203.%20Widoczny%20znak.1.pdf; Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum. 04.12.2008. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Bundestagfraktion http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:daf9oxf0cXQJ:www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/bundestagsreden/dok/261/261137.stiftung_deutsches_historisches_museum.pdf+sichtbares+zeichen+in+Bundestag&hl=pl&gl=pl.

each. The Federation of Expellees and the religious denominations (the Evangelical church, the Catholic church and the Central Council of Jews in Germany) were to be represented by 3 members each. A Scientific Council was to be established consisting of 9 members and it would include invited historians from Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The cost of building the museum was estimated at ca. 29 million Euros and its annual maintenance was estimated at 2.4 million Euros.

Beyond doubt the increased activity of Polish diplomacy demonstrated in the second half of 2008 aimed at creating a friendly climate before the debate in the Bundestag concerning the “Visible sign” project as well as at providing support for Chancellor Merkel in her efforts to prevent E. Steinbach from having influence on the shape of the project. Although two weeks after the resolution was passed in the Bundestag Steinbach herself applied to be a member of the executive management of the foundation, Germans using confidential channels asked Warsaw for restraint and implied that they will keep to the prior arrangements.

The question of the people who were to represent the Federation of Expellees in the Executive Council of the “Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation” Foundation caused a serious upheaval in 2009 on the Warsaw-Berlin line. As early as in April 2008 the Federation of Expellees (*BdV*) decided that it will be represented by E. Steinbach in the Executive Council of the future foundation, and in early 2009 the Presiding Board of *BdV* unanimously nominated three candidates to the future Council of the foundation. Apart from E. Steinbach the list included two deputy presidents of *BdV*: Christian Knauer, a politician from the Bavarian CSU and Albrecht Schlaeger, a politician from the Bavarian SPD. Their stand-in replacement representatives were also nominated. The prospect of E. Steinbach’s nomination and breaking the gentlemen’s agreement with B. Neumann was regarded by Minister W. Bartoszewski as “serious indecency” as it would be comparable to the Vatican nominating the Lefebvre’s bishop Richard Williamson, a Holocaust denier, to be its representative for maintaining relations with Israel. The Minister warned that the potential nomination for E. Steinbach to the Executive Council of the foundation devoted to expulsions would have a detrimental effect on Polish-German relations and would reduce the number of 20 joint projects planned for this year. Other Polish sources using diplomatic channels were supposed to inform Berlin that if the nomination did happen W. Bartoszewski could resign from his office as the Secretary of State in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for relations with Germany, and this would have wide repercussions in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Europe¹⁶.

¹⁶ J. Bielecki, *Bartoszewski: Albo ja, albo Steinbach [Bartoszewski: it's either me or Steinbach]*, “Dziennik” 16.02.2009; P. Jendroszczyk, *Bartoszewski ostrzega Berlin [Bartoszewski warns Berlin]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 15.02.2009; *BdV: Polska szantażuje rząd federalny [BdV: Poland blackmails the Federal government]*, ibidem from 17.02.2009; P. Semka, *Nominacja Steinbach obrazi Polaków [Nomi-*

The reaction on the Polish side was decisive and sharp with W. Bartoszewski putting all his authority to tip the scales. Unfortunately, the climax of the affair involving E. Steinbach happened on 13 February 2009 when Minister R. Sikorski delivered in the Sejm (lower house of the Polish Parliament) his *exposé*, in which he devoted a lot of attention to “reinstated” good neighbourly relations with Germany. He stressed many times that Germany “is our key ally and partner in the EU and in NATO who appreciates the Polish contribution towards strengthening the spirit of integration and building a community of the western world”. The Minister did not hide the fact that there are still many disputable problems; “Nevertheless the joint Polish and German sense of responsibility for the future of the European Union is more important. The cooperation between Poland and Germany confirms that we should remember about the past but we should co-construct the future bearing in mind our national and community interests”¹⁷.

When on 16 February 2009 Minister W. Bartoszewski travelled to Berlin to convince Chancellor Merkel to reject E. Steinbach’s candidacy, the Presiding Board of *BdV* outraged by the Polish reaction published their nominations planning in this way to put pressure on the Chancellor, who was allegedly going to be blackmailed by the government in Warsaw¹⁸. Before W. Bartoszewski’s visit E. Steinbach met Chancellor A. Merkel and President H. Köhler within party consultations and she officially informed them about the decision made by the Federation of Expellees. Chancellor Merkel following talks with the Polish representative found herself in a very awkward situation and decided to postpone the decision concerning establishing the council of the foundation “Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation” until 2010 or even 2011, so that the issue would not become a topic of the campaign before the parliamentary election in September. W. Bartoszewski was appeased when he left after the meeting¹⁹.

In the face of the oncoming election to the Bundestag the question of nomination for E. Steinbach divided political communities and German public opinion. As it was to be expected support for her came from the community of the “Expellees”, CSU, part of the right-wing of CDU and the opinion-forming south-German newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Opinions were voiced that the Chancellor should not succumb to the Polish attempts at blackmail. The *BdV* threatened with

nation for Steibach will offend Poles], “Rzeczpospolita” from 15.02.2009; Bart, *Steinbach w “widocznym znaku”?* [*Steinbach in “Visible Sign”?*], “Gazeta Wyborcza” 2.01.2009.

¹⁷ Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Radosław Sikorski concerning tasks for Polish foreign policy in 2009, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/Informacja,Ministra,Spraw,Zagranicznych,25358.html>

¹⁸ *Umstrittene Entscheidung. Vertriebene nominieren Steinbach für Stiftungsrat*, “Die Welt” from 17.02.2009; G. Gnauck und A. Grain, *Vertriebenen-Stiftung: Deutsch-polnische Spannungen wegen Steinbach*, ibidem

¹⁹ *Kanclerz Niemiec ustąpiła Bartoszewskiemu?* [*German Chancellor gave way to Bartoszewski?*], “Dziennik” from 16.02.2009; P. Jendroszczyk, *Steinbach będzie musiała poczekać na nominację* [*Steinbach will have to wait for nomination*], “Rzeczpospolita” from 17.02.2009.

boycotting the entire project and the target of its sharp attacks focused on the SPD and F.-W. Steinmeier²⁰. The President of the Bundestag, Norbert Lambert spoke of “demonizing” E. Steinbach by Polish public opinion. Jörg Schönbohm, the Minister of the Interior of Brandenburg expected that the Chancellor would defend Ms Steinbach, Ronald Pofalla, the Secretary General of the CDU assured “full solidarity of the CDU” with the head of the *BdV* and considered that “great harm” was being done to her. On the other hand, Christian Wulff, Prime Minister of Lower Saxony was afraid that the lack of nomination for E. Steinbach will only strengthen the radical Right in Germany. Many authorities became engaged in defending her including a well known German writer of Jewish origin, Ralph Giordano and the President of the German Bishops’ Conference, Archbishop Robert Zollitsch, whose liking for the radicals from *BdV* was difficult to conceive of²¹. Berthold Kohler wrote in his editorial commentary of the daily “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” criticizing the Polish exaggerated reactions,

“Poland, our highly appreciated partner made the case of E. Steinbach, an insignificant symbolic character to be a litmus paper for the state of reconciliation and a touchstone for future multi-faceted relations. Warsaw presented Berlin with an alternative which must have sounded ridiculous, but which was treated by Poland with extreme seriousness. It was: Erika Steinbach or us (...) the old Polish phobia again saw the daylight. The Germans with their project are trying to change from the role of culprits into the role of victims, and to make Poles unaware of the guilt the only criminals. What is being said about Ms Steinbach in Poland and about what has never been questioned in Berlin is pure nonsense”.

Nevertheless, another journalist, Ansgar Graw from “Die Welt”, rightly observed that the dispute about the Centre is “not only about personal details. It is about the validity of the conception and about the question whether it is possible to fish out from the entire humanitarian catastrophe only its one part”²².

On 27 February 2009, that is two days before the planned EU summit in Brussels the leaders of both countries met in Hamburg. The main topics included economic issues and combating the crisis. Contrary to the expectations the irritable question

²⁰ *Steinbach attackiert Außenminister Steinmeier*, “Die Welt” from 24.02.2009; *SPD fände Steinbach im Stiftungsrat “inakzeptabel”*, ibidem; *Rozżalona Steinbach krytykuje Steinmeiera [Embittered Steinbach criticizes Steinmeier]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 24.02.2009; P. Jendroszczyk, *Steinbach atakuje szefa niemieckiej dyplomacji [Steinbach attacks the head of German diplomacy]*, ibidem from 25.02.2009; M. Kamann, *Drohung der Sudetendeutschen. Entweder mit Steinbach – oder gar nicht*, “Die Welt” from 23.02.2009; *Steinbach – “SPD hat Polen gegen mich aufgehetzt”*, ibidem from 25.02.2009.

²¹ M. Lau, *CDU stellt sich hinter Erika Steinbach*, “Die Welt” from 3.03.2009; K. Schuler, *Streit mit Polen: CDU verteidigt Steinbach*, “Die Zeit” from 3.03.2009; *Vertriebene: Lammert kritisiert “Dämonisierung Erika Steinbachs”*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 1.03.2009.

²² B. Kohler, *Causa Steinbach. Die alte polnische Phobie*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 2.03.2009; A. Grain, *Streit um Vertriebenenzentrum: Für Polen geht es um mehr als nur um Steinbach*, “Die Welt” from 26.02.2009;

of E. Steinbach's nomination to the Council of the future foundation was not raised. A day before the meeting Chancellor Merkel during a meeting with foreign correspondents in Berlin informed that she intended to wait before she makes the decision concerning the establishment of the foundation until the "right moment" and that she wanted to "find an amicable solution to the problem". During a formal banquet in Hamburg city hall A. Merkel added that the Polish-German relations "are close to her heart" and the "critical issues which we have to solve" will not have any impact on her attitude. The Polish Prime Minister made a statement in a similar tone before his departure, and he said that he was not going to raise the German "internal matter" and assured that on his part there would be "no expectations concerning the issue". However, in an interview given to the daily "Financial Times Deutschland" he openly admitted that he could not imagine a solution according to the BdV's conception, which would burden the good bilateral relations in which he had invested his entire authority²³.

On 3 March 2009 talks were held between Chancellor A. Merkel and the vice-chancellor and the minister of Foreign Affairs, F.-W. Steinmeier concerning the issue of the appointments of personnel for the foundation. The SPD politician insisted on making a quick decision and that was what happened. On the same day the Chancellor's Office released information about the resignation of E. Steinbach from the position of the foundation's Executive Council member. Two days later a statement by the Federation of Expellees was released informing about the "temporary" resignation of E. Steinbach which was made to exclude the possibility of the entire project being blocked, and in consequence not to give the opponents of the project a reason for needless satisfaction. One of the places in the Council of the foundation meant for the *BdV* was to remain vacant²⁴.

The formal conclusion of the Polish-German dispute with E. Steinbach in the main part caused a lot of controversy in Germany, and in Poland it was received with moderate satisfaction. The spokesperson for Chancellor Merkel announced that she accepted the decision of the Federation with "respect and recognition", though certainly the sharp divisions in the CDU before the election campaign to the Bundestag did not suit her in the least. Also the head of the German Foreign Office F.-W. Steinmeier assumed a similar position stating that the commemoration of expulsions must be realized "in the spirit of reconciliation and understanding with Po-

²³ F. Kellermann, N. Fichtner, *Tusk fordert Rückzug Steinbachs*, "Financial Times Deutschland" from 27.02.2009; *Treffen Merkel/Tusk – "Eine wirkliche Herzensangelegenheit"*, "Süddeutsche Zeitung" from 27.02.2009; *Treffen in Hamburg. Merkel und Tusk schweigen zu Streit um Steinbach*, "Die Welt" from 27.02.2009; *Streit um Vertriebenenzentrum: Polens Premier fordert indirekt Rückzug Steinbachs*, "Der Spiegel" from 1.3.2009; P. Jendroszczyk, *O Steinbach krótko [About Steinbach in brief]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 28.02.2009; B. T. Wieliński, *Tusk z Merkel na wieczerzy św. Macieja [Tusk with Merkel at the supper of St. Mathew]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 28.02.2009. Cf. S. Dietrich, *Erika Steinbach: Polnisches Feindbild*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 1.03.2009; *Vertriebenenzentrum: Merkel vertröstet Polen in Steinbach-Konflikt*, "Der Spiegel" 27.02.2009.

²⁴ Text: *Die Erklärung des BdV*, "Die Welt" from 5.03.2009;

land as an important partner, and the step taken by the *BdV* opens the way towards it". The decision was not accepted by the CSU whose leader, Horst Seehofer awarded E. Steinbach with the Bavarian Cross of Merit for her "brave" attitude. The Sudeten Germans Landsmannschaft gave the Chancellor time until the end of the year to fill the vacancy in the foundation Council with Ms Steinbach, or otherwise it threatened with resigning from the cooperation in the execution of the project commemorating "expulsions". The head of the Federation of Expellees herself was making it clear that her resignation was temporary²⁵.

In Poland Prime Minister D. Tusk concluded that "good and composed work done by Władysław Bartoszewski has brought effects". The decision was accepted in a positive way by the opposition PiS. The PiS leader, J. Kaczyński was happy with the news that E. Steinbach would not sit in the Council of "Visible Sign" but he was concerned that the museum would be at all created. From the Polish point of view it was supposed to be unacceptable as it would question the moral right of Poles to the western and northern areas²⁶.

Without going into detail it is possible to say that from a wider perspective the issue of the dispute, very much publicized in the media of both countries, concerning the nomination of E. Steinbach was only a tactical success but a strategic failure for Poland. Warsaw *de facto* resorted to blackmail (either us or Steinbach) and the heaviest cannons were wheeled out together with a threat of freezing the bilateral cooperation, and all this happened in the year of commemorating 70 years since the outbreak of World War II, and 20 years since the collapse of communism in Europe. The image of W. Bartoszewski in Germany was compromised and now he started to be perceived as an uncompromising politician, easily giving in to emotions, who offended E. Steinbach with words such as "anti-Pole", or "blond beast", and who called her defenders "fools"²⁷. The crisis gave E. Steinbach top popularity in Germany. Journalists were competing for interviews with her, she was a frequent guest on television talk shows. The Christian Democrat politicians spoke of the great and respect-

²⁵ Seehofer will Steinbachs Rückzug nicht hinnehmen, "Die Welt" from 5.03.2009; *Streit um Steinbach. Sudetendeutsche drohen mit Konsequenzen*, "Süddeutsche Zeitung" from 1.03.2009; *Freude in Polen, Bedauern bei der CSU. Steinbach zieht zurück*, ibidem from 4.03.2009; *Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen. Sudetendeutsche drohen mit Ausstieg*, "Die Welt" from 5.03.2009; *Steinbach-Eklat: Sude-tendeutsche setzen Regierung Frist*, "Frankfurter Rundschau", from 5.03.2009; B. T. Wieliński, *Erika Steinbach kontratakuję [Erika Steinbach in counterattack]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 9.03.2009.

²⁶ K. Kolenda-Zaleska, *Wielki szacunek dla pani kanclerz [Huge respect for Lady Chancellor]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 11.03.2009; B. T. Wieliński, *Steinbach dziękujemy [No, thank you to Steinbach]*, ibidem from 5.03.2009. Cf. K. Krohn, *Warschau quittiert Steinbach-Rückzug mit Erleichterung*, "Frankfurter Rundschau" from 5.03.2009.

²⁷ K. Schuller, *Neue Töne zu Frau Steinbach: Nebenwirkungen einer Erpressung*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 6.03.2009; *Steinbach verzichtet: "Bedauerliche Folge eines Kesseltreibens"*, ibidem from 10.03.2009; *Vertriebenenstreit. Was zwischen Deutschen und Polen schief läuft*, "Die Welt" 6.03.2009; *Bartoszewski: Steinbach dla Polski jest jak antysemita dla Izraela [Bartoszewski: Steinbach for Poland is like anti-Semite for Israel]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 5.03.2009.

ful deed of Ms Steinbach, namely her temporary resignations from taking a position in the Executive Council of the foundation. After the resignation her position was improved in the *BdV* community and in her own party. In the estimation of German commentators she was in a class of her own by resigning from her “life’s work” in the name of reconciliation and good relations with the eastern neighbour²⁸.

There is no doubt that the dispute was to a large extent about prestige as well as a result of a tremendous pressure from the opposition PiS exerted on the government of D. Tusk. The opposition made the issues of Polish-German relations the leading theme of their propaganda campaign, and in the years 2005-2007 the anti-German mood was in full swing. In reality, the structure of the foundation “Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation”, its legal standing and the manner of appointing members of the Executive Council guaranteed that its functioning will not have a revisionist character. Besides, The Federation of Expellees had only 3 votes in the foundation’s Executive Council of 13 members, and thus it could be easily outvoted.

Contrary to the expectations the resignation of E. Steinbach did not calm down the mood. On 8 March an open letter from N. Lammert, the President of the Bundestag to W. Bartoszewski was published simultaneously in two papers, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”. The letter accused the Polish media of creating a false image of E. Steinbach. She is certainly not a “fair-haired beast”. The letter talked about the high regard for her sincere and credible engagement for the cause of remembrance and reconciliation, especially in the Polish-German relations. The language used by Minister W. Bartoszewski towards E. Steinbach and the people who support her was considered unacceptable in a democratic debate. The author asked a rhetorical question whether they all including the “President of the Bundestag, and the high-rank MPs from the Bundestag, Prime Ministers of the Lands, the CDU Secretary General, the President of the German Episcopate are “insane?”²⁹.

In the reply, which was also made public in the media, W. Bartoszewski expressed his astonishment caused by “both the content of the President’s letter and the form in which it was publicized”. The Minister expressed his regret that N. Lammert attached so much importance to his interviews and to words which were frequently taken out of context, although he did not deny that they were not always in line with “diplomatically balanced statements”. He quoted many examples as evidence for the anti-Polish attitude of E. Steinbach, who “understands reconciliation between our Nations in a very peculiar way”. He also mentioned his role in the process of Polish-German reconciliation. The letter finished with a strong note that only the truth “can lead to responsible, healthy and honest relations between our Nations. The truth must be the foundation of our relations. This is the condition for conducting a sincere dia-

²⁸ A. Graw, *Souveräner Rückzug*, “Die Welt” from 5.03.2009; M. Wolffsohn, *Erika Steinbach hat Respekt und Dank verdient*, ibidem; P. Carstens, *Steinbach Anerkennung durch Verzicht*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 6.03.2009.

²⁹ Przewodniczący Bundestagu Norbert Lammert: Cenię Erikę Steinbach [*President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert: I value Erika Steinbach*], “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 8.03.2009.

logue. With much regret I have to say that the recent events showed a lack of relevant distance and humility towards our shared history on the part of some representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany”³⁰.

At the beginning of April the Council of the remembrance museum “Visible Sign” was appointed and on 13 May it was formally constituted and began its activity. The institution was to be governed for the period of five years by the council consisting of 12 members headed by Angelika Schwall-Düren, an SPD MP and the President of the Polish-German Society and, for the sake of balance, by Jochen-Konrad Fromme, a CDU MP critical towards Poland. The other members of the Council included, among others, B. Neumann (CDU), Minister for Culture and Günter Gloser (SPD), the deputy Foreign Minister. The Evangelical Church was to be represented by Dr. Petra Bahr, and the Catholic Church by Hans-Jochen Jaschke, the auxiliary bishop of Hamburg. The Jewish community was to be represented by Prof. Salomon Korn, Vice President of the Central Council of Jews, who is respected in Germany and whose parents lived in Poland before the war. According to the prior arrangements the Federation of Expellees was represented by Ch. Knauer and A. Schläger. In early July Prof. Manfred Kittel, a professional historian from the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich was elected Director. The Scientific Council consisted of seven German scholars, two historians from the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Prof. Tomasz Szarota from the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw³¹.

The controversy around “Visible Sign” had a strong impact on the widely publicized appeal issued by the CDU and CSU parties on 25 May before the elections to the European Parliament. German Christian Democrats postulated that expulsions should be “condemned on the international level” and that the right to freedom of settling binding in Europe should “grant the expellees the right to their homeland territories”. Although it was clearly visible that the document was an attempt to attract the most conservative electorate and a kind of gratification for the concessions on the part of *BdV* concerning the nomination of E. Steinbach to the Council of the Foundation “Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation”, it nevertheless caused heated debates in Poland. The head of PiS, J. Kaczyński during an election rally in Szczecin in harsh words stated that the “anti-Polish and anti-European manifesto by the CDU/CSU is an open appeal to review the borders and makes Poland into a “rubbish bin”. In a special letter to Prime Minister D. Tusk he suggested that PO should step out from

³⁰ Reply of Minister W. Bartoszewski to the letter by President of the Bundestag Prof. N. Lammert, Warsaw, 10 March 2009. Office of the Representative of the Prime Minister for International Dialogue. Prime Minister’s Office, <http://www.bpdm.kprm.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?id=9&look=59>.

³¹ *Historiker führt Vertriebenen-Stiftung Die Stiftung “Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung”*, “Der Tagesspiegel” from 3.07.2009; P. Jendroszczyk, *Niemiecki historyk młodej generacji Manfred Kittel został dyrektorem tworzonego w Berlinie muzeum niemieckich wysiedlonych [German new generation historian, Manfred Kittel appointed director of the museum against expulsions created in Berlin]*, “Rzeczpospolita” from 8.07.2009; B. T. Wieliński, *Niemcy powołali radę Widocznego Znaku [Germans appointed the Council of “Visible Sign”]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 9.04.2009.

the European People's Party (EPP) which gathers European Christian democratic parties. President L. Kaczyński's Office expected from the government "a calm but decisive reaction"³².

Undoubtedly, for D. Tusk and the ruling coalition the manifesto of the German Christian Democrats was an unpleasant surprise because it introduced a rift and a dissonance into the Polish-German dialogue which was being rebuilt with difficulty. With a lot of self-restraint the Prime Minister stated that the attitude of the Polish government concerning expulsions after WW II is well known: Polish people condemn expulsions but it is the German state which is to blame for them. He admitted that in his opinion "the expressions coming today (...) from some German communities can cause a feeling of distaste". The Civic Platform assumed that on the part of PiS the issue is used to raise opinion poll ratings showing support for the party at the price of "creating conflicts in international relations". It was pointed out that the whole affair has to be treated realistically as a part of a propaganda campaign before the election to the European Parliament³³.

The issue of appointments for the council of the Foundation "Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation" revived again in the middle of 2009, and it was connected with the election campaign to the Bundestag. There were controversial and ambiguous provisions in the official document, which was the election platform of the Union parties as well as the project of the work for the future government in the years 2009-2013. Namely, contrary to the earlier Polish-German arrangements, it was clearly stated in the document that the objective of the Foundation "Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation" was documenting the fate of exclusively German "expellees" and at the same time "serving the truth, building bridges and promoting understanding among nations". The CDU and CSU pointed out that the associations of expellees should decide about the participation of their representatives in the Council of the Foundation. In the opinion of the weekly "Der Spiegel" this was encouraging for E. Steinbach and was leaving the issue of her appointment for the council of the Foundation still open³⁴.

³² *Niemieccy chadecy chcą potępienia wysiedleń [German Christian Democrats want condemnation of expulsions]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 25.05.2009; *Jak kampania, to PiS bije Niemca [When campaigning PiS hits Germans]*, ibidem from 28.05.2009; P. Wroński, Bart, *PiS Niemca się chwyta [PiS clutches at Germans]*, ibidem; *Europa-Wahlen: Polens Nationalkonservative wettern gegen CDU und CSU*, "Der Spiegel" from 26.05.2009; K. Schuller, *Angriff an der deutschen Flanke*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 28.05.2009.

³³ *PO: Obląkańcza polityka Jarosława Kaczyńskiego [PO: The insane politics of J. Kaczyński]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 28.05.2009; *Borusewicz: Odezwa niemieckich partii chadeckich to część kampanii przedwyborczej [Manifesto by the German Christian Democrats as a part of their election campaign]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 28.05.2009; P. Wroński, *Co Kaczyńscy by robili bez wypędzonych [What would Kaczyńskis do without the expellees]*, ibidem from 27.05.2009.

³⁴ *Wir haben Kraft – gemeinsam für unser Land. Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013*, Berlin 28.Juni 2009, p. 59, <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/090628-beschluss-regierungsprogramm-cducu.pdf>; *CSU für Steinbach*, "Der Spiegel" from 25.05.2009

The election calendar included also the participation of Chancellor Merkel in the annual "Day of Homeland Territory" organized by the Federation of Expellees on 22 August 2009 in Berlin. The Chancellor in her short address to the participants promised to be sensitive to the "voices from the neighbouring countries". She thanked E. Steinbach and the German homeland associations for their commitment to cherish history and, at the same time, she added that Germans do not endeavour to distort history. She emphasized that "expulsions were a direct consequence of the crimes of National Socialism and World War II. We accept responsibility for that dark chapter of our past". She highlighted that the history of expulsions is a part of the "German national identity and collective memory". The leader of *BdV* thanked A. Merkel for her efforts towards creating in Berlin the museum and documentation centre, "Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation" but she left no doubt that the "horrors of National Socialist rule over Europe cannot be overused to justify mass expulsions". She also expressed her satisfaction from the fact that the CDU and CSU confirmed in their election manifesto that the Federation of Expellees has the right to take an independent decision concerning their representatives to the Council of the Foundation devoted to expulsions. She was applauded when she added that, "it is not about me but about the freedom in this country" and using one's democratic rights. "This is what we will not allow to be taken away from us either at home or abroad". E. Steinbach made it clear that she expects that after the September election and a change of the ruling coalition in Germany she would be able to take her seat in the Council of the Foundation³⁵.

Undoubtedly, Chancellor Merkel had to do political splits, as the German press wrote, so that, on the one hand the conservative electorate connected with *BdV* and estimated at 2-4% of the total number of voters would be satisfied, and on the other hand, not to deteriorate relations with Poland, which she was going to visit on 1 September for the commemoration events on 70 years since the outbreak of World War II. She underlined the contribution made by E. Steinbach for the homeland associations but she also did not make any promises of changing her position concerning the appointments for the Council of the Foundation "Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation"³⁶.

³⁵ R. Birnbaum, *Szenen einer Wiedervereinigung*, "Der Tagesspiegel" from 23.08.2009; "Tag der Heimat": *Vertriebenen-Präsidentin Steinbach: "Es geht nicht um mich"*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 23.08.2009;

³⁶ Ph. Wittrock, *Merkel drückt sich um klares Bekenntnis zu Steinbach*, "Der Spiegel" from 22.08.2009; *Merkel: nie chcemy rozdrapywać ran [Merkel: We do not want to scratch wounds]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 22.08.2009; *Steinbach: Co czwarta niemiecka rodzina to wypędzeni. Merkel: Dziękuję związkowi za pracę [Steinbach: Every fourth German family are expellees. Merkel: I thank the Federation for their work]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 22.08.2009; B. T. Wieliński, *Wypędzeni bez klów [Expellees without fangs]*, *ibidem* from 24.08.2009.

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The parliamentary election in Poland in October 2007 and the election of the new government of D. Tusk coincided with the period of final stages of work on the Treaty of Lisbon and closing the discussion about the Charter of Fundamental Rights. On 12 December the Charter was officially signed in Lisbon, and the day after the “Reform Treaty” came into effect which introduced huge changes in the functioning of the European Union and its institutions³⁷.

In Poland PiS declared that it would not accept the treaty in its present form and negotiations started with the Civic Platform (PO) concerning the conditions of ratification. The idea of having a referendum was ruled out and it was agreed with J. Kaczyński that D. Tusk’s government would accept the Reform Treaty with the British protocol (*opt-out*) which excluded the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Poland. Additionally, PiS demanded a guarantee that some provisions of the treaty (mechanism from Joanina, *opt out* with reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights) could only be lifted with the consent of the lower (Sejm) and upper house (Senate) of the Polish parliament. These reservations were written down in the text of the resolution adopted by the Sejm on 1 April 2008 before the ratification of the treaty. Bringing the Treaty of Lisbon into force was supported by 384 MPs with 56 against, mainly from the PiS club. On 8 April the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted by the Senate³⁸.

On 24 April 2008 the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified by the Bundestag with a decisive majority of votes, and on 23 May the same was done in the Bundesrat. However, directly after the voting, Peter Gauweiler, a politician from the Bavarian CSU challenged the new treaty and applied to the Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe to have it ruled unconstitutional claiming that the document is undemocratic and undermines the role of national parliaments³⁹.

President H. Köhler approved the contents of the Treaty of Lisbon but, according to the earlier announcement, he abstained from signing the ratification document until the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal. The matter was further complicated when in January 2009 the Tribunal received further complaints concerning the ratification

³⁷ *Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007*, “Official Journal of the European Union”, C 306, 17 December 2007 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:PL:HTML>.

³⁸ *Sejm za ratyfikacją traktatu Lizbońskiego [Sejm for the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon]* “Rzeczpospolita” from 2.04.2008; *Sejm za ratyfikacją traktatu Lizbońskiego [Sejm for the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon]*, “Dziennik” from 1.04.2008; See *Stenographic record from the 8th session of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, 7th term 2 April 2008*, <http://www.senat.gov.pl/k7/ue/index.htm>. Text of the Sejm’s resolution, “Rzeczpospolita” from 2.04.2008; *Polnisches Parlament ratifiziert EU-Reformvertrag*, “Die Welt” from 1.04.2008.

³⁹ J. Fahrn, *Bundesrat: Die rot-rote Koalition pokert um den EU-Vertrag*, “Die Welt” from 22.05.2009; *Bundesrat za ratyfikacją Traktatu Lizbońskieg [Bundesrat for ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 23.05.2008.

of the Treaty of Lisbon from Dieter Spethmann, the former head of the Thyssen AG concern, from Franz Ludwig graf Stauffenberg, former CSU Euro MP, from Joachim Starbatty, economic expert, and from Markus Kerber, Berlin professor of law. They accused the government that by ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon it will breach the constitution by creating a threat to fiscal stability. They claimed that in the EU the Stability and Growth Pact is constantly breached, the European commission transgresses its competencies and the division of powers is not transparent enough⁴⁰.

A serious crisis in the European Union was revealed on 12 June 2008 when following a referendum in Ireland the treaty was rejected (53.4% votes against and 46.7% for), and the Euro sceptic Czech president, Vaclav Klaus made a public statement that he would not sign the ratification documents. In the above circumstances the attitude of President L. Kaczyński became more reserved, although in the parliamentary debate over the ratification he had made positive comments about the treaty in the consecutive months he consistently maintained that the will of the Irish should be respected and he did not sign the ratification document. This attitude was received with moderate criticism in Germany as German politicians were aware of the awkwardness of the situation resulting from the controversies around the Treaty of Lisbon in their own country⁴¹.

On 30 June 2009 the Federal Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe gave a ruling which stated that the Treaty of Lisbon is compatible with the German Constitution. It also added that it is indispensable to strengthen the role of the national parliament. According to the ruling the Bundestag will have to give consent for making the EU legislation effective each time on the territory of Germany, especially within the scope of penal law and foreign missions of the Bundeswehr. The judges also expressed their concern that the developing process of taking over competencies by EU bodies would limit the scope of German sovereignty.

Chancellor Angela Merkel said that during the next EU summit she would inform other member states that Germany is bound by the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the new EU treaty⁴².

At the early stages of the government under D. Tusk preparations were completed for Poland to enter the Schengen zone. At night on 20-21 December 2007 the

⁴⁰ *Bundesverfassungsgericht: Karlsruhe verhandelt zwei Tage über Lissabon-Vertrag*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 17.01.2009; H. Wefing, *Lissabon-Vertrag: Verfassungsgericht lässt Skepsis erkennen*, "Die Zeit" from 10.02.2009.

⁴¹ Rare exception see *Polen: Kaczyński will sich auf Kosten Europas profilieren*, "Welt" from 19.07.2008.

⁴² *Lissabon-Vertrag: Bundestag billigt EU-Begleitgesetze*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 9.09.2009; *Ja zu Begleitgesetzen: Bundestag macht Weg für EU-Vertrag frei*, "Der Spiegel" from 8.09.2009; W. Lorenz, *Niemcy boją się konsekwencji traktatu lizbońskiego [Germans are afraid of the consequences of the Treaty of Lisbon]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 9.09.2009; *Niemcy. Bundestag przyjął ustawy kompetencyjne [Bundestag adopted the resolution about competence]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 8.09.2009; bart. *Niemcy zrobily krok bliżej Lizbony [Germany made a step towards Lisbon]*, ibidem from 9.09.2009.

border crossing barriers were lifted on Poland's western and southern borders, as well as on the border with Lithuania. Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Chancellor A. Merkel in the presence of the Czech Prime Minister, Mirek Topolánek, the Prime Minister of Portugal, José Sócrates, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, as well as the Ministers of the Interior of Poland, Czech Republic and Germany symbolically opened the border on the Porajów-Zittau-Hradec crossing. L. Kaczyński did the same with the Lithuanian President, Valdas Adamkus on the Budzisko-Kalvarija crossing. The politicians stressed that it was a historic breakthrough date. Prime Minister D. Tusk spoke of a "triumph of freedom", and Lech Kaczyński evaluated the entry of Poland to the Schengen zone as a "great success"⁴³.

Poland was aware of the fact that together with joining the Schengen zone the borderland cooperation and human interaction with the Ukraine, which it nevertheless supported in the European Union, would be limited. Small progress was made on 27 March 2008 by signing an agreement about local border traffic between Poland and the Ukraine which came in force on 19 May 2009⁴⁴.

The fact that Poland joined the Schengen zone was initially accepted in Germany with mixed feelings, but the political community treated it as another stage leading to overcoming the still existing divisions in Europe⁴⁵. As Wolfgang Schäuble, the head of the German Ministry of the Interior stated in Brussels, "The expansion of the Schengen area is a symbol for the new member states which are no longer behind the iron curtain". The statement was published in the majority of German newspapers⁴⁶. However, ordinary German citizens were afraid of an influx of illegal workers from Poland, immigrants from Asia and the former USSR, prostitution, car theft, shoplifting, as well as the spread of organized crime. Fairly soon it turned out that these fears were unjustified. According to the reports by the Ministry of the Interior in Brandenburg during 8 months since opening the border the crime rate in the borderland areas dropped by 6%. The same tendency was observed concerning car theft⁴⁷.

43 *Tusk: Dzisiejszy dzień jest triumfem wolności [Today is a triumph of freedom]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 21.12.2007; *Dziś dwie uroczystości z okazji wejścia do Schengen [Today two celebrations of joining Schengen]*, *ibidem*; P. Jendroszczyk, *Otwarta granica do Europy [Open frontiers to Europe]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 21.12.2007.

44 *Umowa o małym ruchu przygranicznym podpisana [Agreement on local border traffic signed]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 28.03.2008; *Ruszył mały ruch przygraniczny pomiędzy Polską a Ukrainą [Local borderland traffic started]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 22.07.2009.

45 *EU öffnet interne Grenzen*, "Frankfurter Rundschau" from 8.11.2007; *Schengen-Raum Der Segen der Säge*, "Süddeutsche Zeitung" from 22.12.2009; *Neue EU-Außengrenzen Grenz-Erfahrungen*, *ibidem*. Por. *Bericht von einer Grenze, die verschwindet*, "Die Welt" from 18.11.2007.

46 *Ohne Passkontrollen nach Polen und Tschechien*, "Die Welt" from 8.11. 2007; *Bez kontroli na granicy wewnętrznej, więcej kontroli na granicy zewnętrznej [No control on the inner borders, more control on the outer borders]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 8.11.2007.

47 *Grenzenlos nach Polen: Kontrollen zu neuen EU-Staaten entfallen*, "Die Tageszeitung" from 8.11.2007.

The customs services and border guards were authorized to inspect vehicles on the borderland territory. Germans started to appreciate the fact that they did not have to apply for Polish visas. Kilometres-long queues of lorries waiting before the border crossing and polluting the environment disappeared. The beauty of Polish beaches and holiday resorts on the Baltic coast started to be appreciated. Polish investors appeared on the other side of the Oder river, as well as people willing to settle in abandoned villages and estates⁴⁸.

Joining the Schengen zone by Poland did not result in facilitating the flow of a Polish workforce to Germany. According to the accession treaty from 16 April 2003 the opening of the job markets in the European Union was to take place after a 7-year transition period. In contrast to other EU countries, which lifted the existing barriers much faster, Germany and Austria decided to keep to the final date of 2011.

In contrast with the government under J. Kaczyński, who used the issue of limitations on the German job market for Poles in his propaganda campaign, D. Tusk's government did not attach much importance to this issue. Although in early 2008 there was a chance that in line with the 2+3+2 procedure the ban on employment of citizens from the new EU member states could be lifted in 2009, Warsaw did not show much initiative in this matter. The emigration impetus of Poles first directed itself to the British Isles, Scandinavian countries and some countries in Western Europe. Furthermore, Poland started to be short of a workforce in such sectors as the construction industry, agriculture and services, and those who had emigrated were being talked into returning to Poland. On the other hand, however, it was understood that freeing the German job market for Poles in 2009 would in a way automatically ensue facilitation in the freedom for Germans to buy land in Poland, and this was treated by PiS as a national threat⁴⁹.

The assumption of power by Angela Merkel cleaned the atmosphere around the trans-Atlantic partnership and around the European defence identity built within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Merkel visited the United States in 2001 and 2003 then as the leader of the opposition and she won respect as an experienced and responsible politician who understands the need to maintain close trans-Atlantic relations. The return of Germany to the role of a traditional mediator between Paris and Washington and functioning as an element of balance between the EU and NATO made things easier for Poland, which consistently granted priority to the "hard guarantees" of security from NATO over the "soft ones" from the European Union. The German Chancellor was aware of the strength of Polish arguments which were in favour of maintaining the position of NATO in Europe and the alliance with the USA. However, a lot of confusion was brought into Polish-German relations within the ESDP

⁴⁸ S. Dietrich, *Europa: Nach Polen hinüberschlendern*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 3.01.2009.

⁴⁹ K. Bachmann, *Ziemia dla Niemców, praca dla Polaków [Land for Germans, work for Poles]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 12.02.2009.

by the American offer of building an anti-missile shield. Germany abstained from taking a position until the conception was still in the early stages of Polish-American consultations. In March 2007, before the visit to Poland A. Merkel for the first time made a statement concerning the building of the anti-missile shield in an interview for the German TV channel ZDF. She suggested that she would persuade the Polish leaders to build such a protective shield under the auspices of NATO. The head of the German diplomacy, F.-W. Steinmeier called the USA to launch talks concerning the building of the shield with all partners, and primarily with Moscow. Sharp words against building the shield were spoken by Kurt Beck, the leader of the ruling coalition party SPD and Guido Westerwelle, the head of the opposition liberal party. The latter politician demanded that the Russian reservations concerning the undertaking should be taken seriously⁵⁰.

D. Tusk's government announced that there was no "rigid doctrine" concerning the issue of building the anti-missile shield, and that he would remain open to arguments for and against. Yet, on 20 August 2008 in the face of the Georgian crisis an agreement with the USA was signed in Warsaw concerning the building of some elements of the anti-missile shield in Poland. This news was acknowledged in Germany but at the same time the objection of the Russian government was eagerly highlighted and various negative consequences of this move for European security were analyzed⁵¹. Nevertheless, in January 2009 the assumption of power in the United States by Barack Obama, who represented a different philosophy of thinking about security than G. W. Bush, and who was interested in "resetting" relations with Russia postponed the implementation of the project until an unspecified future⁵².

The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 was a test for EU's security and defence policy because it, among others, introduced a kind of dissonance between Poland and France and Germany. When Chancellor Merkel was appealing for restraint and the president of France was on behalf of the EU entrusted with the difficult mission of restoring peace, President L. Kaczyński flew to Tbilisi. Irrespec-

⁵⁰ Steinmeier warnt vor neuem Wettrüsten, "Die Welt" from 18.03.2007; O. Thranert, *Benötigt Europa eine Raketenabwehr?*, ibidem from 21.03.2007; J. L. eithäuser, *Streit über Raketen Schild. Merkel kritisiert amerikanische Raketenabwehr*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 19.03.2007; *Merkel za otwartą dyskusją z Rosją w sprawie Tarczy [Merkel for open discussion with Russia about the shield]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 12.03.2007; B. T. Wielński, *Angela Merkel: budujmy tarczę w NATO [Let's build the shield in NATO]*, ibidem from 13.03.2007.

⁵¹ *Polen und Amerika besiegeln den Raketen Schild*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 21.08.2008; *Russland droht Polen wegen Einigung über Raketen Schild*, ibidem from 16.08.2008 G. Lesser, *USA bauen Raketenabwehr in Polen auf*, "Die Tageszeitung" from 20.08.2008; *Anti-Raketen Schild: Zündende Abwehr*, "Frankfurter Rundschau" from 21.08.2008; *Tarcza obroni Polskę [Shield will defend Poland]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 21.08.2008. Cf. P. Wroński, *Z Niemcami się dogadamy, z tarczą zobaczymy [We will reach agreement with the Germans, with the shield we will see]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 7.11.2007.

⁵² Cf. J. Kiwerska, *Podróż Baracka Obamy po Europie [Barack Obama's trip to Europe]*, "Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego" nr 14/2009, http://www.iz.poznan.pl/news/76_nr%2013.%20Obama%20w%20Europie.pdf

tive of the critical opinion of Prime Minister D. Tusk and Minister R. Sikorski, and together with the leaders of the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia he expressed strong support for the President of Georgia, Micheil Saakaszwili, regardless of the possibility of breaking the fragile truce. He condemned Russia using strong words and threatened with “taking up fighting”⁵³.

The attempts to introduce sanctions against Russia proposed by France and Poland were rejected by Germany as an undesirable attempt to isolate Russia in the international arena⁵⁴. On 1 September 2008 after the EU summit in Brussels another solution was adopted. After the armistice the EU sent to Georgia a mission of 300 observers who were to supervise the implementation of N. Sarkozy’s plan. The mission included 44 German police officers and experts, 10 Polish police officers (with personnel altogether 31 people) and the whole mission was governed by an experienced German diplomat, Hansjörg Haber⁵⁵.

It was not difficult to notice that the negative results for the relations between the USA-EU-Russia proved short-lasting. Although the pro-Russian attitude in Western Europe was somehow weakened, Russia in the context of the most important threats to international security remained the most significant partner for the North Atlantic Pact member states. In consequence boycotting cooperation with Moscow was in the long-run adverse for both sides. It is not surprising then that in December 2008 the unofficial dialogue between Brussels and Moscow was resumed while in the beginning of March the work of the NATO-Russia Council was officially resumed.

After the experiences connected with the Caucasian crisis it was decided during the European Council meeting in Brussels on 11-12 December 2008 that a new stimulus needed to be given to European security and defence policy. It was decided that new objectives for the ESDP should be mapped out “to strengthen and optimize European capabilities in the nearest future” and it was underlined that “the EU is ready to take actions towards international peace and security and provide factual security to its citizens”. D. Tusk’s government supported these solutions without reservations⁵⁶.

⁵³ *Lech Kaczyński w Tbilisi: Jesteśmy po to, żeby podjąć walkę [Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi: We are here to take up fighting]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 12.07. 2008; P. Kościński, *Lech Kaczyński w Tbilisi: Cala Europa musi być tutaj [Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi: The whole of Europe should be here]*, ibidem from 13.08. 2008. Cf. K. Schuller and S. Thielbeer, *Fünf solidarische Präsidenten in Tiflis*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 13.08.2008.

⁵⁴ *Steinmeier: EU darf Russland nicht isolieren*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” from 1.09.2008.

⁵⁵ *Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, Auswärtiges Amt. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Broschueren/ESVP.pdf>, *Do Gruzji przyjechali unijni obserwatorzy [EU observers arrive in Georgia]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 30.09.2008.

⁵⁶ *Session of the European Council in Brussels 11 and 12 December 2008. Conclusions from the presidency*, “Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” nr 2/2008, doc. 3, p. 374. Cf. M. Krakiewicz, P. Buras, *Die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Polens unter der Regierung Tusk*, “SWP-Aktuell” nr 40, Mai 2008.

2009: INTENSIFICATION OF CONTACTS AND COOPERATION

In line with the earlier declarations of the Polish and German politicians closer cooperation and scientific and cultural exchange took place in the year of celebrating anniversaries important for both countries. On 27-28 April 2009 the Speaker of the Senate, Bogdan Borusewicz came with a visit to Berlin where he opened one of many exhibitions planned for 2009 entitled "In the enemy's camera lens. German photo reporters in occupied Warsaw 1939-1945". The event was preceded by the openings of other exhibitions. On 19 March in Ephraim-Palais and the Märkisches Museum an exhibition entitled "Us, Berliners!"/"Wir, Berliner!" was inaugurated. It was the largest exhibition so far devoted to the three hundred years of history of the Polish-Berlin. It showed Polish people in the cultural, religious, social and economic public space of the city, and in this way it demonstrated their contribution to the development of Berlin in the past and at present. The exhibition demonstrated, on the one hand how Poles perceived the German capital, and on the other hand how the Berliners reacted to the Polish presence in the city. The exhibition was prepared by the Centre for Historical Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Berlin.

The celebrations of the anniversary of the June 1989 election in Poland were commemorated in Berlin's Paul-Löbe-Haus with an interesting exhibition ("Peaceful revolution – a road to freedom. 20th anniversary of political changes in Poland" which was opened by N. Lammert and B. Komorowski on 26 May. It showed in the form of a suggestive multimedia presentation the process in which Poland freed itself from communist dictatorship, and Solidarity's contribution to initiating democratic breakthrough in Central-Eastern Europe⁵⁷.

The climax of the joint Polish-German celebrations of 20 years since the victory of democratic forces in Poland was the visit of Chancellor A. Merkel to Kraków on 4 June, and the unveiling of the symbolic monument of "Solidarność" (Solidarity) near the Bundestag building in Berlin. During her short stay in Poland in a speech delivered in the Wawel Cathedral the head of the German government thanked the Polish people for the "peaceful breakthrough" of 1989. She stressed that the elections from 4 June 1989 brought a "decisive victory" for democracy in Poland, and eventually for the whole of Europe, and "we, Germans are obliged to deep gratitude towards our friends in Poland, in Hungary, and in the former Czechoslovakia". They helped to "achieve this priceless happiness which was the reunification of Germany"⁵⁸.

On 17 June in the presence of the German head of state, President H. Köhler, N. Lammert and B. Komorowski a fragment of the wall from the Gdańsk shipyard

⁵⁷ *Opening of an exhibition "Peaceful revolution – Road to freedom. 20th anniversary of the political transformations in Poland"*, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=1682>.

⁵⁸ *Angela Merkel's visit to Kraków on the occasion of celebrations commemorating breakthrough events from 1989*. Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Kraków, http://www.krakau.diplo.de/Vertretung/krakau/pl/Teaser_20pl/BK_in_Krakau.html; *Polen: Wem gehört der Sieg über den Kommunismus?*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 5.09.2009.

was unveiled near the former Reichstag. It commemorated the contribution of Solidarity to the fall of communism. A plaque was placed with an inscription in Polish and German, "To commemorate the fight of Solidarity for freedom and democracy and Poland's contribution to the reunification of Germany and the political unity of Europe"⁵⁹.

Another positive event which can be added to the political and historical message inscribed in the celebrations of important anniversaries was the first foreign visit to Warsaw of President H. Köhler on 13 July during his second term of office. During talks with President L. Kaczyński and other Polish politicians a lot of attention was paid to the problem of "historical memory" and the urging need to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon about which President H. Köhler was trying to convince the Polish president⁶⁰.

A letter by German intellectuals published in the Polish press and in the German weekly "Die Zeit" the day before the celebrations of 70 years since the outbreak of World War II was of symbolic significance, as it emphasized the criminal nature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The authors of the letter included, among others, the President of the Bundestag Rita Süßmuth, the first Commissioner for the Stasi Archives, Joachim Gauck and his successor Marianne Birthler, as well as well known professors Dieter Bingen and Arnulf Baring⁶¹.

A similar tone was maintained in the statement of the Presidents of the Polish and German Episcopates made on 25 August on the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. The statement had been prepared by a Contact Group of both episcopates working since May and the idea of preparing the "Statement" was put forward by bishop Józef Skworec. The document signed by both Presidents of the Episcopates: archbishop Józef Michalik and Robert Zollitsch was read simultaneously at the Monastery of Jasna Góra and in Bonn. Both hierarchs of the Catholic Church persuaded that "today primary care should be put into making sure that the new generations can acquire and preserve the right understanding of World War II. It is not only honesty in reckoning with the atrocities of the past that is needed but also abandoning the stereotypes, which make it difficult to truly understand those times and which can compromise the trust between Poles and Germans that has been built with difficulty". In their opinion "also a lot of Germans suffered not only by the end

⁵⁹ *Unveiling of the monument commemorating the contribution of Solidarity to the restoration of freedom and unity in Europe*, Polish Embassy in Berlin, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=142>; P. Jendroszczyk, *Bundestag dziękuje Polsce [The Bundestag thanks Poland]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 16.06.2009.

⁶⁰ A. Rybińska, *Prezydent Niemiec: Polska leży mi na sercu [The President of Germany: Poland is close to my heart]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 14.07.2009

⁶¹ *Statement on the occasion of 70 years since the Hitler-Stalin Pact*. Polish Embassy in Berlin, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=1764>; *Niemieccy intelektualiści o 70. rocznicy wybuchu wojny [German intellectuals about the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of war]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 20.08.2009; bart, *Przepraszamy za 1939, dziękujemy za 1989 [We apologize for 1939 and thank for 1989]*, *ibidem* from 21.08.2009.

of the war but later when they experienced the fate of those who had to flee and who suffered expulsion". While condemning the war crimes they agreed in condemning expulsions "without forgetting about the internal dependencies and repercussions". In this context they appealed for the truth "which does not pass anything in silence and does not demand making up for the wrong done". By making reference to the letter from the Polish Episcopate from November 1965 they mentioned the difficult route to reconciliation and cooperation not without misunderstandings or burdens. In conclusion it was stressed and warned that in "some social and political tendencies there has been a temptation to use for the purpose of propaganda the hurt, which once was done in history, and to stimulate resentment resulting from biased historical interpretations. The church will continuously and firmly act against such a departure from historical truth. We strongly encourage an intensive dialogue which is always combined with the readiness to listen to the other side"⁶².

The last event in the commemoration of 70 years since the outbreak of World War II was a meeting of representatives of 20 countries including the heads of governments of Poland, Germany and Russia organized at Westerplatte on 1 September. The meeting was preceded by a joint special statement of the Foreign Ministers of Germany, F.-W. Steinmeier and of Poland, R. Sikorski. Yet again there were words about the tragic war past and efforts made in the 1960's and 1970's to establish a Polish-German dialogue, when "despite the painful past both nations started to strive for mutual understanding, reconciliation and establishing friendly relations". An appeal was made to maintain and strengthen the friendship between Poles and Germans, members of the European Union and allies in NATO, who are united by common interests and objectives and who are brought together by common threats and challenges"⁶³. The Polish Prime Minister in his speech delivered in Gdańsk stated that it should be remembered who was the executioner and who was the victim. Most critical comments, especially those from President L. Kaczyński were addressed to Prime Minister V. Putin who did not condemn in a straightforward way the USSR's attack on Poland in September 1939 and the crimes against humanity that took place in Katyń. He only promised, under the condition of mutuality, to open the Russian archives⁶⁴.

⁶² *Statement of the President of the Polish Episcopate Conference, Archbishop Dr. Józef Michalik and the President of the German Episcopate Conference, Archbishop Dr. Robert Zollitsch on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 26.08.2009; *Episcopates of Poland and Germany on the anniversary of WW II*, ibidem; *Jest wspólna deklaracja [There is a joint declaration]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 26.08.2009; *Biskupi o krzywdach Polaków i Niemców [Bishops about the wrongdoings of Poles and Germans]*, ibidem; *Episcopates of Poland and Germany: let our nations go the way of truth and love*, ibidem from 25.08.2009.

⁶³ *Aby nigdy więcej - wspólne oświadczenie Sikorskiego i Steinmeiera [Never again – joint statement by Sikorski and Steinmeier]*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 1.09.2009.

⁶⁴ W. Lorenz, *Rozmowy w cieniu przeszłości [Talks in the shadow of the past]*, "Rzeczpospolita" from 2.09.2009; K. Manys, *O prawdzie na Westerplatte [About the truth at Westerplatte]*, ibidem.

The German Chancellor did not go into the Polish-Russian dispute. In a well-balanced speech she once more drew attention to the responsibility of the National Socialist Germany for starting World War II, and for the hecatomb of Polish victims. However, it was the Prime Minister of Russia who drew the attention of German public opinion and his statements dominated the commentaries from Gdańsk⁶⁵.

Initiatives which supported the process of building Polish-German mutual understanding are also worth noticing in the year 2009 which was abundant with events. On 7 May a celebration was held in the Magdeburg cathedral during which W. Bartoszewski was presented with the Emperor Otto Award in recognition of his engagement in the policy of mutual understanding between nations and in the process of European integration, as well as for his personal and political commitment towards the improvement of Polish-German relations and Poland's integration. Several months later on 29 August in the Weimar city hall the Adam Mickiewicz Award was presented to people actively engaged in the trilateral Polish-French-German cooperation within the Weimar Triangle. The list of laureates included countess Freya von Moltke, the honorary President of the Foundation for European Understanding in Krzyżowa, Stéphane Hessel, a member of the Committee Council supporting French-German-Polish cooperation and Prof. Zdzisław Najder, former Director of the Polish section in the Radio Free Europe⁶⁶.

Good progress was achieved in editing a complete joint textbook for teaching history in Poland and in the Federal Republic of Germany, a project which was of prestigious significance in both countries. The initiator of the project was F.-W. Steinmeier, who mentioned it for the first time during the inauguration of the academic year at the Viadrina European University in October 2006, and in January 2008 he issued a formal proposal⁶⁷. The textbook followed the example of the joint French-German textbook which was well-received, and the project received support from Minister R. Sikorski and Education Minister Katarzyna Hall. The work on the project was officially inaugurated in Berlin in May 2008. The work on the project was entrusted to co-Presidents of the Polish-German Textbook Commission, Michael Müller from the Halle-Wittenberg University and Robert Traba from the

⁶⁵ *Gedenken an Zweiten Weltkrieg: Debatte am Heldengedenktag*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" from 1.09.2009; *Jahrestag des Kriegsbeginns: Geschichtsstreit überschattet Gedenkfeier in Polen*, "Der Spiegel" from 1.09.2009; *Gedenken an Zweiten Weltkrieg: Kaczynski wirft Sowjetunion "Messerstich in den Rücken" vor*, ibidem; *Gedenktag: Putin fordert "neuen Pragmatismus" mit Polen*, "Die Welt" from 1.09.2009; *Polen loben Merkel – und ein bisschen sogar Putin*, "Der Tagesspiegel" from 13.9.2009; K. K r o h n, *Monumentaler Konflikt*, ibidem from 2.09.2009. Text of the speech by A. Merkel in German see "Gazeta Wyborcza" from 1.09.2009.

⁶⁶ *The event of presenting W. Bartoszewski with the Emperor Otto Award in Magdeburg: The Adam Mickiewicz Award for the merits towards Reconciliation and European Cooperation 2009. Polish Embassy in Berlin*, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=1720>.

⁶⁷ *Poland and Germany – shaping Europe together: Speech by the Federal Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the occasion of inaugurating a new academic year at Viadrina University in Frankfurt on the Oder on 26.10.2006*, (photocopied material).

Centre for Historical Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Berlin. The experts working on the project included, among others, historians from the Centre for Historical Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, from the George Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Brunswick and from the Polish Institute in Darmstadt⁶⁸.

Drawing up a balance sheet of Polish-German relations under the PO-PSL coalition government it is not difficult to observe that there are many more positive than negative assessment marks. It was possible to rebuild trust in the relations with Berlin which is indispensable to achieve any kind of success in foreign policy. Contacts between governments, economic cooperation and cooperation in the borderland areas have remained at a high level. Both governments show kind support for cooperation between the youth which was neglected during the government under J. Kaczyński and R. Giertych. On both sides there are more initiatives concerning culture and research which was symbolized by establishing in 2008 the Polish-German Foundation for Research. However, there is still deficit in the area of consciousness, historical memory and neighbourhood perception. In this domain the government of J. Kaczyński did make a negative “progress” as in the second half of 2008 the number of people in opinion polls who assessed Polish-German relations in a negative way rose in comparison with 2005⁶⁹.

Undoubtedly, the historical policy so strongly displayed in the years 2005-2007 will continue to have an effect on the entirety of Polish-German relations for many years. In both countries the relations are an important instrument of the current politics in the hands of the largest parties. In Germany a new generation has grown which decisively wants to cut itself off from the constant expiation for the sins of their predecessors and from the policy of self-constraint in the international arena. This situation is skilfully attempted to be used by Erika Steinbach and the Federation of Expellees to expand their ranks on the wave of “new patriotism”. It seems that we should be prepared and take into account the fact that more moral injunctions and issues which even yesterday were taboo subjects will be breached in historical policy and in referring to the past. The film “Der Untergang” does not fill one with horror but evokes sympathy for the fallen dictator, the film “Anonyma. Eine Frau in Berlin” by showing rape scenes on German women by Red Army soldiers brings feelings of

⁶⁸ *Prace nad polsko-niemieckim podręcznikiem do historii [Work on the Polish-German history textbook]*, “Gazeta Prawna” 27.05.2009.

⁶⁹ L. Kolarska-Bobińska, A. Łada, (ed.), *POLSKA-NIEMCY. Wzajemny wizerunek i wizja Europy [Poland-Germany. Mutual image and vision of Europe]*, Warsaw 2009, p. 16-17. Cf. *Die Destruktion des Dialogs : zur innenpolitischen Instrumentalisierung negativer Fremd- und Feindbilder : Polen, Tschechien, Deutschland und die Niederlande im Vergleich, 1900-2005*, hrsg. von D. Bingen [u.a.] Wiesbaden 2007 b a r t, *Mniej Polaków mówi dobrze o stosunkach z Niemcami [Fewer Poles speak well about relations with Germans]*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” from 31.08.2009.

shame and sympathy, a popular series “Die Flucht” is not only a dramatic description of people forced to evacuate but also a nostalgic journey back to the past times to East Prussia and Pomerania.

The European Union remains the major platform for the development of Polish-German relations. Even today one can observe the far-reaching process of the “Europeanization” of bilateral Polish-German relations. Germany, although weakened by the world crisis, still belong to EU leaders, they seriously consider their European commitments and they also want to be treated accordingly in the European Union. Poland, on the other hand, all the time is looking for the opportunity to shape its position in the EU and to strengthen it. The question of how the Federal Republic of Germany in the present difficult period of time will define its interests in Central-Eastern Europe, and how Poles and Germans will mutually harmonize their interests in the European Union is in a long-term perspective very important for European integration.

Germans gradually are getting used to the fact that Poles are bringing to the EU a completely different baggage of experiences, radically different from the countries which had joined the Community in previous years. They are aware that any attempt to force their own conceptions concerning, e.g. eastern policy without obtaining at least the neutral position of Poland will be doomed to failure, and thus they have to make efforts to win its favours. On the other hand, the idea of the Eastern Partnership promoted by Poland must assume a similar friendliness and collaboration on the part of Berlin.

Taking into account the multilayered challenges, those in the bilateral and European realm, the strengthening of the Polish-German “community of interests and values” is very much justified. It has to receive a new stimulus and be popularized in the broad social strata of Polish and German society. It is worth convincing politicians to finalize the idea and initiate meetings, following the pattern of regular, free from commitments and multifaceted French-German consultations in Blaesheim (*Blaesheim-Treffen*). Poznań would be an ideal place for this purpose⁷⁰.

After the bad experiences there is more and more awareness both in Berlin and more and more so in Warsaw that mutual relations require constant care. Both countries are neighbours but they do not have to be partners. Whether this neighbourship will have the character of “confrontational cooperation” or real partnership depends on the goodwill of the governments and the attitude of both societies. Poland should approach cooperation with Germany, especially in the European Union, in a rational manner without being driven by any immediate gain or resentments but with some assertiveness and consistency, with respect for its own interests and those of its partner.

⁷⁰ See J. Frasch, *Dynamisierung deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen. Vorschlag für eine Vertiefung der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit*, “SWP-Aktuell” nr 34, Juli 2009. Cf. A. Krzemiński, *Testfall für Europa: deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaft muss gelingen*, Hamburg 2008.

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AMERICA - POLAND'S PERFECT ALLY

The new Polish reality, which started to take shape after the breakthrough of 1989, entered the world of relations with the United States with incredibly positive baggage. America has traditionally occupied a special place in the Polish collective consciousness. It constituted the myth of a better, more affluent and ideal world. Throughout the decades successive generations of highlanders, peasants, the poor, as well as the representatives of the intelligentsia and aristocracy made their way across the Ocean and later sent letters home with a description of paradise. This oasis of prosperity was at the same time a mainstay of liberty, democracy, strength and hope. The American myth of the country with model values was particularly vibrant during the cold war period, and it was dominant not only in the Polish consciousness but it was collectively referred to in various countries in the communist part of Europe. However, in Poland the American model was exceptional and strengthened by the sense of shared historical experiences associated with people and facts that were symbolic for Polish-American relations, such as Tadeusz Kościuszko, Kazimierz Pułaski and President Thomas Woodrow Wilson with his "14 points" which spoke of rebuilding the independent Poland. When communism was in decline President Ronald Reagan was also a symbolic figure as he had the courage to call the Soviet Union "an empire of evil" and he became as popular in Poland as Lech Wałęsa. At the time Poles saw in Washington hope for change and the only power which was able to overcome Moscow.

Thus, when the West, and to be more precise the United States, had won the Cold War and we regained freedom while the Soviet Union was shattered, the western direction of our foreign policy, referred to as the Atlantic azimuth seemed natural and included a close alliance with the United States and with Western Europe (in this particular order). The embodiment of these relations was to be Poland's accession to NATO and membership in the European Union. For the sake of clarity it should be added that it meant an almost complete change in the strategy of Polish foreign policy, which in communist times was oriented towards an alliance with the Soviet Union and involved close cooperation with other countries of the Soviet bloc. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that even in the times of the Polish People's Republic the relations between Poland and the US were, as for the Soviet bloc, of an exceptional nature. As many as three US presidents visited communist Poland including Richard

Nixon, Gerard Ford and Jimmy Carter. Also, in 1974 Edward Gierek, the Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party visited the United States, and in 1985 even the instigator of martial law in Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski went to the U.S. (although only to New York for the United Nations General Assembly).

In 1989 having rejected Soviet dominance we felt completely free and sovereign, independent in our choices and actions in the international arena, and we made our choices. Consequently, close cooperation with the United States became the paradigm of our "new" foreign policy, especially in the realm of security expressed in the consecutive exposes delivered by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Republic of Poland, beginning with Krzysztof Skubiszewski and ending with Radosław Sikorski. Consistently, throughout the entire last twenty years Warsaw has made efforts to establish, maintain and develop special relations with Washington.

Indeed, this was hardly surprising. Apart from the above mentioned American myth as a starting point for shaping foreign policy in the Republic of Poland with reference to the USA, the objective reality was also inductive to such a direction. The United States came out from the Cold War as an unquestioned victor with unprecedented military, economic, cultural and political potential, with the last attribute accumulating the former three. The world seemed to follow the rhythm of *Pax Americana*, and it was Washington which had a decisive influence on the solution of the major problems and disputes of the post-cold war period. Thus, it was worth to have such an ally and to endeavour after it.

A lot was in our favour. We had the right to feel the initiator and the leader of changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The claim that the myth of "Solidarność" (Solidarity) was relatively vibrant and strong in the United States is no exaggeration. It was anyway strengthened by Wałęsa's visit paid across the Atlantic Ocean in November 1989, and especially by his memorable speech, "We, the People..." delivered to Congress and received with enthusiasm by American politicians. In a way we were thus "morally entitled" to strive for special treatment.

Nevertheless, we also received positive gestures from the United States. When at the turn of 1989 and 1990 Chancellor Helmut Kohl was waging his campaign to reunify Germany, the Polish government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki, without looking at the neighbouring countries won support in Washington for our efforts to obtain final legal regulations concerning the Polish-German border. The fact that President George H. W. Bush senior had included a provision about the integrity of the present borders in Europe in the list of American desiderata which he presented to Kohl in February 1990 was of crucial importance. Winning American support for the Polish demands concerning participation in the "2+4" talks was of similar importance. The Americans managed to break the reluctance on the German side and Minister Skubiszewski was invited to the round of talks concerning the reunification of Germany which concerned the borders of the future German state.

At the beginning of the 1990s it was also the Americans who had a decisive impact on the settlements concerning the reduction of the Polish debt in the Paris Club which were beneficial for Poland. This was anyway a kind of reciprocation

by Washington for the help of the Polish intelligence service in evacuating from Iraq, and in this way saving CIA agents. For this action the officers from the Polish security service (until recently operating within the structures of a communist state) were decorated with American medals. In this way the cooperation between Poland and the USA was being established in the most sensitive, but also most troublesome domains from the point of view of state security.

The new catalogue of examples of the new openings in Polish-American relations should also include American help and support for our efforts towards economic transformation. Although the help actually received was not proportional with the scale that was expected by some Polish politicians. Lech Wałęsa spoke of the need to launch a new Marshall plan for Eastern Europe but the help eventually received involved much smaller funds and a limited support in the area of consultancy. A new opening also took place in trade exchange, however until today our exports to the United States has been of no relevance when compared with trade within the European Union (for example, in 2007 exports to the USA was worth \$2 billion, whereas exports to the EU was worth \$108 billion; the USA is not even in the top ten of our trade partners). As a result, in terms of economic profit it would be difficult to talk about great and spectacular successes.

Yet, this not very profitable trade or economic balance was not able to weaken the conviction which was dominant after 1989 that special relations with Washington are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. This attitude was not changed even by the fact that the United States for some time clearly blocked the main objective of our efforts in the international arena, namely our membership in NATO. The pursuit to join this elitist club and to become a member of the most efficient and the strongest political and military structure in the world was dictated by two reasons. First of all, obviously the aim was to escape from "the grey area" concerning security which we entered with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and to obtain guarantees of protection and defence. Nevertheless, the conviction that by joining NATO we would also raise the quality of our relations with the United States was of no less importance. After all, the U.S. as the most powerful member state of the Pact would primarily become the major guarantor of our security.

However, two successive American administrations, the first one run by Bush senior and primarily the second one under William J. Clinton, were not eager to provide a positive reply to the readiness to join NATO declared by Poland and other countries from Central-Eastern Europe.

It was then that a question could have been asked about whether our love for America was indeed reciprocal. However, the heart of the matter was not in the realm of emotions and psychology but in the realm of the political interests of the superpower, and these forced the United States to take into account the attitude of Russia. It was first of all the objection of Moscow concerning the accession to NATO of its former satellites, including Poland which decided about the attitude assumed by Washington. Bill Clinton's administration, in which politicians sympathizing with the post-Soviet Russia played important roles, for example Strobe Talbott, did not

want to evoke bad emotions in the Russian state with which it even tried to establish “strategic partnership”. As a result, at some point Poland was losing against Moscow. In the calculations done by Washington Russia was more important with its nuclear potential which was difficult to play down and with the impossible to foresee future which, as it was estimated, could be negatively affected by bringing NATO closer to the borders of the Russian state.

Poland found it very difficult to break through American reluctance, and what seems quite symptomatic, it was then that we received more support in our accession efforts from Germany than from America, our most perfect ally. However, when in 1996 the United States “crossed the Rubicon” (largely in effect of a change of attitude by Talbott himself who succumbed to the arguments presented by Jerzy Koźmiński, the Polish deputy Foreign Minister) and acknowledged that it is in their own interest to expand the zone of security and allied guarantees to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (expanding NATO means stronger ties between Europe and the USA, and thus strengthening their position in the world); it was of crucial importance for opening up the Pact towards the East. In effect, the United States, despite their earlier Fabian tactics, sustained their positive image in Poland. The Americans opened for us the door to NATO and helped to achieve the objective so important for our national interest.

In the area of diplomacy and politics this meant that Poland felt it, its duty to show even more loyalty towards the ally from across the Atlantic. We showed it almost the day after joining NATO, in March 1999 when without a moment of hesitation we gave our support to the military intervention of NATO in Yugoslavia initiated by Washington. Then the United States and their allies were in the right. After all the aim was to defend the Kosovar Albanians who were suffering repressions from Serbs. We were proud to be in the same camp with the U.S. and to intervene in the name of human rights (de facto our participation was expressed only by political support). In contrast with some other NATO member countries where the military intervention, which compromised the sovereignty of states and which did not have the UNO mandate caused severe controversy and social protests, in Poland a decisive majority of the Polish public, as well as politicians and experts were united in their common front supporting the NATO war against Yugoslavia. Scant voices of criticism heard in post-communist circles caused rather widespread irritation than called for any reflection.

The successful outcome of the war in Kosovo, as well as the confirmation of the huge military potential of the United States (because of the advanced American military technology used in the conflict, which was called the first war of the 21st century) only strengthened the conviction of Warsaw about the righteousness of our Atlantic orientation and the reasonableness of our efforts to build special relations with Washington. Thus, when in Europe the discussions about the need to shape one’s own policy concerning defence and security as a necessary attribute of the European Union were becoming more and more daring, we consistently opted for the dominant role of NATO and the indispensability of maintaining strong trans-At-

lantic ties. In reply we heard voices, which came especially from the river Seine that we are the "Trojan horse" of America in Europe. Also, in Moscow we were regarded to be the agency of American interest in Europe, and this opinion was affecting more and more the relations with our eastern neighbour.

The most interesting aspect of the matter was that loyalty towards America, care invested in obtaining the best ratings in Washington, and endeavours to win the favours of the American ally were a feature of all governments of Republic of Poland, irrespective of their historical origins, political orientation and the people involved. The pro-American orientation of the Solidarity team seems completely understandable and almost natural. To some extent it was dictated by the inner debt of gratitude for the moral support as well as for financial help in the "grim" times of communism, and to some degree by the ideological and political closeness. However, the near servile attitude of the post-communist government exhibited especially by Alexander Kwaśniewski towards Washington throughout the entire period of his presidency can seem to be surprising but not difficult to explain. It was the best way to legitimize their power, to prove that we have finally broken away from the loyalty towards Moscow, and that now we have become not only true democrats but the implementers of the vital interests of Poland which were understood as maintaining close relations with the United States. It seemed that good ratings in the White House guaranteed popularity among voters. Although in the political campaigns the populist forces voiced accusations that once homage was paid to Moscow whereas now directives come from Washington (or Brussels), these arguments were unable to affect the support of the voters. Neither did they provide grounds for a deeper reflection or public debate.

In this nevertheless understandable and fully justified care for good relations with America and the demonstration of our liking for the superpower from across the Atlantic which translated itself into positive feelings towards the successive presidents, we in fact differed from other European communities, especially from the Germans and the French. In those countries the anti-American orientation has for a long time been shaping the attitudes of the elites as well as of young people. Although it did not lead to larger dissonance in relations on the governmental level it did affect the mood of the mutual relations and the perception of the American superpower. Poland where the U.S. still was breaking the record as the most liked country was indeed almost an exception.

Anyway the Polish political decision-makers and the Poles themselves welcomed the election of George W. Bush junior as the president of the United States in a certainly different way than Western Europe. For the majority of Europeans he was the "polluter from Texas" or "the cowboy ignorant", whereas the Poles had no problems with accepting the new conservative American leader. And when during his first visit to Europe in June 2001 he also visited Poland and delivered a famous speech in the Warsaw Library in which he quoted the words of a Polish hit he won sympathy of young and older Poles; we felt almost singled out and appreciated. Polish politicians irrespective of their orientation (the right-wing AWS was in the

government, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was the president, and the Democratic Left Alliance – SLD was getting ready to come to power) were making efforts to meet the American president. One could be certain that special relations with the United States will remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and a factor which strengthens our national interests.

In such a situation the reaction of Warsaw towards the September 11, 2001 seemed natural and obvious, and anyway we only joined the widespread world front of support, solidarity and compassion for America following Al Qaeda's attack. After all, even the leftish and traditionally anti-American "Le Monde" wrote after the attacks on Washington and New York, "We are all Americans", and in Germany the left-wing coalition government of the SPD-The Greens declared "unlimited solidarity" with the United States. Poland together with the other NATO members took unprecedented steps and brought into effect art. 5 of the Washington Treaty ("one for all, all for one") which meant our complete readiness to cooperate with America in their fight against Al Qaeda.

The attack of the United States on Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda was hiding also received quite widespread support and acceptance from an international public. Besides, in formal terms it was the operation of the entire NATO with the UNO mandate. In fact, however, it was carried out almost exclusively by American forces together with the small participation of British troops, and on land with the help of the Afghan Northern Alliance. Notwithstanding, Poland tried in some exceptional way to demonstrate its solidarity with America and readiness to take part in the war on terrorism that was announced by President Bush. Such message was inscribed in the special conference of the countries of our region in Europe which was organized by President Kwaśniewski in October 2001, and which apart from the protest against terrorism was primarily a demonstration of Poland's pro-American attitude.

The next stage of the war on terrorism implemented by the Bush administration proved to be exceptional and caused a lot of controversy in the international arena. Also Poland, the faithful ally of the U.S. was involved in the swirl. The announcement of the so-called Bush Doctrine in September 2002 and pointing out Iraq as the next target in the war on terrorism by the American administration caused a sharp and incredibly critical reaction on the part of some U.S. allies including Germany, America's most loyal partner on the European continent. There is not enough room in the present article to analyze the reasons and the nature of the dispute. Suffice it to say that there was no acceptance of the conception according to which America claimed the right to intervene in any place on the premises that: we decide who poses a threat to the world. The arguments used by the Bush administration boiled down to the thesis that the scale of the new danger, mainly terrorism, the emergence of the so-called bandit countries, and finally the threat of the expansion of weapons of mass destruction made it necessary to use other, more efficient means, even if they broke the accepted rules and were exempt from the principles adopted so far.

In this dispute Poland decisively took sides with the United States and with President Bush. Although we found ourselves in the same group as Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Denmark we were also on the opposite side to France, Germany, Belgium and Russia, as well as the clear majority of European and international public opinion. In this way we found ourselves in conflict with two of the largest and most important countries of the European Union which we were “just about” to join. Notwithstanding, the authorities in Warsaw not only rejected the offer from European companies and decided to purchase American F-16 jet aircrafts instead of European gripen planes (this does not mean that it was a bad decision), but in February 2003 they also became the signatories of the famous letter of the “eight” which was an expression of support for President Bush and his plans of settling old accounts with Saddam Hussein’s regime.

However, one cannot unambiguously condemn the actions of the then left-wing government under Prime Minister Leszek Miller (as well as President Kwaśniewski), who assumed such a pro-American attitude, even if we accept that one of the reasons behind it was the desire of the SLD politicians with communist roots to become legitimized. To some degree it must have been a result of recognizing American arguments and the will to fight against the tyrant who, as it was then believed, had been building a deadly arsenal. However, this decision was also influenced by the calculated desire to bond with the superpower and earn its favours. Finally, our most important ally was going to war and it was Poland’s duty to offer it our support. Anyway, the result was that when in March 2003 Americans attacked Iraq we sent our special commando squad, and after the victory we received a Polish occupation zone, which then for us seemed to be a great distinction. Because of that the government in Warsaw did not place on Americans any terms and conditions and did not issue any concrete expectations addressed towards Washington.

All these moves not only did not win approval in Berlin and Paris, that is from our future main partners in the European Union but they, on the contrary caused irritation and the memorable reproach by Jacques Chirac, the French President became a symbol of this attitude. In Germany, at the same time it became popular to talk about Poland not only as the “Trojan horse” of America but, to be more precise, “a mule”. Undoubtedly, the attitude of France, Germany and other members of the “denial front” confrontational towards the United States was driven by many complexes of a weaker partner and by the desire to demonstrate independence and autonomy, and lay an emphasis on the growing position of the integrating Europe. However, for Poland it meant that suddenly one’s attitude to America became an index of European identity. In a way we became less worthy of Europe because we were too pro-American.

Thus, we paid a bitter price for our loyalty towards the United States on the European arena, especially in our relations with Paris and Berlin. Notwithstanding, there were no measurable profits of our engagement in Iraq. Certainly in terms of economic gain there was no reason to talk about great success. Although “Bumar” signed contracts with Iraq worth 400 million dollars for an arms delivery, the Polish

participation in the Iraq war itself cost us over 200 million dollars; we also did not reclaim 830 million dollars from the Iraqi debt. We receive military aid from America but it is around 32 million dollars per year (the US defence budget is over 500 billion dollars).

Although in the political sense we could enjoy being labelled as America's faithful and loyal ally and we even had delusive hopes that Washington will see in us a strategic partner, in fact we were only included in the "new" pro-American Europe by Donald Rumsfeld, the American defence secretary, and contrasted with the "old" Europe which was reluctant towards America. In addition, Warsaw made plans to become a bridge to rebuild good relations between Washington Berlin and Paris. However, the ambitions of Poland only irritated the Germans and the French. Anyway, they found their own way to Washington, especially after the change of government in Germany and in France. Chancellor Angela Merkel proved to be more pro-American than Gerhard Schröder, and Nicolas Sarkozy also deviated from the traditional anti-American attitude in French politics. Besides, both countries, and especially Germany were too precious as partners for Washington to keep on holding grudges. In fact, the "old" Europe seemed tired of the "tug-of-war" and declared their willingness to improve relations with America.

The rebuilding of the trans-Atlantic alliance, visible already during Bush's second term of office in the White House meant that Poland was returning to the real position in relations with the United States which resulted from its potential, rank and attributes. Thus, we were still regarded to be a loyal partner but this did not mean that the visa requirement would be lifted (after all Poles by working illegally in the USA not only were breaking American regulations but also acting against their economic interest – sic!). On the other hand, American experts and commentators were making Polish politicians aware of the fact that we would matter in the American calculations depending on how good our relations are with Germany, which again became an important point of reference for Washington. This was due to the change in American diplomacy which started to do away with the tendency to divide Europe, to turn some countries against others and deepen animosities, as this strategy has brought more harm than good.

Nevertheless, the conclusion that even the greatest power in the world cannot by itself cope with the challenging threats of the present times and must act multilaterally was accompanied by the cold calculation of the potential and importance of having European allies. This was of big relevance in the context of the situation in Afghanistan where the NATO forces were operating. Washington counted on a larger military effort from the European members of NATO because without it would be difficult to think about the success of the operation. In consequence, although Polish soldiers were still in Iraq despite the fact that other nation's troops were gradually pulled out and irrespective of the fact that in Afghanistan the Polish contingent as one of few operated without the so-called brackets (the conditions under which soldiers of a given country could take military action) still our exceptional relations

with America and our dream status of a strategic partner were remaining in the realm of rhetoric. At the same time Bush's administration was doing everything to win the Germans and the French over and rebuild close partnerships with them.

Yet, it was precisely then that a definite chance for raising our relations with America to a higher level occurred. The question of installing in Poland some elements of the American anti-missile defence shield in a way fitted into the traditional trend of our attitude towards the American superpower. Already during the rule of the Democratic Left Alliance it seemed that Poland was primarily interested in having the NMD (National Missile Defence) installed on its territory. Indeed, the idea appeared really attractive, and locating the defence base in Poland would strengthen our ties with the United States as they would put special care into the country where they have their own military installations.

A similar point of view was represented by the new government which in 2005 came to power in Poland. The Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński brothers did not hide their liking for the United States. Similar to other governments they were striving to win favours with the White House and they kept to the line of uncritical alliance with the USA. This attitude could mean that we would accept the shield on our territory without laying down the terms and conditions. The way we were treated by Bush's administration when in 2006 the American offer concerning the shield presented to Poland by an American diplomat included a template for a positive answer was indeed very telling.

However, it was then that a new element in our bilateral relations occurred. It was introduced by the then current Defence Minister, Radosław Sikorski who was undoubtedly irritated by the arrogance and disrespect demonstrated by American diplomacy, and who had a better knowledge, than anyone before him, of the American reality and American political backstage. His point of view can be summarized in the following way: a new opportunity has opened up before Poland because we have 300 hectares of land for the construction of the base in a place which suits America. We therefore should start tough negotiations being aware that we do not have to have the base. More so that the location of the shield on our territory puts our country at risk of a new danger because for this particular reason it can become the target of an attack.

Sikorski's opinion had its special justification. Namely, for some time there has been a clear reshuffling concerning assessment of the United States, Bush's administration and the Polish-American alliance. At the beginning of 2007 only 38% of Polish people positively assessed the role of the USA in the world in contrast to 62% who thought so a year earlier. It was an unprecedented drop of support for the American superpower. By the same token we came dangerously close to the majority of the world's nations which were critical towards America. What is more, the idea of placing some elements of the anti-missile shield in Poland stimulated a debate focused not only on the issue of accepting an American military installation but first of all on the validity and on the consequences of such close ties with America, especially in the situation when we were already a member of the European Union and therefore our interests should be localized primarily in Europe.

The scale and fierceness of this discussion which involved politicians, as well as the intellectual elite, specialists and ordinary Poles could suggest that Poland and Poles needed “the vision of a distant paradise” less and less. Mundane realism has entered our life and it is killing the myth of America. Heroism, sacrifice, devotion for the “American dream” is replaced by a calculation of gains and losses, a more critical judgment and more balanced assessment. The new reality was taken into account, in which the United States as a result of, among others, too arrogant but also the too idealistic politics of Bush have been losing their significance, importance and authority. For many Poles, just like for the substantial part of the international opinion, as well as for the leaders of various countries America has ceased to be the attractive and perfect ally, and in recent years it has rather become skilled at building a coalition against itself than around itself. It would be difficult for this substantial qualitative change in the international arena to come unnoticed also in Poland.

Thus, a pragmatic rationale was behind Radosław Sikorski when he was warning the American side not to belittle Polish worries and postulates because the entire Polish public can become discouraged towards the U.S. However, minister Sikorski was not able to continue his mission of convincing Washington in the government headed by J. Kaczyński since in early 2007 he resigned from the office of Defence Minister. Then it could be expected that the Kaczyńskis’ team will give consent to the shield without additional guarantees of security, remaining in this way faithful to the so far binding line of the policy towards Washington, although to some it seemed to be a kind of anachronism. This became more likely when in July 2007 President L. Kaczyński made such a declaration during his visit across the Atlantic Ocean. To many it was astonishing.

The political breakthrough which took place in Poland in the autumn of 2007 when Donald Tusk’s party the Civic Platform (PO) came to power opened up new opportunities for Polish diplomacy. It was then that Sikorski became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Personally, Prime Minister Tusk was not convinced as to the righteousness of having the elements of the anti-missile system installed in Poland. It also seemed that the uncritical alliance with the United States, and first of all the unconditional acceptance of the anti-missile shield was not on the list of the most urgent matters for his government. Instead the exposé of Prime Minister Tusk included plans to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq in the autumn of 2008 and these promises were delivered. The aim was accomplished by Tusk in a cool manner and in cooperation with the American side. However, the main and primary objective of Tusk’s government in the area of diplomacy was to repair what it had inherited after its immediate predecessors: tense relations with Germany, conflict with Russia, and not the best atmosphere in relations with the European Union. These issues absorbed most of the energy of Polish diplomacy.

Yet, paradoxically it was precisely the issue of the shield and obtaining additional guarantees and military benefits for Poland which became the cause of incredibly dramatic moments which in the summer of 2008 resulted, among others, in the dismissal of the deputy Foreign Minister, Witold Waszczykowski, who was negotiat-

ing with the United States on matters related with the shield. Anyway, it was beyond doubt that the government under the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) has redefined the place of Poland in the international arena, especially with reference to the European Union and its closest neighbours, but also with reference to the United States. While maintaining the importance and significance of close relations with Washington, it nevertheless showed more care for mutuality in relations even at the risk of causing irritation in the Presidential palace, where the binding strategy was "yes to the shield at all costs", the idea which was also close to Witold Waszczykowski, the dismissed deputy Foreign Minister.

The Declaration concerning strategic cooperation which accompanied the agreement on the installation of elements of the anti-missile shield in Poland signed in August 2008 was confirmation of the new quality in Polish-American relations. Although, truly nothing was decided 100% because the signatory on the American side was George Bush's administration, which was leaving the government in the following months, Poland, at least on paper, gained "something for something". It succeeded in obtaining what it fought for. In consequence, among others, the support of the Polish people towards accepting the American installation on Polish territory rose. To show the full picture of the situation it needs to be added that all that was happening in the tense atmosphere caused by the conflict in Georgia, which also in Poland contributed to the growing fear of a threat from the Russian side. In these circumstances the promise of sending to Poland the US Patriot missile battery together with a small number of American soldiers, as well as the plans for wider military and technological cooperation seemed to be a valuable and significant benefit. It provided a positive note at the end of Bush's government.

When in January 2009 the new President Barack Obama moved into the White House, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski published an important article in the Polish daily newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza* (20 Jan 2009). He wrote about the tasks which are ahead of America's first black president, and he formulated the Polish expectations from the new administration concerning, among others, the issue of the realization of the provisions written in the August Declaration about strategic cooperation. It was not a letter by an acquiescent and entirely dedicated ally but by a representative of a state conscious not only of the country's own interests and needs but also of a global dimension. The head of Polish diplomacy wrote,

"The United States with President Obama are facing a unique chance to rebuild the 'soft power' potential which constitutes the indispensable component of the non-confrontational global leadership of the USA. Such leadership conducted in close cooperation with the European partners serves well the interests of a free democratic world". When making reference to Polish-American relations Sikorski added, "We believe that the bilateral cooperation between Poland and the USA during the presidency of Barack Obama will enter a higher level in terms of quality. Over the past years we have laid solid foundations for our relations [...]. We have reasons to believe that using these agreements and relying on the so far experiences we will be able [...] to develop our cooperation with benefits for the interests of both countries."

These are the expectations of Polish diplomacy towards Obama's administration. It is important however, not to overestimate our realistic assets and capabilities in relations with the American superpower, as it is common knowledge that we are not able to meet the criteria of a strategic partner. Being aware of it we need to look at America not as our perfect ally at all costs but as a powerful and valuable partner from whom we expect mutuality.

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POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The present article is a comparative analysis of the European policy of Poland and Germany. In the first part of the analysis the priorities of governments of both countries concerning the European policy will be demonstrated. The second part will present the most important aspects of Polish-German cooperation and conflict of interests in the European Union on the example of the political reform of the European Union, the Eastern Partnership project and the EU Energy Security.

PRIORITIES IN THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF GERMANY AND POLAND

Priorities in the European policy of the Federal Republic of Germany

In contrast to other member states such as Great Britain or France, the Federal Republic of Germany treated the issue of deepening and enlarging the European integration as two sides of the same coin. While, for example Great Britain perceived the enlargement of the European Union as a way of slowing down the integration process, Germany pointed to the compatibility of both objectives of integration. For this reason the Federal Republic of Germany was the initiator, or one of the initiators of establishing the European Union (1993), the Economic and Monetary Union (1999), adopting the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), as well as the political reform of the European Union initiated at the intergovernmental conference in the years 1996-1997 and continued during the consecutive intergovernmental conferences organized in the years 2000, 2003-2004 and 2007. On the other hand, Germany supported the efforts of the European Union and the European Free Trade Association to establish European Economic Area (1994), the efforts of Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway to join the European Union (1995)¹, as well as the accession efforts

¹ Although Norway signed the accession treaty the Norwegian public rejected it in a referendum carried out on 28 November 1994 with the majority of 52.2% of votes, and with the turnout at 88.6%, cf. G. Brandstetter, *Chronologisches Lexikon der europäischen Integration 1945-1995*, Wien 1996, p. 218.

made by the 10 Central-Eastern European states, Malta and Cyprus which were finalized in the largest expansion of the European Union in history (2004 and 2007).

Germany because of its economic and demographic potential and political significance resulting from that was able to agree its national interest with the necessity to resign from some attributes of sovereignty much more than other member states of the European Union. Consequently, the benefits from participating and operating within institutions of supranational character were sometimes greater than benefits stemming from traditional diplomatic activities. Self-restraining one's sovereignty in the process of integration many a time led to factual benefits on the intraregional or even global scale².

However, after the reunification of Germany four very important changes in the European Policy of the German government occurred. First of all, in the years 1991-1992 there was a change in the political conception demonstrated in the official resignation by the German government from efforts to integrate Europe in the form of a classically understood federation. Since then the final objective of the process of European integration was a closely unspecified federation of national states. This was expressed in September 1991 during the session of the intergovernmental conference in the years 1990-1991 by a rejection of the Dutch project of establishing the European Union as a uniform supranational structure without the division into three pillars and assuming partially common foreign and security policy and policies concerning justice and internal matters. In this way the German delegation resigned from the *iunctim* which it very much wanted to enforce in the years 1989-1990 and which assumed simultaneous establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union as a prototype of the later "European federal state"³.

Secondly, after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, ratified and came into force the European policy of Germany was becoming more and more pragmatic but at the same time it was oriented more than before towards protecting national interests. This attitude was visible, among others, in the evolution of the political program of both Christian Democratic parties which were then in power in the federal government. While in the Dresden Manifesto of CDU from 1991, the aim of Ger-

² For a wider account see J. J. Węc, *Stanowisko Niemiec wobec kryzysu konstytucyjnego w Unii Europejskiej [Attitude of Germany towards the constitutional crisis in the European Union]*, „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2006 No. 4, p. 213.

³ Apart from Netherlands, the European Commission and the European Parliament the project was also supported by: Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Greece. Initially the German delegation was also an advocate of a similar constitutional structure of the European Union, but as a result of some pressure from France it changed its mind, cf. U. Frenkler, *Die Maastricht-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Machtpolitik oder Zivilmacht*. Konferenzpapier zum Workshop "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik – Erste Befunde der europäischen Forschung" Trier 1998, p. 6-7, 9; J.J. Węc, *Spór o kształt instytucjonalny Wspólnot Europejskich i Unii Europejskiej 1950-2005. Między ideą ponadnarodowości a współpracą międzyrządową [Controversy over the institutional structure of European Communities and European Union 1950-2005. Between the idea of supranationality and intergovernmental cooperation]*, Kraków 2006, p. 189-191.

man European Policy was the “United States of Europe in the form of a European federal state”, in the fundamental program from 1994 CDU was then in favour of “strong Europe which can guarantee the future of nations” but in national states, which would undergo changes in the process of European integration but which could never be “dissolved”. While even in January 1991, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in favour of establishing the “United States of Europe” as a target model of the European integration, immediately after signing the Maastricht Treaty he was convincing others that the idea was wrong, because it makes everybody “at once think of the United States of America whose citizens identify themselves with their nation”. Since, however “Europeans from the united Europe should remain the Germans, the British, the Italians or the French”, the European Union “should never become a centralized supranational state”⁴. Kohl’s views were largely shared by Edmund Stoiber, the then vice-president of CSU and the Prime Minister of the constituent government of Bavaria, who after the Maastricht Treaty coming into force objected to the idea of establishing the European federal state as a target model of European integration, and pointed out to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Tribunal from 12 October 1993, which in his opinion imposed restrictions on the member states in the scope of assigning their sovereign powers to the European Union. During the sessions of the intergovernmental conference in the years 1996-1997 the German delegation objected to fully common policy concerning asylum laws and immigration in the European Union. What is more, it even suggested reducing the monopoly of the European Commission in the scope of its right to legal initiatives and it proposed to strengthen the position of the European Union Council, which would after all mean disturbing the institutional balance in the decision-making triangle of the European Union consisting of the European Commission, the EU Council and the European Parliament. Chancellor Kohl in the governmental declaration summing up the results of the intergovernmental conference, when justifying the German attitude towards the asylum and immigration policy, as well as towards the policy concerning industry and craft he referred to the need to “defend the well understood German national interests”⁵.

Thirdly, at the latest since autumn 1998 that is since the assumption of power by the SPD/Alliance’90/The Greens coalition the geopolitical paradigm in the European policy became more and more emphasized, which was meant to guard the German national interest. In the coalition agreement of the new ruling parties signed on 20 October 1998 as well as in the governmental declaration presented by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to the Bundestag on 10 November the same year there were, how-

⁴ H. Kohl, *Die eigene Kraft des kulturellen Lebens in zusammenwachsenden Europa*, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung vom 17. Mai 1992, quoted after E. Cziomer, *Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec. Kontynuacja i zmiana po zjednoczeniu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki europejskiej i transatlantyckiej*, Warszawa 2005, p. 98.

⁵ A. Statz, K.-P. Weiner, *Fortschritt durch Flexibilisierung? Stand und Aussichten von Maastricht II*, “Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik” 1996, No. 12, p.1485; U. Frenkler, op. cit., p. 14-16.

ever several important modifications in the European policy. Those which are worth mentioning here include in particular the announcement of reforms in the common agricultural policy based on co-financing by the European Union member states, lowering the German contribution towards the general EU budget, strengthening the common foreign and security policy, coordinating the employment policy to combat unemployment, as well as strengthening the policy of environmental protection in the EU. At the same time the new federal government maintained the attitude of the former governments concerning the need to treat the process of deepening and enlarging the European Union as two sides of the same coin, as well as concerning the need to transform the European Union into a Political Union, understood as a community of decentralized national states⁶.

Fourthly, in the years 2004-2005 after the greatest in history enlargement of the European Union, and following the failed constitution referendums in France and Netherlands the so far adopted strategy in the German European policy which treated the deepening and enlargement of the EU as two sides of the same coin was replaced by a strategy aimed at the internal and external consolidation of the EU. Already in June 2005 the end of the “integrative capacity” of the European Union was mentioned by Angela Merkel, then the head of the parliamentary CDU/CSU faction and a candidate of the Christian Democratic parties for the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the next parliamentary election. In her opinion, the European Union by implementing its present enlargement strategy has reached the limits of its capacity. For this reason Merkel then called the governments of the EU member states to keep the accession promises towards Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, and afterwards prepare an alternative political strategy. She also declared herself as an advocate of the changes proposed by the treaty establishing Constitution for Europe from 29 October 2004 which divided the competencies between the European Union and the member states by adoption of a mechanism enabling the transfer of powers back to the member states⁷. Nevertheless, in the coalition agreement from 11 November 2005 the parties of the new CDU/CSU/SPD coalition declared themselves in favour of deepening the process of European integration understood as “adequate combination of unity and diversity”. However, on the other hand they also announced undertaking all the necessary steps aimed at drafting a new enlargement strategy which would mark out “the limits of enlargement” for the EU, pointing, among others, to the constitutional crisis in the European Union caused by the negative results of the referendums in France and in Netherlands. This “sensible” enlargement strategy, not exceeding the accession capacity of the European Union was regarded to be

⁶ For a wider account see J.J. Węc, *Ciągłość i zmiana w polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa pod rządami nowej koalicji SPD/Sojusz '90/Zieloni. Analiza porozumienia koalicyjnego i deklaracji rządowej [Continuity and change in the foreign and security policy under the new SPD/Alliance '90/The Greens coalition government. Analysis of the coalition agreement and governmental declaration]* „Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki” 1999, No. 8, p. 187-193.

⁷ The end of the “integration capacity” of the EU, PAP from 23 June 2005.

“an important contribution towards ensuring peace and stability” on the European continent. Still the document upheld the prospect of Croatia and other West Balkan states joining the European Union, whereas accession of Turkey was made dependant on the capacity of the EU itself, as well as on the adoptive capabilities of Turkey. If one of these conditions was not met, the alternative solution for Turkey would be “possibly close” “ties with the European structures” in the form of “privileged partnership”. In consequence a development of the European neighbourhood policy, presented below, as an alternative to a full membership in the European Union started to gain importance. Apart from that both coalition parties with reference to the political reform of the European Union defined in the constitutional treaty, not only declared to provide new stimuli for the process of its ratification in the first half of 2007, that is during the German presidency but they also appealed to the other member states to take up further constitutional changes which would guarantee integrity of the competencies of the member states without them being questioned (*Aushöhlung*) by the European Union. Although it seemed an incredibly radical postulate in the case of Germany, both parties also called for strengthening the intergovernmental infrastructure in the European Union by encouraging the European Council to make use of its right to persuade (*aufzufordern*) the European Commission to withdraw its drafts of legal acts in singular cases” and even “if the need arises to withdraw already adopted legislation”⁸. Chancellor Angela Merkel in the governmental declaration presented to the Bundestag on 30 November 2005 asked again about the limits of enlarging and deepening the process of integration realized within the European Union⁹. On 11 May 2006 in the government’s statement devoted exclusively to the European policy Merkel literally demanded marking out the limits of enlargement of the European Union claiming that the EU is unable to accept all the European countries which would like to join it. She also, for the first time, very clearly spoke about the need for internal and external consolidation (*Verfasstheit*) of the European Union and at the same time she expressed her doubts concerning the possibility to harmonize this task with the process of further enlargement of the EU¹⁰. In this context enlarging and deepening the integration within the European Union therefore assumed a com-

⁸ Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit, Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nsc_true/Content/DE/___Anlagen/koalitionsvertrag, p. 147-151.

⁹ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographischer Bericht. 16. Wahlperiode, 4. Sitzung am 30. November 2005, p. 88-89.

¹⁰ Verhandlungen..., 35. Sitzung am 11. Mai 2006, op. cit., p. 2892-2893. The rationale of the new enlargement strategy for the European Union was developed in Chancellor Merkel’s speech delivered in the Bertelsmann Foundation on 22 September 2006 cf. Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung des Internationalen Bertelsmann Forum „Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union” am 22. September 2006 in Berlin, “Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung” vom 24. September 2006. For analysis of the latter speech see P. Buras, „*Europa uda się wspólnie*”. *Zmiany w niemieckiej polityce europejskiej a rola Niemiec w Unii Europejskiej* [“Europe will succeed together”. *Changes in the German European policy and the role of Germany in the European Union*], „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” 2007, No. 1, p. 40.

pletely new dimension. The internal and external consolidation of the European Union was supposed to constitute an indispensable premise of its capability to act. From this point of view it was also of utmost importance for the German government to finalize the constitutional reform in the European Union which was defined in the constitutional treaty. Thus, the objective of the internal and external consolidation understood as strengthening the European Union inside and outside the structure obtained an absolute priority before the process of the EU enlargement. This was tantamount to a departure from the dual strategy of deepening and enlarging which was until then implemented by the former German governments.

However, it should be emphasized that parallel to the approaching date of election to the European Parliament in June 2009 the attitudes of both coalition parties concerning the new strategy of enlargement for the European Union were becoming more and more divergent. To illustrate, CDU in its election manifesto *Strong Europe – Secure future* adopted on 16 March 2009 in Berlin declared itself in favour of the need to introduce a “phase of consolidation” in the European Union during which “the strengthening of the EU identity and its institutions should have priority over its further enlargement”. In what follows full membership in the European Union should not “be the only answer to the expectations concerning the European perspective”, although it was at the same time stated in the document that such a perspective would undoubtedly be “important for the process of reforms” in the countries of Eastern Europe and Western Balkans. Notwithstanding, according to CDU it is only Croatia which should be accepted into the European Union as the most advanced candidate state, while the best solution for Turkey, which had started the accession negotiations as well, would be a programme of privileged partnership. The remaining countries neighbouring with the European Union and applying for, or intending to apply for accession to the European Union should be embraced by the European neighbourhood policy where some projects should be supported and implemented, among others, the EU project for the Mediterranean Sea and the Eastern Partnership project¹¹. In contrast with the Christian Democrats, SPD in its European manifesto *For the sake of strong and social Europe* adopted on 10 February 2009 in Berlin ex-

¹¹ Starkes Europa – Sichere Zukunft. Programm der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zur Europawahl 2009, Berlin 16. März 2009, <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/090316-europa-wahlprogramm-2009.pdf>, p. 12-13. The CDU enlargement strategy supported by Chancellor Merkel met with sharp criticism from Karel Schwarzenberg (Czech Republic), Jean Asselborn (Luxembourg), David Miliband (Great Britain), Carl Bildt (Sweden) and Alexander Stubb (Finland) during the meeting of foreign ministers from the European Union which took place in Czech Hlubka on 28 March 2009. The critics were in favour of accepting into the European Union the countries from former Yugoslavia and Turkey. While Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Foreign Minister and the SPD candidate for the office of chancellor in the election to the Bundestag in 2009 accused CDU of conducting a contradictory internal policy concerning the enlargement of European Union because it demanded that only Croatia was accepted into the EU, whereas on the other hand it was in favour of establishing a clear European perspective for the Western Balkan states, cf. Criticism of the German Chancellor’s course concerning the EU enlargement, Deutsche Welle, 30 March 2009 r., <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4137019,00.html>.

pressed support for the accession of Turkey to the European Union under the condition of meeting the essential membership requirements, as well as it clearly declared itself in favour of establishing a clear accession perspective for the Western Balkan states¹².

Priorities in the European policy of Poland

Because of the political and economic position in the European Union, but primarily due to modest experience in the area of European integration, as well as due to traumatic historical experiences in the last two hundred years or more, the Polish government found it much more difficult than the German government to agree the national interest with the need to abandon some attributes of the state sovereignty. For this reason Poland belonged to the group of these European Union member states which were opposing the far-reaching process of deepening the integration and strengthening the supranational infrastructure (especially in the area of common foreign policy and security) and which were opting for strengthening cooperation and intergovernmental infrastructure.

After Poland's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 one of the fundamental priorities in the European policy of the coalition government (SLD/UP) under Prime Minister Marek Belka was for Poland to enter in an active manner the process of building effective, from the point of Polish interest, coalition alliances within the EU. This was supposed to serve the purpose of attracting individual member states of the European Union as supporters of the Polish position. This priority was based on the assumption that it was necessary to reconcile the Polish national interest with the interests of the other member states of the European Union in the name of the interest of the community (common good). The second important priority was the intention to overcome the discrepancy in the relations with Germany and France which resulted from the debate on the project of the constitutional treaty during the sessions of the intergovernmental conference in the years 2003-2004. The shared duty of Poland and Germany should also include counteraction against burdening their bilateral relations and image of both nations in the international arena with problems resulting from the past. Maintaining high dynamics in the political relations with Germany and France was meant to serve the purpose of using them for collaboration towards eastern policy and common foreign and security policy of the European Union. The aim of these efforts was to design a new conception of the eastern policy in the European Union, development of the trans-Atlantic relations, as well as the development of the security and defence policy in a way cohesive with the role of NATO in Europe¹³.

¹² Für Europa: stark und sozial. Europamanifest der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands für die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament 2009. Kurzfassung, hrsg. vom SPD-Parteivorstand, Berlin 2009, p. 4.

¹³ Cf. Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz about the tasks for Polish foreign policy in 2004. Stenographic report from 67th session of the Polish Sejm from 21

The active involvement of Poland in building and establishing effective coalitions within the European Union was also supported by the minority government (PiS) formed in the autumn of 2005 under the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. Representatives of this government also postulated maintaining the so far enlargement strategy of the European Union, and they in particular supported the efforts made by the Ukraine towards accession and integration with the EU¹⁴. Notwithstanding, in contrast to the previous governments, the geopolitical paradigm which was meant to guard the Polish national interest became more and more emphasized in the European policy of both the minority and coalition government (PiS/Samoobrona/LPR) headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, and especially during the government under Prime Minister J. Kaczyński (PiS/Samoobrona LPR). Realization of the national interest within the entire Euro-Atlantic area that is within the European Union and NATO was the requirement of the Polish reason of state for the government of Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz. While integration within the European Union was supposed to guarantee economic development and prosperity in Poland, the alliance with the USA within NATO was meant to guarantee its external security. It was for this reason that Marcinkiewicz's government made efforts to eliminate dissonance and misunderstandings between the USA, France and Germany concerning the security policy, although this turned out to be only wishful thinking¹⁵. On the other hand, however, the representatives of that government were also warning against excessive demonstration of the Polish national interest in the European Union as a constant confrontation of one's own national interests with national interests of other states could lead to a battle of "national egoisms" in the EU, which indeed should be avoided at all cost (Stefan Meller)¹⁶. The geopolitical paradigm received an even stronger emphasis in the European policy of the government under Prime Minister Kaczyński, according to which the realization of the national interest was

January 2004. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 4th term, p. 2-6. For an extensive analysis of the new conception of the Polish government concerning the European policy see J.J. Węc, *Stanowisko Polski wobec reformy Unii Europejskiej w latach 2003-2004. Nowa koncepcja polskiej polityki europejskiej [Poland's attitude towards the reform of the European Union in the years 2003-2004. New conception of the Polish European Policy.]*, in: *Międzynarodowe implikacje procesu integracji europejskiej dla Polski i Niemiec*, E. Cziomer and M. Czajkowski (eds.), Kraków 2004, p. 47-60.

¹⁴ Exposé of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Stenographic report form 2nd session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 10 November 2005. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 7; Information from the Foreign Minister, Stefan Meller about the tasks for the Polish foreign policy in 2006, Stenographic report form 10th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 15 February 2006, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 7-9.

¹⁵ Exposé of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Stenographic report form 2nd session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 10 November 2005. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 7.

¹⁶ Information from the Foreign Minister, Stefan Meller about the tasks for the Polish foreign policy in 2006, Stenographic report form 10th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 15 February 2006, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 7-9.

a direct consequence of the specific historical and geopolitical position of Poland. Even enlarging the European Union to include the Ukraine was for Kaczyński not only a geopolitical issue, in the sense of strengthening the security for Poland and the EU against the threat from Russia, but also an incredibly significant issue for the decision-making mechanism in the EU, in the sense of weakening the German influence in the EU¹⁷. In other words, as it was expressed in a straightforward manner by the Polish Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga, the European Union was to be the most important platform for the realization of Poland's political and economic interests¹⁸.

While the government under Jarosław Kaczyński approached the constitutional reform of the European Union, which was codified in the constitutional treaty with an undisguised restraint, the new government (PO/PSL) headed by Donald Tusk treated this reform, as well as the Treaty of Lisbon from 13 December 2007 itself as an indispensable condition for strengthening and facilitating the legal and institutional foundations of the EU, and in consequence as a premise of the internal consolidation of the EU indispensable for its proper functioning and a strong position in the international arena. Internal consolidation of the European Union was therefore to be a guarantee of its effective operation outside the EU, and in particular in common foreign and security policy and European neighbourhood policy. With reference to the latter policy in May 2008 the new Polish government together with the Swedish government came up with a proposal to implement the project of Eastern Partnership. In the opinion of the new Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski the project could constitute for Poland and Germany "a very important area for cooperation" within the European Union.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Tusk in its political declarations did not highlight, as much as it was done until then by Kaczyński's government, the national interest and the desire to maintain the political position of one out of the six most influential member states in the European Union. It rather returned to the conception of national interest adopted in the years 2004-2005, understood as the economic and technological development with Poland making in the foreseeable future a "civilization jump", among others, thanks to benefits coming from the process of European integration. On 7 May 2008 in a report on foreign policy presented to the Sejm Minister Sikorski stated that the national interest or the reason of state cannot be understood arbitrarily. The "sense of being in control of its own fate" should be one of the most important attributes of the national interest in contemporary Poland, as well as being able to make a "jump towards advanced civilization" thanks to the process of European integration. In this sense the process of European integration is not in contradiction

¹⁷ Exposé of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, Stenographic report form 22nd session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 19 July 2006, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 174-176.

¹⁸ Information from the Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga about the tasks for the Polish foreign policy in 2007, Stenographic report form 41st session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 11 May 2007, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5th term, p. 359-360.

with the Polish national interest but, on the contrary “peaceful integration of Europe is in our direct interest”. In what follows, the Minister appealed to both, the opposition political party, PiS not to scare the citizens “with a threat of emergence of the European super state, which is hiding the imaginary subjection towards the larger and stronger states”, as well as to the governments of the western partners of Poland in the European Union to finally start to treat the Polish struggle for freedom in the second half of the 20th century also as a part of the European experience just like the prosperity they enjoyed in those years, and finally he appealed for abandoning the “national egoisms” in favour of the primary principle of subsidiarity and common good¹⁹. Thus, the European Union demonstrating solidarity and subordinate to the principle of subsidiarity and common good was supposed to constitute the best platform for the realization of the Polish national interest.

BETWEEN COOPERATION AND A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

Constitutional reform in the European Union

From the German point of view the constitutional reform of the European Union codified in the Constitutional Treaty from 29 October 2004 and then in the Treaty of Lisbon from 13 December 2007 played an extremely important role in the strategy of internal and external consolidation and stabilization of the European Union. In line with the so far binding philosophy behind the European integration since 1957, the

¹⁹ During the mentioned speech in the Sejm Sikorski said, among others, “The stylistics of diplomacy is fundamentally dependant on the initial assumptions, especially the doctrinal ones. Ideologists like to resort to ultimate concepts, usually arbitrarily understood, such as ‘national interest’ or ‘reason of state’ (...). Perhaps it is worth to think about a convincing definition of “national interest’ of contemporary Poland. We would probably agree that the most important thing is for our nation to have the sense of control over our own fate. However, it is not enough to be free, the ability to compete is needed as well. In other words in order to be, we need to have the ability to strengthen ourselves. And gaining a stronger position means for Poland catching up with at least the level of development of our EU community. The Membership of Poland in the European Union inspires us to make a jump towards advanced civilization. Advanced civilization is absolutely in our national interest. Consequently, our Polish national interest is not in opposition to the process of European integration, and quite on the contrary, peaceful integration of Europe is in our direct interest. Let us not be afraid of the process, let us not scare co-citizens with a threat of emergence of the European super state, which is hiding the imaginary subjection towards the larger and stronger states (...) It is not only us who do not agree to subjection, but also no other European nation would agree to that (...). Europe will not reach mental unity until our western partners make an effort to understand, truly understand that our struggle for freedom in the second half of the 20th century constitutes the same European experience like the prosperity they enjoyed in those years (...). It is important to see that the partnership nature of the European Union re-orientates in the same way us and other member states from our national egoisms towards the primacy of subsidiarity and common good”, cf. Information from the Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski about the Polish foreign policy in 2008, Stenographic report form 15th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 7 May 2008, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 6th term, p. 6-8.

reform meant further deepening of the integration process but also strengthening the intergovernmental infrastructure in the EU. Transforming the European Union into an international organization and the changes in the common foreign and security policy were supposed to lead to the strengthening of the EU's position in the international system, and by the same token to the widening of the freedom of action and strengthening the role of Germany in the international politics. The internal consolidation and stabilization of the European Union, on the other hand was assumed to result from the establishment of the rigid division of competencies between the European Union and the member states, the development of axiological basis of the EU, strengthening the position of national parliaments, changes in the institutional system, in the internal market, as well as in the realm of freedom, security and justice. Paradoxically, the strategy of internal consolidation and stabilization of the European Union contained also all the changes introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon which in contrast with the Constitutional Treaty, strengthened the position of member states by including, among others detailed specification of the principle of division of competencies between the EU and the member states, or the even greater strengthening of the position of national parliaments in the EU. In addition, establishing the so-called double majority in decision-making procedure by qualified majority in the Council of the European Union and in the European Council meant a significant increase of political importance of Germany in the decision-making system of the European Union, and in consequence a very serious change of balance of powers in the organization.

Poland perceived the constitutional reform of the European Union in many respects similar to Germany, which is as a necessity resulting from the enlargement of the EU intended to extend its internal and external capacity needed for this international organization to function. The above thesis applied to all the Polish governments which participated in the constitutional reform of the European Union, irrespective of the fact that during the rule of PiS/Samoobrona/LPR the Polish national interest was articulated much stronger in the European policy. During the session of the Convention on the future of Europe (2002-2003) and during the intergovernmental conference (2003-2004) the governments of Poland and Germany were in agreement concerning the necessity of the constitutional reform in the European Union in the following areas: transforming the European Union into an international organization; strengthening the axiological foundations of the EU, establishing the division of competencies between the EU and the member states, simplifying the legislation procedures and the catalogue of sources of the law, introducing some changes in the institutional system (empowering the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice), as well as strengthening the role and position of the national parliaments in the decision-making and legislative process in the EU.

At the same time, however during the debate concerning the constitutional reform of the European Union disputable issues occurred between the governments of both countries which created potential or real conflict areas. Already during the work of the Convention in the years 2002-2003 Poland and Germany differed in their attitudes to such issues as decision-making-procedure in the EU Council and in the

European Council, presidency in the European Union, membership in the European Commission and the common foreign and security policy in the European Union. While the Polish delegates were in favour of maintaining the so far used decision-making procedure in the Council of the European Union, that is by a qualified majority and in favour of equal rights for the citizens of all member states in the European Commission, the representatives of Germany suggested abandoning the system of weighting votes and introducing the so-called double majority. They also wanted to reduce the number of commissioners and agreed to divide the commissioners into two different categories, with the right to vote and without the right to vote. During the session of the Convention the German delegates supported by the representatives of France were advocating communitizing the second pillar of the European Union and postulating, among others, to grant the EU foreign minister a very wide range of competences, to establish voting with qualified majority as a principle in decision-making concerning the common foreign and security policy, and to introduce a full control of the European Parliament over these issues, to transform the common security and defence policy into the European Union of Security and Defence which would strengthen the European pillar of NATO, to establish the European Defence Agency as a supranational body, securing this area by principles of enhanced cooperation, to take over the commitments stemming from the modified Treaty of Brussels from 1954, together with the then alliance clause, to establish the so-called structural cooperation initiated, however, not by the European Council or the Council of Ministers²⁰, but by the interested member states, that is to say clearly based on the conception of *Europe à la carte* which was commonly criticized in Poland and in other member states. On the other hand, delegates of Poland, similar to representatives of many other member states or candidate states were firmly against the proposal to communitize the second pillar of the European Union for fear of a division within the EU security system into two areas, the European and trans-Atlantic system. Following that, they demanded introducing into the project of the constitutional treaty provisions which would fully respect commitments of the member states in the European Union resulting from their membership in NATO²¹.

The only significant initiatives which were jointly put forward by Germany and Poland during the European Convention concerning the future of Europe included a joint memorandum of the governments of France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland and Poland submitted to the Convention's Secretariat on 14 June 2002 which concerned the division of competences between the European Union and the member

²⁰ Council of Ministers is a new name for the Council of the European Union defined in the Constitutional Treaty from 29 October 2004.

²¹ For a wider account see Europäischer Konvent. Beitrag von Herrn Dominique de Villepin und von Herrn Joschka Fischer "Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Vorschläge für den Europäischen Konvent zum Bereich Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik", 22. November 2002, CONV 422/02, p. 1-4; J.J. Węc, *Spór o kształt instytucjonalny [Dispute over the institutional structure]*, op. cit., p. 339-343, 348-350.

states. The other initiative was a declaration of the ministers for European Affairs of Poland, Germany and France adopted on 26 May 2003 concerning the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. In particular the first document was of substantial importance for the course of the proceedings of the Convention. The authors of the memorandum called the participants of the Convention to define clearly and precisely in the draft of the constitutional treaty the norms and principles specifying how the European Union could acquire its competences. They argued that according to the general principles binding in the international legislation, the European Union cannot have competences other than those which have been, or will be determined by the member states in the international agreements (the assignment principle). The competences of the European Union should be realized in line with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, whereas competences in all areas unspecified in the international agreements should be assigned exclusively to the member states²².

The governmental delegations of Poland and Germany came also with different political objectives to the session of the intergovernmental conference in the years 2003-2004. While the German delegation was against the “untying of the package” of agreements determined in the draft of the Convention, and it did not present in fact any new postulates at the intergovernmental conference, the Polish delegation submitted as many as five new proposals including introducing *invocatio Dei* to the preamble of the constitutional treaty, establishing group presidency in the European Union, reflecting the full representation of the member states in the membership of the European Commission, maintaining the system of weighting votes in the European Council and the Council of Ministers agreed upon in the Treaty of Nice, as well as excluding such solutions in the common security and defence policy which would weaken the role of NATO in Europe²³. The fiasco of the European Council session in Brussels in December 2003 was, among others, the aftermath of the failure to reach agreement in several crucial issues in which Poland and Germany presented different attitudes. They included: the contents of the preamble, the membership in the European Commission, definition of the qualified majority as well as the minimum number of mandates in the European Parliament²⁴. However, when in June 2004 the European Council adopted the Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe it was also to a large extent the merit of Poland and Germany. The German government from the

²² Cf. S. Parzymies, *Polska wobec projektu traktatu konstytucyjnego Unii Europejskiej [Poland's attitude towards the Constitutional Treaty project of the European Union]*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2003, No. 2, p. 102.

²³ For a wider account see J.J. Węc, *Reforma instytucjonalna Unii Europejskiej w pracach Konwentu. Stanowisko Polski [Institutional reform of the European Union in the proceedings of the Convention. Poland's attitude]*, in: *Stanowisko Unii Europejskiej wobec Polski i jej sąsiadów w przededniu poszerzenia*, M. Czajkowski and E. Cziomer (eds.), Kraków 2003, p. 134.

²⁴ For a wider account see J.J. Węc, *Spór o kształt instytucjonalny [Dispute over the institutional structure]*, op. cit., p. 381-421.

beginning of 2004 made efforts to enter into “a more intensive discussion” with the Polish government (Schröder), while the Polish government demonstrated readiness to reach a compromise by agreeing to the modification of the arrangements in the constitutional treaty drafted by the Convention. Out of the five fundamental postulates submitted by the Polish delegation two were adopted by the intergovernmental conference (group presidency, common foreign and security policy), and with reference to the three other proposals Polish efforts were unsuccessful (the membership in the European Commission, definition of the qualified majority, *invocatio Dei*). These provisions of the constitutional treaty which concerned the group presidency in the European Union and the common foreign and security policy in the EU could be treated by the Polish government as its huge political success as Poland was one of their initiators²⁵. The German government, on the other hand considered the establishment of the so-called double majority in the decision-making procedure in the Council of Ministers and in the European Council its greatest diplomatic success, because it created a new balance of powers in the European Union. The representatives of the federal government also did not hide their satisfaction from the reduction of the number of commissioners in the council of the European Commission to 2/3 of the number of the member states because they were from the very beginning for a radical reduction in this respect²⁶.

In June 2007 the German presidency managed to prepare a complex draft of a mandate for the next intergovernmental conference, mostly thanks to strong determination and a very precise methodology of negotiations with the member states of the European Union. The project envisaged signing a new revision treaty called a reformation treaty which would change the presently binding treaties but which would retain ca. 90% of the provisions of the constitutional treaty. Following that, on 14 June 2007 the German presidency sent the project of the mandate to the governments of the individual member states. Some of the states nearly to the last moment were considering the possibility of introducing changes in the project of the mandate. Poland belonged to the group which reported the largest number of reservations²⁷.

²⁵ The principle of unanimous voting was maintained in common foreign and security policy, there was a lack of legislative acts, the competences of the European Parliament were slight and the competences of the Court of Justice were very limited. Besides this area belonged to a separate category in the division of competences between the European Union and member states.

²⁶ For a wider account see J.J. Węc, *Spór o kształt instytucjonalny [Dispute over the institutional structure]*, op. cit., p. 360-361, 452-454.

²⁷ The group also included the government of Great Britain, Netherlands, Czech Republic and France, cf. The attitudes of the member states except Poland and Germany which share presidency in the EU Council in the present term concerning the treaty reform. Department of Analysis and Strategy of the Office of European Integration Commission, <http://www.ukie.gov.pl>, s. 3-4, 8-9, 15-16; L. Jesień, *Stan debaty nad reformą instytucjonalną w wybranych państwach Unii Europejskiej [The state of the debate over the institutional reform in the chosen countries of the European Union]*, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” 2007, No. 4, p. 144-145 (survey of the negotiators of German presidency);

In this situation the day before the session of the intergovernmental conference in 2007 there was a dispute between the government of Poland and Germany concerning the constitutional reform of the European Union. Also this time the dispute focused first of all on the definition of a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and in the European Council. The Polish government which was to lose the most by the European Union resigning from the Niece principles of decision-making procedure in the Council of Ministers by a qualified majority, proposed to replace the so-called double majority drafted in the project of the mandate (at least 55% of the votes of the states including at least 15 states and representing at least 65% of the EU population) by a system of even voting called a square root system. The arguments put forward included the fact that according to the voting theory an equal say of all the EU citizens in voting in the Council of Ministers would be possible if the weighting of each country in the voting procedure was approximately proportional to the square root of its population size, and not to the population size. However, Germany objected to this proposal, for whom as it was mentioned earlier, the system of the so-called double majority was incredibly beneficial. Since during the decisive session of the European Council on 21-22 June 2007 the Polish delegation remained very much on its own in the dispute, President Lech Kaczyński resigned from this postulate in exchange for the promise of strengthening the so-called Joanina mechanism.

During the session of the intergovernmental conference in the period from July to October 2007 representatives of the Polish government demanded that the so-called mechanism from Joanina should be written down in the new treaty, but they also postulated (similar to the day before the conference) that the role of the national parliaments should be strengthened in the scope of observing the principle of subsidiarity. They also demanded a more precise specification of the division of competences between the European Union and member states, especially in the scope of competitive competences and in common foreign and security policy. Eventually, in the Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007 in line with the postulates of the Polish delegation the period of observing the Niece definition of a qualified majority in the Council²⁸ and in the European Council was *de facto* extended until as late as 2017. The so-called Joanina mechanism was also strengthened although not in the Treaty but in the declaration²⁹.

R. Grzeszczak, *Prezydencja Niemiec a reforma ustrojowa Unii Europejskiej [German presidency and the constitutional reform of the European Union]*, in: *Procesy reform w Niemczech i Unii Europejskiej*, R. Grzeszczak and M. Piotrowska, Wrocław 2009, p. 22-25.

²⁸ Council is the new name for the Council of the European Union defined in the Treaty of Lisbon.

²⁹ Declaration nr 7 referring to article 16 paragraph 4 of the Treaty about the European Union, and article 238 paragraph 2 of the Treaty about the functioning of the European Union, [in] *Traktat z Lizbony, zmieniający traktat o Unii Europejskiej i traktat ustanawiający Wspólnotę Europejską*, Lizbona, 13 grudnia 2007 r., *Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej*, C, 2008, No. 115, p. 338-340.

On the other hand, however the possibility was taken into account that the mechanism may be changed or lifted by a unanimous decision of the European Council³⁰. By virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon the principles of the division of competences between the European Union and member states were also precisely specified³¹, and the right of objection by the national parliaments within the early warning system was broadened³². Apart from that new regulations were adopted concerning common foreign and security policy which confirmed competences of the member states in this area (art. 24 paragraph 1 EUT), as well as two declarations appended to the Treaty of Lisbon were adopted, which defined full independence of the member states in foreign and security policy, in the area of establishing relations with other countries and international organizations, and in the area of national diplomatic service³³.

The Eastern Partnership Project

As it was mentioned earlier, Poland and Sweden were the initiators of the idea of the Eastern Partnership project. On 26 May 2008 the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, Radosław Sikorski and Carl Bildt, came up with an official proposal during the session of the Council devoted to General Matters and External Relations in Brussels. The project was supposed to be an integral part of the European neighbourhood policy, which the European Commission had described already on 12 May 2004, and which was then adopted by the EU Council in June of the same year³⁴.

³⁰ Protocol nr 9 concerning the decision of the Council referring to the execution of the article 16 paragraph 4 of the Treaty about the European Union and article 238 paragraph 2 of the Treaty about the functioning of the European Union in the period between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017 and from 1 April 2017, [in] *Traktat z Lizbony*, op. cit., p. 274.

³¹ Treaty about the functioning of the European Union, in: *Traktat z Lizbony*, op. cit., p. 346

³² Protocol nr 2 concerning the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, in: *Traktat z Lizbony*, op. cit., p. 208.

³³ Treaty about the European Union, in: *Traktat z Lizbony*, op. cit., p. 40; Declaration nr 13 concerning common foreign and security policy, *ibidem*, p. 343; Declaration nr 14 concerning common foreign and security policy, *ibidem*.

³⁴ The European neighbourhood policy was aimed at establishing good relations between the European Union and the neighbouring countries. With reference to the new security strategy of the European Union from December 2003 this policy should also serve the purpose of ensuring stability and security to those countries, cf. *Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa – Komunikat Komisji [European Neighbourship Policy – Communiqué of the Commission]*, “Monitor Europejski”, Brussels 12 October 2004, COM (2004), 373 final, p. 1-36. For an extensive analysis of the document see B. Koszel, *Polska i Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Pola konfliktów i płaszczyzny współpracy [Poland and Germany in the European Union. Areas of conflict and platforms for cooperation]*, Poznań 2008, p. 176-187. The examples of cooperation with the countries from Eastern Europe within the European neighbourhood policy included so far, among others, a plan of establishing a free trade zone with the Ukraine, establishing the first visa centre of the European Union in Moldavia, or financial support for Georgia in the implementation of economic and political reforms. Only in 2007 the European Union allocated 1.65 billion Euros for the European neighbourhood policy, cf. J.J.Węc, *Niebezpieczna Europa [Dangerous Europe]*, „Monitor Unii Europejskiej” 2008, No. 9, p.14-15.

The Polish-Swedish idea of Eastern Partnership was also supported by the German government although not from the very beginning. The Eastern Partnership project was accepted by the European Council on 20 June 2008³⁵. The project was addressed to the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldavia. On conditional terms also Belarus could participate in the project. The fundamental aim of the project was to facilitate visa traffic, and even possibly establish visa-free traffic, as well as joint activity concerning energy policy, cooperation in the area of culture, education and environmental protection, and in the long-range perspective the aim was to establish a free trade zone with the six above mentioned countries. The usefulness and topicality of the Eastern Partnership was confirmed by the European Council during a special meeting on 1 September 2008 devoted to the Georgian crisis. In the conclusions accepted then by the European Council there was an announcement of implementing the Eastern Partnership project starting from March 2009³⁶.

Following this the European Council during a session in Brussels on 19-20 March 2009 adopted a declaration about starting the implementation of the Eastern Partnership project understood as an integral part of the European neighbourhood policy and concerning the Ukraine, Armenia Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavia and Belarus. The declaration specified and defined the assumptions of the Polish-Swedish project. The cooperation was supposed to be based on "shared values such as democracy, lawfulness, and respect for human rights as well as the principles of free market economy, sustainable development and good governance". This cooperation was meant in future to lay "foundations for new agreements concerning association between the EU and those partners" that have made satisfactory progress in the realization of the above principles and values. The Eastern Partnership project envisaged, among others, full liberalization of the visa regime as a long-range aim of bilateral cooperation, establishment of the free trade zone between the European Union and the above mentioned countries, but it also provided for a closer cooperation in the area of energy security in order to ensure long-term supply and transit of energy. The mechanism of consultations between the European Union and the six countries participating in the cooperation would involve regular meetings of heads of states or governments, "as matter of principle every two years", as well as meetings of foreign ministers held once a year. During the consultations four aspects of mutual cooperation called thematic platforms should be discussed. These include democracy, lawfulness and political stability (among others, election standards, freedom of the media, fighting corruption, civil service reform, cooperation concerning system of justice and the police), economic integration and convergence with the UE policies (among others, standardization of market and trade solutions, social-economic development, health, environment, climatic changes), energy security (among others,

³⁵ Session of the European Council in Brussels. Conclusions of Presidency, Brussels, 19-20 June 2008, „Monitor Europejski” 2008, No 50, p. 20.

³⁶ Special session of the European Council 1 September 2008 in Brussels. Conclusions of Presidency, 1 September 2008, No. 12594/08, p. 3.

development and construction of the basic energy infrastructure, providing support for the southern energy corridor, extending the Odessa-Brody oil-pipeline to Poland), as well as interpersonal contacts (cultural and scientific cooperation, support for non-governmental organizations and civil society)³⁷. During the above mentioned session the European Council also decided to raise the financial expenditure for the realization of the aims planned in the project of Eastern Partnership for the years 2010-2013 up to 600 million Euros³⁸.

The first meeting of the representatives of the EU member states and the six countries included in the Eastern Partnership was held on 7 May 2009 in Prague. Despite the fact that the heads of states or governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain did not participate in the meeting, which showed their scepticism or lack of interest in the project, the concluding declaration contained resolutions substantiating this initiative. It was agreed, among others, that the first meetings devoted to the discussion of the so-called thematic platforms will be held in June 2009. Apart from that the participants appealed to the European Commission, to the future presidencies, and to the partner states to quickly work out the schedule of the meetings at the ministerial level and define the priorities of the individual thematic groups for the years 2009-2010³⁹.

It should be underlined that the lack of enthusiasm inherent in the reaction of four out of five largest member states of the European Union towards the inauguration meeting of the representatives of the governments of the countries included in the Eastern Partnership does not hold much promise for a full success of the project. This fact also shows that the European Union still has a serious problem with defining and creating a common eastern policy. Also the interest in the Eastern Partnership from the governments of Poland and Germany stems from, as it seems, different political premises. In particular both countries differed and still differ in their approach to the aims of the project and in terms of their attitude towards Russia.

While Germany supported the initiative because of the changes in the hitherto enlargement strategy and because of their willingness to develop the capacity of the European Union to operate outside the EU area, Poland treated the project as a stage

³⁷ Session of the European Council in Brussels. Conclusions of Presidency, Brussels, 19-20 March 2009, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/>, s. 1, 19-21; Eastern Partnership, European Commission. Directorate-General for External Relations, <http://www.ec.europa.eu/>, s. 1-17 (analysis by J. Urbanik).

³⁸ 250 million Euros came from resources provided for earlier on for these countries within the European neighbourhood policy, and 350 million Euros are additional financial resources granted during the discussed session of the European Council, A. Talaga, *Partnerstwo Wschodnie zaczęło pękać na długo przed szczytem* [The eastern Partnership started to split long before the summit], „Dziennik” 8 May 2005, p. 14-15; cf. also Szczyt dodatkowych pieniędzy [Summit of extra money], PAP from 20 March 2009.

³⁹ M. Dulak, *Szczyt partnerstwa Wschodniego – co dalej?* [Summit of the Eastern Partnership – where do we go from here?], 12 May 2009, <http://jagiellonski.salon24.pl/>; A. Talaga, op. cit., p. 14-15; J. Bielecki, *Wielcy z Europy zignorowali Wschód* [The mighty from Europe ignored the East], „Dziennik” 8 May 2005, p. 14-15.

on the way to the future enlargement of the European Union towards the east (the Ukraine, and possibly also Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldavia). Russia was not included either into the aims of the European neighbourhood policy (although it was the addressee of one of its financial instruments) or in the aims of the Eastern Partnership. Since, however, Germany perceived Russia as its key partner in Eastern Europe, as well as a country which has to be taken into account in the policy towards the other post-Soviet states of the region, it is possible that the interest of the German government in the realization of the aims of the Eastern Partnership might be a resultant of the German-Russian relations. The role of the post-Soviet states was perceived in a completely different way by Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The existence and stability of these countries were to constitute a guarantee of security and sovereignty for Poland and other countries of Central-Eastern Europe. For this reason in Poland's approach, differently from the German approach the element of separation dominated over the element of cooperation with Russia⁴⁰.

Energy security in the European Union

Increase in the price of energy carriers, growing competition worldwide in this area, as well as repetitive gas crises made it evident to the EU member states that there is a need to strengthen energy security. The Treaty of Lisbon, among others on the initiative of Poland, formulated legal basis for establishing in the future common energy policy including a provision concerning "ensuring security in terms of energy supply". Following a motion submitted by the Polish delegation a clause of solidarity was adopted also in this area stating that the policy of the European Union concerning energy should be based on "solidarity among the member states" (art. 194 Treaty of Lisbon)⁴¹.

Poland and Germany were interested in developing the energy security of the European Union. However, both countries differed in their perception of the principles on which common energy policy of the EU should be based. Poland supported the position of the European Commission concerning full liberalization of the energy policy as the basis for communitizing it, whereas Germany, alike France, was against one of the fundamental postulates of the European Commission in this area, namely the postulate of dividing the function of energy producers from the function of energy distributors. The reason behind such attitude of the German government was enormous involvement of German companies engaged in the Russian energy sector, as well as a lack of interest of energy concerns in separating the companies dealing with (energy sources) production from those dealing with energy distribution (transmission networks)⁴².

⁴⁰ For a wider account see P. Buras, *op. cit.*, p. 58-59.

⁴¹ Treaty about the functioning of the European Union, in: *Traktat z Lizbony*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁴² For a wider account see P. Buras, *op. cit.*, p. 53-56; B. Koszel, *op. cit.*, p. 187-200.

On 13 November 2008 the European Commission presented an energy security plan for the European Union which was meant to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. In the conclusions from 12 December 2008 the European Council called the Council of the European Union to “quickly check out” the plan before the meeting of the European Council in March 2009. The plan of the energy security for the European Union was based on implementation of four objectives. The first one included connecting all the wind power stations in the North Sea area into one network (Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Great Britain) which would allow for a mutual exchange of electric energy from the wind power stations, and which thus would make these countries independent from the change of weather conditions (wind power). This objective followed the example of a similar and well tested in practice cooperation between Denmark and Norway: if the wind is weak in Denmark its network is powered by electricity from the Norwegian water power stations and vice versa. The second objective included connecting separate at present systems of electricity transmission in the area from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea as a premise for creating in future an energy network which would ensure energy security to all member states of the European Union. The principle of evening up the energy balance and settling accounts among the individual countries would be similar to the one in the case of wind power stations. The third objective included building a community gas ring which would allow to exchange natural gas in case of gas supply from Russia being cut off. The fourth objective was building at least two new gas pipelines connecting the European Union with Central Asia and Africa. One was supposed to run from Azerbaijan, the other one from Nigeria. These two new gas pipelines would secure the present and future demand for natural gas in the European Union. According to the estimates of the European Commission, though the dependence of the European Union on imports of gas in the years 2008-2020 is supposed to increase from 61% to 73%. Besides the new sources of supply would allow for a better diversification of gas imports to the European Union and would make it possible to break out from the so far dominant position of Russia. To illustrate, according to the data from the European Commission in 2008 the share of Russia in gas imports to the European Union reached as much as 40% with 8 EU member states being 100% dependent on that supply (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ireland). The plan of energy security for the European Union was combined with the climate package 20-20-20 which predicts that by 2020 the European Union will increase energy saving by 20%, will reduce CO₂ emission by 20%, and 20% of the used energy will come from renewable resources⁴³.

On 19-20 March 2009 the European Council during a meeting in Brussels worked out directives meant to serve the purpose of creating a reaction mechanism in case of a crisis concerning disturbance in the supply of gas to the European Union.

⁴³ New plan of energy security of the European Union, http://www.wiadomosci24.pl/artykul/nowy_plan_bezpieczenstwa_energetycznego_unii_europejskiej_81272.html.

The European Council decided that an increase in energy security should be reached through an improvement of energy efficiency, diversification of energy suppliers, sources and transmission routes, as well as through propagating the EU energy interests in relations with other countries. "Efficient, liberalized and integrated internal energy market" was considered to be "the condition of effectiveness of energy security policy" of the European Union. The European Council also approved the plan of energy security of the European Commission from 13 November 2008, which was made more precise in the conclusions of the European Union Council from 19 February 2009. As a result the European Council called the European Commission to quickly prepare a detailed plan of actions which are indispensable for the implementation of the plan in cooperation with the member states. In particular by the end of 2009 it was supposed to specify the conclusions concerning specific steps "referring to the development of the southern corridor" including the mechanism which would facilitate access to gas in the area of the Caspian Sea. However, these actions could not have any impact on other priority projects concerning energy which had been agreed upon earlier on. This provision was a clear concession towards Germany. Besides, the European Council pointed out that in order to increase energy security of individual EU member states "it is essential to make the best possible use of their own resources including renewable sources, mineral fuel, and nuclear energy in those countries which choose this option"⁴⁴. The heads of states or governments also decided to allocate 200 million Euros for the preparation of *Nabucco* gas pipeline construction, which would allow for the natural gas to be transmitted from the Central Asia through Georgia and Turkey to the European Union bypassing Russia⁴⁵.

On 23 March 2009 following the above mentioned resolutions of the European Council, the head of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, the Ukrainian President, Wiktor Juszczenko and the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government, Julia Tymoszenko signed a declaration in Brussels concerning the modernization of the Ukrainian systems of gas transmission to the European Union. The declaration stated that the European Union will be ready to invest 2.5 billion Euros in the modernization of 13,500 kilometres of the Ukrainian gas pipelines, which currently supply 20% of the gas used in the European Union. The Project would involve participation of international financial institutions. The Ukraine obliged itself to ensure better transparency in the access to the gas pipelines and to equal treatment of all investors. The responsibility for management of the transmission network would be entrusted to an independent institution appointed by both sides, which would assume its duties by the end of 2011. A part of the financial resources of the European Union would be allocated to installing modern counters, which using the satellite connection could instantly inform how much gas is being delivered from Russia to the Ukraine.

⁴⁴ Session of the European Council in Brussels. Conclusions of Presidency, Brussels, 19-20 March 2009, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/>, p. 1, 8-10.

⁴⁵ A. Kublik, *Moskwa nie zgadza się na rozwód UE z Gazpromem [Moscow says no to a divorce of the EU with Gazprom]*, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 30 March 2009.

The EU companies would also gain access to the underground storage of gas located on the territory of the Ukraine. Besides, the Ukrainian side offered to increase the capacity of their transit gas pipelines by 60 billion cubic metres per annum, which in their opinion could be an alternative to the construction of *Nord Stream* and *South Stream* gas pipelines planned by Russia which would bypass Belarus, the Ukraine and Poland⁴⁶. Signing the declaration caused immediate sharp criticism from the Russian government, which treated it as an irresponsible and unfriendly gesture towards Russia and announced to review their relations with the European Union concerning energy policy⁴⁷. Although the Russian government could not, or did not want to admit it openly, it seems that the criticism was mainly due to the fear that the engagement of the European Union in the Ukraine would make it impossible for *Gazprom* to take over the Ukrainian transmission networks, which had been the objective of the Russian side for quite a long time.

Beyond doubt the success of the energy security plan of the European Union will depend on the attitudes of all the interested member states. However, to a substantially large extent it will be dependent on the attitude of Germany and its future relations in this matter with Russia. This thesis seems much more justified in view of the fact that the Russian government will probably continue its strategy of using energy resources to reach its aggressive political and economic objectives in foreign policy. This view is further confirmed by the fact that the Russian government not only supports *Gazprom* projects, which are competitive to the European Union, like for example the *Nord Stream* gas pipeline construction plans being competitive towards the *Nabucco* gas pipeline, or by its intention to establish closer cooperation with Azerbaijan and Nigeria in terms of gas supply but the above thesis is also corroborated by a categorical objection of the Russian government to the plan of modernization by the European Union of the Ukrainian transmission systems which supply gas to the EU.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the period of the first five years of Poland's membership in the European Union the most disputable issues in Polish-German relations undoubtedly included: constitutional reform of the European Union, Eastern Partnership as an integral part of the European neighbourhood policy and the EU energy security. Although governments of both countries supported projects which aimed at the implementation of the constitutional reform of the European Union, establishing the Eastern Partnership and common EU energy policy, they nevertheless differed in matters concerning the

⁴⁶ Ibidem; Deklaracja gazowa Ukraina - UE to nieprzyjazny gest [The Ukraine-EU gas declaration as an unfriendly gesture], PAP from 30/31 March 2009.

⁴⁷ J. Bielecki, *Unia stawia na ukraińskie gazociągi* [The EU stakes on the Ukrainian gas pipelines], „Dziennik” 24 March 2009; Deklaracja gazowa Ukraina - UE to nieprzyjazny gest ..., op.cit.

methods of achieving those aims. These differences were not only due to different priorities in the European policy but also due to different perception of national interests in the process of European integration. While Poland was in favour of strengthening cooperation and the intergovernmental infrastructure, Germany on the other hand, was still in principle advocating the deepening of the integration process and strengthening the supranational infrastructure in the European Union. While Poland, also after the constitutional crisis in the European Union in the years 2005-2007, was in favour of the continuation of the EU enlargement process, Germany since 2005 departed from its hitherto prevailing enlargement strategy which treated enlarging and deepening the integration process as two sides of the same coin. Both countries also differed in their approach towards the European neighbourhood policy, including the Eastern Partnership project. For Poland the project was treated as a stage towards the future enlargement of the European Union towards the East, whereas Germany supported the project because of the change in their previous enlargement strategy and their willingness to develop the European Union's capabilities to operate outside the EU area. Additionally, both countries differently perceived the principles which were supposed to lay foundations for the common energy policy of the European Union. Poland supported the position of the European Commission concerning full liberalization of energy policy as the foundation for communitizing it, Germany, on the other hand, was against it, among others because of the reluctance of the German energy concerns to divide companies which are the producers and distributors of energy. Finally, the German opinions in this matter were also determined by a vast engagement of German companies in the Russian energy sector. In general however, attitudes of governments of both countries towards the Eastern Partnership and energy security of the European Union were a resultant of their relations with Russia. While Germany perceived Russia as its key partner in Eastern Europe, as well as a country which should be taken into account in the policy towards the other post-Soviet states in the region, Poland as a matter of fact was making efforts to make these countries stronger and more stable as a guarantee of its own security and sovereignty.

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POLISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION

Poland's accession to the European Union not only required fundamental systemic changes, but also necessitated other methods of describing Poland's place and mission in Europe. It would be difficult to conceptualise these transformations in a straightforward manner, not to mention evaluate them. The aims of this paper are primarily explorative in nature. The objective is to outline a framework for a discussion on the attitudes of Poles towards the EU seven years after Poland's accession; both public opinion surveys and research publications will be taken into consideration. The main thesis of the analysis put forward boils down to the claim that these standpoints cannot continue to be described as opposing categories of "enthusiasm" – "scepticism". This stems from the fact that, in general, they are characterised by a favourable detachment. The Polish Euro-indifference is a combination of the strong conviction that EU membership is a positive and beneficial phenomenon on the one hand, and a complete lack of involvement in European matters on the other. So long as Polish citizens were 'queuing' to join this elite club, EU membership was being idealised; once, they managed to enter it – or, as it used to be worded in Poland, the "return to Europe" – opinions on EU membership started to become more pragmatic.

THE PRE-ACCESSION PERCEPTION OF THE EU IN POLAND

In the pre-accession period the European Union was present in the Polish social consciousness mainly in the form of the metaphor of the "return to Europe". This slogan was often perceived as controversial, since it implied that the borders of Europe could be identified with the borders of the European Union; also, because it indirectly questioned the European identity of Poland. The discussion between the advocates of the "return to Europe" and those who claimed Poland cannot return to Europe, as in fact, it had always belonged there, remained barren to a large extent. This stemmed from the well-grounded misunderstanding of the concept of European identity. As Jerzy Jedlicki succinctly put it: "It turns out Poland simultaneously is and is not a part of Europe, or maybe rather the idea of Europe tends to have different meanings in different contexts"¹. Nevertheless, this misunderstanding is far from

¹ J. Jedlicki, *Poland's Perpetual Return to Europe*, in: *Cross Currents: a yearbook of Central European Culture* (1993) p. 78.

being trivial. Not only has it opposed a form of idealism with a realistic perception of EU integration, but also has reflected the Poles' ambivalent attitude to their peripheral position. In fact, the debate on the European identity of Poland quickly died down after Poland's accession to the Union. This allows one to think that the tension in the public sphere in Poland related to this issue did not stem from actual internal doubts about our own European identity, but rather from a tacit fear of being perceived from the outside as a society, to some extent, alien to Europe.

Identifying EU membership with being a part of Europe obviously was grounded in the system. Access to a common market and other freedoms guaranteed to the member states was directly linked to the Polish vision of western prosperity. This idea, key for the Polish way of perceiving EU integration, in fact, was not understood strictly in economic terms. In this respect a European identity was "recognized as a higher civilizational standard, i.e. a higher level of life and a wealthier society, with modern technologies being applied to everyday activities. However, this meaning of Europe also includes a common respect for values such as law and order, cleanliness, work ethics, politeness and reliability"². In other words, the return to Europe was, in this context, supposed to denote a return to the path of modernisation, understood as westernisation. Therefore, the main challenge in terms of development was the fact that "Poland's peripheral position meant being in the vicinity, but not in their centre of major historical processes which took place on the continent; these included colonial expansion and technological revolution, and hence – modernisation"³.

In contrast to the discourse focused on modernisation, the advocates of a broader perspective on European identity (which Poland was assumed never to have lost) stressed the need of including also the pre-modern values essential for the idea of Europe. Consequently, they tended to broaden the historic perspective beyond the 18th century, emphasising the European heritage of the First Republic of Poland. The list of Poland's historic achievements mentioned above included religious ones – Poland as the bulwark of Christianity opposing Islam, as well as of Catholicism opposing the Orthodox church; political ones – the parliamentary system and political tolerance, in contrast to Eastern autocratic rule; as well as cultural ones – the Latin alphabet rather than Cyrillic script⁴. The thing about the claim that there must be more to Europe than just the common market, which – as the saying goes – one cannot fall in love with, is that it is easily gains recognition, but rarely has any practical application.

The juxtaposition between an idealistic and realistic vision of European identity, to an extent, also translates to the social divisions in Polish society. Idealistic thinking was primarily characteristic of the ethos of intellectuals. Moreover, it seemed to be presented in the public sphere to a degree larger than its actual popularity. This was accurately, yet maybe slightly too sharply, put by Zdzisław Mach:

² Ibidem p. 79.

³ A. Horolets, *Obrazy Europy w Polskim dyskursie publicznym*, Kraków 2007, p. 20.

⁴ Z. Mach, *Heritage, Dream, and Anxiety: the European Identity of Poles*, in: Z. Mach, D. Niedźwiedzki, *European Enlargement and Identity*, Kraków 1997, p. 35-37.

“For the educated elites Europe was a mythical paradise of freedom, market economy and democracy. For the majority of society, farmers and workers, Europe was also a mythical paradise of prosperity, where everyone enjoyed an abundance of goods. For most uneducated Poles Europe was less so an ideological centre of tradition and values, but rather a mythical paradise which they wanted to belong to – a paradise of wealth known from stories told by relatives living abroad, accounts of those few who had the opportunity to travel, or from Western films”⁵.

Additionally, the dichotomy of the visions of Europe expressed by intellectuals and non-intellectuals, in a rather fickle way, subscribes to the relation centre–periphery. The dream of returning to Europe, as an aspiration for prosperity, unassumingly recognises our own underdevelopment; simultaneously, however, by admitting the peripheral position, it finds value in overcoming it through carrying out transformations imposed by those in the centre. In turn, the thesis of Poland’s perennial European identity questioned the country’s peripheral position on the one hand, and simultaneously was an unintentional testimony to that position on the other. For instance, emphasising the key role of Christian heritage for the strength of European identity is inconsistent with the post-Christian character of many Western European societies. Moreover, the tendency to make distant historic references might seem similarly eccentric, as EU integration has been rather based on forgetting than brooding on past events.

Equalling the EU with Europe seemed controversial in Poland so long as Poland remained outside the Union. Incidentally, yet another Polish debate which could be labelled “between the East and the West” turned out to be unfruitful; in fact, it ended not through reaching a conclusion, but because public interest dwindled away.

“In the context of *the return to Europe* equally many valuable remarks have been made, as absolutely nonsensical ones, ridden of elementary logic. The debate on our place in Europe, unleashed in the process, (...) generally finished in an uninteresting and void compromise between the advocates of *westernness*, or *westernising* Poland, and the opponents of a too close integration with Western European structures, as well as those who – not without justification – emphasised the significance of Eastern elements in our national culture”⁶.

The dispute with respect to Europe’s boundaries has had a long history, and its only conclusive outcome so far has been the apparent inability to reach a consensus. The conceptual boundaries of European identity can be stipulated in reference to two geographical axes: North – South and East – West. As far as contrasting North and South is concerned, one can observe that “At times, the South has tried to define the identity of Europe. (...) Renaissance Europe probably was the most explicit attempt by the South to define Europe. This is Europe defined by its culture. The other way around, defining Europe by the North, is a rather recent phenomenon: it is Europe

⁵ Ibidem, p. 40.

⁶ R. Zenderowski, *Pomiędzy Wschodem a Zachodem*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 2004, No. 3, p. 14-15.

defined by its welfare”⁷. In other words, putting the stereotype this way juxtaposes the rustic charms of pre-modern values and the disillusioned world of modernised economies. In terms of the East – West differentiation, what can be noticed is that

“division follows the two different modes of agrarian production in Europe: the small agrarian peasant household producing for himself and in part for the landowners against the feudal land-ownership system prevailing in the East. (...) The East–West distinction was always related to the experience of the Eastern border as a ‘frontier’. (...) The East is the space from once the ‘Mongols’ came, then the ‘Russians’ and finally the ‘Soviet Communists’”⁸.

In this respect, entering the European Union gave Polish people a sense of moving the frontier further to the East. Similarly, just like the previous extension of the EU changed the permanently peripheral (as it would seem until recently) character of countries such as Greece or Portugal.

Joining the European Union curtailed the debate on the “return to Europe”; however, it would be difficult to say whether it had any bearing on the change in the Polish attitude toward EU integration. As far as the “modernisation camp” is concerned, it would even appear that there was no significant change in the way of thinking, which only “received a new façade”. In terms of the discourse on the necessity of transformations, the paradigm of the “return” was changed into that of “catching up”, while EU institutions continued to be perceived as external guarantees of stability. Simultaneously, the date of Poland’s accession to the EU became another candidate for a symbolic turning point finalising the process of systemic transformation. The way this date will be seen in the long run remains an open question: whether it will be a point of discontinuity, or a small fragment of a larger process. It seems, however, that perceiving EU membership as a stable state of affairs is an element of the pre-accession configuration. Yet, when looking at the EU from the inside, it turns out that “there is no Europe, only Europeanization, understood as an institutionalised process of continual change... Europe is just another word for the changing geometry, changing national interests, changing internal relations, changing statehood, changing identity”⁹.

THE POST-ACCESSION PERCEPTION OF POLAND’S EU MEMBERSHIP

Opinion polls demonstrate that from the start a great majority of Poles have been convinced that EU membership is beneficial for Poland. It should be noted that the percentage of those in favour of integration was initially slightly lower, and hence, more in line with the result of the accession referendum. With time, however, the

⁷ K. Eder, *The narrative construction of the boundaries of Europe*, “European Journal of Social Theory” 2006, No. 9(2), p. 263.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 264.

⁹ U. Beck, E. Grande, *Europa kosmopolityczna*, Warszawa 2009, p. 32-33.

division between Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-sceptics became blurred. Furthermore, opinions that were openly anti-European opinions became scattered and died down, which to a large extent, stems from the disintegration of the political environment being united around opposing the ratification of the accession treaty. The short-term perspective did not bear out the pessimistic forecasts of a disadvantageous membership; neither did any obvious threats to Polish national identity emerge.

For the most part, the temporary weakening of Euro-enthusiasm immediately after Poland's accession to the EU was "interpreted as a symptom of the 'accession shock' described in other countries, which manifests itself through a feeling of disorientation caused by a confrontation of the over-optimistic expectations"¹⁰. Although the existence of the accession shock can be demonstrated in many other countries becoming EU member states, this explanation does not seem fully convincing and sufficient. Above all, it should be borne in mind that the short span of this drop in EU support can be ascertained with certainty only with time. Additionally, it needs to be noted that it was only in the context of the campaign prior to the accession referendum that political environments representing clearly anti-European views revealed themselves. This breach of the existing pro-European consensus functioning above political divisions was further strengthened by the fierce controversies around the changes of the provisions established by the treaty of Nice, and the ultimately unsuccessful ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. In other words, the temporary expansion of anti-European views might have resulted not only from disorientation, but in fact also from the awareness of specific processes, and internal European policies that in some respects were assessed negatively.


The idea of the "accession shock" remains an interesting interpretation, when considered in a context wider than merely that of a temporary disappointment resulting from too high expectations. According to the quoted analysis by Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, the tension between the pre- and post-accession conditions of the assessment seems to be a much more convincing interpretative lead. On the one hand, she rightly notices that the "results of opinion polls indicated that we agreed to join the EU rather 'under the influence of history and current events in Europe' than because of a 'conscious choice'. Moreover, we were convinced that if our choice was right, it would be our children and grandchildren that would benefit from it in the distant future"¹¹. In fact, in the pre-accession period, integration was discussed primarily in terms of values, and was talked about in the context of historic justice. After the long-awaited "return to Europe", the perception of EU membership quickly became more pragmatic: "As the capacity to actually calculate the gains and costs improved, and we could identify ourselves with the European environment to a greater extent, more rational assessments and opinions became commonplace;

¹⁰ E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, *Dynamika zmian świadomości społecznej w mijającym pięcioleciu członkostwa*, in: E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, *5 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej w perspektywie społecznej*, Warszawa 2009, p. 42.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

these do not lend themselves easily to the pressure of current events"¹². As the benefits gained by Poland and Poles from EU integration became relatively obvious, this new, pragmatically oriented mode of narration quickly became a fairly permanent basis for social support of the EU integration process.

Figure 1
Support for Poland's integration with the EU, 2005-2011



Source: based on data from the Public Opinion Research Centre, www.cbos.pl; reports used: BS/71/2005, BS/76/2006, BS/70/2007, BS/60/2008, BS/64/2009, BS/56/2010, BS/52/2011.


A positive attitude towards Poland's EU membership has become dominant in all of the social-demographic groups. Even the supporters of the Law and Justice political party (PiS) – the only major party presenting anti-European tendencies – in general remain satisfied with Poland's membership in the EU. The structure of the electorate of Law and Justice is reflected in the party's position towards the issue of EU integration. It is characterized by being sensitive to Euro-sceptical arguments and sentiments, yet at the same time continuing to be favourably disposed towards Poland's presence in the EU. In recent years both the political standpoint and the supporters of Law and Justice (PiS) were strongly opposed to those of the Civic Platform (PO). However, EU membership has never been a point around which it would be possible to construct a political disagreement. Naturally, certain disputes with respect to European matters – often very emotional ones – did arise between

¹² Ibidem, p. 45.

Law and Justice and the Civic Platform. These, however, focused around the question what Poland should do in the EU, and not whether it should be in the Union at all. The Euro-sceptical part of Law and Justice's electorate was inherited when the party absorbed those voters who formerly supported the League of Polish Families (LPR) – the only party the majority of whose supporters declared an unfavourable attitude towards European integration. As a result of the League's election failure, since 2007 Euro-sceptical voters were without parliamentary representation. As a result, such views became weaker within the public sphere. Consequently, in Poland those who are negatively adjusted towards EU membership not only constitute a small group, but also are ridden of a political formation which could unite them as an electorate. What is more, the disappearance of Euro-sceptical political representation occurred in Poland, just as a new wave of support for Euro-scepticism began to surge in both old and new member states.

Figure 2

European Parliament election turnouts, 1979-2009



Source: based on European Parliament data, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/pl/turnout_pl.html

These predominantly positive attitudes declared by Polish people do not, however, entail a readiness for action. A glaring example of that was the especially low voter turnout in the EU parliamentary elections. In 2004 in Poland the turnout in the elections to the European Parliament was 21%, which was one of the lowest in the entire Union; the overall percentage of EU citizens who cast a ballot was 46%.

Hence, the low turnout in Poland reflected the general European trend showing that public opinion has lost interest in European Parliament elections. In 2009, in turn, the turnout was 24%, which was slightly better than the previous one; however, still one of the worst results in the entire European Union. If these trends continue, the percentage of Polish voters who take part in elections might converge with the EU average; nonetheless, this is not an optimistic forecast for the Union.


In 2009, just before the European Parliament election, a special Euro barometer report was published, on the predicted participation in the elections with respect to particular member states¹³. It characterised Polish society as above average in terms of indifference to the European election debate. The average percentage of those who declared interest in the matter in all member states was 44%, whereas in Poland this indicator was 30%. This placed Poland in the antepenultimate position in the Entire Union, with a lower interest noted only in the Czech Republic and in Latvia. Simultaneously, in the context of the results presented earlier, it is clear that in Poland, the lack of interest by no means equals a lack of acceptance. Poland's Euro-indifference is not Euro-scepticism, mainly because the European Union, as well as Poland's membership it is evaluated as definitely positive by Polish public opinion. Thus, the indifference of the voters towards elections to the European Parliament cannot stem from an antipathy for the institution. Although the trust for the European Parliament declared in Poland during the Euro election was on a par with the EU average (52% to 51% respectively), it should be noted that this indicator is much higher than in the case of Poland's national parliament.

THE PERCEPTION OF THE BENEFITS OF EU MEMBERSHIP

The positive indifference of Polish people with respect to EU integrative processes is based on a lack of coherence between the affective and behavioural components of their position. On the one hand, the EU is evaluated positively, but at the same time, there is a tendency not to become involved in European affairs, which, in turn, stems from a more general Polish lack of interest in public matters. On the other hand, with the end of the waiting period for EU accession, the Polish way of perceiving integration has become more down to earth. This process of pragmatism has been blamed as the reason explaining the temporary decay of the support for integration, immediately following Poland joining the EU. According to the explanation based on the "accession shock", the shift of public interest to the benefits from EU membership weakened Euro-enthusiasm, due to the fact that the said benefits were not immediate and visible enough to leave a mark on the social consciousness.

¹³ The European Elections 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_299_en.pdf.

Figure 3
The opinions of the benefits related to EU integration



Source: based on data of the Public Opinion Research Centre, www.cbos.pl, reports used: BS/115/2005, BS/76/2006, BS/70/2007, BS/60/2008, BS/64/2009/, BS/56/2010, BS/52/2010.

The pragmatic reconfiguration of the way of thinking about the European Union from the pre-accession narration to the post-accession one had to influence the results of public opinion polls. “The idea of *joining the European Union* was perceived as a natural consequence on the events of 1989; a fulfilment of the postulate of *returning to Europe* without deeper reflection on the method and potential costs of the process. The society was not aware what integration entailed, and how much effort would be needed to meet the requirements put before Poland”¹⁴. It should be noted, however, that the general support for integration is greater, that the belief that our country enjoys substantial benefits resulting from its membership. In turn, the conviction that the integration process brings about individual, personal gains is even less common. In other words, should one juxtapose the answers to questions about the general support for integration, the belief that EU membership is beneficial for Poland, and the question about personal benefits, the result would be a hierarchy where a positive view of EU integration turns out to be more common than the belief in collective or personal gains obtained from this process. Consequently, the claim that the Polish way of thinking about European integration is strictly pragmatic

¹⁴ J. Ściegienny, *Opinia publiczna. Polacy wobec integracji europejskiej*, in: M. Fałkowski, J. Kucharczyk (eds.), *Obywatele Europy: integracja europejska w polskim życiu publicznym*, Warszawa 2005, p. 55.

would seem difficult to uphold. In the case of Poland, one could rather speak of a mutual strengthening of the pre- and post-accession narration, as well as of short- and long-term thinking. To a large extent, Poland's membership has turned out to be favourable, similarly to the social perception of integrative processes; many hopes have come true, while the majority of concerns have not. Nevertheless, it should not be inferred from this that the support for European integration will continue to be strong also in more challenging times.

An additional problem with rooting the support for European integration in a calculation of gains lies in the fact that the standards that particular individuals refer to are not clear. The contrast between "personal gains" and "benefits for the country" involves only one of these inconsistencies; in fact, when it comes to the vast majority of them, standard quantitative measures basically prove useless. Numerous examples are provided by studies carried out in the years 2005-2006, the objective of which was to perfect the tools of quantitatively measuring public opinion of European integration in the Wielkopolska region¹⁵. By resorting to the standard qualitative research technique of focus groups, the authors tried to register opinions on public matters, yet ones not related to participation in an actual public sphere. The objective was to identify how various communities¹⁶ understand particular research questions and issues. What the authors came across was fundamental – as it would seem in the case of the early accession stage – contrast between rural and urban communities.

Even a cursory glance at the research materials makes it possible to see that the EU mechanisms are a matter of individual experience in the case of farmers, whereas they do not have such a personal and practical character in the case of city inhabitants. Moreover, we are not only dealing with a contrast between a practical and discursive consciousness, but also both groups are aware of a difference in the fundamental way they experience EU membership. Additionally, opinions claiming that it is in fact farmers who are the main beneficiaries of integration processes are relatively common: "generally in Poland it might be farming, so, coming back, that's where its more tangible"¹⁷. What is interesting, as it has already been demonstrated, farmers are also aware of the social perception of the situation: "the media, all they see is plusses everywhere. Then those townies, so to say, listen and say how good we farmers have it, that we just get everything". This last view also indicates that there is a gap between the media image of reality, which to some extent all citizens participate in, and the practical details of contact with EU financial mechanisms, which mainly farmers deal with on a large scale.

¹⁵ P. Cichocki, P. Jabkowski, *Wielkopolska – regionalny kontekst integracji europejskiej*, Poznań 2010.

¹⁶ The focus group interviews were carried out in three types of locations: in the capital of the region (Poznań), two former voivodeship cities (Leszno, Piła), and a number of other rural and town-rural areas (*gminy*) (Gołańcz, Brodnica Śremska, Chawłodno, Smogulec).

¹⁷ Opinions cited from the transcripts of the above-mentioned focus group interviews.

Although a general awareness of some large – though unspecified when it comes to size – financial expenditures on the development of the country has been noted, city inhabitants experience them as impersonal infrastructural investments. “It’s like this: half of the funds, the money to be spent, sort of, on what is ours (...) we don’t see. How are we supposed to know about some or other plans or investments, and whether they financed from EU funds or not”. Investments in developing infrastructure are perceived as impersonal in the sense that they pertain to public goods and public space, and not directly to the households of individual citizens. Contrary to the inhabitants of rural areas employed in farming, city inhabitants have noticed new buildings, roads and bridges, the construction of which they can, to some extent, attribute to EU support. However, they are unable, or find it difficult to put down the improvement of their personal wellbeing to various forms of European help. “It seems to me that this is practically the only such tangible proof of these changes. In some places, I don’t know, maybe finding a job is easier, maybe such other changes have happened as well, but they are, lets say, less visible than all these investments, be it a motorway, some new buildings or construction sites”.

The contrast between a practical and discursive way of experiencing European integration is also clearly visible in relation to the issue of allegedly pervasive European bureaucracy when it comes to managing funds.

“Well, maybe like this. Firstly, with time the system will change; the system, that is the power of bureaucracy in Poland. The governing politicians will finally realise that we do not need such a massive administrative apparatus as we have now, because it serves for nothing really, apart from feeding itself. The second thing is, we will learn more about capitalism, maybe in the sense that the financial ladder will change somewhat. We all know it will stratify, and the poor will become poorer and the rich will be richer, because that’s natural – well, that’s just the way it is, but in the middle... I mean something like a middle class will appear after all.”

Whereas in the case of farmers, we are dealing with very specific experiences: “and at random they picked me for an inspection. They came to check up on how I run all the books, and I had things written down, of course (...) and well, they came and inspected, and sure I was the second or so who had the region written down. Now in April I had to count everything up, and I’m just wondering and I think I’ll just quit. It just doesn’t add up”. Or cases such as:

“there’s just no information. Let me just say, I deliver the milk, and we were told the reproductive year starts on 1st April and ends on the last day of May. But the reproductive year to raise the milk quotas ended on the 4th February, and I submitted an application to increase the milk quota on the 8th March, so that ship had sailed, it was too late. And who informed us? The people from Marcelesińska street told us the president should have informed us, the president said: you won’t get it, I’ll add those kilograms, because the national reserve has only so much to share. It turned out I had been given my notice, and that was that. And there was quite a pile of papers from those who had submitted those applications”.

As a side note, it should be mentioned that in the above-mentioned complaints on the accumulation of bureaucratic difficulties, both European and local elements overlap. The extensive formal EU procedures are put into practice by the ineffective Polish civil service. As a result, in the experience of farmers who receive financial support, bureaucracy has a particular form of “the people from Marcelesińska street” and ceases to be only a vague vision of “the people from Brussels”.

An additional element which combines both ways of thinking about public matters is the ability to perceive positive phenomena mainly in terms of comparative reference groups. However, noticing one’s own structural involvement poses difficulties. In fact, when individuals see their dependence on the structure, it is chiefly in a limiting sense, and rarely in a context where it enables things. In this case, we are talking about an impairment of a common sociological imagination, an inability to perceive the relation between one’s own biographic trajectory and phenomena occurring on the macro level. Thinking about European Union mechanisms is relatively shallowly rooted in the practical consciousness of farmers. Firstly, it pertains to a rather small portion of the activity of European institutions, and it mixes with the way national and local administration function. This small fragment of Poland’s Europeanisation is insufficient to work out an opinion on the nature of this process. Secondly, farmers do not define the practical experience of EU financial help in running a farm as a public problem. Instead, it appears to be a private matter, important for economic reasons rather than political ones. In this case the contrast private/public translates rather straightforwardly into the already described juxtapositions of practical and discursive consciousness, as well as micro and macro levels. What is fundamental for the colloquial way of thinking about Poland’s integration with the EU is the inability to move from the private and practical micro-world to a public and discursive macro-perspective. From the point of view of the competence to function in the public sphere it leads to a paradoxical situation. Citizens, who are involved in egocentric discourse, cannot link their personal interests and experiences with macrostructures. It makes little difference, in this context, whether this inability stems from a lack of individual and practical experiences, or from not being able to interpret them.

Similar research carried out after seven years of Poland’s EU membership, would probably produce drastically different results. One reason for this would be the enormous extent of actions carried out within the framework of the Human Capital Programme. Nonetheless, the main objective of relating the results of this qualitative analysis carried out during the immediate accession stage is to illustrate the disordered variety of attitudes hidden behind sterile quantitative indicators. On a macro level, it is easy to formulate theses about the dependence of the support for European integration from the declared individual or collective benefits obtained from EU membership. In the case of particular persons, groups and communities, opinions on the topic evolve as a result of distinct beliefs and

expectations in such a way that any general statements sound more like clichés. We do know that a positive view of Poland's membership in the EU prevails. It also seems that these opinions and beliefs are long-lasting, but by no means strong. However, still not much is known about the actual rooting of these regularities in the social consciousness.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is difficult to find a common denominator in the attitudes of Poles towards the European Union. By referring to a simple line of thought, where Euro-sceptics are opposed to Euro-enthusiasts, one could claim that Polish society and public discourse remain to a large extent enthusiastic towards integration. However, Euro-sceptical opinions function as well. Nonetheless, this analysis does not reflect the entire landscape of current Polish attitudes adequately. It did have a justified application in the pre-accession period; however, later, even when the Law and Justice party was in power, when Polish politics openly referred to our national interests, naturally alarming many European partners, the anti-European rhetoric was rare in Poland. Poland also avoided the wave of controversies around the Euro currency and Schengen agreement, which shook public support for the integration processes in many states of the "old" EU-15. In fact, Poland's problem is not so much a dispute over the Union, but rather the lack of a matter-of-fact dispute. The weakness of the European public sphere, as well as a fundamental deficit of the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions is not a specifically Polish problem. At the same time, however, it seems that these pan-European tendencies appear to be relatively stronger in Poland than in other member states. Poles seem to be European citizens only by name, as they do not link this forma-legal status with any particular attitudes, apart from a certain general pride and satisfaction gained from this fact.

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ABOUT THE STRATEGY OF PROMOTING POLAND

Acting on the invitation to join the discussion about Polish foreign policy, which will take place on the pages of “Przeгляд Zachodni” (Western Review), I would like to take up a topic which is relatively not very popular, at least in academic discourse. Promoting a country is for many academics either an issue of little importance or even of a slightly unserious nature. At the same time however, its role is becoming more and more valued in today’s globalised world. Beyond doubt, this is related to the increasing density of relations between politics and the economy. The state is no longer perceived as a political institution only but also as an economic entity. Thanks to the opening of financial markets a large flow of capital among countries has been observed. The key element of the strategy aimed at attracting foreign capital is then the capacity to create an image of the country which is amiable towards foreign investment. The situation is similar in the exchange of goods where countries/producers which have a good reliable brand draw substantial economic benefits. Furthermore, tourism which has become a very important branch of the economy relies on the positive image of the place where one can enjoy spending time. It seems therefore that the more frequent task of creating foreign policy is to consciously create the image of the country. This of course does not imply a crisis within traditional diplomacy (although it is as well undergoing continuous changes), nevertheless it should be emphasized that promotion is gaining importance in foreign policy.

When talking about promoting a country most often several not always interchangeable terms are used. The first most general term is undoubtedly ‘promoting a country’ which occurs more frequently in journalistic discussions than in academic literature. Broadly speaking it encompasses a range of activities aimed at informing the general public about the country and its characteristics, objectives and the opportunities it can offer. Another term frequently used is *nation branding* which means creating images of countries or nations as brands. The broadest term is ‘marketing’ which in the context I explore in this paper appears in sub-disciplines such as ‘region marketing’, ‘place marketing’, or finally as most interesting here ‘nation marketing’ comprising the processes of planning and implementing the concept of the state and its nation as well as promoting them in international markets.

From the perspective of *nation branding* Poland is a country with a poor image. This is caused on the one hand, by our location on the semi-peripheries of Europe

and on the other hand, by the lack of clearly recognizable brands of products and symbols which are straightforwardly present in the consciousness of other societies. The attempts to make Poland a strong contender in the international arena (at least on the regional scale) have not as yet brought the expected positive effects. There is a lack of recognizably made-in-Poland products which could contribute to the building of a positive and clear image. Similarly, what the Polish tourism industry offers although interesting still remains little known.

All the image related problems are reflected in the results of the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index¹ described as a typical consumer survey with ca. 20 thousand respondents from 20 countries. The respondents are asked to evaluate each country in five categories: consumer goods exports, governance, culture, people, tourism, attracting foreign capital in terms of investment and human capital.

Individual data add up for the overall grade on the basis of which a country is being ranked. In 2008 in the general ranking Poland was ranked at 30.

		Export of consumer goods	Governance	Culture	People	Tourism	Immigration and foreign investment
1	Germany	3	4	4	7	10	5
2	France	5	10	1	11	2	6
3	Great Britain	4	9	3	6	4	2
4	Canada	6	2	12	1	7	1
5	Japan	1	17	8	8	8	10
6	Italy	9	18	2	3	1	9
7	The United States of America	2	22	5	13	6	2
8	Switzerland	7	1	18	5	8	4
9	Australia	10	5	11	2	5	7
10	Sweden	8	3	13	4	14	8
11	Spain	12	16	6	8	3	12
12	The Netherlands	11	7	14	12	18	11
13	Norway	13	6	23	14	20	14
13	Austria	16	13	15	18	15	15
15	Denmark	14	7	24	16	23	13
16	Scotland	22	14	16	15	12	17
17	New Zealand	20	12	25	10	16	15
18	Finland	15	11	27	18	27	18
19	Ireland	24	20	22	17	19	20
20	Belgium	19	15	26	21	28	19
21	Brazil	27	26	10	20	13	23
22	Russia	17	43	7	31	22	25

¹ For more information see the webpage <http://www.gfkamerica.com>.

23	Iceland	28	19	38	22	32	21
24	Singapore	23	23	40	25	30	22
24	Argentina	31	28	17	23	26	28
26	Mexico	35	33	21	24	17	31
27	India	26	41	20	26	24	34
28	Hungary	32	21	32	27	33	24
28	China	21	48	9	41	21	33
30	Poland	29	23	30	28	36	26
31	Czech Republic	30	25	29	29	35	27
31	Egypt	39	36	18	32	10	43
33	South Korea	18	31	33	39	43	41
34	Thailand	36	39	37	29	25	39
35	Taiwan	25	31	43	33	41	32
36	Turkey	38	37	28	37	31	36

Source: The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands IndexSM 2008 Report, http://www.presence.ch/d/800/pdf/800b_Switzerland_2008_NBI_Report.pdf.

In each of the listed categories we occupy a similar position. This seems to demonstrate quite well the specificity of Poland's image (as well as of similar countries in the region) as lacking a distinctive feature or an area in which we would be markedly recognizable. Such an assumption implies the need to point out areas which could provide grounds for promotion practices and which would allow to sustain positive associations with Poland in the social consciousness.

This idea however, requires a well-considered and deliberate promotional practice. Yet, observing the activities promoting 'Poland's brand', one can have an impression that these activities are not a result of implementing a coherent strategy. Quite on the contrary, it seems that they take place *ad hoc*. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for this situation lies in the lack of coordination of individual activities. This stems from the fact that various institutions are involved in promoting Poland. Primarily the task of promoting Poland is in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which includes the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy (formerly the Promotion Department). This Department "implements activities aiming at creating a positive image of Poland with the use of public diplomacy tools. It also exercises management over the internet websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"². Until quite recently the basic promotional tools used by the Promotion Department were study visits by journalists and foreign experts in Poland. Additionally, the Department together with the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has participated in organizing events highlighting Polish cultural heritage, including, for example conferences, competitions, exhibitions, or larger events such as, for instance 'A Polish-German Year', 'Polish Days' in selected countries, or 'The Year of Joseph Conrad'.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/>

Recently the Promotion Department has been engaged in projects undertaking the use of anniversaries of great importance for Poland for promotional purposes, for example the 25th anniversary of establishing 'Solidarity' or the 60th anniversary of the ending of WWII. Another event worth mentioning here, and co-financed by the Ministry, is the exhibition combined with a series of events 'We Berliners!' concerning the participation of Polish people in the life of Berlin's past and present.

Besides, the Ministry has been promoting Poland on the Internet, primarily using the Poland website³. There are also some publications which are being prepared including: brochures (general, e.g., "Poland in brief", and thematic, e.g., "German Nazi camps in occupied Poland during WW II"), as well as books, journals ("The Polish Voice", "Polish Culture"), calendars and others.

Polish Institutes serve as the Ministry's tool to promote Poland abroad. Their "main objective is to disseminate Polish culture, the knowledge of history and national heritage across the world, as well as to promote cooperation in the area of culture, education and social life. In many places Polish Institutes also fulfill the role of departments of Polish Embassies for culture and education"⁴. At present there are 22 Polish Institutes in various countries of the world.

The change of the name of the Department responsible for promoting Poland and some initiatives taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggest that there are plans to change promotional practice to enhance the so-called public diplomacy which includes shaping public opinion in individual countries. One of its interesting features is using well known people who have won recognition and high esteem to build the image of the country. It is too early as yet to evaluate the efficiency of this change.

The responsibility for promoting Poland, however, is also shared by other ministries within the scope of their competencies. The two whose role needs to be emphasized are the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and the Ministry of Economy. Apart from that there are certain institutions which have been established to improve the image of Poland in very narrowly defined target groups. At least two such institutions can be mentioned here: the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency S.A. (in Polish abbreviated as PAIiIZ) and the Polish Tourist Organization (in Polish in brief POT). The main objective of the former (PAIiIZ) is the "growth of the flow of 'Foreign Direct Investment' (FDI) as a result of encouraging international corporate businesses to invest in Poland. The Agency provides assistance for foreign investors throughout all the necessary administrative and legal procedures which occur in the process of implementing an investment project. Another mission of the PAIiIZ is creating a positive image of Poland in the world as well as promoting Polish produce and services"⁵. On the other hand, the Polish Tourist Organization (POT) has as its aim:

³ Poland, www.poland.gov.pl.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ PAIiIZ, <http://www.paiz.gov.pl>.

- 1) "Promoting Poland as an attractive country for tourism,
- 2) Ensuring the operation of and improvement of the Polish system of tourist information in Poland and abroad,
- 3) Initiating, providing assessment and support for plans concerning the development and modernization of the tourist infrastructure"⁶.

The dispersion of the institutions responsible for promoting Poland is the reason for the lack of cohesive operation. It can create an impression of chaos but it also, if not above all, makes all the independently organized promotional campaigns less effective than if they were organized as an element of one cohesive promotional strategy. The lack of coordination makes the expenses on singular promotion activities higher and their results less effective. In a way we have got used to the fact that now and again public opinion is informed about CNN or BBC broadcasts of advertisements promoting Poland, either as a tourist destination or as an attractive place for investment. This kind of activity, however does not bring positive and long-lasting effects.

Nation marketing requires a long-term strategy which will first of all determine the objectives of the promotion, secondly it should define its recipients, thirdly the means which should be used, and fourthly the tools and indices of assessing its effectiveness. The Council for Promoting Poland has been in operation since 2004 as an opinion-making advisory body of the Polish Council of Ministers whose main aim is to draft the "Frame Strategy for Promoting Poland until 2015". According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the complete document will be submitted to the Council of Ministers most likely in the second half of 2009.

Although some information about the strategy has leaked to the press⁷ the Ministry has asked not to reveal its content. It is possible however to voice a few general remarks. What causes the most concern is the assumed time scale. Having assumed that the implementation of the strategy starts in 2010, it means that it has been calculated for only 5 years. However, a truly long-term strategy should be projected for the following 20-30 years. Its long-term nature requires a rather slogan-based and general (that is indeed frame-like) definition of its guidelines determining its most important objectives and directions, which then can become the basis for drafting more detailed strategies.

The second issue is the question of the starting point, that is a diagnosis of the present image of Poland. Building a strategy of promoting Poland one cannot rely only on the generally available results of the Simon Anholt survey mentioned earlier on as they are too general. It is necessary to conduct research aimed at describing the starting condition of Poland's image and carry out further surveys showing whether or not and what kind of changes have occurred as a result of planned activities.

⁶ Legal Act from 25 June 1999 about the Polish Tourist Organization, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws) from 23 July 1999.

⁷ Cf. P. Kula, A. Panuszko, *Sikorski wypromuje Polskę* [*Sikorski will promote Poland*], "Polska – The Times" 28.04.2009.

The research should comprise of opinion polls, attitudes of social leaders and the presence of Poland in political discourse. It is equally necessary to define who (which countries and which people) is the target of our promotional practice. Without a detailed definition of the target group it is impossible to talk about a strategy of action. Each target group is of a different nature and therefore it requires a different approach. We have to decide which communities, or otherwise which sections of these communities are especially important for us. It is possible to enumerate at least a few categories of target groups such as our neighbouring countries, countries of the region important from the point of view of our interests, more distant countries but with significant political and economic potential, etc. Each of these groups requires a different kind of message.

The third important issue is a lack of a clear vision of what we want to promote. What is needed here is the so-called key concept or idea which will become a guiding force of the entire strategy and its activities. This idea, on the one hand should stem from the research results and on the other hand, it should be a result of a reflective contribution from communication specialists. The lack of the central idea makes us again 'dangle' between various conceptions; once we want to come across as a strong country with a well-developed infrastructure and education, another time we want to be seen as an ideal place for ecotourism. We want our image to be modern and at the same time we emphasize our historical role⁸. The multitude of ideas can make our message incoherent and thus less effective.

There is another potentially significant gap in the strategy of Poland's promotion, namely lack of appreciation of an important factor which has an impact on the image of every country and which resides in the attitudes of its citizens. The way Polish people perceive Poland and its capabilities as well as the way they talk about it can have a very strong impact on the way Poland is perceived abroad. If we do not turn our attention to the so-called internal *nation branding*, and if we do not start to shape positive attitudes of Poles towards our country and its institutions many promotional activities that we undertake may not bring expected results.

The above four general reservations show the basic weaknesses of the strategy. They primarily are the effect of making the efforts put into developing the strategy a political issue. After all, the Council for Promoting Poland does consist of politicians and officials from individual ministries and not of communication and promotion experts. This has serious drawbacks as for the quality of the document. Additionally, implementing the strategy remains an open issue. So far the bodies established for the purpose of promoting Poland in various domains were state institutions. However, promoting Poland could be more effective if it was carried out

⁸ It is worth mentioning here that messages referring to historical events are sometimes overused in promotional practice. It should be remembered that various ceremonies commemorating important historical events should be organized within the scope of the so-called history policy and not within promoting Poland. The effectiveness of using anniversaries and celebrating them to promote a country is, as a matter of fact, problematic.

in cooperation with other entities including both business enterprises and non-governmental organizations. It seems that promoting Poland in many cases requires innovation and dynamic action which is frequently missing in state institutions. It is quite likely that a positive effect could be gained by opting for a partnership between public and private initiatives.

Summing up, it should be said that despite the fact that promoting Poland is gradually becoming an increasingly important element in politics the quality of suggested solutions leaves much to be desired. What is missing first of all is a long-term perspective exceeding the parliamentary term of office. The practices which are adopted are often characterized by glaring temporariness. What is more, there is a lack of coordination between individual institutions responsible for promotion. The recently drafted Frame Strategy for Promoting Poland may not be able to meet all the expectations. It remains to be hoped that its preparation and implementation will provide experience which then will contribute to the development of another frame strategy, not only by name, for promoting Poland.

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THE PRIORITIES OF POLAND'S PRESIDENCY IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION¹

Poland has been preparing to take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (CEU) for quite some time now, and will chair the Council in the second half of 2011 (July – December). This is a new challenge for Poland, requiring more effort on behalf of public administration, including local authorities, NGOs and voluntary workers.

The examples of countries that have already chaired CEU meetings (such as Germany), demonstrates that during this period, support for integrative processes usually increases among the citizens of the president state². Holding ministerial meetings in various locations in the country, not just in the presiding nation's capital, can bring issues of the EU closer to its citizens³.

The idea of the Presidency primarily consists in the effective management and coordination of EU institutions, in particular of the CEU. The mode of exercising the Presidency changed when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009. The first group of countries to “test” the provisions of the treaty in this respect was the so-called *Presidency trio*: Spain – Belgium – Hungary. The next such trio includes Poland, Denmark and Cyprus; hence, the Polish Presidency will initiate an 18-month-long period during which the three countries will lead the CEU. Despite the countries' mutual plans and agreements, the priorities of particular presidencies are the result of issues which are either important for, or characteristic of a given member state, and depend on the interests which are vital for the EU at a given time. These priorities are

¹ This English version of the article is translation of the Polish text delivered to the “Przeгляд Zachodni” Journal and is modified version while comparing to the text delivered to *Modern World Economy. Micro- and Macroeconomic Issues*, edited by the Poznań University of Economics in 2012.

² W. Jahn-Hommer, “The EU Presidency as a media topic: role of Federal Press and Information Office,” lecture given during the seminar “How to manage a presidency”, Europäische Akademie Berlin, Berlin April 14-19, 2009.

³ A. Fuksiewicz, A. Łada, *Czeska prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Spojrzenie z Polski*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych (2009): 17, accessed February 2nd, 2011, <http://prezydencjaue.gov.pl/dopobrania>.

consulted with the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – a post corresponding to the foreign minister of the EU, as well as with the European Parliament.

The prevalent topic in recent years has been the economic crisis and its consequences for the EU itself: the issue of the functioning of the economic and monetary union and further integration; the necessity of budget cuts determining the discussion of the union budget in the years to come (2011-2013), as well as the shape of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020. One of the most significant areas of EU expenditure is the financing of a cohesion policy. Therefore, the abovementioned consequences of the crisis affecting the size of the entire EU budget, also impact the discussion of a new cohesion policy and its legitimacy. Moreover, the current events on the African continent determine foreign policy, including the European Neighbourhood Policy. Yet another challenge is the issue of safety, including energy security, which, among others, is discussed in the new EU growth strategy – Europe 2020.

The aim of this paper is to present the mechanisms involved in exercising the Presidency in the CEU following the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty; hence, the mechanism of shaping the priorities on the European agenda and the assumptions of the Polish Presidency, especially those pertaining to the economic problems of the EU.

THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Presidency of a country in the CEU means that an individual state needs to take over the coordination of the entire work and all the meetings of the council, as well as represent it before other EU institutions. In the former case, the state is expected to display organisational and administrative effectiveness; in the latter, what is required is proficiency in legislative procedure, both in terms of rules of practice and content. These competences are particularly important, taking into consideration the fact that the Council – despite the changes enhancing the role of the Parliament in the decision process – continues to remain the chief legislative body of the EU. Furthermore, it is an intergovernmental body, hence, on the one hand it represents the interests of the member states – as Council members answer to their national governments for their actions; on the other hand, the Council makes decisions pertaining to the internal policies of the member states, as well as intergovernmental and supra-governmental policies, which take into consideration the interests of the entire EU. Thus, the member state taking over the Presidency of the Council must function as an intermediary, seeking out compromise solutions and optimally managing the decision making process, so as to place EU interests over national ones. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a system of 18-month rotating presidencies held by groups of three pre-established member states, (Presidency trios)⁴. For six months each of the

⁴ Declaration 9 in article 16 section 9 of the Treaty of the European Union, together with article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Groups (*presidency trios*) are established

members of a trio chairs over a particular configuration of the Council, except for the Foreign Affairs Council. The remaining members support the Presidency state in all its duties based on a common programme. This solution – aimed at long-term actions – will undoubtedly increase the coherence and effectiveness of EU functioning. However, the basic roles of the Presidency remains unchanged:

- a manager, responsible for organising, coordinating and chairing all the meetings of the Council and its auxiliary bodies, also including Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC),
- a mediator, aimed at reaching a consensus during negotiations – particularly during IGCs – offering compromise solutions, frequently through mutual sacrifices, and striving to reconcile all the sensitive interests of the involved parties.
- a leader, promoting the political initiatives and priorities of the Presidency aspiring to deepen the integration process and facilitate the functioning of the EU,
- a representative of the EU in internal and external affairs, functioning as a liaison between the Council and other EU institutions, as well as between the EU and other countries⁵.

The organisation of the proceedings of the Council, understood in broad terms, is among the basic tasks which each Presidency country faces. During the six-month tenure, the managerial function pivots around the preparation and coordination of nearly 4 thousand meetings of the Council on various levels (working groups, committees, COREPER, the Council of Ministers). Apart from securing the logistics of the all meetings on all working levels, the Presidency country – together with the General Secretary of the CEU – is also responsible for the preparation, translation and archiving of the documents connected with the meetings' agenda. That country prepares the agenda, determines the progress of the work on particular issues by managing discussions, chairs the meetings and conducts negotiations putting forward compromise solutions. Fulfilling the role of a manager in a proficient and efficient manner requires preparing adequate negotiation strategies in advance, as well as determining up to which point individual issues should be processed on a given level of the Council. This, in turn, calls for civil servants with expert knowledge of a particular area, as well as the necessary experience and appropriate strategic-diplomatic skills. The rules of practice in this respect dictate that in order to hold effective meetings of a given assembly and achieve a desired aim, the national delegations should be presented with the agenda and documents with due notice. This makes

on the basis of an equal rotation of Member States, taking into consideration the diversity of the states and the geographical balance within the Union. As a result, with the current composition of the EU, the waiting period for Presidency equals 13 and a half years, and each trio should not include more than one large Member State. In each trio both old and new states should be represented, whereas the dominance of the so-called geographical coalitions should be avoided. For practical reasons, it would seem that the implementation of the abovementioned rules could prove very difficult.

⁵ L. Quaglia, E. Moxon-Browne, *What Makes a Good EU presidency? Italy and Ireland Compared*, "Journal of Common Market Studies" vol. 44 No. 2, 2006, p. 351.

it possible for the interested parties to familiarise themselves with the raised issues and, consequently, limits the area of the dispute to only the most controversial points. Thus, the Presidency country gains additional time for interventions, as well as for preparing and presenting the proposals of specific changes pertaining to the most questionable issues. As a result of this practice, the time devoted to particular delegations is reduced and the entire decision making procedure becomes more effective⁶.

The role of a mediator – assuming the Presidency state wishes to attain a set goal in the sphere of management – consists in seeking out a consensus between the interests of member states represented during negotiations in the Council, intra-institutional negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, as well as during negotiations between the Council and countries outside the EU with respect to trade policy⁷.

At this point, it should be noted that when the Lisbon treaty came into force, among others, it brought about a strengthening of the European Parliament in terms of the adoption of EU legal acts. The ordinary legislative procedure introduced by the treaty (the modified former co-decision procedure) divides the law-making power between the Parliament and the Council equally, granting the right to reject legislation proposals put forward by the commission. Consequently, this means that in many areas the Parliament will have identical decision making powers as the Council⁸. Extending the prerogatives of the Parliament means that cooperation with this institution has become exceptionally important. Hence, the Presidency of the Council cannot be limited to conducting effective negotiations solely within the Council and assuming that the Parliament will automatically accept the consensus reached by the ministerial representatives from particular member states. It is also necessary to observe the talks and speeches in the Parliament and determine the ultimate shape of a legal act together with the MEPs. As a result, this approach increases the chance of success in the negotiations, while the awareness of the Parliament's viewpoint enhances the decision making process⁹.

What is also vital in the process of the negotiations is the bilateral scanning of the positions of the involved parties. As a result, it is possible to identify the common ground, “bargain” over the moot points with the national delegations and, finally,

⁶ D. Kietz, *Methoden zur Analyse von EU-Ratspräsidentschaften*, “Diskussionspapier der FG” 1, SWP Berlin 2007, p. 10f.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁸ The changes introduced by the treaty extended the application of this policy to approximately forty new legislative areas. These are related mainly to the policy areas of freedom, security and justice (border control, asylum policy, immigration policy, judicial cooperation, etc.), common agricultural policy, and – to an extent – trade policy. The Parliament has also gained the power to influence the EU budget equal to that of the Council. This is a result of the elimination of the division between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and subsuming the budget under the co-decision procedure. Source: A. Fuksiewicz, M. Szczepanik, *Parlament Europejski jako partner polskiej Prezydencji*, “Analizy i opinie” No. 112, ISP 2010, p. 5.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5-6.

to formulate compromise solutions which can be accepted by all of the interested states, or at least the vast majority of them. Additionally, expert groups – or the so-called Friends of the Presidency Groups – constitute important instruments supporting the process of arriving at a consensus. They consist of representatives of member states with similar views and help work out compromise solutions. This occurs parallel to negotiations held in various assemblies, hence, accelerating the decision making process. Moreover, even in situations where some groups have already reached a consensus, the adoption of an appropriate and effective decision strategy is a vital instrument which is capable of convincing national delegations to make concessions and accept compromise solutions. When performing the mediator function, the Presidency country must signalise its national interests. It is assumed, that not only does this function entail observing the impartiality rule, but also should lead to such an agreement between all the member states which would benefit the interests of the entire EU. Therefore, in situations where the Presidency state would be unable to ensure the required neutrality due to its national interest, or other considerations, it is possible for the European Commission – whose representatives attend all Council meetings – to take over the mediator function. The civil servants working for the Secretary possess the necessary competences in terms of knowledge, tactics and strategy so as to support the Presidency country. Moreover, apart from purely technical experience, they are also characterised by political neutrality, which makes them valuable allies in the process of devising a compromise between the member states. It should be noted, that in some cases it is the Secretary that drafts proposals of compromise solutions and presents them to the Presidency with due notice; in others, it receives a mandate from the Council to take over mediation in the negotiations between the conflicted parties. This, however, does not change the fact that it is the Presidency state that bears the full responsibility for the decision making process¹⁰.

The state holding the Presidency – as a political leader – concentrates its efforts around attributing genuine significance to current discussions of future challenges for the EU and forming extended plans of action. National delegations need to take into account that their short-term national interests will be subordinated to a long-term European agenda. This is also a method of livening up difficult negotiations and lingering debates and giving them a fresh impulse¹¹. The Presidency can contribute to an increase in the awareness of certain concerns and convince the Commission to initiate actions in a particular area. In response to the indicated problems, proposals for action are made, after which the Council reaches an understanding in order to implement these solutions. Moreover, new practices shaping the decision-making process can be implemented, particularly in areas where attaining an agreement has proven to be difficult¹². The proposals of initiatives and the most vital priorities are

¹⁰ D. Kietz, *op.cit.*, p. 11f.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

¹² J. Tallberg, *The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency*, “Journal of European Public Policy” vol.10 No. 1, 2003, p. 7f.

set out in a programme of activities – the agenda. In the light of the current regulations, with respect to the functioning of a particular configuration of the CEU, the Council agenda should be prepared in close cooperation with the European Commission and the President of the European Council, as well as with the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. The trio is also obliged to include on the agenda important issues related to the political priorities for a given year raised during the discussions within the European Commission. The programme of activities should be presented as a single document a month before the relevant period, after which it should be approved by the General Affairs Council¹³.

The creation of the trio and the rules of procedure are a response to the frequent allegation that the Presidency has a limited effect on the functioning of the EU and no real possibilities of fulfilling the agenda during a six-month cycle. In this respect, it seems understandable that identifying the impact of the agenda on the functioning of the EU with merely introducing new political initiatives is too narrow¹⁴. The role of the Presidency state as a political leader initiating new areas of development should be perceived as much broader. A concept that seems appropriate in this context is *agenda shaping*, particularly with reference to the eighteen-month programme of activities. This term incorporates three alternative and mutually exclusive forms of influencing the agenda: *agenda setting*, *structuring*, and *exclusion*. What is meant in the first case is introducing new issues on the agenda, which were either not touched upon by previous presidencies, or whose realisation is necessitated by the current situation. Agenda structuring takes place during the tenure of the Presidency itself and chiefly consists in emphasising a particular issue or – depending on the progress on the negotiations – in postponing, or delaying them. Agenda exclusion means giving up on a particular problem due to justified causes, or eliminating it from the programme altogether¹⁵. Perceiving the fulfilment of the agenda according to the presented scheme could be motivated, for instance, by the specific way in which the EU legislative system functions. The Presidency state – as the main player shaping the talks – undertakes the effort of working out an agreement which would satisfy all the delegations of member states. As a result of the negotiations, a common position is established often through mutual concessions. The final effect, however, can be very different from the initial assumptions, both in terms of the shape of the accepted solution and the time of its implementation. A country holding the Presidency which also has the advantage of having a strong position in a given area of EU policy will find it much easier to convince others and accomplish its objectives, than a country which has no such advantage. Additionally, in many cases the success of a Presidency in terms of fulfilling its aims also depends on the length of the negotiations. The process of negotiations can be divided into several main

¹³ Council decision of 1st December 2009 adopting the Council's rules of procedure (2009/937/UE) Article 2, para. 6.

¹⁴ J. Tallberg, *op.cit.*, p. 2-4.


¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 4-13.

stages¹⁶, which may overlap (Fig. 1). The first one (PA – pre-adoption) is the interval during which policy proposals are presented. The second stage (A - acceptance) involves accepting the proposal by the Commission. The third stage (I) is described as an intermediate one, as it takes place between stage A and the last stage – D (decision), which is when the final voting takes place. Stage D is simultaneously the moment when the Council accepts the decision – hence, is a success of the Presidency. Each of the stages – apart from the intermediary one – can last up to six months, i.e. exactly the term of a single Presidency.

Based on the empirical verification of the presented model, it is possible to claim that holding the Presidency in the initial stages of the negotiation process “doesn't pay”¹⁷. The actual negotiations take place on the level of COREPER and working groups, where strong lobbying influences the final shape of the decisions to a large extent. Therefore, there may not be enough time to follow through with the entire procedure. The analysis also demonstrates that a Presidency has a better impact factor in terms of its priorities on a level where voting is more centralised, i.e. in the Council. Moreover, irrespective of the size of the member state or the strength of its economy – which the weight of the vote is based on – in the voting stage the Presidency country has a much bigger impact on the decision process than the other states¹⁸.

Figure 1

An outline of the bargaining process conducted by the Presidency



Source: J. Schalk, R. Torenvlied, J. Weesie, F. Stokman, *The power of the Presidency in EU Council decision-making*, “European Union Politics” vol. 8 No. 2, 2007, p. 232.

¹⁶ J. Schalk, R. Torenvlied, J. Weesie, F. Stokman, *The power of the Presidency in EU Council decision-making*, “European Union Politics” vol. 8 No. 2, 2007, p. 231f.

¹⁷ However, one cannot deny that the country to hold the Presidency as the first in a trio acts a “moving spirit” regardless of whether the negotiations are in their initial stage or a further one. If such a state initiates important changes, e.g. related to regulating a cohesion policy, the financial framework, etc., it can still be perceived as an important player. Nevertheless, if “effectiveness” were to be measured through the number of the legal acts adopted, one would have to concur with the authors of the quoted publication. Source: *ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 234-246.

The role of the Presidency as a representative of the EU both in internal and external affairs has been significantly modified by the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty has introduced a hybrid Presidency, i.e. one that combines permanent and rotating elements¹⁹. The former involve two new positions (elected for a term of office): the President of the Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is simultaneously also a member of the Council of the European Union, the chair of one of the Council's configurations – the Council for Foreign Affairs, as well as the vice-president of the European Commission. The rotating Presidency, as has been already mentioned, is held by the trios. The emergence of the two new offices has reduced the power of the rotating Presidency to a large extent. This is most clearly visible in terms of the rotating Presidency as a representative of the EU in international relations. When the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the High Representative became responsible for the external relations, and he coordinates the entire foreign policy of the EU. Also, the president of the Council performs representative functions with respect to countries outside the EU, yet he is obliged to perform his duties without infringing the powers of the High Representative (Fig. 2).

Apart from preparing matters strictly related to the Presidency itself, what is also of importance is presenting a state's achievements, and hence promoting both the entire country and particular regions. Therefore, the next natural task of a Presidency, and an extremely important one at that, is the so-called external promotion, i.e. acquainting the citizens of other member states with an appropriate image of the country and its parts. The cities (and hence the entire regions) chosen to host the meetings of working groups should pay particular attention to preparing the logistics of these events (together with central agencies), but also to arranging the cultural setting. As a result, internal promotion will be restricted to promoting the Presidency itself. With respect to the issue of particular regions, this can be used as a way of bringing the EU closer to citizens, building a civil society, as well as engaging non-governmental organisations and voluntary workers in the preparation of the meetings²⁰.


What undoubtedly facilitates carrying the promotional tasks is spreading the conference and meeting centres across the country. Member states have adopted various strategies in this respect. For instance, Slovenia assumed a centralised idea of Presidency, characterised by the weaker involvement of particular regions or social groups. On the other hand, France – in order to boost the promotional effect in society – decided to host numerous important events in cities other than Paris, e.g. in Marseilles, Nantes, Lyon, La Rochelle²¹.

¹⁹ *The Treaty of Lisbon: implementing the institutional innovations*, Joint Study CEPS, EGMONT and EPC (2007): 45.

²⁰ P. Idczak, I. Musiałkowska, M. Sapała-Gazda, *Rola regionów podczas przewodnictwa Polski w Radzie UE*, in: Z. Czachór, M. Tomaszuk (ed.), *Przewodnictwo państwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej – doświadczenia partnerów, propozycje dla Polski*, Poznań 2009.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 72.

Figure 2
Outline of a hybrid presidency



Source: own study

The changes stemming from the new regulations and the division of tasks between the Presidency state and the permanent Presidency EU bodies do not mean that the rotating Presidency forfeits all responsibility for EU foreign policy. It still holds important powers, particularly in cases where its function of a representative overlaps with the administrative function. The rotating Polish Presidency will chair some of the preparatory bodies of the Foreign Affairs Council, although the meetings of the Council itself will be presided over by the High Representative. Moreover, a representative of the rotating Presidency will chair the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II) responsible for preparing the Foreign Affairs Council. In turn, when it comes to working groups, the chairmanship has been divided into a number of categories – some will be chaired by a civil servant from the External Action Service of the EU which is under the authority of the High Representative; others by a civil servant from the Presidency state. It should be noted that according

to the rules of procedure of the Council, the rotating Presidency chairs the council meetings if they are related to matters of trade policy²².

Effective management of the agenda will be possible due to the clearly stated priorities of the Presidency.

THE ESSENCE OF THE PRESIDENCY PRIORITIES

An important factor conditioning the effectiveness of the actions undertaken by a Presidency state is the choice of the appropriate priorities. These, on the one hand, should include the most vital aspects of EU activity at a given time (from the point of view of the future development of the Union), and on the other – match the aspirations of the Presidency state. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the freedom of defining the priorities by a member state is relatively limited. This fact chiefly stems from the requirement of the Presidency state's impartiality, but also from the adopted legal regulations (Council decision 2009/937/E), which impose the necessity to cooperate with EU bodies in preparing the final draft of the programme of activities.

The choice of priorities performed by a country preparing to hold the Presidency ought to be based on two fundamental criteria: the criterion of the *desirability* of a particular issue for a state, as well as the criterion of *feasibility*, referring to the probability of attaining the set goals. The best-case scenario should be selecting such priorities that would satisfy both criteria to the greatest extent²³. According to the first criterion, when selecting its priorities, countries suggest ones which meet their national interests, and at the same time can be presented as European projects accepted by all member states and undertaken in the interest of the entire EU. Promoting one's own national interests too strongly might lead to losing the role of an unbiased mediator, and as a result, weaken the negotiating position. On the other hand, neutrality might also turn out to be rather impractical. Each state – through the powers stemming from the Presidency – may have a significant impact on the deepening of the process of EU integration. Being too neutral may result in a bland Presidency, and one perceived by public opinion as bureaucratic. Such a Presidency may become unattractive to the media, and consequently turn out to be even undesirable. The conviction that a completely impartial stance leads to success can sometimes result in a paradox where ambitious politicians may also be the ones who are successful in negotiating and reaching cooperation between member states²⁴. Therefore, from

²² A. Fuksiewicz, M. Szczepanik, op. cit., p. 2f.

²³ M. Jaczak, B. Słomińska, *Dobór priorytetów przez państwa członkowskie sprawujące przewodnictwo w Radzie UE w latach 2002-2008 – wnioski dla Polski*, "Biuletyn Analiz UKiE" No. 2/2009, 2009, p. 52.

²⁴ A. Schout, *The presidency as juggler. Managing Conflicting Expectations*, EIPASCOPE 1998, p. 4.

the point of view of a country preparing itself to hold the Presidency, the ideal solution could be initiatives involving that state's national interest, but simultaneously positively impacting its public image. In the case of Poland, such schemes – which in a way reflect its current interests and are related to the country's geographical location – could be supporting the Eastern Partnership project, a Polish-Swedish joint venture, or endorsing democracy in North Africa and the Middle East.

The second criterion serves to determine the probability of obtaining positive results and fulfilling set goals. Already at the stage of drafting the agenda, it is vital to assess whether a member state preparing to take over the Presidency has the necessary assets and the power to attain an agreement. Such an assessment should be based on a thorough diagnosis of the moot points and carrying out (in advance) appropriate analyses assessing whether the remaining countries will be willing to support the proposed endeavours²⁵. In other words, checking if there is a possibility for the member states to work out a common ground with respect to a given problem. This issue is particularly important for the three countries taking hold of the Presidency, as it deals with their immediate involvement in shaping the long-term EU agenda, i.e. negotiating the assumptions behind the new financial perspective after 2013.

THE PRIORITIES OF THE POLISH PRESIDENCY

On 21st July 2010 the Council of Ministers adopted a document which tentatively set out the plans of the Polish Presidency. These were shaped in a process of national consultations as well as through international talks, with other states, EU institutions and partners within the Poland – Denmark – Cyprus trio. The final list of priorities and the programme of activities for the Polish Presidency of the European Union was presented in June 2011. The priorities proposed in the 2010 document evolved under the influence of current events occurring in the EU and across the world. They were presented in a document published by the Council of Ministers on 15th March 2011 – *The Six-month Programme of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council in the Second Half of 2011*. The document was put forward by the Government Plenipotentiary for the Preparation of Government Administration Bodies and the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Both general priorities and plans for particular thematic areas were selected (Table 1). The priorities and areas were combined with the premises of the new Europe 2020 strategy, which replaced the Lisbon strategy in March 2010. Additionally, the assumptions of Poland's chairmanship also stem from the European Commission's strategy and current proposal of activities. The Europe 2020 strategy – set for the next 10 years – refers to the European idea of a social market economy and is based on three priorities (Table 1). The first area – 'smart growth' refers to the development

²⁵ M. Jatzak, B. Słomińska, *op. cit.*, p. 53-54.

of economies based on knowledge and innovation; the second area – ‘sustainable growth’ is to encourage economies which are characterised by competitiveness and low-emissions, as well as by using natural resources more effectively; the task of the third one – ‘inclusive growth’ is to inspire economies characterised by high employment rates, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion²⁶.

In order to reach the main targets, the Commission proposes the Europe 2020 programme, which is comprised of several flagship initiatives. Their implementation is the common task of all member states and requires the involvement of organisations operating at the EU level of the member states themselves, as well as regional and local authorities. The initiatives are as follows²⁷:

- Innovation Union – consists in using research and innovation in solving our greatest problems, as well as eliminating the gap in commercialising research results²⁸.
- Youth on the move – aimed at improving the quality and attractiveness of European higher education on the global stage by supporting the mobility of students and young specialists. The goal is to increase the availability of job posts in member states for candidates from all over Europe, as well as to properly recognise qualifications and work experience.
- A digital agenda for Europe – its implementation is to bring lasting economic and social benefits by creating a uniform digital market based on very fast Internet connections. By 2013 all European residents should have access to a fast Internet broadband.
- Resource efficient Europe – this initiative supports changes moving towards a low-emissions and resource efficient economy. By 2020 this would reduce the value of imported oil and gas by 60 billion Euros.
- An industrial policy for globalisation era – its task is to increase the competitiveness of the EU industry sector in the aftermath of the economic crisis, to support initiative and the development of new skills. The assumption is to create millions of new work places.

²⁶ Progress in fulfilling these three priorities will be measured with reference to the five EU headline targets, which the member states will place above national aims, yet taking into consideration their initial situation. By 2020:

- the employment rate of the age group 20-64 should equal 75%;
- 3% of EU GDP should be invested in research and development;
- the 20/20/20 goals with respect to climate and energy should be reached;
- school drop-out rates should be reduced to 10%, and at least 40% of the younger generation should obtain higher education;
- the number of people at risk of poverty should be reduced by 20 million.

European Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. COM (2010) 2020 final.

²⁷ Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth...

²⁸ An example of implementing this initiative could be the unitary patent, thanks to which enterprises could save 289 million Euros each year. www.eurofunds.org (accessed 20th February 2011).

- An agenda for new skills and jobs – aimed at creating conditions for modernising the work markets, in order to increase the employment rate, as well as to secure the durability of social models in the light of the retiring generation of the demographic boom.
- European platform against poverty – its goal is to ensure economic, social and territorial cohesion by helping the poor and socially excluded, as well as to enable them to actively participate in social life.

In order to ensure that the undertaken tasks will be effectively put into practice, the role of monitoring and managing progress will also be strengthened. What is important is the integration of the Europe 2020 strategy with a Stability and Growth Pact so as to face the current challenges in a post-crisis Europe. Both strategies are assumed to achieve similar reform aims.

Table 1

The priorities and areas of the Polish Presidency in 2011 and the priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy.

The main priorities according to the document published by the government of the Republic of Poland in 2011	The main priorities according to the document published by the government of the Republic of Poland in 2010	Focus areas of the Presidency	Europe 2020 priorities
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. European integration as a source of growth 2. Secure Europe 3. Europe benefitting from openness 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The internal market 2. Relations with the East 3. Strengthening the EU's external energy policy 4. A common security and defence policy 5. Negotiating the multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020 6. Fully utilising Europe's intellectual capital 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Financial and economic issues 2. Agriculture and fisheries 3. Cohesion policy 4. Transport, telecommunications and energy 5. Justice and home affairs 6. Competitiveness 7. Environmental protection 8. Employment, social policy, health and consumer protection 9. Education, youth and culture 10. Foreign affairs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Smart growth: economic development based on knowledge and innovation 2. Sustainable growth: encouraging economies to be resource efficient, environmentally friendly and competitive 3. Inclusive growth: encouraging economies with high employment rates, ensuring social and territorial cohesion.

Author's own analysis based on materials published by the government of the Republic of Poland in 2010 and 2011, as well as the European Commission, COM(2010) 553 final, 6th March 2010.

The next part of this paper presents a discussion of the priorities and plans with an emphasis on the economic aspects of the Polish Presidency. They are of particular significance in the post-crisis reality, with the EU debating on the future of integra-

tion, its pace (such as the proposal of creating a two-speed Europe within the framework of the economic and monetary union), size, sources of budget income and energy security. Each of the priorities of the strategy presented in Table 1 involves specific ideas pertaining to the growth of the EU until 2020; hence, it constitutes a list of guidelines for the shaping of new multiannual financial framework in the EU. After the modification performed in the recent months (April/May 2011), what can be observed is that the particular labels of the Polish Presidency's priorities are thematically parallel with the aims of the Europe 2020 strategy. Poland strives to make its proposals²⁹ congruent with the assumptions behind European guidelines, particularly in terms of a cohesion policy and energy security.

The first priority – European integration as a source of growth includes the previous target related to deepening the integration in terms of the internal market, the issues of the budget and negotiating the multiannual financial framework for 2014–2020, as well as the question of external trade relations and opening new markets (included earlier with, among others, relations with the East).

With reference to the **internal market** – Poland will be postulating strengthening the internal market – its potential is not fully utilised, and to some extent the freedom of movement of people and the result of production is not fully realised. Also, the 20th anniversary of creating and introducing the common European market takes place during the Presidency of the trio. Poland's activities within the sphere of the internal market, among others, will concentrate on: implementing the proposals of the European Commission stemming from M. Monti's report from 2010 on the future of the internal market – a package of reforms entitled the *Single Market Act* regulating the financial sector, issues of mobility and free movement of knowledge and innovation, removing the existing barriers in the EU market, as well as developing the services sector. Moreover, the Polish Presidency wants to focus on advancing the market of electronic services, and in order to do so, it will strive to eliminate barriers impeding international online transactions, as well as continue to work on lowering the process of international roaming³⁰. **Negotiations of the multiannual financial framework 2014–2020** and the issue of the EU budget – are of particular importance. The Polish government conducted an opinion poll pertaining to the importance of particular priorities. According to the participants of the survey, the negotiations of the long-term financial framework for the coming years was the most important of Poland's priorities (cf. Chart 1).


²⁹ The discussion of the priorities and areas of the Polish Presidency in this section is based on the materials published by the Polish government in 2010 and 2011, public consultations on 1st October 2010, Warsaw, as well as www.prezydencjaue.gov.pl (accessed 20th February 2011 and 25th May 2011).

³⁰ Interview with Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, http://finanse.wnp.pl_minister-dowgielewicz-priorytety-polskiej-prezydencji-w-ue,139236-1-0-3.html, and Waldemar Pawlak www.mg.gov.pl (accessed 10th May 2011).

Chart 1

The importance of the priorities of the Presidency according to the readers of the website prezydencjaue.gov.pl

In your opinion which of the initial priorities of the Polish presidency is most important



Source: www.prezydencjaue.gov.pl (accessed 26th February 2011)³¹.

What will take place during the Polish Presidency is a stage of in-depth analysis of the European Commission proposals, as well as the identification of the main negotiating tasks in the next EU budget. Talks on this topic will commence in the middle of 2011 and their formal end will occur in the second half of 2012. It will require a political agreement in the European Council during the Danish Presidency – in the first half of 2012. This period reflects the significance of the trio in the entire process (cf. Fig. 1). The goal of the Polish Presidency in this respect will primarily be to manage the process of bargaining and to advance the talks as much as possible, including making it possible for all member states to articulate their interests. Poland is currently in a rather special situation, as the person responsible for the budget is the Polish commissioner – Janusz Lewandowski. Although the commissioners are independent of their home country and their task is to represent the interests of the entire EU, there is always the suspicion of member states informally supporting their national interests. Recently, in order to eliminate these concerns as much as possible, the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso took up the main tasks related to the negotiations, and the commissioners involved in financial and budget issues are to support him in the process. Moreover, currently (between 2007 and 2013) Poland is the biggest beneficiary of EU funding, hence, the issue of supervising negotiations related to this topic in the Council of the EU is extremely inter-

³¹ Between the 10th and 26th February 2011 678 respondents took part in the opinion poll.

esting. The Polish government ensures that Poland will play the role of a so-called honest broker in this context. Additionally, much depends on the adoption of one of the scenarios of developing a cohesion policy – only the so-called European scenario (Delors' scenario) makes it possible to deepen and extend the integration process and realise the aims set out by the Europe 2020 strategy. This stems from the division of powers and ensuring appropriate financial means necessary for the development of the entire European Union³². The Polish government will endeavour to maintain a cohesion policy by demonstrating the advantages it brings about, not solely for the programme's beneficiaries, but also for the states whose transactors participate in, e.g. executing public orders, thus making profits. The moot points also pertain to issues of own resources, resolving the conflict of interest between net contributors and beneficiaries, or the British rebate³³.

The specific sub-priority of the **external trade relations** (previously under the label of relations with the East) bears a chiefly political importance. In fact, it is an attempt at carrying out the main project of the Eastern Partnership³⁴. After consultations with the Hungarian Presidency in 2011, the task of the Polish chairmanship in the Council will include organising a conference as part of the Eastern Partnership project. In this context, Poland will aim at, among others, entering into association agreements, accepting mandates for the negotiations on creating free trade zones with the EU, finalising talks with Ukraine about liberalising visa and trade policies, as well as intensifying trade cooperation between the EU and countries to the East.

The second priority – a Secure Europe concentrates chiefly on **strengthening an external energy policy**. It is aimed at an in-depth discussion of new legislative and non-legislative solutions which would allow the European energy sector to remain competitive in today's changing environment. The plan includes holding a debate on the current solutions and new directions within the EU in the context of the energy market. Its aim is to work out mechanisms of introducing energy policies that would be characterised by solidarity and external competitiveness. This priority corresponds to the 20/20/20 target of reducing pollution and increasing the amount of energy obtained from renewal energy sources. Moreover, it is a continuation of the Hungarian policy carried out in this respect.

³² A. Faludi, J. Peyrony, *Cohesion Policy Contributing to Territorial Cohesion – Scenarios*, RSA Conference Materials, Bled, Slovenia, http://www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk_events_2011_mar-slovenia-papers.asp (accessed 11th March 2011).

³³ Polish Press Agency PAP 16th May 2011.

³⁴ The Eastern Partnership is an initiative consisting in extending the actions of the EU within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (hence, EU foreign policy). It is a response to the proposal of creating a Union for the Mediterranean suggested by the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. The major aim of the Eastern Partnership is to bring countries from the Eastern Europe states and South Caucasus closer together. It is to promote democracy and help develop economic and interpersonal relations, as well as issues connected to energy safety with countries located to the East of the EU. The partnership includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

What is more, the task of the Polish Presidency in the sphere of finance and economy will be strengthening economic governance in the EU and attempting to finalise the process of setting up the European Stability Mechanism which will require changes in the Lisbon Treaty.

Other issues taken up will include:

- actions related to the protection of borders: e.g. changing the regulation on Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union), so as to make Frontex support member states more effectively in crisis situations (such as in North Africa and the Middle East);
- discussions on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Polish government believes the CAP should be more market oriented and ought to take into consideration the common good, including food security and multifunctional development. An important aspect of reforming the CAP will involve decisions pertaining to direct subsidy payments and supporting rural areas, as well as a policy on the quality of farm produce. Additionally, work will be carried out to implement an EU biodiversity action plan;
- strengthening the military and civic capabilities of the EU, and supporting actions to establish a direct dialogue between the EU and NATO.

The third priority – **Europe benefiting from openness** – is aimed at, among others, EU contacts with Russia (the Presidency will support actions serving to sign an agreement with Russia, outlining the content, as well as the formal and legal framework of an EU-Russia partnership. It will also continue to develop the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation). It also involves negotiations within the World Trade Organisation directed at finalising the so-called Doha Round (with respect to trade liberalisation, subsidising agriculture, patent law, anti-dumping regulations, or intellectual property protection).

Additionally the Polish Presidency will support endeavours to work out new relations between the EU and the Arabic world and a complex strategy for that region, as well as aid democratisation and the construction of modern state institutions in North African countries. It has also been established that in the abovementioned context the Polish foreign minister will represent the EU in consultation with Catherine Ashton. A major aim of Poland's Presidency in the CEU, as a "strategic political project" of the EU, will be finalising the accession negotiations with Croatia and signing the accession treaty, continuing the negotiations with Turkey and Iceland, or supporting the European aspirations of the Western Balkan countries.

A number of assumptions have also been made in the sphere of **thematic areas**. Within the area of **economic and financial issues** the most vital target of the Polish Presidency will be to strengthen economic governance in the EU and consolidate public finance. Poland intends to actively support actions ensuring lasting financial stability and on-going, stable and balanced economic growth. The tenure of Poland's Presidency in the CEU will also be the time of implementing long-term solutions prepared by a taskforce on reforming EU economic governance. That is why Poland

will direct the work on concluding the work of the first cycle of the so-called European semester. The Polish Presidency will also strive to effectively carry out the procedure of adopting the annual EU budget for 2012. It is of extreme importance to reconcile the interests of the member states, as well as the European Parliament and to reach an agreement without which adopting the budget is not possible. This is borne out by the example of the negotiations in 2010 when the EU faced the threat of having no annual budget. Moreover, actions undertaken with respect to financial services will also concur with the commitments resulting from the decisions made by the G20 group.

The next two areas are key for the issue of EU budget expenses, as they are connected with the most costly spheres of activity. These are a **cohesion policy and agriculture**.

With respect to agriculture and fisheries Poland's Presidency will focus on:

- reforming the system of direct payments – Poland will attempt to reach an agreement and ease out a new system of direct subsidies;
- the future of the rural development policy – through strategic and legislative endeavours, Poland will try to arrive at a consensus, with an emphasis on the complementary use of the instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and cohesion policy for rural areas. Additionally, it will strive to highlight the role of these areas in the context of new challenges (climate issues, preserving biodiversity, the economics of water management, public goods, etc.);
- supporting new investments connected with the development of renewable energy sources in rural areas;
- work on changing the rules of the common fisheries policy.

With respect to a cohesion policy, in the second half of 2011 Poland will attempt to include strategic issues related to the future of that policy on the agenda of the General Affairs Council³⁵. These issues will pivot around the discussion of the draft regulations of a Cohesion policy in the years 2014-2020. These are key documents conditioning the shape of a cohesion policy in subsequent years by determining its aims, as well as the instruments of its execution. The aim is to achieve the broadest possible compromise as far as strengthening the effectiveness of a cohesion policy in achieving EU development goals, also taking into consideration the Europe 2020 strategy. Poland is promoting one particular solution – the so-called integrated approach to regional development. This policy can be described as place-based, and involves the strong coordination of sectoral policies. This is what differs this approach from the current one (2007-2013) where the sectoral policies are dominant³⁶. Also, within this context, the work of the Hungarian Presidency on the newly adopted Territorial Agenda 2020 will be continued.

³⁵ This is a group formed within the Council of the European Union.

³⁶ On the basis of VASAB conference materials, P. Żuber, *Territorial Cohesion*, Warsaw, 7-8th February 2011.

As far as the next topical issue – transportation, telecommunications and energy – is concerned, one of the key tasks of Poland's Presidency will be revising the guidelines on the trans-European transport networks, including the rules of financing investments in TEN-T³⁷. This is especially important, as these are extremely large investments financed from a number of sources: the TEN-T programme, the European Investment Bank, the Cohesion Fund, as well as (if proper provisions were made) from public-private partnerships. The digital agenda for Europe will constitute another significant issue, as the execution of many of the actions and initiatives included in it are to occur in the second half of 2011. Carrying out this strategy is one of the targets of the Europe 2020 programme, and Poland intends to attribute to the challenges placed before the e-administration.

In the context of the EU's external energy policy Poland shall:

- endeavour to work out a common and coherent position with respect to regional and global energy problems;
- strive to create a mechanism of financing small and “scattered” investments in energy efficiency in sectors such as the construction industry, district heating, heat and electricity distribution networks, local public transport and electricity production;
- continue the activities of previous presidencies in connection to the Energy Infrastructure Package.

Another vital topic area is **competitiveness**, in relation to which:

- a debate will be held on the approach to an industrial policy in the context of the economic crisis and its influence on the state of enterprises. It is believed that during the Polish Presidency a list of initiatives might be prepared which the EU member states committed themselves to at the end of 2008, by supporting the proposal of an action plan for companies based on the Small Business Act;
- talks related to innovation and space policy will be conducted;
- the Presidency will continue work on creating a European patent, as well as legislative endeavours pertaining to technological harmonisation;
- the issue of improving the regulatory environment policy will be considered crucial – the so-called Smart Regulation initiative – with particular emphasis of its influence on the development of enterprises and the increase in the competitiveness of the European economy;
- Poland will continue reviewing the legal regulations related to consumer rights, support increasing consumer product safety as well as improving market supervision in terms of products that pose a significant threat;
- the issue of boosting the competitiveness of the tourism sector will be raised, e.g. by considering the role of innovation in tourism, analysing new challenges as well as assessing the progress in carrying out the Agenda for sustainable and competitive European tourism;

³⁷ A programme of developing transportation infrastructure in the EU.

- work will be continued on issues such as regulating the problem of orphan works or the collective management of copyright and related rights. The Polish Presidency will be responsible for synchronizing and presenting the EU viewpoint at the World Intellectual Property Organisation.

Moreover, during Poland's presidency in the CEU work will be carried out on the fundamental principles of the 8th Framework Programme (named Horizon 2020) with respect to research, technological development and demonstration activities. The chief initiatives and activities of the Presidency will include, among others, "enhancing the accessibility of the 8th FP to SMEs, small research teams, as well as convergence regions; better research coordination at the European, supra-national and national levels; deeper integration of the European Research Area (ERA). It will also be vital to enhance the synergy between a cohesion policy and the 8th Framework Programme by ensuring complementarity between the instruments of structural funds and framework programmes, supporting the formation of European clusters, creating a mechanism of co-financing the construction and functioning of regional research infrastructure from the funds of the 8th FP, as well as integrating regional and national policies in the B+R+I area"³⁸.

With respect to **social policy and employment** the Presidency will concentrate on:

- working on solutions which would facilitate reconciling professional and private life;
- actions aimed at professional activation in the context of demographic challenges;
- encouraging activity on the labour market and an active social integration policy;
- promoting various forms of cooperation between the government administration, local administration and non-governmental organisations in achieving the aims of social policy and employment.

The remaining topical areas are related to cultural issues, education and foreign affairs. Additional important elements of Poland's Presidency in the Council of the EU will include the promotional initiatives of a strong socio-economic character, directly connected with the events planned for the second half of 2011: the European Year of Volunteering, the European Culture Congress, the European Congress of People with Disabilities, as well as the Internal Market Forum. These events are to serve as the "political promotion of Poland and creating its image as a modern, creative and dynamic country, which cares about following the best examples and role models and benefiting from a common European market"³⁹. Additionally, the 50th anniversary of OECD, as well as the 15th anniversary of Poland's accession to this organisation fall during the Polish presidency.

³⁸ prezycncjaue.gov.pl (accessed 20th February 2011).

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

CONCLUSION

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the models, and to an extent, also the tasks of rotating presidencies changed. Along with the introduction of new functions in EU institutions, a permanent presidency was introduced, which assumes inter-institutional cooperation. Moreover, the tenure of the rotating presidency was extended from 6 to 18 months, with the provision that it be held by three states. This period is sufficient to prepare both the member states and the EU institutions for the adoption of specific decisions.

Poland shall be the first country in its trio (together with Denmark and Cyprus), initiating the decision process in numerous crucial economic areas: modelling the budget, the financial framework, the internal market, or the shape of a cohesion policy. Its agenda was prepared very effectively. In the subsequent months, during the Presidency itself, this agenda may only undergo reductions or modifications. The most important premises may be subject to changes stemming from Poland's current situation in the EU. During the conference "Poland and Spain in the EU – Experiences and Prospects" held on 4th November 2010 at the University of Warsaw, The Spanish Secretary of State for the European Union – Diego López Garrido said: "We came up with dozens of different scenarios when preparing for the Presidency but we did not expect such crises". Therefore, it is vital for both the administration and politicians to be prepared for changes, and be able to implement the regulations of crisis management during the Presidency in the CEU. An external threat that might contribute to modifying the activities of the Presidency might be the current situation in North Africa. The effectiveness of managing the presidency, in turn, might be influenced by a change of the government resulting from the parliamentary elections which will be held in Poland in the Autumn of 2011. The blame for the unsuccessful Czech Presidency is primarily placed on politicians who "spoiled" the work of thousands of public civil servants. Consequently, the Presidency will be yet another test assessing the maturity of the Polish political class as well as Polish democracy⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ Considerations of the article can be confirmed by results of the ex-post assessment. The greatest achievement of the Polish Presidency was the adoption of the "six-pack" strengthening economic and financial management in the EU, the smooth adoption of the EU budget for 2012, the uniform system of patent protection, the directive on consumer rights, the discussions on the European Commission's proposals for the multiannual financial framework and the legislative package for cohesion policy. In the EU external relations, it is important to note that Poland prepared the substantive content of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and facilitated the agreement on conditions for accession of Russia to the World Trade Organization. In turn, the weaknesses of the Polish Presidency were an insufficient action on economic growth in the post-crisis time. Moreover, Poland was unable to go beyond the EU internal matters especially in case of external energy security. Due to delay of the publication of the Communication of the European Commission it was impossible to initiate an intense debate on e-commerce. Due to the same reason the legislative changes in the field of public procurement law were also not begun which was one of the priority proposal of the Single Market Act. To sum up it is claimed that the Polish Presidency was surely a success at an organizational level. The fears of potential obstacles as a result of parliamentary elections in the mid-term of the Presidency turned out unjustified.

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POLISH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)

The article attempts to present the background for research into Polish direct investment aimed at foreign markets, the so-called outward FDI¹. The first part of the article provides arguments justifying the purposefulness of investigating Polish FDI and points to a *de facto* dissonance which occurs between the poor recognition of the issue and its growing economic importance. Next, the most important theories explaining the flow of capital in the form of FDI are discussed and the possibility of using them to analyze Polish investment is emphasized. Also, the results of selected empirical studies are presented.

The International Monetary Fund defines FDI as investment made in order to acquire participation in management in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, with the foreign investor having the capacity to effectively participate in management. The lower limit marking the execution of direct investment is at the range of 10 -25% of the voting share. In other words, foreign direct investment includes, apart from the 100% ownership by a foreign investor, commonly occurring joint partnership (joint ventures), and long-term internal corporation loans given by the parent company to its branch in another country. Reinvested profits are also included in foreign direct investment. FDI can be also treated as a form of capital import. Generally, it can be defined as undertaking from scratch independent economic activity abroad (greenfield) or taking over management in an already existing enterprise via Merger & Acquisitions². The internationally available publications are dominated by research into investment from highly developed countries which is being directed to less affluent economies. FDI originated in Poland is recognized as such to a very small extent. This so far very poor investigation of Polish FDI is certainly connected with the small scale of the phenomenon at the moment. However, the situation can soon change.

¹ The literature search query was conducted within the project of the Ministry for Science and Higher Education, "Poles in Germany. Social, political, economic and legal aspects".

² A. Budnikowski, *Międzynarodowe stosunki gospodarcze [International business relations]*, Warsaw 1996, p. 144.

Taking up the issue is a result of the present state of knowledge about Polish entrepreneurship abroad, including the EU countries. After initial reconnaissance it can be concluded that research concerning this issue is not significantly developed. Yet, recognizing Polish entrepreneurship in the EU is of tremendous cognitive importance in the context of the predicted increase of FDI from Poland in the near future, as well as because of the growing expectations of potential investors to receive assistance in this matter from the Polish state³.

According to the concept of the Investment Development Path (IDP)⁴ every country at a certain stage of evolution changes from being a receiver of the capital into being a provider of the capital; it sends out more capital than it receives. Thus, it can be expected that together with the advancing modernization of the economy and the expanding scope of participation in the global network it is also ahead of Poland⁵. As the study carried out by the Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research showed the accession to the EU had a (psychologically) positive influence on the FDI initiative as, on the one hand, it raised the level of self-confidence and optimism among Polish entrepreneurs and, on the other hand, it increased the trust among the foreign partners⁶. The study at the same time confirmed that the FDI by Polish companies is still at the initial stage of development.

³ W. Karpińska-Mizielińska, T. Smuga, *Determinanty bezpośrednich inwestycji polskich przedsiębiorstw na rynkach zagranicznych* [Determinants of direct investment by Polish enterprises in foreign markets], "Gospodarka Narodowa" No. 9/ 2007 p. 31-51.

⁴ J. Dunning, R. Narula, *Foreign direct investment and governments: Catalyst for economic restructuring*, London, New York, Routledge 1996, p. 1-9.

⁵ The graphic representation of the investment development path is a continuous line marking the net investment position of a country, the so-called NOI (Net Outward Investment). In terms of arithmetics it is the difference between the gross outward investment and the gross inward investment. The first stage of the investment development path is characterized by the negative gradient of the NOI curve which additionally assumes negative values. The location benefits of such economy (apart from natural resources) prove insufficient to attract foreign investors. At the second stage the NOI curve still assumes negative values which shows the dominance of inward investment over outward investment from a given country, and the gradient of the curve initially negative (although less than in the first stage) is starting to change into positive. A country needs to have some desirable characteristics which ensure the inflow of investors. The third stage of the investment development path is characterized by the positive gradient of the NOI curve which initially assumes negative values to reach positive values next. The location benefits of an economy at this stage such as a large absorbent market, well developed infrastructure and innovative potential enable the external effects advantage, which taking into account the increase of payments and production factors attracts mainly technologically advanced investment. The fourth stage of investment development path is characterized by a positive value of NOI and its clearly positive gradient. An economy at this stage of development outward investment dominate over inward investment and this tendency is growing which means that the country is a provider of net investment. The last fifth stage according to Narula and Dunning is open and unlimited with the NOI curve having both positive and negative values (reflecting the dominance of inward investment or outward investment for a particular economy) and a positive or negative gradient. Eventually the curve fluctuates around the line of balance (NOI=0), and the investment position of a country oscillates around zero.

⁶ W. Karpińska-Mizielińska, T. Smuga, op.cit., p. 48.

Taking up the issue of Polish FDI also reflects the objectives of the foreign and economic policy of the Republic of Poland which are expressed, for example in the strategy of internationalization. The Ministry of Economy sees the instruments supporting the internationalization of Polish enterprises as an integral part of the Operational Program for Innovative Economy and the Regional Operational Programs for the years 2007-2013. "Increasing the presence of Polish enterprises in the international market" is one of the priorities of the economic policy of the government in line with the "assumptions for the strategy of promoting Polish economy" prepared by the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry stipulated that through "the strategy of internationalizing Polish economy"⁷ it wants to promote the economy, that is Polish business abroad, and not "Poland" as a brand name. The strategy is focused on activities which are supposed to result in the growth of trade and investment, including Polish investment abroad. For the time being however, there are around 60 institutions and offices with an annual budget of 100 million PLN which deal with promoting the Polish economy in a manner which is not well coordinated or very effective⁸.

In international publications concerning outward FDI attention has focused on analyzing the consequences of the capital outflow for the whole country economy. Special attention is paid to the job market, the impact on employment and productivity⁹. These aspects together with the predicted increase of Polish foreign investment should be the subject matter of further research. At the present stage however, it seems crucial to precisely identify the investment process itself, including the profile of the enterprises which become investors.

Recent studies concerning the internationalization of an enterprise seem to represent a compromising attitude and resort to eclectics in making use of various available theories depending on a widely understood context in which the process of the internationalization of a company takes place¹⁰. The foreign investment being the highest form of the process is so specific and idiosyncratic depending on the investor's country of origin, business environment, situation in a particular branch and the technological factors that it seems futile to search for a universal theory which would embrace all the elements, and which would be applicable in all cases¹¹.

⁷ *Promotion goes to economy*, "Rzeczpospolita" 23.02.2010.

⁸ To compare the Japanese Foreign Trade Organization JETRO has a yearly budget within the range of 1.2 billion PLN, in Great Britain the annual expenditure on promotion reaches 200 million pounds. "Rzeczpospolita" 23.02.2010.

⁹ P. Debaerea, H. Leeb, J. Leec, *It matters where you go: Outward foreign direct investment and multinational employment growth at home*, "Journal of Development Economics", Vol. 91, Issue 2, March 2010, s. 301-309; S. Federico, G. A. Minerva, *Outward FDI and Local Employment Growth in Italy*, Economic working papers 613, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department, 2007.

¹⁰ M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *Teorie internacjonalizacji [Theories of internationalization]*, "Gospodarka Narodowa" 10/2007, p. 41.

¹¹ „Outward FDI is so strongly teleological, firm-, country-, sector-, and environment specific that one can hardly expect to develop an all embracing general explanation applicable in all cases”.

It is assumed that the first stage of internationalizing a company is participation in foreign trade. The macroeconomic concepts described by M. Gorynia and R. Owczarzak explain the flow of exports and imports between countries. They include, among others, the concept of absolute advantage by A. Smith¹², the concept of comparative advantage by D. Ricardo¹³, or for that matter the theorem by Heckscher-Ohlin-Samulson¹⁴. The link between the pure theory of foreign trade and the theory of international production is provided by the (mezo-economic) concept of a product's life cycle by Vernon¹⁵. The concepts of international entrepreneurship are also in-between constructs between the above mentioned theories, and the FDI theories of a microeconomic character. The most popular one, the Uppsala model analyzes the sequences of the internalization of a company and *de facto* is a combination of earlier paradigms. It incorporates both, simple internationalization through trade as well as the complex ventures of direct investment¹⁶. As far as the in-between concepts are concerned the theoretical output is incredibly rich and it would be difficult to enumerate even a part of the various concepts. However, it is worth mentioning that they include both, very general paradigms, as for example the Investment Development Path (IDP)¹⁷ which assumes that countries (economies) undergo a five-stage evolution in which the consecutive stages are marked by the country's inclination to exports or imports of investment, and according to which at a certain stage of development the country becomes the provider of the capital. On the other hand, there are also very detailed models which take into account the characteristics of the present globalized economies and which emphasize the new tools, e.g., the Internet¹⁸.

1. Most likely the modest volume of FDI from Poland viewed against the background of international flow of capital should be related to the smaller scale of transnational corporations (TNC) originated in Poland, which are treated as vehicles

M. Svetličič, *Theoretical context of outward foreign direct investment from transition economies*, in: M. Svetličič, M. Rojec, *Facilitating transition by internationalization, Outward direct investment from Central European Economies in Transition*, Ashgate 2003, p.15.

¹² A. Smith, *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*, Warsaw, 1954.

¹³ D. Ricardo, *Principles of political economy and taxation*, Amherst, New York, 1996.

¹⁴ B. Ohlin, *Interregional and international trade*, Cambridge MA, 1933.

¹⁵ R. Vernon, *International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle*, "Quarterly Journal of Economics" Cambridge 1966.

¹⁶ J. Johanson, F. Wiedersheim-Paul, *The internationalization of the firm – Four Swedish cases*, http://www.iei.liu.se/program/ekprog/civilek_intern/ar_3/723g17/pwom_2008_filarkiv/1.104707/FourSwedishCases.pdf, date of access: 12.03.2011 and analysis by N. Kossut, F. Kaczmarek, *Internationalisation process of the firm Scania's case in Poland, Master Thesis - International Master's Programme in Business Administration - Strategy & Culture*, 2003/01, Avdelning, Institution Division, Department Ekonomiska Institutionen, Linköping, 20.01.2003.

¹⁷ J. Dunning, R. Narula, op.cit., p. 1-9.

¹⁸ S. Mathew, *Internationalization, The Internet influence on international market growth in the firm's outward internationalization process*, Queensland University of Technology, 2009, p. 193. The study showed a positive impact of the Internet and its tools including, Internet fora, discussion groups, e-business on the level of firm's internationalization, its international mindset, business relations, management and access to information.

for the distribution of capital. For this reason in order to study Polish FDI it seems justified to make reference not only to the classical FDI theories but also to the theories of international entrepreneurship. These two trends seem the most relevant to analyze Polish direct investment and Polish entrepreneurship in the EU.

Yet, it should be pointed out that the international publications concerning international entrepreneurship are in fact dominated by the perspective of well developed countries. As a result the object of analysis involves strategies and investment made by companies which come from countries with advanced technologies and which are addressed at less developed markets. At the other extreme, there is a handful of theories¹⁹ (in comparison to the above mentioned ones) which refer to the so-called ethnic economy, which in fact analyze opposite situations, that is initiatives taken by companies originating from less developed countries and directed at more affluent economies²⁰. Judged against the above mentioned theoretical background the functioning of Polish companies in the EU market (especially in the “15” old EU countries) looks rather atypical. The investment of Polish entities in the EU does not fit in within the classical models of capital flow from a well developed country to a poorly developed one, but on the other hand, they are certainly not exotic enough²¹ to be analyzed in the context of an ethnic economy²².

International Entrepreneurship (IE) defined as a “process of creative discovery and exploitation of opportunities which are located outside the domestic market of a company where it operates in pursuit of gaining a competitive advantage” does not exist as a separate and independent area of study²³. In consequence the IE issues are to a limited degree taken up by researchers interested in the internationalization of enterprises and international management. B.M. Oviatt and P.P. McDougall regarded as pioneers of IE define this concept as a combination of proactive, innovative behaviour which accepts risk-taking, which transcends countries’ borders and which is directed at creating value in organizations²⁴. In other words, international

¹⁹ Although in 2006 a report by UNCTAD was published under the title, „Direct foreign investment from developing economies undergoing transformation: implications for development”, it in fact concerned investment made by the BRIC countries (Brasil, Russia, India and China) in the raw material, energy sector.

²⁰ I. Ekeledo, *Internationalization of firms from emerging economies: entry mode strategies and research propositions*, “International Journal of Business Strategy” January 2008.

²¹ More about the similarities and numerous differences between FDI made by Corporation from the CEE countries and those from the „third world countries” such as the tempo of globalization changes, the number of small and medium companies, the role of ICT, low importance of ethnic ties, or a more defensive character, cf. M. Svetličič, *Slovenia Transition Economies’ Multinationals - Are They Different From Third World Multinationals?* in: Chakraborty, Chandana (ed.), *Proceedings of the 8th International conference on Global Business and Economic Development*, January 7-10, 2004, Guadalajara, Mexico 2004.

²² „You cannot be serious talking about outflows of capital when transition economies so badly need an inflow of FDI” –a comment made in 1996 quoted in: M. Svetličič, M. Rojec, op.cit, p. xxviii.

²³ T. Kraśnicka (ed.), *Przedsiębiorczość międzynarodowa Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne [International entrepreneurship. Theoretical and practical aspects]*, Katowice 2008.

²⁴ P.P. McDougall, B.M. Oviatt, *Some fundamental issues in international entrepreneurship*, “Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice” July 2003, p. 5.


entrepreneurship is a process of discovery, enactment, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities beyond national borders in order to create new goods and services²⁵.

According to S.A. Zahra and G. George, IE is a process of creative discovery and exploitation of opportunities perceived outside the internal (domestic) market of a given company which strives to achieve a competitive advantage²⁶. As it was observed by T. Krašnicka IE is a separate but still not solidified research domain in the process of crystallization. Consequently, it has not yet won full acceptance from researchers dealing with both entrepreneurship and internationalization at the crossroads of which it is emerging²⁷.

T. Hutzschenreuter, T. Pedersen and H. Volberda propose a co-evolutionary model of internationalization in which the process of internationalization is a result of the conjugated interaction between managerial intentions, learning in the sense of gaining experience and other institutional factors and forces of selection²⁸. The model suggests that processes of internationalization should take into account conscious, clearly defined aims, ambitions of the managerial staff, individually made decisions as factors determining the manner and the nature of making an investment. Thus, internationalization should not be treated only (mainly) in the sense of a reaction to the changes taking place within the so-called path dependence.

Graph 1

Model of internationalization according to T. Hutzschenreuter, T. Pedersen and H. Volberda



Source: after T. Hutzschenreuter, T. Pedersen and H. Volberda, *The role of path dependency and managerial intentionality: a perspective on international business research*, "Journal of International Business Studies", 2007, 38, p. 1057.

²⁵ T. Krašnicka (ed.), op.cit.

²⁶ S.A. Zahra, G. George, *International Entrepreneurship: The current status of the field and future research agenda* in: *Strategic Entrepreneurship Creating a new mindset*, M.A. Hitt (eds.), Oxford 2002, p. 259.

²⁷ T. Krašnicka (ed.), op.cit, p. 19.

²⁸ T. Hutzschenreuter, T. Pedersen, H. Volberda, *The role of path dependency and managerial intentionality: a perspective on international business research*, "Journal of International Business Studies" 2007, 38, 1055-1068.

The so-called Uppsala model (of stages in internationalization) was a milestone in research into the process of internationalization of an enterprise. It was put forward by researchers from the Scandinavian School of Management, J. Johanson and F. Wiedersheim-Paul²⁹. This approach assumes a sequence of steps which are taken mainly by small and medium size companies with an aversion to risk-taking in the process of expansion into foreign markets. The basic stages include: 1) lack of regular export activity, 2) exporting via the mediation of agents, 3) setting up a branch sale department, 4) starting own production abroad. In the Uppsala model foreign expansion is not *ex ante* the aim of the company but an effect of gradual decisions concerning close neighbouring markets³⁰. The model became an inspiration for many developments and modifications referring to the idea of the sequential nature of the internationalization process. The criticism of the model refers to the fact that it is too general and deterministic as it does not specify the borderlines between various stages of the process, assumes unidirectionality, and as a matter of fact it cannot be applied to services and does not account for the possibility of skipping some stages, the so-called leapfrogging³¹. This kind of criticism became a springboard for building a model of unconventional internationalization³². This approach formulates a more general view that international companies, especially large corporations, frequently skip some stages from the Uppsala model, and they additionally show a tendency to enter distant markets in the early stages of expansion. Another proposal of simultaneous internalization, which according to M. Gorynia is a variety of unconventional internationalization, assumes that the convergence of economies and the Californization of needs favour simultaneous expansion into many markets and leapfrogging some stages in the sequential model³³. A qualitatively new approach to the internationalization process is offered by the network approach in which a company is perceived as an element of a system of many actors mutually influencing one another, as a part of a network, which in turn is treated sometimes as a third possible form of coordination of an economy apart from hierarchy and market³⁴. The network approach incorporates various trends such as resource dependence theory³⁵, or the new

²⁹ J. Johanson, F. Wiedersheim-Paul, (1975), *op.cit.*, p. 305-322.

³⁰ The significance of the foreign expansion path of an enterprise is the knowledge and gained experience.

³¹ M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *op.cit.*, p. 29-30.

³² L.S. Welch, R. Loustarinen, *Internationalization, Evolution of a concept*, "Journal of General Management" 14 (2), 1988, in: M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

³³ S. Bridgewater, *The internationalization process and type of firms*, in: *International Business. Theories, policies and practices*, M. Tayeb (ed.), Pearson Education Harlow 2000 in: M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³⁴ D. Knoke, J.H. Kukliński, *Network analysis, basic concepts in markets, hierarchies and networks. The coordination of social life*. G. Thompson, J. Frances, R. Levacic, J. Mitchell, SAGE Publications, London, in: M. Gorynia, B. Jankowska, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³⁵ J. Pfeffer, G. Salancik, *The external control of organizations*, Harper and Row, New York, 1978.

institutional economy with the transaction cost theory³⁶ and it assumes that entering a new market requires establishing a network of relations in the market.

On the other hand in the REM model, internationalization is dependent on the following three factors: R – reason factor which defines the reason why a company makes a decision about internationalization, E – environment factor, determining where the company wants to implement internationalization, and the M - mode factor describing the manner of the internationalization of a company. These three factors influence one another and complement one another and are therefore treated not as independent variables but as dependent variables³⁷.

Foreign investment can be also viewed from the perspective of the so-called ethnic economy that is the part of an economy which is connected with the presence of immigrants. Research carried out by the German Institute of Urban Affairs in 2005 suggested that to fully describe this sector of economy a combination of three concepts should be used: the niche model (*das Nischenmodell*), the cultural model (*das Kulturmodell*) and the reaction model (*das Reaktionsmodell*)³⁸. The niche model refers to the first generation of immigrants and defines activities taken by them mainly in order to fulfill their own specific needs, and it does not compete with the rest of the German economy (*Ergänzungsökonomie*). The cultural model perceives the emergence of an ethnic economy as a result of such factors as tradition, roots, community from which the immigrants come from and their economic order. The reaction model treats ethnic economy as a reaction to the existing circumstances; the only way to get past the hurdles. This particular model seems to be the most appropriate to describe the activities of Polish entrepreneurs in Germany. However, it seems that the application of the ethnic economy concept as the framework for analyzing Polish FDI in the EU countries is not justified because of the scale and nature of Polish immigration. The fundamental distinguishing characteristics of an ethnic economy including strong family ties, trust and mutual support for the compatriots, frequent unwillingness of the local community, operating in a sector where there is need for intensive labour outlay and low capital expenditure, where the major organizational form is a small company or a micro-company, and especially the assumption that the social networks within the group and ethnic resources are indispensable for the functioning of the ethnic economy³⁹, as well as the acceptance of the sequence of employment

³⁶ O.E. Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics of international organization*, New York 1975.

³⁷ N. Daszkiewicz, *Internacjonalizacja małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw we współczesnej gospodarce [Internationalization of small and medium companies in contemporary economy]*, Gdańsk 2005.

³⁸ H. Floeting, B. Reimann, U.K. Schuleri-Hartje, *Expertise Ethnische Ökonomie: Integrationsfaktor und Integrationsmaßstab*, Berlin 2004, <http://middleeastmessenger.christina-schlegel.de/wp-content/uploads/ethnischeokonomie.pdf>, date of access: 20.11.2010.

³⁹ Cf. Idea of homophily - *birds of a feather flock together* – there is a very clear tendency among immigrants operating in Germany to form business groups, joint entrepreneurship despite the fact that such strong homogeneity of a group in terms of nationality does not correlate with good results of the company (homophily paradox). N. Fertala, *Determinants of successful immigrant entrepreneurship in*

from hired labour to self-employment⁴⁰, all these features do not seem to provide the best ramification to discuss Polish entrepreneurship in the EU.

In the literature devoted to the topic the theory of international production is also known as the OLI (ownership-localization-internalization)⁴¹ paradigm because of the presented set of conditions. It is used as the theoretical basis for analyzing the international expansion of TNC, or the FDI flow. J.H. Dunning distinguished three types of conditions which have to be met at the same time for FDI to occur: 1. The company must have some ownership advantage which would give it an advantage over the competitors in another country. 2. The transfer of the advantage possessed by the company abroad within its own organization is more profitable than its sale or lease to a foreign company, that is there are benefits from internalizing its activity (in the sense of reducing the cost by carrying out transactions within the company). 3. There must be a localization advantage which makes the company place their production in a particular country. Thus, according to the eclectic model by Dunning, Foreign Direct Investment is a function of three variables which decide about the investment: characteristic features of a given company, benefits from internalizing its economic activity and localization benefits. A certain modification of this model was proposed by M. Peng who suggested that Dunning's OLI paradigm should be extended by the so-called option for learning advantage that is benefits coming from learning⁴². The term "option for organizational learning and innovation" should be understood as an opportunity (which is created by investing abroad) to acquire knowledge in the country of location and carry out innovative activity. M. Peng argues that apart from the readiness to overcome imperfections of the market and making use of the possessed advantage FDI should be treated as an opportunity for learning, innovation and growth. Another improvement of the OLI model is also suggested by S. Guisinger⁴³. The OLMA paradigm replaces internationalization with the mode of entering a market (M - Mode of entry) and taking into account the adjustment of a company to the international environment (A - Adjustment) which allows for a holistic perception of the internationalization of companies.

the Federal Republic of Germany, Dissertation: Universität Tübingen, 04 Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2005, p 204-205.

⁴⁰ O. Wahlbeck, *Work in kebab economy: A study of the ethnic economy of Turkish immigrants in Finland*, "Ethnicities" 2007, 7, 543, p. 558.

⁴¹ J. H. Dunning, *The Determinants of International Production*, "Oxford Economics Papers" No 3, 1973.

⁴² M. Peng, *Foreign direct investment in the innovation-driven stage: Toward a learning option perspective* in: M. Green, R. McNaughton, *The location of foreign direct investment. Geographic and business approach*, Avebury Ashgate Publishing 1995, p. 29-42.

⁴³ S. Guisinger, *From OLI to OLMA incorporating higher levels of environmental and structural complexity into the eclectic paradigm*, "International Journal of the Economics of Business" vol. 8, no 2, 2001.

The transaction cost theory⁴⁴ provides conceptual ramification for the choice of the form of foreign expansion made by a company. The choice is subordinate to the minimization of the production and transaction cost. The latter include the cost of obtaining all kinds of information necessary for the functioning in the market environment, the cost of conducting negotiations with partners and the cost of complying with contracts. The existence of a positive transaction cost results from market inefficiency as a way of regulating a transaction. The available literature on the modes of entering a foreign market is incredibly rich⁴⁵. The following methods are distinguished: the *greenfield* type of investment, that is from scratch, is taken by companies which want to finance a completely new economic entity in the country of destination by building all the necessary facilities; acquisitions which involve purchasing an existing company in the country of destination by a foreign investor which is done by acquiring the controlling block of shares from the former owner; mergers which occur when two or more companies merge together, and joint-ventures which take place when the resources of two companies are joined and a new entity is therefore created with both companies sharing the ownership of the new entity and the profits brought by the company. Also the *brownfield* investment can be distinguished which is a specific kind of acquisition, when the investor initially purchases an already existing company and transforms it into an almost completely new entity.

INVESTMENT FROM THE COUNTRIES OF SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The theoretical discourse concerning the Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) indicates certain departures from the main trend (that is from classical FDI theories for highly developed countries) but these deviations are not significant enough to question the use of these theories to analyze the realities of transformational economies⁴⁶. Any occurring divergences should be first of all ascribed to the delay with which companies from these countries enter the process of globalization, the tempo of globalization and other aspects of the reality in which they function⁴⁷. The research into FDI from the countries of systemic transformation shows that the primary stimulus for the companies from that region to go for internationalization consisted of external pull factors rather than the possessed advantage or resources acting as factors pushing them out

⁴⁴ M. Gorynia (ed.), *Strategie firm polskich wobec ekspansji inwestorów zagranicznych [Strategies of Polish companies towards expansion of foreign investors]*, Poznań 2005, p. 28

⁴⁵ M. Gorynia (ed.), op.cit., p. 50.

⁴⁶ M. Svetličič, *Theoretical context of outward foreign direct investment from transition economies*, in: M. Svetličič, M. Rojec, *Facilitating transition by internationalization, Outward direct investment from Central European economies in transition*, Ashgate 2003, p.15 and M. Svetličič, *Slovenia Transition*, op.cit.

⁴⁷ M. Svetličič, *Theoretical context*, op.cit., p.15.

of the country (push factors)⁴⁸. The situation will be changing parallel to the development of these economies. It is already so in the case of investment made in more mature, more affluent markets. Companies should possess certain resources which make them competitive and attractive enough to invest in a more developed market. The resources model⁴⁹ or the evolutionary model⁵⁰ seems to be highly applicable here. The concept of searching for resources abroad is contradictory to both⁵¹. On the other hand the unconventional theory of imbalance which assumes that enterprises do not have certain assets but they want to acquire them in the process of foreign investment (and regain balance) is a combination of both above approaches⁵². What is significant, as the name itself suggests the unconventional theory of FDI imbalance, contrary to the pure resources searching theory, puts an emphasis on some kind of imbalance between the assets which the company possesses and those it is short of. Consequently, it takes into account both the strong and the weak points of the company looking at it holistically, through a set of elements which constantly affect one another. It analyzes relations between the elements without limiting the perception of the company only to the prism of its advantages or its weaknesses but it treats FDI as an attempt to regain balance by acquiring the missing resources.

The specificity of FDI from the CEE countries is brought to attention in analyses by E. Rugraff⁵³. The investment originating in the Czech Republic and Hungary is most often made by foreign investors already operating in those countries (the so-called indirect investment made by entities with the participation of foreign capital). In the case of Slovenia their national entities which aspire to the rank of transnational corporations decide to enter foreign markets. The investment from Poland is, on the other hand a result of activities undertaken by large enterprises, as a rule with state capital which represent strategic sectors such as the extraction or infrastructure sector. The specificity of FDI from the CEE countries stems from the fact that there is a small number of TNCs investing in the neighbouring countries which is responsible for the majority of the outward capital in the form of FDI.

⁴⁸ M. Svetličič, *Conclusions, Policy Suggestions and Future Perspective*, in: M. Svetličič, M. Rojec, op.cit, p. 244.

⁴⁹ E.T. Penrose, *The theory of the growth of the firm*, Oxford 1959.

⁵⁰ B. Kogut, U. Zander, *Knowledge of the firms and the evolutionary theory of multinational corporations*, "Journal of International Business Studies" 4th Quarter, 1993, p. 625-646; C.K. Prahalad, G. Hamer, *The core competence of the corporation*, HBR, May-June, 1990; J.A. Cantwell, *Technological innovation and multinational corporations*, Oxford 1989, J.A. Cantwell, *Transnational corporations and innovatory activities UN Library on Transnational Corporations*, London, New York, 1994.

⁵¹ A. Fosfuri, M. Motta, *Multinationals without advantages*, "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" vol. 101 (4), 1999, p. 617-630.

⁵² H.C. Moon, T.W. Roehl, *Unconventional foreign direct investment and the imbalance theory*, "International Business Review" Vol. 10, 2001, p.151-161.

⁵³ E. Rugraff, *Strengths and weaknesses of the outward FDI paths of the Central European countries*, "Post-Communist Economies" Vol. 22, Issue 1 March 2010, p. 1-17.

As far as the outward FDI is concerned, K. Kalotay includes Poland in the group of “Seven Dwarfs” together with Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, and their FDI is confronted with investment from the Russian Federation⁵⁴. This group of countries is, among others, characterized by the limited role of the state as a catalyst of changes creating favourable conditions for FDI made by regional companies. Such investment is generally concentrated only in the region, in the neighbouring countries and mostly motivated by the small size of the domestic market, which in fact makes the scale advantage impossible to achieve. Additionally, such FDI has a horizontal character, that is it is motivated by the aim of gaining access to foreign markets.

Generally, the specificity of FDI from the CEE countries results from the relatively significant role played by foreign investors and from substantial involvement of the service sector (banking, commerce). This differentiates the FDI flow from those carried out by companies from highly developed countries, as a rule located in the industrial sector to start with⁵⁵. The FDI from the CEE countries is also strongly influenced by all the globalization processes including accession to the EU⁵⁶.

On the other hand, the analyses by M. Gorynia, J. Nowak and R. Wolniak point out the idiosyncrasy of the investment development path (IDP) for particular countries and the impact of the external effects for the shaping of the net outward investment (NOI) position for the CEE countries⁵⁷. As it seems the financial-economic crisis of 2008-2009⁵⁸ speeded up the moment of transition to the consecutive stages of NOI for these countries. In this context it is worth mentioning that the opposite effect on the investment position of some countries was made by a seemingly positive impulse, namely accession to the EU (Portugal and Austria)⁵⁹. This situation in connection with the increased inflow of new investment had a disturbing effect on the relations between inward and outward FDI, and by the same token it delayed the transition of these economies to the successive stages of IDP. In other words, despite the fact that countries generally follow the path of IDP (especially small and medium-size ones, because in the case of large countries like, for example the

⁵⁴ K. Kalotay, The future of Russian outward foreign direct investment and the eclectic paradigm: What changes after the crisis of 2008–2009? http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1702829, p. 14.

⁵⁵ K. Kalotay, *Outward FDI from Central and Eastern European Countries*, “Economics of Planning” Vol. 37, No 2, p. 141-172, DOI: 10.1007/s10644-004-7506-z, p. 148, 151.

⁵⁶ M. Svetličič, op.cit., 2004.

⁵⁷ M. Gorynia, J. Nowak, R. Wolniak, *Foreign direct investment of Central and Eastern European countries, and the investment development path revisited*, “Eastern Journal of European Studies” Vol. 1, Issue 2, December 2010, p. 34.

⁵⁸ More about the possible impact of the crisis on FDI but mainly outflowing from Russia see K. Kalotay, *The future...*

⁵⁹ M. Gorynia, J. Nowak, R. Wolniak, op.cit., p.27.

Russian Federation the outward FDI can be explained by other factors, e.g., the oligarchic system, wealth concentration, or the willingness to shift capital) its precise course remains different for individual countries⁶⁰.

The low level of outward FDI from the CEE countries is caused by the disadvantaged status of “late investors” and the systemic transformation cost. Also, the shaping of the net position on the Investment Development Path (IDP) in these countries was affected by the EU enlargement in 2004, which gave a stimulus not only for the expansion of domestic companies but also for additional inward FDI⁶¹.

Sometimes in the literature devoted to FDI a term ‘middle income countries’ is used⁶². It describes economies located (in a figurative sense and sometimes in a geographically literal sense like in the case of Poland) between the highly developed, affluent and technologically advanced countries, and poorly developed countries with a cheap workforce. The necessity to treat companies from such countries in a different way stems from the fact that they do not possess a specific advantage, a well known brand or unique technology, and from relying on low production costs. Companies from such countries cannot compete, e.g. in terms of technology with firms from highly developed countries and in terms of costs with companies from poorly developed countries. Therefore designing further research into Polish FDI aimed at exploring and classifying them should take into account many from the above paradigms. In terms of theory, such research is in a way an attempt to answer a question to what extent these theories are useful when analyzing a relatively atypical phenomenon (investment from a less developed to a more developed country) but not entirely exotic (because of the various similarities between the EU countries and Poland), a kind of “atypical classic example”.

POLISH FOREIGN INVESTMENT

There is not a lot of research concerning Polish foreign investment⁶³. It includes: annual reports of the National Bank of Poland (NBP), the UNCTAD World Investment Reports, information from the Trade and Investment Promotion Department, as well as from the Economic Departments which function next to Polish diplomatic services abroad, and additionally from: press articles and the report of the Analyses and Forecasting Department of the Polish Ministry of Economy, e.g., “Polish direct investment 2006/2007” published in March 2008, or the still rare scientific analyses⁶⁴.

⁶⁰ K. Kalotay, *Outward FDI ...*, p. 152-153.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p.140.

⁶² A. Klimek, *The Determinants of Outward Foreign Direct Investment: the Case of Poland* Very preliminary (draft), July 2009, <http://etsg.org/ETSG2009/papers/klimek.pdf>, p. 3.


⁶³ E. Radomska, Head of Economics Department and a lecturer in the Institute of Economics and Management at Polish Open University (POU), <http://www.pou.pl/>, date of access: 10.11.2010.

⁶⁴ D. Rosati, W. Wiliński, *Outward Foreign Investments from Poland*, in: M. Svetličič, M. Rojec, *op.cit.*, p. 175-204; 244.

What is the position of Polish foreign investment? The Analyses and Forecasting Department in the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Poland conducted a comparative analysis on the basis of the UNCTAD data for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for the period from 1997 to 2007. With reference to the NOI index per capita, that is the net value of outward investment which constitutes the difference between the outward FDI and the inward FDI, these countries (including Poland) can be classified between the third and fourth stage of development. On the other hand, according to M. Gorynia, J. Nowak and R. Wolniak and the research they quote⁶⁵, Poland is at the final phase of the second stage and at the beginning of the third stage⁶⁶. This classification is also confirmed by the data from the NBP concerning the international position of Polish investment in the years 1994-2009.

Graph 2

The investment position of Poland measured with NOI per capita



Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the “NBP international investment position of Poland, 1994-2009 – annual data (USD, EUR & PLN)”.

⁶⁵ F. Boudier-Bensebaa, *FDI-Assisted Development in the Light of the Investment Development Path Paradigm: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries*, “Transnational Corporations” 2008, Vol. 17, No 1, p. 37-67, C. Kottardi, F. Filippaios, M. Papanastassiou, *The Investment Development Path and the Product Cycle – An Integrated Approach: Empirical Evidence from the New EU Member States of CEE*, “University of Reading Economics and Management Discussion Papers” 2004 No 003, Reading: University of Reading. after M. Gorynia, J. Nowak, R. Wolniak, op.cit., p. 23-25.

⁶⁶ M. Gorynia, J. Nowak, R. Wolniak, op.cit., p. 26.

UNCTAD, which is the major source of information about the condition and flow of direct foreign investment in the world, has for years published indices concerning real and potential FDI. They include the so-called FDI Performance Index of real FDI and the FDI Potential Index concerning potential FDI⁶⁷. The index of real foreign direct investment is calculated as a relation between the participation of a country in the international FDI and its share in the world GDP. The index value higher than 1 shows that the country receives or sends out more FDI than it is expected judging by its economic position. The FDI Potential Index includes a wide range of factors which affect attractiveness such as, the value of GDP, expenditure on Research and Development, the ratio of students in the general population, etc. According to the available data (lack of information about the index value) with respect to the real inward FDI (2005-2007) Poland was ranked 60 in the analyzed group of 141 countries, and with respect to the potential FDI index it was ranked 43. With respect to outward FDI it was ranked 38.

Another index of participation in the international flow of capital used by UNCTAD is the number of transnational corporations from a particular country. According to UNCTAD 2000 the list of top 25 non-financial TNCs based in CEE included only one company from Poland, KGHM Polska Miedź ranked 22. The Network Spread Index also remains quite low, and it correlates to the number of countries in which the company is present with the number of countries potentially open to inward FDI (for Poland it is 1.82)⁶⁸. Other calculations, the so-called outward FDI performance index (OFDIPI) point to the country's potential concerning outward FDI, and indirectly to the possibility of the transition to further stages of NOI as it is assumed in J.H. Dunning's model⁶⁹. The value smaller than one means a weaker participation in supplying capital (the correlation between the GDP of the country and the world GDP) in the form of FDI (the correlation between the country's outward FDI and the world outward FDI) than it would be expected judging by the participation of the country in the world economy. For Poland in the years 1990-2008 the index assumed values within the range of 0.02-0.536. Beginning with 2005 when it reached a maximum level, it has been dropping and it reached 0.222 in 2008⁷⁰.

According to UNCTAD figures Polish direct foreign investment worth 3,120 million Euro in 2007 constituted 0.35% of the world capital flow in foreign investment. This ranked Poland at 44. However, in terms of cumulative value it was ranked 43 (about 19,500 million Euro). In the ranking of the EU countries Poland holds 16th position as far as the cumulative value of Polish capital invested

⁶⁷ *World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge*, UNCTAD, Geneva 2008.

⁶⁸ K. Kalotay, *Outward* ..., p.158-159.

⁶⁹ M. Gorynia, J. Nowak, R. Wolniak, op.cit. p. 32.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

abroad is concerned⁷¹. In 2005 the value of Polish foreign investment constituted as little as 33% of inward FDI, in 2006 this correlation was improved and reached 46.9%⁷².

For many years the Polish FDI was on the verge of a measurement error. In 2004 it reached a decent value of 624 million Euro⁷³. According to experts, companies had to reach the maturity level for foreign investment. To start with small companies merged with small companies and medium-size ones with medium-size ones. Then large companies emerged on a national scale and they started to think about becoming a large company on a regional scale. This kind of strategy became very clear after accession to the EU.

According to some opinions the small participation of Polish investment in outward investment from the region of Central and Eastern Europe is in particular clearly visible when we correlate it with other indices such as the participation of Polish GDP in the GDP of the region, or the share of inward foreign investment coming to Poland against the backdrop of inward investment coming to the entire region⁷⁴. This is most likely determined by the size of the country. Namely, the substantial size of the internal market did not provide a stimulus for expanding business activity outside its area. Other barriers are most likely connected also with the low level of national reserves (“hunger for capital”) and high attractiveness for the inflow of foreign capital, which meant that Poland was a receiver of FDI rather than a supplier. Such a situation seems to reflect the predictions of the model of developmental stages by Ozawa⁷⁵ and can be explained by the theory of conditionings⁷⁶.

In 2009 the world value of FDI dropped by 40% in comparison with 2008 and it amounted to ca. 1 billion dollars. The drop was mainly caused by a drastic decrease of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by 2/3 and a drop in greenfield projects

⁷¹ L. Pałys (ed.), *Polskie inwestycje zagranicą [Polish foreign investment]*, Instytut Badań Rynku, Konsumpcji i Konkurencji, Studia i Materiały 87, Warszawa 2009, p. 10.

⁷² J. Wyszowska-Kuna, *Foreign Direct Investment in the Service Sector - Flowing from Poland and into Poland - in Light of Poland's Accession to the European Union*, “Comparative Economic Research” Vol. 11, No 4/2008, University of Łódź, p. 41.

⁷³ *Polskie firmy zaczynają ekspansję zagraniczną [Polish companies start expansion abroad]*, “Gazeta” 11.10.2006.

⁷⁴ D. Rosati, W. Wiliński, op.cit., p. 200.

⁷⁵ The paradigm assumes that the growth of an economy in the process of evolution is based on different factors in consecutive stages, starting with raw materials and traditional production factors, through a stage directed by investment, the stage of innovation until the stage when the development depends on the level of affluence. T. Ozawa, *Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development*, “Transnational Corporations” 1992, Vol. 1, p. 27-54.

⁷⁶ The model assumes that the internationalization of a company depends on domestic determinants including economic policy and the structure of industry. It can be assumed that lack of public incentives and absorbent internal market did not stimulate investment made by Polish companies in foreign markets. P.R. Lawrence, J.W. Losh, *Organization and Environment*, Harvard Graduate School of Business, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967; P.W. Turnbull, *A challenge to the stages theory of the internationalization process*, in: P.J. Rosson, S.D. Reed (eds.) *Managing export entry and expansion*, New York 1987, p. 21-40.

by 23%⁷⁷. The world economic crisis discouraged Polish companies from investing abroad⁷⁸. At the same time, however, experts are emphatic that this is the best moment to start a business in foreign markets⁷⁹. According to a report by Grant Thornton International (GTI) out of 36 countries which were investigated the ambition to acquire another company is in Poland incomparable to any other country⁸⁰. It seems that the crisis is encouraging Polish companies into aggressive expansion. As many as 2/3 of the researched companies are planning to take over another company in the next three years. Although in the majority of cases this involves companies in Poland, 48% of the respondents also take into account foreign markets. The primary aim is to find new markets (60% of declarations), gain access to new technologies and attractive brands (53% of responses), or to expand the scale of the conducted activity (19%). According to the report by KPMG and PAIIZ from April 2010 the foreign expansion of Polish firms is growing⁸¹. Since 1994 Polish companies have invested 76 billion PLN in foreign markets. Almost 40% of the income of Polish producers comes from abroad. Over 90% of the largest Polish companies are present in foreign markets. In the last five years the value of the FDI of Polish companies has risen more than six times. The breakthrough moment was in 2004 when Poland joined the European Union. Before that date the average annual value of Polish FDI was ca. 86.7 million Euro, after 2004 it was over 3 billion Euro. Research done by KPMG and PAIIZ shows that as many as 88% of all the companies present in foreign markets export their products, 55% cooperate with foreign partners, and 23% have their branches abroad. Export is usually the first stage of expansion. Only 18% of company owners decide to invest in their own production branches. According to the studies by KPMG and PAIIZ the preferred region for expansion is Western Europe (88%), then Central Europe and the Balkans (71%) and Eastern Europe (61%). The highest percentage of business entities operate in the German market (75%) followed by the Czech and Ukrainian market. As experts from KPMG and PAIIZ underline, reforms in the Polish economy started 20 years ago, but the expansion of Polish companies abroad started only 5-6 years ago. According to the NBP data cumulative Polish foreign investment in the years 1994-2009 reached as much as 26.1 billion dollars that is about 77 billion PLN. According to the recent NBP report Polish foreign investment in 2009 reached the level of ca. 3.8 billion Euro (with the value of inward FDI equal to 7.5 billion Euro)⁸².

⁷⁷ *Auslandsinvestitionen erholen sich wieder*, "Wirtschaftswoche" 20.01.2010.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Stabnie ekspansja polskich firm [Expansion of Polish firms on the decrease]*, "Rzeczpospolita" 15.02.2010.

⁷⁹ *Zagranica kusi wyprzedzami [Tempting with sales abroad]*, "Puls Biznesu" 14.01.2010.

⁸⁰ *Duży apetyt firm nad Wisłą [Big appetite of Polish companies]*, PAP, 2010-02-26.

⁸¹ From press coverage: "Rzeczpospolita", "Dziennik Forsal", "Gazeta Wyborcza" 01.04.2010. KPMG Consulting Agency and Polish Agency for Information and Foreign Investment randomly chose and analyzed 112 out of a thousand companies with the majority of Polish capital.

⁸² National Bank of Poland, Department of Statistics, *Polish foreign direct investment in 2009*, Statistical Supplement, Warsaw, September 2010.

When analyzing Polish FDI it seems purposeful to quote the results of the research carried out in 2006 by the Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research (in Polish abbreviated as IBRKiK) from Warsaw commissioned by a commercial insurance company, Korporacja Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych and carried out on a group of investors and potential investors⁸³. It is also in order to refer to the possibly first in Poland comprehensive analysis of outward FDI outgoing from Poland which was carried out by a research team from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń in 2007⁸⁴. In the first case, the study included 40 firms (10 investors and 30 potential investors) with the majority of Polish capital from the top of the ranking list (e.g., the 500 largest companies in Poland)⁸⁵. The majority of firms were large companies, that is employing over 249 people. The study confirmed a positive correlation known from earlier analyses between such elements as: the size of the company, its financial situation, or exporting experiences and participating in FDI. The factors deciding about making FDI included: prospective market, earlier exports to a given country, or low cost. To a lesser extent the decisive factors included personal contacts, or the possibility of cooperation with foreign entities. Such an important role attached to the factors referring to the past (exporting experience) and to the future (market prospects) implies that Polish entrepreneurs make an impression of being as if “suspended” between what was and what will be. The real factors in the real time of “here and now” (*hic et nunc*) seem to matter less. The decision to make FDI is also influenced by the assessment of investment barriers. In the analysis carried out by IBRKiK over 50% of respondents pointed to insufficient financial resources and lack of knowledge about conditions in the given market. Substantial competition was listed by 1/3, while 1/4 of the respondents mentioned the lack of an insurance system offered by Polish insurance companies, and 1/5 pointed to bureaucracy and an unstable political situation. In the future the company owners are mostly afraid of a change in the legal regulations, and they fear unfair competition from other companies the least. A clear tendency to start with investing in markets located in close vicinity, and a later expansion into further markets confirms earlier observations made by foreign studies⁸⁶. Future investors expect to increase the scale of their activity as a result of making FDI, whereas they attach not much importance to the possibility of improving their work efficiency and increasing innovation. The majority of the potential investors in the study expected help from Polish state institutions⁸⁷. It was to be demonstrated first

⁸³ W. Karpińska-Mizelińska, T. Smuga, op.cit., p. 31.

⁸⁴ W. Karaszewski, (ed.), *Bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne polskich przedsiębiorców [Foreign direct investment by Polish entrepreneurs]*, Toruń 2008.

⁸⁵ Research showed that companies with domestic capital lower than 100%, mainly companies with participation of foreign capital which were created as a result of earlier FDI (indirect investor) show a higher tendency to undergo internationalization. M. Svetličič, *Conclusions...* op.cit., p. 201.

⁸⁶ W. Karpińska-Mizelińska, T. Smuga, op.cit., p. 41.

⁸⁷ Already a few years ago attention was drawn to the need for quick and concrete actions taken within the economic policy. Due to the tempo of globalization processes and the extent of economic

of all by “creating a favourable climate for investment by maintaining good political relations”, by “public help, that is direct financial support”, as well as by supplying information about the investment conditions in a given country”. The most frequent form of investment was establishing a branch (40%), building a branch (30%), less frequently it involved a decision about buying shares (20%) or joint ventures with a foreign partner (10%)⁸⁸. As it was pointed out by the IBRKiK experts a significant dispersion of the respondents’ opinions suggests that decisions about investment were of a very individual nature. The investors considered insufficient support from the Polish economic policy (50%) and insufficient own financial resources (40%) as the most important barriers encountered during the investment process. However, none of the respondents included a lack of incentives (facilitation) on the part of the receiving country, or large competition as a barrier for such investment. It appears that the expectations of investors and potential investors are directed at state authorities and institutions, whereas there are no demands or even expectations towards the receiving country; “a decisive importance was attached to barriers coming from Polish economic policy and then from the company’s capacity (lack of capital and the know-how), while less importance was attached to the conditions present in the market of the receiving country”. According to the Institute for Internal Market and Consumption, the process of the internationalization of Polish enterprises is at the very initial stage of development⁸⁹.

The analyses carried out by the Nicolaus Copernicus University involved 102 companies which made investment abroad. The largest group of companies under study (64%) included enterprises which made the greenfield type of investment. Only 17% pointed to acquisition as a way of entering a foreign market. Another dominant group of entities (63%) included companies which operated by a subordinate branch or company, and only 22% participated in joint ventures⁹⁰. The major direction of foreign expansion in the form of FDI includes the EU countries (60% of the investment). Out of this 60% is involved in the 15 old EU countries and 40% in the 12 new EU member states⁹¹. The main reasons behind FDI included market and cost factors, the scale benefit. The responses of the companies show some inconsistency. On the one hand, for one third of the respondents making an investment decision was aimed at reducing the risk in the domestic market by diversification, on the other hand however, one third of the respondents admitted that they did not estimate the risk of the project because of the lack of need and competences.

transformation, and after years of neglect, entrepreneurs from transformational countries do not have time for gradual restoration of potential and development of competition advantage therefore support from the state is very much in order. M. Svetličič, *Conclusions*, op.cit.

⁸⁸ W. Karpińska-Mizielińska, T. Smuga, op.cit., p. 43.

⁸⁹ E. Maleszyk, *Internacjonalizacja polskich przedsiębiorstw handlowych [Internationalization of Polish trade companies]*, “Gospodarka Narodowa” 9/ 2007, p. 96.

⁹⁰ Results showed that this form of investment corresponds with low level of met expectations. Karaszewski, (ed.), op.cit., p. 342.

⁹¹ Ibidem, p. 23.

The hypothesis concerning the positive influence of allocating capital abroad on the competitiveness of Polish investors was positively verified. The companies themselves competed mainly thanks to the high quality of provided services and goods. The “Polish origin of the capital” proved to have a positive influence on the image of the company and it positively affected its development in the foreign market (confirmation of the hypothesis that a significant impact on the development of companies with Polish capital abroad is made by transferable resources within the “investment packages” from parent companies)⁹². The study, “Success factors for Polish enterprises in the European Union markets” published by the Warsaw School of Economics demonstrated that successful companies as a rule make use of the cost advantage in comparison with western entities, as well as of their relations with the buyers, advantage of time, reputation and quality⁹³. The results also show that the so-called key competences including developed technologies and skills are a source of competition advantage for 30% of Polish companies operating in the EU markets. These competences are of a systemic nature of certain clusters combining possessed resources, relations with the outside environment (outstanding skills), competences (technologies and the know-how) and capacities (e.g., learning, management)⁹⁴. All of these allow for long-lasting advantages due to the possibility of achieving a certain sequence of short-lasting advantages⁹⁵, which suggests that they are flexible and adaptable to the changing and dynamic market conditions.

The central bank (NBP) predicts that in 2011 the inward FDI will increase to ca. 12.7 billion Euro, whereas the Polish outward FDI will reach ca. 2.1 billion Euro in comparison with 2.5 billion for 2010⁹⁶. According to the analyses presented by the consulting services, Akademia Rozwoju Systemów Sieciowych the number of foreign shops under the signboards of Polish brands will increase. The annual tempo of changes might reach 15-20%⁹⁷. The major incentive towards expansion in the form of franchising includes mainly success achieved in the country. At present over 40 national franchising networks have been developing abroad.

According to the report published by the end of March 2011 by the Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research and by the New York Columbia University, Polish foreign investment has been only slightly affected by the crisis⁹⁸. There was a drop from the level of 5.5 billion dollars in 2007 to about 4.5 billion in 2008 and an increase to the level of over 5 billion dollars in 2009. The consequences of the crisis for the world economy mostly affected the metal and motoring indus-

⁹² Ibidem, p. 348.

⁹³ Z. Pierścionek, S. Jurek-Stępień, *Czynniki sukcesu polskich przedsiębiorstw na rynkach Unii Europejskiej [Success factors for Polish enterprises in the European Union markets]*, Warsaw 2006.

⁹⁴ Ibidem, p.10.

⁹⁵ Ibidem, p. 18.

⁹⁶ NBP : FDI in 2011 will amount to 12.7 billion Euro, “Forsal” 26.11.2010 .

⁹⁷ *Polish brands conquer Europe*, after “DGP” and “Rzeczpospolita” 15.11.2010.

⁹⁸ *Orlen the largest foreign investor*, “Rzeczpospolita” 31.03.2011.

tries, whereas the chemical and petrochemical industries noted a kind of boom, and the highest growth was felt by the producers of food, drinks and companies providing business services. The ranking of Polish firms with the largest assets abroad is led by the fuel extraction companies, PKN Orlen and PGNiG⁹⁹.

CONCLUSIONS

Due to the small scale of direct investment made by Polish enterprises abroad this issue has not been a subject of special attention in the economic literature¹⁰⁰. However, together with the developing participation of Poland in the globalization processes it should be expected that the volume of such investment will increase. Nevertheless, the opinions that Poland in the near future will become an exporter of the net capital in the form of FDI seem premature. This conclusion stems from the fact that: the interest of foreign investors in locating their capital in Poland remains high, the level of competitiveness of the majority of Polish companies is still low, the incentives to make FDI are insufficient (both in the target countries of the investment as well as on the part of the Polish government, e.g., via the guarantees and insurance of credits allocated for such investment). Three stages can be distinguished in the policy supporting FDI among the national business entities¹⁰¹. The first stage includes activities connected with the liberalization of capital flow; the second stage involves passive promotion concerning making agreements about avoiding double taxation and signing agreements concerning the mutual protection of investments. When it comes to the third stage involving active promotion which includes grants, subsidies, support for foreign expansion and the functioning of a promotion agency, it seems that Poland has barely entered this stage.

According to predictions Polish companies have increased their tendency to make direct investment mainly in well developed countries¹⁰². In 2006 European countries received 97.2% of all Polish foreign investment. It is difficult to regard Polish entrepreneurship in the EU countries, especially in the countries of the “old” EU, as unique or peculiar. At the same time however, it does not fit in with the classical paradigm of investment flowing from a “better developed” to a “less developed” country. On the one hand, there is relatively a lot of similarity between the economies of EU members. On the other hand the specificity of the situation stems from the fact that the capital comes from a country where it is a rarer factor which stands

⁹⁹ The ranking included 19 companies which in 2009 possessed assets abroad worth over 10 billion dollars and their income from foreign sale amounted to 17 billion dollars. They had altogether 275 foreign branches in 50 countries where they employed nearly 14,000 people. As many as 18 of these companies have their shares quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and two companies are also quoted on a Stock Exchange abroad.

¹⁰⁰ W. Karpńska-Mizielińska, T. Smuga, op.cit., p. 31-52; W. Karaszewski, (ed.), op.cit, p. 9.

¹⁰¹ K. Kalotay, *Outward*, op.cit. , p.166.

¹⁰² W. Karaszewski, (ed.), op.cit., p. 340.

in opposition to the traditional conception of capital flow. As far as Polish direct investment is concerned there is a need for further research. The research should, among others, serve the purpose of identifying, describing and classifying the behaviour and strategies of Polish enterprises in the EU by making references to the existing theoretical paradigms which were discussed in the present article¹⁰³. Also it should establish certain regularities occurring in this scope, and in its further part it should formulate some recommendations addressed to the actors engaged in the process: politicians, local decision-makers and the investors themselves.

¹⁰³ Cf. the proposal pointing to the need to work within the framework of International Business (IB) to develop classification and typology. R. Aggarwal, J. Berrill, E. Hutson, C. Kearney, *What is a multinational corporation? Classifying the degree of firm-level multinationality*, "International Business Review", "In Press", Corrected Proof, available online 17 December 2010, date of access: 02.03.2011.